Latest 3 Cases This Week: Louisiana v. Covington (La.), State v. Gideon (Ohio), Begg v. Alexander-Scott (R.I.)

Joe, Joey, Joe-Baby, Sexist: Where’s Your Imposter Syndrome?

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman responds to a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed criticizing soon-to-be First Lady Jill Biden for using the academic title she earned. Professor Grossman dissects the op-ed, penned by a retired lecturer at Northwestern University, and explains the deep and pervasive sexism behind it.

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Louisiana v. Covington

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2020-KK-00447

Opinion Date: December 11, 2020

Judge: Jefferson D. Hughes, III

Areas of Law: Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In consolidated cases, Michael Mitchell, Chief Indigent Defender for the Office of Public Defender for East Baton Rouge Parish, filed a “Motion to Withdraw from Current Appointments and to Decline Future Appointments” in 2018 in each of these Nineteenth Judicial District Court (“19th JDC”), Section VI cases. Mitchell alleged that long term chronic underfunding of the public defender’s office had necessitated the implementation of “service restriction protocols,” pursuant to La. Administrative Code, Title 22, Section 1701 et seq., and led to the elimination of a number of attorney and support staff positions. Mitchell asserted that the consequent increase in the workloads of the remaining attorneys could potentially create conflicts of interest, as counsel might have to allot more time to one case over another, and could potentially cause ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. In response (which were confined to 19th JDC, Section VI cases), the State filed motions for dismissal of the motions for withdrawal and Daubert objections to expert testimony relative to the La. Project since it was based on the “Delphi Method,” contending, inter alia, that the Delphi Method produced unreliable generalized conclusions about the Louisiana public defender system and, further, that Louisiana v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993), required individualized findings as to whether there has been ineffective assistance of counsel in each specific case. The district court ruled in favor of the State, implicitly finding that any remedy related to chronic underfunding of the public defender system was within the exclusive purview of the Louisiana Legislature and was outside the parameters of what the court had the authority to fashion; however, the court stated that it would consider any individual motions to withdraw from, or to decline, representation on a case-by-case basis. Thereafter, the appellate court granted the district public defender’s writ application, in part, to reverse the district court’s denial of the motions to withdraw, to vacate the district court orders appointing the public defender in the remaining ongoing consolidated cases, and to grant the request to allow the named public defenders to withdraw from future representation of indigent defendants “until the caseloads are no greater than 100% of his or her annual capacity.” The Louisiana Supreme Court found the appellate court's conclusion was reached without evidence of the specific factual details surrounding the work performance of the individual assistant public defenders: "the question of whether assistance of counsel has been constitutionally ineffective cannot be answered without a detailed examination of the specific facts and circumstances of the representation provided by counsel to the individual defendant. Therefore, the appellate court erred in reversing the district court and ruling in favor of Mr. Mitchell." The district court's rulings were reinstated.

State v. Gideon

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-5635

Opinion Date: December 15, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that statements made by a medical doctor during a medical board investigation were inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution of that doctor, holding that the trial court properly admitted incriminating answers given by the doctor during the investigation. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) a medical license is a property right, and the threatened loss of the license is a form of coercion that can compromise the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) in order for coercion to be sufficient to warrant the suppression of statements made during a medical board investigative review, the coercion must be both subjectively believed and objectively reasonable; and (3) competent, credible evidence supported the trial court's factual finding that the doctor did not objectively believe that a refusal truthfully to answer questions posed by the medical board investigator could lead to the loss of the doctor's medical license.

Begg v. Alexander-Scott

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-155

Opinion Date: December 10, 2020

Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Appellant's administrative appeal from a decision of the Rhode Island Department of Health (DOH) in favor of the DOH director, Board of Examiners in Dentistry of the DOH, and the DOH, holding that the trial justice did not err. The Board imposed sanctions upon Appellant John F. Begg, D.D.S. for violations of R.I. Gen. Laws 5-31.1-10(19), (23), and (24) and sections 25.1.1, 27.1(s), 27.1(x), and 27.1(w) of DOH's rules and regulations pertaining to dentists, dental hygienists, and dental assistants. The trial justice affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOH had subject matter jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings; (2) the Board did not utilize the subpoena power provided to it by R.I. Gen. Laws 5-31.1-4 and 5-31.1-14 in its request for patient healthcare information, nor was it required to do so; and (3) legally competent evidence existed to support the sanctions imposed by the Board.