Latest 4 Cases: U.S. Futures Exchange, L.L.C. v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (Antitrust & Trade Regulation), Orr v. Shicker (Civil ...

What Should Democrats Do About Republicans’ Insistence on Lining Their Own Pockets With the Stimulus Plan?

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan discusses the ongoing negotiations in Congress over the stimulus bill that would purportedly start to address the present economic crisis. Buchanan argues that while Democrats are right to try to stop Republicans from writing a huge unrestricted corporate handout into the bill, they will have to agree to something quickly—and the sooner the better.

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Will Coronavirus Stop America from Carrying Out Executions?

AUSTIN SARAT

Guest columnist Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—points out one unusual effect of the COVID-19 pandemic: deferring the executions of death row inmates. Sarat observes that while past pandemics have not affected the rate at which states have executed inmates, last week the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted 60-day stays in the execution sentences of two men, and other states seem poised to follow suit.

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U.S. Futures Exchange, L.L.C. v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago

Docket: 18-3558

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation

USFE planned to offer an electronic-based futures trading platform that posed a competitive threat to exchanges using the more traditional floor-trading model, like CBOT. USFE targeted February 1, 2004, as its launch date to establish itself before several futures and options contracts expired, so that traders could transfer their business to USFE. In July 2003, USFE sought approval as a designated contract market by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The Commission solicited public comment. CBOT, another futures exchange (CME), and others raised objections. CBOT and CME successfully requested a postponement. USFE approached BOTCC to negotiate an agreement for clearing services that would have provided USFE with access to startup liquidity in the form of open interest created by market participants and held at BOTCC. CBOT also used BOTCC and proposed Rule 701.01. The Commission approved the rule, which compelled the transfer of CBOT’s open interest from BOTCC to its new, exclusive clearing partner. By draining its open contracts from BOTCC, CBOT deprived USFE of access to significant liquidity. The Commission approved USFE on February 4, 2004. USFE launched on February 8. The undertaking flopped. USFE sued under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine shields the defendants’ petitioning from antitrust scrutiny and neither exception (fraud or sham lawsuit) applies. The Commission’s explicit approval of Rule 701.01 impliedly repeals the antitrust laws, immunizing defendants against USFE’s open interest claims.

Orr v. Shicker

Dockets: 19-1380, 19-1387, 19-1732

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Class Action, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The plaintiffs, current and former inmates of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), have been diagnosed with hepatitis C. They filed suit against IDOC, Wexford (which provides inmate health services) and doctors more than 10 years ago after fruitless efforts to receive treatment for their disease while incarcerated. Their 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleges that the diagnostic and treatment protocols for IDOC inmates with hepatitis C violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of class certification and vacated a preliminary injunction. After discussing numerosity and commonality of facts and issues, the court noted that the district court failed to name a class representative or explain its omission, leaving no way to assess the adequacy of representation. On the assumption that the court would have accepted the proposed representatives, the record does not reveal whether they would be adequate. The lack of a named representative also makes it impossible to find typicality--that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” The individual plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the preliminary injunction, so it was error to grant injunctive relief.

National Immigrant Justice Center v. United States Department of Justice

Docket: 19-2088

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law, Legal Ethics

The Center lodged a FOIA request with the Department of Justice (DOJ) for records of communications between the Attorney General, the Office of the Attorney General and any Office of Immigration Litigation or Office of the Solicitor General lawyers related to 11 certified cases decided in 2002-2009. DOJ produced about 1,000 pages but withheld 4,000 pages, citing FOIA Exemption 5, which allows the withholding of agency memoranda not subject to disclosure in the ordinary course of litigation, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5). Exemption 5 encompasses the attorney work product, attorney-client, and deliberative process privileges. DOJ submitted a Vaughn index describing each document withheld, identifying documents reflecting discussions between attorneys working within different offices of issues related to immigration cases under consideration or on certification for decision by the Attorney General. The Center unsuccessfully argued that the documents contained ex parte communications outside Exemption 5's scope because the DOJ attorneys’ eventual litigation role taints the advice they provide the Attorney General at the certification stage; removal proceedings end in federal court litigation where those same attorneys are opposite the immigrant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Office of Immigration Litigation and Solicitor General attorneys do not hold interests adverse to the noncitizen at the stage at which the Attorney General certifies a case for decision. “ To conclude otherwise would chill the deliberations that department and agency heads like the Attorney General undertake in confidence to execute the weighty responsibilities of their offices.”

Hall v. City of Chicago

Docket: 19-1347

Opinion Date: March 23, 2020

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Police officers stopped the plaintiffs numerous times for violating an ordinance while they were panhandling on the streets of Chicago. During these stops, the officers typically asked the plaintiffs to produce identification and then used the provided ID cards to search for outstanding warrants for their arrest or investigative alerts. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that these checks unnecessarily prolong street stops and that the delays constitute unreasonable detentions in violation of the Fourth Amendment. They argued that Chicago maintained an unconstitutional policy or practice of performing these checks (Monell claim), citing a Chicago Police Department Special Order regulating name-checks that purportedly omitted essential constitutional limits, arguing that the Department failed to train on these same constitutional limits, and claiming that the former Superintendent promulgated an unconstitutional policy by promoting name-checks in conjunction with every street stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claims. Officers may execute a name check on an individual incidental to a proper stop under Terry v. Ohio, as long as the resulting delay is reasonable. The plaintiffs e failed to establish that they suffered an underlying constitutional violation such that Chicago can be held liable.