One More for the Road: Why Congress Must Impeach Donald Trump (Again)

DEAN FALVY

Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, makes the case for impeaching Donald Trump again, after the failed insurrection of January 6. Falvy describes three possible ways to disempower Trump from undermining democracy in our nation and explains why immediate impeachment by the House and removal by the Senate is the most appropriate course of action.

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CHKRS, LLC v. City of Dublin, Ohio

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-3435

Opinion Date: January 4, 2021

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

CHKRS leased Friedman’s property and paid $8,500 for an option to purchase by giving 30 days’ notice. With respect to eminent-domain, the lease stated that any money from the City of Dublin was payable to Friedman “until [CHKRS] has procured on the purchase option.” Dublin was constructing a roundabout near the property. Weeks later, Dublin notified the residents that workers would be entering to construct a bike path through the leased property. Dublin initiated a “quick-take” action, adding CHKRS to the suit, and deposited $25,080. with the court. CHKRS emailed Friedman, indicating that CHKRS intended to buy the property. Ohio courts ruled that the email did not “procure” the purchase option and that Friedman was entitled to Dublin’s funds. Dublin began construction. CHKRS sued, citing the driveway's removal. In 2016, the city constructed a new driveway, which CHKRS asserts suffers from design flaws, violates building and traffic codes, creates a hazard, and limits access. CHKRS completed its purchase of the property. CHKRS filed federal litigation, asserting takings and due-process claims, seeking payment for the defective replacement driveway. CHKRS disavowed any attempt to again seek payment for the appropriation of the bike-path easements. The court held that CHKRS lacked Article III standing, reasoning that the state courts had already held that CHKRS lacked a protectable interest in the property. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Article III standing was not the correct doctrine. CHKRS established its standing by alleging a colorable interest in the property for its takings claim. The district court misread Ohio issue-preclusion law in reaching the contrary result. The court affirmed the dismissal of CHKRS’s due-process claims as forfeited.

State v. Sanschagrin

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Dockets: A19-1700, A19-1701, A19-1702, A19-1703

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Court held that a letter contesting a notice of zoning violation was not a "request" as defined by Minn. Stat. 15.99, subd. (1)(c) and therefore did not entitle respondent property owners to the benefit of the automatic approval provision in Minn. Stat. 15.99, subd. (2)(a). The automatic approval provision requires agencies to, within sixty days, approve or deny a written zoning request. Failure to deny such a request within sixty days is deemed an approval of the request. Respondents received notice of a zoning violation from the City of Shorewood after installing a dock and contested the zoning violation in a written letter to the city planning commission. The City did not respond. Thereafter, Respondents were charged by criminal complaint with two misdemeanor violations of the city code. The district court granted Respondents' pretrial motion to dismiss, concluding that Respondents' letter was a "request" under Minn. Stat. 15.99, subd. 1(c), and therefore, Respondents' request for zoning action was automatically approved by operation of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the letter was not a "request" under the statute.

Dolezal-Soukup v. Dodge County Board of Adjustment

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 308 Neb. 63

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court approving the Dodge County Board of Adjustment's grant of variance for a 4-H pigpen built in violation of county setback requirements, holding that competent evidence supported the district court's factual findings and that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in approving the variance. The variance was based on, within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 23-168.03(1)(c), peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties or exceptional and undue hardships. In affirming the Board's decision to grant a variance, the district court found that the Board's decision was reasonable, well considered, and within the Board's discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not make an error of law or abuse its discretion in determining that the narrowness or shape of the property resulted in sufficient hardship to justify upholding the Board's decision to grant the variance.

Egan v. County of Lancaster

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 308 Neb. 48

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court finding that E. Jane Egan lacked standing to challenge the Lancaster County Board of Commissioners' issuance of a special use permit allowing Randy Essink to construct and operate a poultry production facility on land within the county's agricultural zoning district and that the permit was appropriately issued, holding that the district court did not err. Egan and Janis Howlett challenged the Board's decision in the district court, asserting that the proposed poultry production facility would lead to adverse effects on the environment, properly values, public health, and local infrastructure. The district court affirmed the issuance of the special use permit, concluding that Egan did not have standing and that the permit was appropriately issued. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by failing to find that Egan had standing and finding that the special use permit was properly approved.