A Constitutional Commitment to Access to Literacy: Bridging the Chasm Between Negative and Positive Rights

EVAN CAMINKER

Michigan Law dean emeritus Evan Caminker discusses a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in which that court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause secures schoolchildren a fundamental right to a “basic minimum education” that “can plausibly impart literacy.” Caminker—one of the co-counsel for the plaintiffs in that case—explains why the decision is so remarkable and why the supposed dichotomy between positive and negative rights is not as stark as canonically claimed.

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Turubchuk v. Southern Illinois Asphalt Co., Inc.

Docket: 18-3507

Opinion Date: April 29, 2020

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

In 2005, a van containing six family members van slipped off the edge of an Illinois roadway. In the ensuing rollover crash, everyone was hurt; one passenger died. The crash occurred in a construction zone; a guardrail had been removed and not replaced. All lines had not been repainted on the repaved road, and pieces of asphalt lay on the shoulder. In a suit against the construction companies, the defense attorney told the plaintiffs that the two companies were operating as a joint venture with a $1 million liability insurance policy. The parties settled for $1 million. Plaintiffs signed a release of all claims that stated the plaintiffs agreed they were not relying on any statements by any parties’ attorneys. Four years later, the plaintiffs discovered that the companies carried separate liability policies. The district court ruled as a matter of law that the failure to identify the individual policies violated FRCP 26; that the undisclosed policies would have covered plaintiffs’ claims; and no joint venture agreement existed under Illinois law, so joint venture exclusions in the individual policies were inapplicable. A jury awarded damages of $8,169,512.84 for negligent misrepresentation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court erred in allowing plaintiffs to rely on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for a duty of care; in deciding, before trial, that plaintiffs reasonably relied on the insurance disclosures; and in excluding the defense’s expert testimony on liability and settlement value.

Siler v. City of Kenosha

Docket: 19-1855

Opinion Date: April 29, 2020

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Kenosha Officer Torres, on patrol, received a call requesting assistance apprehending Siler. The dispatcher stated that Siler was wanted on a warrant for strangulation and suffocation, had taken a vehicle without consent, and was known to have violent tendencies. Siler did not actually have a warrant for strangulation and suffocation; he was wanted for violating probation. When Torres spotted Siler, he activated his lights and siren. Siler did not stop, resulting in a three-minute chase. Siler crashed his car and fled on foot. Torres followed him to an auto body shop. Bystanders indicated that Siler was in the back room. Siler again attempted to flee. Torres blocked the exit. Within seconds Torres and Siler were on opposite sides of an SUV and began to move in “cat and mouse” fashion. Torres pointed his service revolver at Siler, ordering him to the ground. Siler responded, “fuck you” and “shoot me.” Siler bent over and, when he stood up, Torres saw a black cylindrical object pressed against Siler’s forearm. Torres yelled “drop it.” Siler responded, “fuck you,” “no,” and “shoot me.” Torres still could not see Siler’s hands. Eventually, Torres fired his gun seven times successively. Siler died from gunshot wounds. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by Siler’s estate, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Torres, citing qualified immunity. Torres’s action conformed to constitutional standards.

Stop Illinois Health Care Fraud, LLC v. Sayeed

Docket: 19-2635

Opinion Date: April 29, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Government Contracts, Health Law

HCI, on behalf of the Illinois Department of Aging, coordinates services for low-income seniors in an effort to keep them at home. HCI sometimes referred clients who needed in-home healthcare services to home healthcare companies owned by MPI. Qui tam claims against MPI, its home healthcare companies, and HCI, alleged that they orchestrated an illegal patient referral scheme that violated the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(g), and, by extension, the state and federal False Claims Acts, 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(1). The district court entered judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The evidence showed that MPI made monthly payments to HCI in return for access to the non-profit’s client records and used that information to solicit clients. The Anti-Kickback Statute definition of a referral is broad, encapsulating both direct and indirect means of connecting a patient with a provider. It goes beyond explicit recommendations; the inquiry is a practical one that focuses on substance, not form. The plaintiff’s theory was that MPI’s payments to HCI under the Management Services Agreement constituted kickbacks intended to obtain referrals in the form of receiving access to the HCI files that the defendants then exploited to solicit clients. A factfinder applying an erroneously narrow understanding of "referral "might find those facts, devoid of an explicit direction of a patient to a provider, to fall outside its scope.