Here We Go Again: The Supreme Court Considers Whether to Further Narrow the Law of Personal Jurisdiction

LAURA DOOLEY, RODGER CITRON

Laura Dooley and Rodger D. Citron—both law professors at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center—comment on two consolidated cases pending before the U.S. Supreme Court that present questions of the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Dooley and Citron summarize the facts and procedural history of each case, analyze the issues raised by the defendant, and consider how the recent death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg might affect the Court’s decision.

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Reales Investment, LLC v. Johnson

Docket: E072523(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Carol D. Codrington

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

Two months before trial, appellant Reales Investment, LLC’s attorney moved to withdraw from the case. Reales did not retain counsel until a few days before trial began, and it did not participate in any of the pretrial proceedings mandated by Riverside County Superior Court Local Rule 3401. On the morning of the first day of trial, Reales’ new attorney orally requested a continuance. The trial court denied the request, and also excluded all documents and witnesses Reales did not disclose in pretrial exchanges between the parties as required by Rule 3401. Because Reales did not disclose anything under Rule 3401, it was precluded from offering any evidence or testimony at trial, so the trial court granted a nonsuit for respondent Thomas Johnson. On appeal, Reales argued the trial court’s pretrial rulings were an abuse of discretion. After review, the Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment.

Skaff v. Rio Nido Roadhouse

Docket: A152462(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics, Real Estate & Property Law

Skaff sued the Roadhouse restaurant and grill, located in Sonoma County, alleging that the Roadhouse and parking lot were inaccessible to wheelchair users. Skaff cited Health and Safety Code section 19955 and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civ. Code section 51. Under section 19955, public accommodations must comply with California Building Code disability access standards if repairs and alterations were made to an existing facility, triggering accessibility mandates. No evidence was presented that the Roadhouse's owner had undertaken any triggering alterations. The owner nonetheless voluntarily remediated the identified barriers to access. The court entered judgment against Skaff on his Unruh Act claim but ruled in his favor on the section 19955 claim, reasoning that he was the prevailing party under a “catalyst theory” because his lawsuit was the catalyst that caused the renovations. Skaff was awarded $242,672 in attorney fees and costs. The court of appeal reversed the judgment and fee award. A plaintiff cannot prevail on a cause of action in which no violation of law was ever demonstrated or found. Nor is the catalyst theory available when a claim lacks legal merit. That a prelitigation demand may have spurred action that resulted in positive societal benefit is not reason alone to award attorney fees under the Civil Code.

Shipp v. Western Engineering, Inc.

Docket: C087371(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: William J. Murray, Jr.

Areas of Law: Construction Law, Personal Injury

Defendants were performing road construction work, implementing a “reversing lane closure” traffic control, reducing traffic to one lane. A flagger to control northbound traffic was positioned at the south end of the reversing lane closure on Latrobe Road, north of where it intersected with Ryan Ranch Road. Because the flagger was positioned north of the intersection, when the flagger stopped northbound traffic, that traffic could back up, extending south into the intersection. Plaintiff Kevin Shipp was driving south on Latrobe Road when he came to a stop behind two other vehicles. The vehicle two cars ahead of plaintiff was attempting to turn left onto Ryan Ranch Road, but it could not because northbound traffic, stopped by the flagger at the south end of the reversing lane closure, was stopped in the intersection. Seconds after plaintiff stopped, a vehicle driven by George Smithson rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle. This case presented the question of whether a highway contractor controlling traffic on a public highway owed a duty of care to a motorist who was rear-ended when forced to stop behind a vehicle that was unable to turn left at an intersection that was blocked by stopped traffic controlled by the contractor. The Court of Appeal concluded the contractor here did indeed owe a duty of care.

Fipke v. California Horse Racing Board

Docket: B299810(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Tricia A. Bigelow

Areas of Law: Entertainment & Sports Law

Charles Fipke, owner of a racehorse that won the 2017 Breeders' Cup Distaff race, initially named real party in interest Joel Rosario as the jockey for the race, but prior to the draw, he removed Rosario and named a different jockey. The race stewards then awarded Rosario a "double jockey fee," which entitled him to the same fee earned by the jockey who replaced him. Fipke challenged the decision, but it was upheld by the California Horse Racing Board and the superior court. The Court of Appeal reversed and held that Business and Professions Code section 19500 prohibits stewards from awarding a double jockey fee to a rider, like Rosario, who is removed from a mount prior to the draw. In this case, it is undisputed that Rosario was removed from his mount prior to the draw, which necessarily means he was removed prior to "scratch time." The court explained that, under section 19500, he was not entitled to a "riding fee" but was, at most, entitled to a "mount fee." The court also concluded that the double jockey fee award is not a fine or monetary penalty and the stewards did not have authority to impose a double jockey fee as a novel form of punishment.