Latest 4 Cases: State v. Majors (Civil Rights), State v. Fordyce (Civil Rights), Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, LLP v. Plante (Contracts)

Which Laws Apply to Broker-Dealers? Federal Laws? State Laws? Both? General Principles Leading to an Answer

TAMAR FRANKEL

BU Law emerita professor Tamar Frankel explains the law of preemption as it pertains to broker-dealers and their investor clients. She predicts, among other things, that either the clients will demand that broker-dealers adhere to a fiduciary duty, or else that states will impose that duty on them.

Read More

State v. Majors

Docket: 18-0563

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court imposing a seventeen and one-half year mandatory minimum prison term before parole eligibility on Defendant's second resentencing for attempted murder during a home invasion after considering the youth sentencing factors under State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017), holding that there was no error in the sentence and that counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the crime and was since resentenced twice, once in 2014 and once in 2018, as caselaw on juvenile sentencing evolved. In this appeal from his latest resentencing, Defendant argued that the district court failed to follow the Supreme Court's 2017 mandate to apply Roby and that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to retain a defense expert on the youth sentencing factors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors and deciding to impose the mandatory minimum sentence; and (2) Defendant's defense counsel had no duty to present a defense expert to testify regarding the Roby factors where Defendant decided to forgo retaining a defense expert.

State v. Fordyce

Docket: 17-1701

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that the district court correctly determined that Defendant was not justified in his use of deadly force because he continued the incident which resulted in the victim's death. On appeal from his conviction of voluntary manslaughter Defendant argued that he was justified in his use of deadly force. The district court rejected the argument, finding that Defendant continued the incident with the victim and could have pursued an alternative course of action by retreating. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, while Defendant did not continue the incident with the victim, Defendant was not justified in his use of self-defense because he had an alternative course of action available. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant continued the incident that resulted in the victim's death, and therefore, substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Defendant was not justified in his use of deadly force; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his due process and equal protection claims.

Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, LLP v. Plante

Docket: 19-0519

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Contracts, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury

In this action brought by a law firm seeking to enforce its payment due under a contingency fee contract the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering judgment against the family that retained the law firm for one-third of their recovery plus interest, holding that the one-third contingency fee contract was reasonable at the time of its inception. After a car accident left a motorist in critical condition, the motorist's family (Appellants) retained a law firm to represent the motorist's interests. A contingency fee contract required Appellants to pay one-third of the recovery to the law firm for attorney fees. Appellants accepted a $7.5 million offer to settle the case. When Appellants failed to pay the contingency fee the law firm brought this action to enforce its payment. Appellants argued that the one-third contingency fee contract violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a) because it was an unreasonable fee. Judgment was ordered against Appellants for one-third of the recovery plus interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the one-third contingency fee agreement was reasonable at the time of its inception; and (2) this Court will not use the noncontingency fee factors under Rule 32:1.5(a) to reevaluate the contingency fee contract from a position of hindsight.

Sahinovic v. State

Docket: 18-1911

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Edward M. Mansfield

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that the limitations period for challenging Appellant's convictions had expired and that his resentencing did not bring about a new limitations period for attacking his conviction. In 2011, Appellant pled guilty to second-degree robbery and forgery. In 2015, the district court granted Appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. Appellant was resentenced. That same, year, Appellant filed the instant petition for postconviction relief. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellant's petition was time barred under the three-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code 822.3. The district court dismissed the petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the resentencing of Defendant, which did not affect his underlying convictions, did not restart section 822.3's time clock.