Latest 4 Cases: Brickstructures, Inc. v. Coaster Dynamix, Inc. (Arbitration & Mediation), Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc. (Civil Procedure), United States ...

Can A City Refuse Land-Use Permits Because it Doesn’t Like the Federal Policies the Property Will be Used to Implement?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar explains why a local government cannot constitutionally create policy discriminating against entities that do business with the feds. Specifically, Amar discusses a situation in which the city of Farland, California, is trying to prevent a privately operated state prison facility located in that city from contracting with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

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Brickstructures, Inc. v. Coaster Dynamix, Inc.

Docket: 19-2187

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Contracts

Brickstructures and Coaster executed a fill‐in‐the‐blank joint venture agreement to design a roller coaster kit, compatible with LEGOs. Many of the blanks went unfilled. The agreement contained an arbitration clause. They successfully released one product but the relationship fizzled. Coaster independently launched another LEGO‐compatible kit, without any credit to Brickstructures. Brickstructures sued, claiming that Coaster breached the agreement and its fiduciary duties and violated the Lanham Act. Coaster moved to dismiss, arguing that the arrangement was not an enforceable contract. The court dismissed the complaint for a jurisdictional defect. An amendment cured that issue. Coaster again moved to dismiss, arguing that the amended complaint did not allege a binding joint venture or, alternatively, that arbitration was the exclusive forum for the claims. Brickstructures demanded that Coaster withdraw the arbitration arguments, claiming Coaster waived them by not advancing them in its first motion. Coaster formally withdrew those arguments. The court found that the amended complaint adequately alleged a binding agreement. Coaster then moved to compel arbitration. The court found that Coaster waived arbitration, rejecting an argument that it was reasonable to abandon an arbitration demand in acquiescence to Brickstructures’s threat to seek sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. "Having put the arbitration card on the table and then taken it back, Coaster was not permitted to play that card again." A court has the discretion to allow recission of a waiver of the right to arbitrate only in “abnormal” circumstances,

Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc.

Docket: 19-1204

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Class Action

Mussat, an Illinois professional services corporation, received unsolicited faxes from IQVIA, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Pennsylvania. These faxes failed to include the required opt-out notice. Mussat brought a putative class action in Illinois under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, on behalf of itself and all persons in the country who had received similar junk faxes from IQVIA in the four previous years. The district court granted IQVIA's motion to strike the class definition, reasoning that under the Supreme Court’s 2017 “Bristol-Myers” holding, not just the named plaintiff, but also the unnamed class members, each had to show minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Because IQVIA is not subject to general jurisdiction in Illinois, the court turned to specific jurisdiction and found that it had no jurisdiction over the claims of parties who were harmed outside of Illinois. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Bristol-Myers does not apply to the case of a nationwide class action filed in federal court under a federal statute. Bristol-Myers did not reach the question of whether, in a Rule 23 class action, each unnamed class member must separately establish specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. In such an action the lead plaintiffs earn the right to represent the interests of absent class members by satisfying Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) criteria. Absent class members are not full parties to the case for many purposes.

United States v. Rickmon

Docket: 19-2054

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Judge: Joel Martin Flaum

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

ShotSpotter's surveillance system uses microphones to record gunshots. An individual determines whether the sound is a shot. When that individual confirms a gunshot, ShotSpotter contacts local police. At 4:40:02 a.m., ShotSpotter reported gunshots coming from North Ellis Street. Peoria Officer Ellefritz, driving toward the address, heard the dispatcher report a second ShotSpotter alert of more shots fired. Ellefritz, the first responding officer, saw headlights leaving North Ellis, coming his way. He activated his emergency lights and shouted “stop.” Within seconds, the car stopped next to Ellefritz’s cruiser; its occupants pointed backward, yelling: “They are down there!” Ellefritz observed 15–20 people at the street’s dead end, approximately 300 feet from him. Ellefritz kept his firearm drawn. The driver and the passenger, Rickmon, kept their hands up until backup arrived. Rickmon then stated that someone had shot him in the leg. With the driver’s consent, Ellefritz searched the automobile and found a handgun under Rickmon's seat. Rickmon was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon. Ellefritz testified that there was nothing particularly unusual about this car, except leaving the area of the gunfire. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. The totality of the circumstances provided the officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop.

Vargas v. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board

Docket: 19-1686

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The plaintiffs, current and former Cook County sheriff’s deputies and correctional officers, were disciplined for violating various departmental policies and rules. Seven of the eight plaintiffs were fired; the remaining officer was suspended. They sought to represent a class of officers who were disciplined in 2013-2016. The complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged deprivations of due process based on a defect in the composition of the Merit Board: at the time of the challenged disciplinary decisions, certain Board members held their appointments in violation of Illinois law. They also alleged that Sheriff Dart and his General Counsel assumed control of the Board through political means and pressured its members to make decisions contrary to Illinois law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. A violation of state law is not a federal due-process violation, so the defect in the Board’s membership is not a basis for a federal constitutional claim. The allegations of biased decision-making suggest only that the plaintiffs may have suffered a random and unauthorized deprivation of their property interest in public employment. An injury of that type is not a violation of due process if the state offers adequate postdeprivation remedies. Illinois provides constitutionally adequate postdeprivation remedies for aggrieved public employees.