Bringing Home the Supply Chain

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, JONATHAN F. HARRIS

NYU law professors Samuel Estreicher and Jonathan F. Harris describe how the COVID-19 pandemic is forcing the United States to confront the problem of unchecked globalization. Estreicher and Harris argue that once the pandemic subsides, U.S. policymakers should, as a matter of national security, mandate that a minimum percentage of essential supplies be manufactured domestically.

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Unconstitutional Chaos: Abortion in the Time of COVID-19

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, MARY ZIEGLER

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Florida State University law professor Mary Ziegler discuss the abortion bans implemented in several states in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Grossman and Ziegler explain why the bans are constitutional and comment on the connection between the legal challenges to those bans and the broader fight over abortion rights.

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State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Loomis

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1463

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against the Trumbull Correctional Institution and Julie Loomis, the assistant to the warden (collectively, TCI), holding that the appellate court erred in dismissing Appellant's public-records mandamus complaint. While incarcerated at the Trumbull Correction Institution, Appellant submitted a handwritten public-records request to TCI seeking legal-mailroom logs and the dates and times that the institutional inspector made rounds in the housing units for certain periods. Loomis provided copies of the portions of the requested legal-mailroom logs in which Appellant's name appeared but none of the remaining records. Appellant filed a complaint seeking to compel TCI to provide him with the rest of his requested records. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, determining that the complaint was moot because Appellant had already received all the requested records to which he was entitled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where TCI provided no evidence demonstrating that it complied with the second part of Appellant's records request, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that Appellant's claim was moot.

State ex rel. Davis v. Janas

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1462

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus against former Lorain County Court of Common Pleas Judge Thomas W. Janas, holding that Appellant's complaint sufficiently alleged that the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to change Appellant's sentence after the sentence had been affirmed on appeal. In 1994, following Appellant's conviction for aggravated murder, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison with parole eligibility after twenty years. In 2018, the Adult Parole Authority informed Appellant that the trial court had issued a nunc pro tunc entry in 1999 stating that Appellant's sentence for aggravated murder was twenty full years to life. In 2019, Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus arguing that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the nunc pro tunc entry after the court of appeals had affirmed his sentence. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant's complaint stated a meritorious claim that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to change his sentence after his sentence had been affirmed on appeal.

In re N.M.P.

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1458

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Donnelly

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court placing Mother's child in the permanent custody of the Portage County Department of Job and Family Services (the agency), holding that because the child was in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the agency was entitled to seek permanent custody. After the was found to be a dependent child the agency was given temporary custody. Later, the agency filed a motion for permanent custody of the child. After a hearing, court placed the child in the permanent custody of the agency. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue was whether, under section 2151.414(B)(1)(d), an agency may seek permanent custody of a child only if the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that permanent custody may be granted to an agency if the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month permanent and permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.

In re A.W.

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1457

Opinion Date: April 16, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court vacated the adult portion of A.W.'s juvenile disposition, holding that because the juvenile court's order invoking the adult sentence under the serious youthful offender (SYO) specification was not journalized until A.W. turned twenty-one years old, the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it entered the adult portion of the sentence. At the age of seventeen, A.W. committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of rape. The count was later amended to include an SYO specification. The court placed A.W. in custody until he would turn twenty-one years old and found A.W. to be an SYO. As A.W. neared his twenty-first birthday the State filed a motion to invoke the adult portion of his SYO sentence on the grounds that he had failed to complete "mandatory" sex-offender treatment. After a hearing, the juvenile court terminated the juvenile disposition and invoked the adult sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the juvenile court issued its order invoking the adult sentence while A.W. was twenty years old, the clerk of the court did not enter that order upon the journal until after A.W. turned twenty-one years old, depriving the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction.