The Oprah Interview as a Truth Commission

LESLEY WEXLER

Illinois Law professor Lesley Wexler explains how Oprah’s interview with Prince Harry and Meghan Markle might illuminate how a formal truth commission to deal with legacies of racism and colonialism might function in the British empire. Professor Wexler describes the purpose and function of state-operated truth commissions and notes the similarities and differences between those and the interview.

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Lucaj v. Wilkinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 20-1566

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Boudin

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's request to reopen removal proceedings based on changed country circumstances, holding that the BIA's failure to assess whether certain changes were sufficient was arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner, a native and citizen of Albania, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he and his family had been persecuted due to Petitioner's support of the Democratic Party in Albania and that the family had a well-founded fear of future persecution. An immigration judge denied relief, and the BIA affirmed. Petitioner later asked the BIA to reopen his case on the ground that government corruption had deteriorated in Albania. The BIA denied the request. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA "exercised its judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or irrational manner."

DeSuze v. Ammon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-1141

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: William J. Nardini

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In 2018 plaintiffs, the former and current tenants of a privately owned affordable housing project, filed suit challenging the regulatory approval of rent increases a decade earlier by HUD and the New York HPD. The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The Second Circuit held that the tenants lack standing for their procedural violation claim against HUD under the Administrative Procedure Act based on the sequence of regulatory approval because the order of the approval process was not designed to protect the tenants' concrete interests in notice and participation; all of the tenants' APA claims are in any event untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) because they accrued in April 2011, which is more than six years before they filed their complaint; Section 2401(a) is a claims-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar, but the tenants are not entitled to equitable tolling; and the tenants' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and its housing authority are untimely and the continuing violation doctrine does not save those claims because each arises from a discrete approval process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Sierra Club

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-1971

Opinion Date: March 11, 2021

Judge: Roger L. Gregory

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Fourth Circuit granted MVP's petition for review challenging the Department's denial of MVP's Clean Water Act certification. MVP seeks to build a natural gas pipeline running through North Carolina and its rivers, streams, and wetlands. The court held that the Department's denial is consistent with the State’s regulations and the Clean Water Act. The court explained that it need not decide which version of the certification regulation to consider because, under the current version of the regulation, the Department's minimization reasoning is consistent with its water quality standards: namely, its riparian buffer rules. Furthermore, the Department properly denied certification, as it found that the temporal adjustment constituted a practical alternative that would better minimize harm to the State's waters. However, the court held that the Department did not adequately explain its decision in light of the administrative record. While the Department's decision adequately explained its concerns with the Mainline Project and the adverse effects of the Southgate Project, the court concluded that it failed to address the hearing officer's minimization findings and explain why it chose to deny certification rather than granting it conditionally. Accordingly, the court vacated the denial and remanded for additional agency explanation. The court remanded for further proceedings.

National Veterans Legal Services Program v. Department of Defense

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-1435

Opinion Date: March 11, 2021

Judge: Niemeyer

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

Various statutory provisions and regulations require the DOD to maintain a publicly accessible website containing all decisions rendered by its Discharge Review Boards and Boards for Correction of Military/Naval Records. When the DOD was alerted in 2019 that some posted decisions contained personally identifiable information, it temporarily removed all decisions from the website. Since then, the DOD has slowly been redacting and restoring the decisions to the site. NVLSP filed suit against the DOD and the Secretaries of the military departments to require them to fulfill the statutory mandate of publishing all decisions and to do so promptly. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that NVLSP lacked Article III standing to bring the action and that the DoD's conduct was not judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that although NVLSP has standing to bring this action, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In this case, NVLSP challenges defendants' ongoing actions in maintaining and managing the website, not any final agency action understood as a discrete agency determination of rights and obligations, as necessary to give a court subject matter jurisdiction under the APA.

Sierra Club v. Department of Interior

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-60299

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Carolyn Dineen King

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Fifth Circuit denied petitions for review of the Service's incidental take statement and biological opinion in connection with the construction and operation of a liquefied natural gas terminal in south Texas (the Rio Grande project). The court held that the Service complied with its obligations under the Endangered Species Act in authorizing the harm or harassment of one ocelot or jaguarundi and in determining that the proposed project was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of either cat. In this case, the incidental take statement is not arbitrary and capricious because it clearly specifies the anticipated take and specifies the amount or extent of the anticipated take. Furthermore, the reinitiation trigger is clear and enforceable. Finally, the failure to include the reasonable and prudent measures word-for-word in the terms and conditions does not render the incidental take statement arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court explained that the no-jeopardy conclusion is not arbitrary and capricious where the Service's conclusion was reached after evaluating both the direct and indirect effects of an action on the cats.

Sierra Club v. Department of Interior

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-60319

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Carolyn Dineen King

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Fifth Circuit denied petitions for review of the Service's incidental take statement and biological opinion in connection with the construction and operation of a liquefied natural gas terminal in south Texas (the Annova project). The court held that the Service complied with its obligations under the Endangered Species Act in authorizing the harm or harassment of one ocelot or jaguarundi and in determining that the proposed project was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of either cat. In this case, the incidental take statement is not arbitrary and capricious because it clearly specifies the anticipated take and specifies the amount or extent of the anticipated take. Furthermore, the reinitiation trigger is clear and enforceable. Finally, the failure to include the reasonable and prudent measures word-for-word in the terms and conditions does not render the incidental take statement arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court explained that the no-jeopardy conclusion is not arbitrary and capricious where the Service's conclusion was reached after evaluating both the direct and indirect effects of an action on the cats. The court rejected petitioners' challenge to the opinion's mitigation measures, namely the conservation of acreage, as arbitrary and capricious.

United States v. Baltazar-Sebastian

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-60067

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

There is no conflict between the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Bail Reform Act (BRA) that prevents DHS from civilly detaining a criminal defendant after she has been granted pretrial release pursuant to the BRA. As a preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court's December order is appealable under the BRA, 18 U.S.C. 3145 and 3731. The court explained that the September release order released defendant from criminal detention under the BRA and, considered by itself, the court would lack jurisdiction over the September release order because it was issued by a magistrate judge and not a district court. However, the December order was the district court's affirmation of the September release order in response to defendant's motion to clarify her release status. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court correctly rejected the applicability of 8 U.S.C. 1226(e) and 1252(g) in its December order, explaining it was "not attempting to review or set aside any decision or action to commence removal proceedings" but was instead "attempting to enforce the Magistrate Judge's [September release] Order." The court considered decisions by six other circuits that have addressed the issue and concluded that pretrial release under the BRA does not preclude pre-removal detention under the INA. The court explained that, fundamentally, the BRA and INA concern separate grants of Executive authority and govern independent criminal and civil proceedings. The court concluded that the remaining claims lacked merit and vacated the district court's December order precluding ICE from detaining defendant pending completion of her criminal proceedings.

Arnold v. Saul

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-2067

Opinion Date: March 11, 2021

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Public Benefits

Arnold applied for Social Security disability benefits based on ailments related to her back, heart, and joints, and chronic pain syndrome. Following the initial denial of her claim, Arnold requested a hearing before an ALJ. Arnold testified at the hearing, as did a vocational expert. The ALJ concluded that Arnold was not disabled, finding Arnold had several severe impairments, but that she retained the ability, with certain movement restrictions, to perform her past relevant work as a daycare center director. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s decision, rejecting an argument that the ALJ failed to analyze whether the side effects of her medications impacted Arnold’s ability to work. While there is some evidence of side effects in the record, there is no evidence that the side effects impacted Arnold’s ability to work. On this record, the ALJ was not required to make findings about Arnold’s side effects.

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. Holcomb

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1445

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

Owned by the Indiana Finance Authority, the Indiana Toll Road has been operated since 2006 by a lessee, ITR. What ITR can charge depends on state law. In 2018, ITR paid the state $1 billion in exchange for permission to raise by 35 percent the tolls on heavy trucks. The district court dismissed a suit under the Commerce Clause, reasoning that Indiana, as a market participant, was exempt from rules ordinarily applied under the Commerce Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the increase is valid even if it discriminates against interstate commerce. The tolls are neutral with respect to the origins, destinations, and ownership of the trucks. The court also reasoned that when a state participates in, rather than just regulates, the market, it may discriminate in favor of its own citizens and declined to find that tollways “are different.” The court noted the history of private ownership of roads.

Birhanu v. Wilkinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-9599

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

Ethiopian native, petitioner Thewodros Wolie Birhanu petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed Birhanu’s appeal of the Immigration Judge's (“IJ”) decision finding him removable. The BIA and the IJ found: (1) Birhanu was removable as an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMTs”) not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct; (2) he was not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal because his convictions qualified as particularly serious crimes; and (3) he was not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Tenth Circuit dismissed Birhanu's claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as unexhausted, and denied the balance of his petition for review on the merits.

Kwoka v. IRS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-5310

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: David S. Tatel

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiff, a law professor, filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking information regarding nine categories of information about each FOIA request received by the IRS in Fiscal Year 2015. The IRS granted most of plaintiff's request but denied it with respect to two categories of information. The district court granted each party's summary judgment motion in part, rejecting the IRS's blanket withholding of the two categories of information, but allowing for the possibility of limited redactions on a case-by-case basis. At issue in this appeal is under what circumstances a prevailing plaintiff in a FOIA case entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The DC Circuit concluded that, in evaluating a fee petition, the district court assesses whether the plaintiff "substantially prevailed" within the meaning of the statute, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(E)(i). In this case, the district court found plaintiff had done so, a conclusion the IRS does not contest. However, the court reasoned that this is not enough. Because the statute provides that an eligible party "may" receive fees, the district court must also decide whether the plaintiff is "entitled" to a fee award. Applying a four-factor test to determine whether a plaintiff is "entitled" to fees, the court concluded that the second and third factors, commercial benefit and plaintiff's interest, support a fee award. The court remanded for the district court to evaluate the reasonableness of the IRS's burden argument in the first instance and then to rebalance the four-factors in light of the court's conclusion that factors two and three weigh in plaintiff's favor. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of plaintiff's fee motion and remanded for further proceedings.

New Jersey v. Environmental Protection Agency

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 08-1065

Opinion Date: March 5, 2021

Judge: Judith Ann Wilson Rogers

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The DC Circuit denied the State of New Jersey's petition for review of an EPA rule promulgated in response to New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In New York, environmental organizations and industrial entities challenged the revision of the Clean Air Act's new source review (NSR) program for preconstruction permitting of stationary sources of air pollution. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that challenges to the State's Article III standing lack merit. In this case, petitioner has identified two injuries, either of which suffices to establish standing to challenge the rule. On the merits, the court concluded that the record confirms that EPA engaged in reasoned decisionmaking. The court explained that EPA's obligation was to analyze the trade-off between compliance improvement and the burdens of data collection and reporting and articulate a reasoned judgment as to why any proposed additional burden would not be justifiable in terms of the likely enhancement of compliance. By adequately considering NSR enforcement concerns raised during this rulemaking and offering a reasoned explanation for its 50 percent trigger, the court concluded that EPA satisfied this obligation. On this record, petitioner otherwise fails to show that EPA's action was arbitrary or capricious.

Brenner v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-2032

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Wallach

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In 1992, Brenner joined the VA as an attorney. In 2015, he suffered an accident that resulted in the amputation of his lower leg. He missed approximately six months of work and was reassigned to the Collections National Practice Group (CNPG). He received an overall “unacceptable” rating for 2017. Brenner unsuccessfully challenged the rating. In 2018, his supervisor proposed Brenner’s removal under 38 U.S.C. 714, listing 31 instances in which Brenner failed to meet deadlines and other errors. Brenner challenged the charges, citing his assignment to the CNPG and the “discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment[,] and abuse of authority he has endured since.” Brenner also asserted that he had previously engaged in protected EEO and whistleblowing activity and attached copies of his complaints filed with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP). He argued that the deciding official, Hipolit, was required to recuse himself, given his prior involvement in Brenner’s complaints and discipline. Following the conclusion of Brenner's OSC and OAWP cases, Hipolit upheld the proposed removal as supported by substantial evidence. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, finding that Brenner had not proven his affirmative defenses. The Federal Circuit vacated. The MSPB erred when it concluded that the Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, 38 U.S.C. 714, precluded, rather than required, review of the penalty imposed on Brenner and erred in applying the Act retroactively.

Columbus Regional Hospital v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 20-1226

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: William Curtis Bryson

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts

In 2008, severe storms hit Indiana. Columbus Hospital sustained significant damage. President Bush authorized FEMA assistance through disaster grants under the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121–5206. The state agreed to be the grantee for all grant assistance, with the exception of assistance to individuals and households. FEMA reserved the right to recover assistance funds if they were spent inappropriately or distributed through error, misrepresentation, or fraud. Columbus apparently submitted its request directly to FEMA, instead of through the state. FEMA approved Columbus projects, totaling approximately $94 million. Funds were transmitted to Columbus through the state. In 2013, the DHS Inspector General issued an audit report finding that Columbus had committed procurement violations and recommended that FEMA recover $10.9 million. FEMA reduced that amount to $9,612,831.19 and denied Columbus’s appeal. Columbus did not seek judicial review. FEMA recovered the disputed costs from Columbus in 2014. In 2018, Columbus filed suit, alleging four counts of contract breach and illegal exaction. The Claims Court dismissed Columbus’s illegal exaction claim, holding that Columbus did not have a property interest in the disputed funds and that FEMA’s appeal process protected Columbus’s rights to due process, and dismissed Columbus’s contract-based claims, finding that Columbus had no rights against FEMA under that contract or otherwise. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the illegal exaction and express and implied contract claims. The court vacated the dismissal of the third-party beneficiary contract claim.

Meidinger v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 20-1518

Opinion Date: March 8, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Tax Law

In 2009, Meidinger submitted whistleblower information to the IRS under 26 U.S.C. 7623, concerning “one million taxpayers in the healthcare industry that are involved in a kickback scheme.” The IRS acknowledged receipt of the information, but did not take action against the accused persons. The IRS notified Meidinger of that determination. Meidinger argued that the IRS created a contract when it confirmed receipt of his Form 211 Application, obligating it to investigate and to pay the statutory award. The Tax Court held that it lacked the authority to order the IRS to act and granted the IRS summary judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed that Meidinger was not eligible for a whistleblower award because the information did not result in initiation of an administrative or judicial action or collection of tax proceeds. In 2018, Meidinger filed another Form 211, with the same information as his previous submission. The IRS acknowledged receipt, but advised Meidinger that the information was “speculative” and “did not provide specific or credible information regarding tax underpayments or violations of internal revenue laws.” The Tax Court dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim; the D.C. Circuit affirmed, stating that a breach of contract claim against the IRS is properly filed in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act: 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal, agreeing that the submission of information did not create a contract.

Taylor Energy Co., L.L.C. v. Department of the Interior

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 20-1909

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: O'Malley

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

Taylor Energy leased and operated Gulf of Mexico oil and gas properties, on the Outer Continental Shelf, offshore Louisiana. In 2004, Hurricane Ivan destroyed those operations, causing oil leaks. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Oil Pollution Act required Taylor to decommission the site and stop the leaks. Taylor and the Department of the Interior developed a plan. Interior approved Taylor’s assignments of its leases to third parties with conditions requiring financial assurances. Three agreements addressed how Taylor would fund a trust account and how Interior would disburse payments. Taylor began decommissioning work. In 2009, Taylor proposed that Taylor “make the full final deposit into the trust account,” without any offsets, and retain all insurance proceeds. Interior rejected Taylor’s proposal. Taylor continued the work. In 2011, Taylor requested reimbursement from the trust account for rig downtime costs. Interior denied the request. In 2018, the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) affirmed Interior’s 2009 and 2011 Decisions. Taylor filed suit in the Claims Court, asserting contract claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting “Taylor’s attempt to disguise its regulatory obligations as contractual ones,” and stating an IBLA decision must be appealed to a district court. In 2018, Taylor filed suit in a Louisiana district court, seeking review of the IBLA’s 2018 decision and filed a second complaint in the Claims Court, alleging breach of contract. On Taylor's motion, the district court transferred the case, citing the Tucker Act. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Claims Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Taylor is challenging the IBLA Decision and must do so in district court under the APA.

Calhoun v. Area Agency on Aging of Southeast Arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 Ark. 56

Opinion Date: March 11, 2021

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that Appellant was not entitled to a wage-loss award in addition to his impairment rating because Area Agency on Aging of Southeast Arkansas (AAA) extended to him a bona fide offer of employment, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's decision. Appellant was driving an AAA van that overturned, injuring Appellant. An ALJ determined that Appellant was entitled to a sixty percent wage-loss award and that Appellees made no bona fide job offer of employment because the position and wages were not clear. The Commission reversed, concluding that any wage-loss award was precluded because AAA made a bona fide and reasonable obtainable job offer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that AAA did not meet its burden to prove that Appellant was offered employment at wages equal to or greater than his average weekly wage at the time of the accident.

Coachella Valley Water Dist. v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E074010(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Slough

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The tax at issue in this case related to the State Water Project ("SWP"): California’s vast system of storage and conveyance facilities designed to provide water to its millions of residents and farmers. In 2013, the Coachella Valley Water District (the water district) passed a resolution adopting a two-cent increase to the rate of its ad valorem property tax, which the water district levies annually to satisfy its contractual financial obligations to the SWP. In 2018, Randall Roberts filed a lawsuit against the water district and the County of Riverside, seeking to invalidate the tax under the Burns-Porter Act of 1960, and the California Constitution, and to obtain a refund. The water district demurred, arguing the entire action was time-barred because Roberts was required under the validation statutes to present his claims in a “reverse validation action” no later than 60 days after the water district adopted the tax, which it does annually by resolution. The trial court concluded the validation statutes did not apply to the SWP tax and overruled the demurrer. The Court of Appeal concurred with the water district that the validation statutes applied to the SWP tax by operation of the County Water District Law, which made the validation statutes applicable to any action to determine the validity of a county water district's "assessment" (and defined a property tax as an "assessment").

Sargent v. Board of Trustees of the California State University

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A153072(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 5, 2021

Judge: Humes

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics

Sargent began working for the University in 1991 as an environmental health-and-safety technician. Sargent was the campus’s licensed asbestos consultant. Sargent sued, presenting abundant evidence about retaliation after he raised concerns about environmental hazards. A jury found in his favor on claims alleging unlawful retaliation and on a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (Labor Code 2698, PAGA), which was premised almost entirely on violations of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act (Labor Code 6300, CalOSHA). He was awarded more than $2.9 million in PAGA penalties and more than $7.8 million in attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed the award of attorney fees but reversed the award of PAGA penalties. Education Code 66606.2 does not bar PAGA claims against the California State University (CSU) system; CSU is not categorically immune from PAGA penalties because it is a public entity. Viable PAGA claims can be asserted against CSU only when the statutes upon which the claims are premised themselves provide for penalties. Here, Sargent brought some viable PAGA claims but ultimately failed to establish CSU’s liability for them because the jury found that he was not personally affected by the underlying statutory violations.

Jones v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2021 IL 126974

Opinion Date: March 11, 2021

Judge: Rita B. Garman

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Calumet City held a referendum proposing that candidates could not seek the office of mayor while simultaneously holding an elected, paid state office. Before the outcome of the referendum was certified, Representative Jones of the 29th District of the General Assembly filed nomination papers seeking the office of mayor. The referendum was later certified as adopted. The day after certification, objectors brought suit to bar Jones from appearing on the February 2021 ballot in light of the newly passed referendum. The Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City sustained the objection and removed Jones from the ballot. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed, directing that Jones’s name appear on the ballot but that all his votes be impounded or suppressed. The appellate court summarily reversed and ordered that Jones appear on the ballot. The Illinois Supreme Court stayed the appellate court order and subsequently reversed in favor of Jones. The referendum became effective on November 24, 2020, the date the election was certified. Because Jones filed his nomination papers on November 16, 2020, he was legally qualified to run for mayor at that time. His nomination papers were not defective at that time.

In the Matter of The Stewardship of the Public Trust Tidelands

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2020-SA-00174-SCT

Opinion Date: March 11, 2021

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts

The City of Biloxi (City), the Secretary of State on behalf of the State of Mississippi (State), and the Board of Trustees of the State Institutes of Higher Learning (IHL) settled an ownership dispute over coastal property leased to a casino, and agreed how to divide the annual casino rent. Seventeen years later, the City asked the chancery court to declare that it could adjust for inflation its base amount of rent received before divvying up its rent with the State and the IHL. But the City’s only support of its new inflation-adjustment claim was the three public entities’ lease with the casino. While the casino lease required the minimum amount of rent owed be adjusted for inflation every five years, the casino lease did not govern how the City, the State, and the IHL were to divide the rent. Instead, the manner in which rent was divided is governed solely by the settlement agreement. And the settlement agreement was silent with respect to an inflation adjustment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found, however, the agreement was clear: the City received a specific sum, and any rent in excess of that exact amount had to be shared with the State and the IHL.

S.M.H v. Schmitt

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC98675

Opinion Date: March 8, 2021

Judge: Zel M. Fischer

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court held that Missouri's Legal Expense Fund had no obligation to satisfy a default judgment against Allen Merry, an employee of the St. Louis Public School District. S.M.H., a student in the Transitional School District of the City of St. Louis, sued Merry, a former teacher, and obtained a default judgment against him for $4 million. Because the Transitional School District had lost its state accreditation, the Special Administrative Board (Board) of the Transitional School District governed the district and employed Merry. S.M.H. subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action seeking satisfaction of the judgment from the Legal Expense Fund. The circuit court granted summary judgment for S.M.H. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Board was not an "agency of the state" for purposes of the Legal Expense Fund, and therefore, the Fund was not liable for damages against employees of the Transitional School District; and (2) S.M.H. was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Home Warranty Administrator of Nevada, Inc. v. State, Department of Business & Industry

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 137 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5

Opinion Date: March 4, 2021

Judge: Ron D. Parraguirre

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the order of the district court denying Petitioner's petition for judicial review of an order of the Nevada Division of Insurance, holding that remand was required with the instruction that the district court grant judicial review in part. Choice Home Warranty (CHW) marketed and sold Home Warranty Administrator of Nevada, Inc. (HWAN)'s home warranty service contracts, in which HWAN was the obligor. The Department of Business and Industry, Division of Insurance filed a complaint alleging that HWAN, dba CHW, made false entries by answering no to a question in certificate-of-registration renewal applications, conducted business in an unsuitable manner, and failed to make records available to the Division. A hearing officer found that HWAN committed all of the alleged violations. The district court denied HWAN's petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) under Nev. Rev. Stat. 690C.150, a provider of home warranty services is not simply an entity that issues, sells, or offers for sale service contracts but the obligor in those contracts; (2) CHW was not an obligor so it was not a provider and need not have held a certificate of registration; and (3) HWAN did not act improperly by selling its contracts through an unregistered entity.

State ex rel. Fire Rock, Ltd. v. Ohio Department of Commerce

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2021-Ohio-673

Opinion Date: March 11, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling with Ohio Department of Commerce and the Ohio Medical Marijuana Control Program (collectively, the Department) to approve or deny Fire Rock, Ltd.'s application to expand its marijuana cultivation area, holding that Fire Rock was entitled to the writ. Fire Rock submitted an application requesting approval to expand its Akron-based cultivation facility. When the Department took no action on the expansion request, Fire Rock filed a complaint for writ of mandamus ordering the Department to approve or deny Fire Rock's application. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ, holding (1) Ohio law does not prohibit a cultivator like Fire Rock from submitting an expansion application on its own initiative; (2) the Department had a clear legal duty to act on Fire Rock's application, and Fire Rock had a clear legal right to that relief; and (3) Fire Rock lacked an adequate remedy at law.

State ex rel. McDougald v. Sehlmeyer

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2021-Ohio-666

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Jerone McDougald to compel Sonrisa Sehlmeyer, the public-records custodian at Toledo Correctional Institution, where McDougald was an inmate, to make available for inspection a certain video, holding that Sehlmeyer presented evidence supporting her claim that allowing McDougald to inspect the video would create undue security risks. McDougald send a public-records request to Sehlmeyer asking to inspect video surveillance footage of a use-of-force incident involving him. Sehlmeyer did not provide the video to McDougald. McDougald then filed this original action asking the Supreme Court to compel Sehlmeyer to allow him to inspect the video. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Sehlmeyer did not have a clear legal duty to allow McDougald to inspect the video.

State ex rel. Tarrier v. Public Employees Retirement Board

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2021-Ohio-649

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus ordering the Public Employees Retirement Board to transfer Appellant from the "combined" plan in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System to the "traditional" plan, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus. After the court of appeals denied the writ, Appellant appealed, asserting six propositions of law sounding in mandamus and in common-law tort. Appellant also filed a motion for oral argument. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and denied the motion for oral argument, holding (1) Appellant failed to establish a clear legal right to relief or a clear legal duty on the part of the Board to provide it; and (2) this Court and the court of appeals lacked original jurisdiction over Appellant's common-law tort claims.

State ex rel. Ware v. Akron

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2021-Ohio-624

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling the City of Akron and its police chief (collectively, the City) to inform Kimani Ware, the relator in this action, of the cost for copying the public records he sought, holding that Ware was entitled to the writ. Ware, an inmate, sent two letters to the Akron Policy Department requesting various public records. When he did not receive a response Ware filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. After receiving the complaint, the City responded to Ware with two letters. The City noted in an affidavit the total cost for copying the requested records and informed Ware that the records would be sent to him once he paid the requested amount. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) because the City was willing to provide copies of the records once Ware had paid for the copies, a writ compelling the City to provide the records was unnecessary; (2) this Court grants a writ ordering the City to provide the invoices to Ware so he may decide whether to pay for the copies; and (3) Ware was not entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages.

Baddourah v. Baddourah

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28013

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Donald W. Beatty

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster issued an order suspending Mohsen Baddourah from his position as a member of the Columbia City Council after Baddourah was indicted for second-degree domestic violence. Baddourah initiated this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that: (1) he was a member of the Legislative Branch and was, therefore, excepted from the Governor's suspension power under the South Carolina Constitution; and (2) second-degree domestic violence was not a crime involving moral turpitude, so it was not an act that was within the scope of the Governor's suspension power. The circuit court dismissed Baddourah's complaint on the ground the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure to state a cause of action. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded Baddourah's indictment charged a crime involving moral turpitude, and the Governor had the constitutional authority to issue the Executive Order suspending Baddourah from his position as a member of the Columbia City Council. Although Baddourah disputed whether the suspension was warranted, "where the Governor was constitutionally authorized to impose a suspension, the decision whether to do so is a matter committed to the Governor's discretion after considering all of the attendant circumstances." Consequently, the circuit court's order dismissing Baddourah's challenge to the suspension order is affirmed as modified.

Billman v. Clarke Machine, Inc.

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: INC., 2021 S.D. 18

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: David Gilbertson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Labor and Regulation denying Steven Billman's application for permanent total disability benefits, holding that the Department's determination that Billman was not obviously unemployable was clearly erroneous. During his employment, Billman suffered a work-related injury that required the amputation of his left leg just below the knee. The Department denied Billman's application for benefits, finding that Billman was not obviously unemployable and that he failed to conduct a reasonable job search. The circuit court affirmed the Department's findings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Billman established that he was obviously unemployable, and therefore, he was entitled to odd-lot disability benefits.

Ibrahim v. Department Of Public Safety

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 S.D. 17

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the Department of Public Safety ordering Appellee's commercial driving privileges to be disqualified for one year, holding that commercial driver's license (CDL) disqualification under S.D. Codified Laws 32-12A-36(4) applies when a vehicle is used as a means to possess a felony quantity of marijuana. The Department disqualified Appellee's commercial driving privileges for one year pursuant to 32-12A-36(4) because he had been convicted of a felony committed in a vehicle by a CDL holder. The circuit court reversed Appellee's CDL disqualification, holding that the statute requires that a vehicle was an "instrumentality" of the felony. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the Department's decision, holding (1) possession of a felony quantity of marijuana in a vehicle is "using a...vehicle in the commission of any felony" under section 13-21A-36(4); (2) the circuit court erred by holding that section 13-21A-36(4) was unconstitutionally vague; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the Department's disqualification of Appellee's CDL privileges.

State v. Jendusa

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Docket: 2018AP002357-LV

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Dallet

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals denying the State's petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal of an order of the circuit court granting Defendant's discovery request, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting the request. In 2016, the State filed a petition seeking to commit Defendant was a sexually violent person. The circuit court found probable cause to believe that Defendant was a sexually violent person and bound him over for trial. Thereafter, Defendant moved the circuit court to order the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) to disclose its database so he could have an expert analyze the Wisconsin-specific base rate. Defendant asserted that the DOC's Wisconsin-specific data provided a more relevant basis upon which to calculate his risk of engaging in future acts of sexual violence and that the database was discoverable. The circuit court ordered the DOC to transmit the full, unredacted database to Defendant. The court of appeals denied the State's petition for leave to appeal the non-final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court permissibly ordered the disclosure of the DOC database.