Latest 4 Cases: Maldonado v. Fast Auto Loans (Arbitration & Mediation), Guo v. Moorpark Recovery Service, LLC (Civil Procedure), Early v. Bacerra ...

Virginia Delivers a Rebuke to Trump’s Execution Spree and Points to the End of America’s Death Penalty

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—comments on the news that both houses of the Virginia General Assembly passed legislation abolishing the death penalty in that state. Professor Sarat explains why Virginia’s change in policy is so significant: it has executed more people than any other state and is the first state south of the Mason-Dixon line to abolish capital punishment.

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The Post-Pandemic Workplace

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, ELENA J. VOSS

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and Elena J. Voss, associate general counsel for the Metropolitan Museum of Art, provide a roadmap of how employers can ready their workplaces for post-pandemic life. Professor Estreicher and Ms. Voss describe the importance of employers determining their workplace vision, communicating that vision to employees, defining what a “flexible” workplace means, setting clear policies with definitive maximums and minimums.

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Would Senate Republicans Abandon Their Baseless Arguments if There Were a Secret Ballot?

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan considers whether a secret ballot is a good idea, or even permissible, in former President Trump’s impeachment trial. Professor Buchanan ultimately takes no position on the question of a secret ballot, suggesting that it might simply be an easy way out for Senate Republicans; he argues that what matters most is that the trial go forward, revealing an open-and-shut case against Donald Trump.

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Maldonado v. Fast Auto Loans

Docket: G058645(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Kathleen E. O'Leary

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Contracts

In a putative class action, plaintiffs Joe Maldonado, Alfredo Mendez, J. Peter Tuma, Jonabette Michelle Tuma, and Roberto Mateos Salmeron (collectively referred to as “the Customers”), claimed Fast Auto Loans, Inc., (Lender) charged unconscionable interest rates on loans in violation of California Financial Code sections 22302 and 22303. Lender filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the action pursuant to an arbitration clause contained within the Customers’ loan agreements. The court denied the motion on the grounds the provision was invalid and unenforceable because it required consumers to waive their right to pursue public injunctive relief, a rule described in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal.5th 945 (2017). On appeal, Lender argued the “McGill Rule” did not apply, but even if it did, other claims were subject to arbitration. Alternatively, Lender contended the McGill Rule was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act . Finding Lender’s contentions on appeal lacked merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order.

Guo v. Moorpark Recovery Service, LLC

Docket: A159195(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Needham

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Legal Ethics

Guo owned TVGC, which operated a Pleasanton spa. TVGC agreed to sell the business to Mazurova's corporation, LSI. The sale was partially financed through a promissory note. The sales agreement and promissory note contained provisions allowing a party prevailing in a legal action to recover attorney fees. After the sale, a dispute arose regarding Guo’s alleged nondisclosure of outstanding coupons for free spa services and Mazurova’s alleged failure to make payments. A judgment was entered for $161,085.58 against Guo and TVGC, which was affirmed. A subsequent order specifically stated that LSI and Mazurova were deemed the prevailing parties under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1032, “entitled to recover their costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees.” Mazurova and LSI assigned the judgment to Moorpark, which engaged in collection efforts and moved for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040. The court denied the motion because the underlying judgment did not include an award of attorney’s fees. The court of appeal reversed. The judgment awarded reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing parties, although it did not set a particular amount of fees and no costs bill including such fees was ever filed. The court’s failure to include a specific amount in the judgment does not defeat section 685.040.

Early v. Bacerra

Docket: C089943(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Vance W. Raye

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Xavier Becerra and his election committee (collectively, Becerra) successfully defended a petition for writ of mandate brought by Eric Early and his election committee (collectively, Early) seeking to remove Becerra as a candidate for California's Attorney General on the November 2018 ballot. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision denying the petition. Early alleged that Becerra was ineligible for the office of Attorney General because his state bar status was “inactive” during the five years preceding the election and therefore he was not “admitted to practice” in the state as required for that period under Government Code section 12503. We held that the phrase “admitted to practice” in the statute “refers to the event of admission to the bar and the status of being admitted, and does not require engagement in the 'actual’ or 'active’ practice of law.” Becerra brought a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which the trial court granted awarding Becerra $69,718 in attorney fees. "Becerra's successful defense of the petition enforced an important public right and conferred a significant benefit on the general public as required by subdivision (a) of section 1021.5. . . . Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining under subdivision (b) of section 1021.5 that the financial burden Becerra incurred in defending Early’s suit outweighed any pecuniary benefit in the form of the salary paid to the Attorney General or otherwise."

Doe v. Westmont College

Docket: B303208(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Tangeman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics

After plaintiff filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate to overturn Westmont College's determination that he committed sexual assault, the trial court granted plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff then moved for attorney fees, which the trial court denied. Westmont appealed from the judgment, but plaintiff did not appeal from the postjudgment order denying his attorney fee motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. After remittitur issued, plaintiff moved for attorney's fees based on the court's decision. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court applied the wrong standards when it denied plaintiff's attorney fee motion. In this case, the trial court erred when it denied plaintiff's post-appeal motion for attorney fees because his action against Westmont resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, and his action conferred significant benefits on a large group of people. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether public enforcement of plaintiff's fair hearing rights was available or adequate. The trial court also failed to consider whether the financial burden hoisted on plaintiff in prosecuting his case outweighed his own personal interests, focusing instead on the "punishment" that would be inflicted on Westmont for exercising its right to appeal. The court also agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred when it denied his attorney fee motion due to his failure to provide a basis for apportionment between the fees he incurred to advance his private interests and those that advanced the public interest. Therefore, the court vacated the denial order and remanded for further proceedings.