Can A City Refuse Land-Use Permits Because it Doesn’t Like the Federal Policies the Property Will be Used to Implement?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar explains why a local government cannot constitutionally create policy discriminating against entities that do business with the feds. Specifically, Amar discusses a situation in which the city of Farland, California, is trying to prevent a privately operated state prison facility located in that city from contracting with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

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Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC

Docket: B295439(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Judge: Nora M. Manella

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation

After Victrola filed suit against the Jaman Parties, defendants moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) based on the parties' real estate purchase agreement. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the procedural provisions of the California Arbitration Act (CAA), rather than those of the FAA, applied to its ruling on the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the parties incorporated the procedural provisions of the FAA into the agreement and thus the trial court could not look to section 1281.2(c) of the CAA to deny defendants' motion; the agreement's arbitration clause encompasses all of Victrola's claims against defendants; the FAA preempts section 1298.7 in this instance; and JP and Manheim have standing to enforce the arbitration provision. The court vacated the trial court's order, with instructions to determine whether defendants are prejudicially estopped from claiming the FAA's procedural provisions apply.

County of Humboldt v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Humboldt County

Docket: A157609(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

Government Code section 53069.4 authorizes local governments to assess administrative fines or penalties for ordinance violations. Judicial review of a final administrative decision may be obtained either by petition for writ of mandate or by a limited de novo appeal to the superior court. Humboldt County brought an enforcement action against Quezada for conditions on his property which were deemed public nuisances in violation of county ordinance. Quezada sought review of the adverse agency determination through a de novo appeal to the superior court, which reduced his penalty from $88,800 to $59,200. Although the amount in controversy exceeded the $25,000 threshold for a limited civil case, the County appealed to the appellate division of the superior court based on section 53069.4(b)(1), which provides that “a proceeding under this subdivision is a limited civil case.” The appellate division dismissed, concluding that no right to appeal exists in a code enforcement proceeding beyond section 53069.4(b) and that a superior court order after a de novo appeal under section 53069.4 is final and nonreviewable. The court of appeal directed that the appellate division vacate its order. In an unlimited civil action such as this, a final judgment from a de novo appeal to the superior court under section 53069.4 is reviewable on appeal to an intermediate appellate court, Code Civil Procedure 904.1(a)(1).

California v. Lopez

Docket: C080065(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Sharon Darlene Lopez appealed after a trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless blood draw. Police conducted the blood draw upon defendant’s arrest for driving under the influence of a controlled substance. The officer instructed defendant she was required to undergo a blood draw by the state’s implied consent law, but he did not relate the law’s admonitions regarding the consequences should she refuse the test. Defendant did not object or resist, and the draw was performed without a warrant. The trial court concluded defendant consented to the test. After review, the Court of Appeal determined substantial evidence supported the court’s ruling, so judgment was affirmed.

Becerra v. Shine

Docket: A155903(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Judge: Barbara J.R. Jones

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Trusts & Estates

The Attorney General sought an accounting relating to the Trust, alleging that Shine, a trustee, failed to fulfill his duties and failed to create a charitable organization, the “Livewire Lindskog Foundation.” The court removed without prejudice Shine and the other trustees. The other trustees were later dismissed from the case. During his trial, Shine agreed to permanently step down. Addressing whether Shine should be disgorged of fees he was paid as trustee, the court found “that Shine violated most, if not all of his fiduciary responsibilities and duties.” The court nonetheless entered judgment in favor of Shine on many of the examples of his alleged breaches because the Attorney General either failed to prove that Shine was grossly negligent or failed to prove specific damages. Based on instances in which the Attorney General met its burden of proof, the court ordered Shine to reimburse the Trust for $1,421,598. The Attorney General sought (Government Code section 12598) reasonable attorney fees and costs of $1,929,757.50. The court of appeal affirmed an award of $1,654,083.65, finding that Shine is precluded from seeking indemnification from the Trust. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to reduce the award based on the difference between the Attorney General’s goals and its results.