The Third-Party Doctrine vs. Katz v. Untied States

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb proposes revising the third-party doctrine in a way that reconciles two of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions that some critics view as conflicting. Colb suggests that, contrary to what most critics argue and what she herself has long assumed, the prior decision, Katz v. United States rather than the later one, United States v. White, is the anomaly.

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In re Trenton Farms RE, LLC Permit No. MOGS10520

Docket: SC97695

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Patricia Breckenridge

Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Animal / Dog Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the clean water commission approving Trenton Farms' permit to establish a twin concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO), holding that House Bill No. 1713 (HB 1713) does not violate the original purpose, single subject, or clear title requirements of the Missouri Constitution and that there was sufficient evidence regarding the CAFO's protection from a 100-year flood. The clean water commission affirmed the department of natural resource's issuance of a permit to Trenton Farms to establish a CAFO. Hickory Neighbors United, Inc. appealed, arguing (1) HB 1713, which amended Mo. Rev. Stat. 644.021.1 to change the criteria for members of the commission, violated Missouri Constitution article III's original purpose requirement and single subject and clear title requirements; and (2) there was insufficient evidence that CAFO's manure containment structures would be protected from inundation or damages in the event of a 100-year flood, a requirement of 10 C.S.R. 20-8.300. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) HB 1713 is constitutionally valid; and (2) there was sufficient evidence that CAFO structures met regulatory requirements.

Dreyer Electric Co., LLC v. Director of Revenue

Docket: SC98007

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Laura Denvir Stith

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) that certain equipment purchased by Dreyer Electric Co. was exempt from sales tax because it was "replacement equipment" "used directly in the manufacturing process," as those terms are used in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(5), holding that the AHC erred. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the AHC correctly applied the three-factor "integrated plant doctrine" test set out in Floyd Charcoal Co. v. Director of Revenue, 599 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. banc 1980), to determine whether the subject replacement parts and equipment were "used directly in manufacturing"; but (2) the AHC erred in making specific findings as to some parts and then grouping all the parts together, including those it had not mentioned specifically in its decision, to find they were collectively integral to the electrical system that powered the machinery. The Court remanded the case for application of the integrated plant test to each type of replacement part or equipment purchased.

In re D.E.G.

Docket: SC97869

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: George W. Draper, III

Areas of Law: Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court retransferred this case to the court of appeals after the juvenile division dismissed a juvenile petition and transferred jurisdiction over D.E.G., a juvenile, to a court of general jurisdiction, holding that a juvenile has the statutory right to appeal from any final juvenile division judgment. A Juvenile Officer filed a petition alleging that D.E.G. required care and treatment because he committed conduct that, had he been an adult, would have constituted first-degree assault and armed criminal action. After a hearing, the juvenile court dismissed the juvenile petition and transferred jurisdiction over D.E.G. to a court of general jurisdiction. D.E.G. appealed to the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Supreme Court retransferred this case to the court of appeals for its review of the underlying merits of the juvenile division's judgment, holding (1) a juvenile may appeal from a final judgment in the juvenile division, including the juvenile division's decision to dismiss a case from its jurisdiction following a Mo. Rev. Stat. 211.071 hearing; and (2) In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo banc 1972), and all other cases holding a juvenile's dismissal from a juvenile division's jurisdiction may be challenged only in a court of general jurisdiction are overruled and should no longer be followed.

Sofia v. Dodson

Docket: SC97854

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Laura Denvir Stith

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In this wrongful death action, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Mercy Hospital Joplin due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed Mercy Hospital. On appeal, Plaintiffs conceded that the statute of limitations had run prior to the filing of their claim against Mercy Hospital. Plaintiffs, however, argued that the one-year savings statute that applies to nonsuits applied in this case because they had taken nonsuit against Mercy Hospital less than one year before filing the instant action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not suffer a nonsuit against Mercy Hospital but, rather, substituted Mercy Clinic, LLC under Rule 55.33(c) in place of Mercy Hospital even though the limitations period had already expired; (2) Plaintiffs' substitution of Mercy Clinic in place of Mercy Hospital was not a nonsuit entitling them to the benefit of the one-year savings provision; and (3) therefore, the action against Mercy Hospital was time barred.