How Much Worse Will Trump Become, and How Quickly?

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

Neil H. Buchanan, law professor and economist at UF Levin College of Law, contemplates the world in which we are likely to live if President Trump is reelected. Focusing in this column on the effects on government employees and contractors, Buchanan predicts that our society will be almost unimaginably worse a year from today and thereafter.

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Letting His Hair Down: Why a School District in Texas Is Wrong to Deprive a Male Student of an Education Because of the Length of His Hair

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, KATHARINE BARTLETT

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Duke law professor Katharine T. Bartlett explain why a public school district in Texas violated both the federal Constitution and Title IX by having (and enforcing) a hair-length policy for boys but not for girls. Grossman and Bartlett describe the facts of the case and the legal landscape for sex-specific dress and appearance policies before concluding that the school district’s decision to enforce the policy was not only poor judgment but illegal.

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Jennissen v. City of Bloomington

Docket: A17-0221

Opinion Date: February 12, 2020

Judge: McKeig

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government Contracts

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals holding that a proposed charter amendment was not manifestly unconstitutional but was an improper referendum, holding that the proposed amendment was not an improper exercise of the charter amendment power and was not manifestly unconstitutional. After the City of Bloomington changed from a system of open trash collection to a system of organized collection a group of residents attempted, through an amendment to the City Charter, to require that voters pre-approve a change in the method of trash collection. The City refused to put the proposed charter amendment on the ballot. In the original appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for decision on whether the proposed amendment would violate the Contract Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions and whether it was an attempt to exercise the voter referendum power through an improper means. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that the proposed amendment was an improper referendum but was not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the proposed charter amendment was not an improper referendum and did not violate the Contract Clauses.

Visser v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

Docket: A18-1204

Opinion Date: February 12, 2020

Judge: Lorie Skjerven Gildea

Areas of Law: Insurance Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding that Appellant, who was injured while she was driving a Pontiac and sought additional primary underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under an insurance policy that covered a separate vehicle, a Chevrolet, was not entitled to primary UIM benefits under the Chevrolet policy, holding that Appellant could not recover additional primary UIM benefits under the Chevrolet policy. State Farm, Appellant's insurer, paid Appellant the Pontiac policy's UIM benefits limit but denied that the Chevrolet policy applied to Appellant's claim for additional primary UIM benefits. The district court granted summary judgment for State Farm, holding that the Chevrolet policy did not apply under Minn. Stat. 65B.49, subd. 3a(5). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) consistent with section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5) and precedent interpreting that provision, Appellant was limited to primary UIM benefits under the policy that covered the vehicle she occupied at the time of the accident; and (2) even assuming that parties can contract around the priority scheme for primary UIM benefits that the legislature established in section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5), no explicit language in the State Farm policies actually did so.

In re Cindi Ali

Docket: A18-1287

Opinion Date: February 12, 2020

Judge: David L. Lillehaug

Areas of Law: Public Benefits

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the determination of Scott County that Consumer Directed Community Support (CDCS) money that Cindy Ali, whose son was disabled, had allocated to herself as wages to care for her child was not excluded from the annual income calculation for the purpose of Section 8 eligibility, holding that amounts allocated to a parent to care for her disabled child are not excluded as income under 24 C.F.R. 5.609(c)(16). This dispute arose from the interplay between two public welfare programs, the state CDCS option for families with disabled members, and Section 8, an income-based federal housing program. Ali participated in the Section 8 housing program until Scott County, the local housing administrator, determined that the amounts Ali paid herself under the CDCS option were not excluded from her income when calculating her eligibility for Section 8 housing. As a result, Ali lost her Section 8 eligibility. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the CDCS amounts Ali received as compensation for her services in caring for her child were correctly included as annual income when calculating Ali's Section 8 eligibility.

Inland Edinburgh Festival, LLC v. County of Hennepin

Docket: A19-0567

Opinion Date: February 12, 2020

Judge: G. Barry Anderson

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

In this appeal from the tax court's conclusion that the market value of Relator's two parcels of improved real estate was higher than the initial assessment value determined by Hennepin County or the valuation opinion presented by the sole appraiser to testify at trial the Supreme Court reversed in part the tax court, holding that the tax court erred in its valuation determination under the sales comparison approach. Relator sought review of Hennepin County's assessed value of $8,384,300 for Relator's retail shopping center property as of January 2, 2015. After a trial, the tax court gave a final valuation determination for the property of $8,461,400. Relator appealed, arguing that the tax court's value determination was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the tax court did not err in its decision to afford no weight to Relator's expert's opinion on the income approach; but (2) the tax court erred in its valuation determination based on the sales-comparison approach.