Latest 42 Cases This Week: Doughty v. State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire (1st Cir.), United States v. Hernandez-Roman (1st Cir.), Spanier v. ...

How Mike Huckabee and Robert Bork Could Help Center Neil Gorsuch

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb analyzes an unusual comment by former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee that a government restriction on the size of people’s Thanksgiving gathering would violate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Colb describes a similar statement (in a different context) by conservative Supreme Court nominee Robert H. Bork during his (unsuccessful) confirmation hearings in 1987 and observes from that pattern a possibility that even as unenumerated rights are eroded, the Court might be creative in identifying a source of privacy rights elsewhere in the Constitution.

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Doughty v. State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1636

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a Union's motion to dismiss two Hampshire state employees' (Appellants) complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that Appellants' claim based on Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), was not cognizable under section 1983. Appellants sought retrospective relief for themselves and other state employees who were not members of the State Employees' Association of New Hampshire (the Union) but were forced to pay "agency fees" to it prior to the decision in Janus. In Janus, the United States Supreme Court overruled its decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and held that "agency fee" arrangements violate the First Amendment. The district court granted the Union's motion to dismiss Appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly held that Appellants' damages claim failed.

United States v. Hernandez-Roman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 18-2133

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of armed bank robbery and related crimes, holding that Defendant's claims on appeal were without merit. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, armed bank robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and using, carrying or brandishing firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of eighty-seven months of imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) any constitutional shortcoming in the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) does not undermine Defendant's section 924(c) conviction.

Spanier v. Director Dauphin County Probation Services

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-2228

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: D. Michael Fisher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2001, Penn State’s former president, Spanier, and others decided not to report to state authorities suspected sexual abuse of children involving the school’s football program and Jerry Sandusky, the well-known defensive coordinator for Penn State’s football team. In 2007, Pennsylvania amended the statutory definition of child endangerment and its statute of limitations. In 2012, Spanier was charged. The jury was instructed in language that tracked the post-amendment statute. The Commonwealth argued that Spanier engaged in a course of conduct endangering child welfare until 2012, and therefore he “was charged well within the applicable statute of limitation.” In affirming Spanier’s 2017 conviction, the state court concluded that Spanier's conduct violated the 1995 statute as interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2015. The federal district court granted Spanier’s federal habeas corpus petition and vacated his conviction. The Third Circuit reversed. The Pennsylvania court’s affirmance of Spanier’s conviction, based on its conclusion that his conduct was covered by the 1995 statute was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” While that court applied state supreme court precedent post-dating the conduct in question, the supreme court’s interpretation of the statute was not unforeseeable nor indefensible.

United States v. Nasir

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 18-2888

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: Jordan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The owner told officers that he suspected Nasir used unit C69 for drug activity and provided a photograph of the inside, showing coolers and a box of baggies. The police learned that Nasir had felony drug convictions. They visited unit C69 with a drug detection dog, who positively alerted. Waiting for a search warrant, the officers stopped Nasir. In his SUV, they found a key to unit C69, which contained marijuana, scales, and packaging materials. They obtained a search warrant for Nasir’s home and any vehicles on the property. The officers found $5,000 in cash in the house and several handguns with ammunition in a Dodge parked on the property. Nasir was indicted under the crack house statute; for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; and as a felon in possession of a firearm. His motion to suppress was denied. Nasir stipulated that before the date when he allegedly possessed the firearm, he had been “convicted of a felony crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." Convicted, Nasir was sentenced as a career offender based on Virginia convictions for attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and for possession of cocaine and marijuana. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting arguments that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his crack house conviction because the section under which he was convicted does not make it unlawful to store drugs, that the officer who searched the Mercury did not have probable cause, and that a juror was avowedly partial. Career offender enhancement should not have applied; one of his convictions does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense.” The court vacated the firearm conviction; the government did not prove that Nasir knew he was a felon, as required by the Supreme Court’s 2019 Rehaif holding.

Smith v. Stein

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 18-7239

Opinion Date: December 3, 2020

Judge: Diana Jane Gribbon Motz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. The court rejected petitioner's contention that McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), extended his limitations period by recognizing a new constitutional right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Rather, the court explained that McCoy refines the Gideon rule, but it is an extension of a watershed rule rather than a watershed rule itself. Therefore, the rule announced in McCoy is not retroactively applicable on collateral review.

United States v. Ayon-Brito

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4403

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: Niemeyer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Ayon-Brito was prosecuted and convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia of reentering the U.S. without permission after having been removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). The district court had denied his pretrial motion to dismiss for improper venue. Ayon-Brito argued that although the indictment alleged that he was first “encountered” after his reentry by officers in Virginia, it also alleged, as an element of the offense, that he was “found” in the Middle District of Pennsylvania where he was first accurately identified. He argued that the crime charged was committed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, so that venue was appropriate only there; 8 U.S.C. 1329 establishes venue for a section 1326 violation in the district where the violation “occurred.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. The violation of 1326(a) was a continuing offense that began when he reentered the U.S. and continued wherever he was present until he was found and arrested. Because “found” does not itself refer to an act or conduct of the defendant, it does not describe a conduct element; the crime at issue is “being in” the U.S. If Ayon-Brito believed that he faced prejudice or inconvenience, he could have sought a transfer; he did not. He elected a bench trial in Virginia and was dealt with fairly.

United States v. Collins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4596

Opinion Date: December 3, 2020

Judge: Diana Jane Gribbon Motz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of making false statements on an ATF form (Count One) and possessing a firearm after being "adjudicated as a mental defective" (Count Two). On appeal, defendant challenged his firearms conviction, arguing that Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), renders the indictment and jury instructions deficient, that the conviction runs afoul of the Second Amendment, and that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that because defendant had notice of the allegations against him and has not demonstrated that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different without the indictment error, his challenge to the indictment cannot survive plain-error review. The court also held that the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of Count One. In doing so, it necessarily found that defendant knew he had been committed to a mental institution, satisfying Rehaif's knowledge-of-status element in Count Two. The court rejected defendant's Second Amendment claim where United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999), foreclosed his argument that his commitment under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) does not fall within the realm of ordinary 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) challenges because a different West Virginia statute, W. Va. Code 27-5-1 to -11, governs "final commitment proceedings." Rather, defendant's commitment to restore him to competency under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) falls squarely within the definition of committed as used in section 922(g)(4). Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable.

United States v. Ka

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 18-4913

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: James Andrew Wynn, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ka was convicted of possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. While serving five years of supervised release, he tested positive for drug use three times. Ka stated, in the presence of his probation officer, Padilla, and her partner, that he had been helping friends sell drugs to make money. Padilla examined Ka’s phone, finding text messages related to drug sales. Ka then signed a statement admitting to selling marijuana and cocaine with an averment that “[t]hese are my own words and [are] given voluntarily.” Ka did not invoke his right against self-incrimination. Padilla petitioned to revoke Ka’s supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e). Ka moved to suppress statements he had made to Padilla concerning his possession and sale of drugs, citing the Fifth Amendment and arguing that the “penalty exception” applied to his situation. His terms of supervision required him to “answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer” so he would have been penalized for any assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ka’s motion to suppress, having previously held that the use of compelled, self-incriminating statements in a supervised release revocation hearing does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

United States v. McCoy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Dockets: 20-6821, 20-6869, 20-6875, 20-6877

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: Pamela Harris

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motions to reduce their sentences under the First Step Act and reduce their sentences to time served. In these consolidated appeals, defendants were convicted of robberies and accompanying firearms violations under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court concluded that the district courts appropriately exercised the discretion conferred by Congress and cabined by the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court saw no error in the district courts' reliance on the length of defendants' sentences, and the dramatic degree to which they exceed what Congress now deems appropriate, in finding "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for potential sentence reductions. In this case, the district courts took seriously the requirement that they conduct individualized inquiries, basing relief not only on the First Step Act's change to sentencing law under section 924(c) but also on such factors as defendants' relative youth at the time of their offenses, their post-sentencing conduct and rehabilitation, and the very substantial terms of imprisonment they already served. The court concluded that these individualized determinations were neither inconsistent with any "applicable" Sentencing Commission guidance nor tantamount to wholesale retroactive application of the First Step Act's amendments to section 924(c).

United States v. McGrath

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4277

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Roger L. Gregory

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement that contained a waiver of appeal, to coercion and enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable and that the district court violated his due process rights. The Fourth Circuit found that defendant's challenges to his sentence fall squarely within the waiver's scope. The court explained that, by its express terms, the appeal waiver is applicable to any sentence imposed "for any reason," including "the weighing of the sentencing factors, and any constitutional challenges to the calculation and imposition of any term of imprisonment . . . ." Therefore, the appeal waiver bars any appeal of defendant's sentence based on an alleged failure to consider his nonfrivolous statistical argument or any purported due process violation. Because defendant's 264 month sentence was far below the advisory Guidelines range of life in prison, the court dismissed defendant's appeal.

Varner v. Roane

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-1350

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: James Harvie Wilkinson, III

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Varner’was having an alcoholic drink and lunch at a restaurant. Deputy Roane approached and requested that he leave the restaurant with him. Varner complied. Roane had previously arrested Varner on drug charges. Outside, Roane asked Varner to empty his pockets. Finding nothing, Roane patted Varner down. No incriminating items were found. Roane asked him to submit to a breath test. Varner stated he would not be driving and refused. K-9 officer Johnson then approached Varner’s car with a drug-sniffing dog, Zeke. Zeke and Johnson had successfully completed Police Narcotic Detection Training. Zeke gave a positive alert. Varner alleges that Johnson manufactured this alert by smacking the side of his car and that Zeke displayed erratic behavior. Johnson contradicted those assertions. No drugs were found in the car. Varner sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Varner’s claim that he had been unlawfully seized during the pat-down, reasoning that Varner had failed to demonstrate the encounter was anything but consensual. After discovery, the court granted Roane summary judgment on the remaining Fourth Amendment claim, finding no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson had manufactured Zeke’s alert. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Roane did not use or threaten force, did not restrain Varner, and did not make any misrepresentation as to a warrant. There is nothing to suggest a conspiracy to manipulate Zeke’s behavior.

United States v. Cano

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-11297

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's consecutive 24-month sentences for violating the terms of his supervised release. Defendant argued that the district court clearly gave significant weight to an improper factor—the need to promote respect for the law—because the district court "cited only this one reason when explaining its decision to impose two consecutive sentences" fifteen months above the high end of the guideline range. The court concluded that the district court's reliance on defendant's absconding in pronouncing sentence was not itself plain error. The court explained that the district court's passing reference to defendant's lack of respect for the law does not make it plain that the district court impermissibly used defendant's history of absconding. Furthermore, the court concluded that the district court's failure to consider defendant's first alleged self-surrender does not warrant reversal. Nor does the upward variance from the guidelines call into doubt the reasonableness of the sentence.

United States v. Willis

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-5229

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Willis was charged in Kentucky state court with murder, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and first-degree possession of a controlled substance. The gun charge was severed from the other charges before trial. Willis obtained a directed verdict on the drug charge and was acquitted on the murder charge; he was convicted of the lesser offense of reckless homicide and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The federal government indicted Willis as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) the following month. The Commonwealth dismissed the state gun charge. Willis filed an unsuccessful motion to dismiss for prosecutorial vindictiveness, then moved to dismiss based on double jeopardy, reasoning that he was previously convicted of committing reckless homicide with the same handgun. The district court denied that motion, holding that neither double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel applies when two sovereigns prosecute a defendant based on the same underlying conduct. Willis was not the victim of a “sham prosecution,” an exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Willis’s appeal. In addition to his double jeopardy claim being barred by the dual sovereignty doctrine, Willis did not have a colorable claim because the federal offense and the state crime have different elements.

Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-3038

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: KANNE

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Medical Malpractice

Donald has glaucoma and keratoconus, a thinning of the cornea that causes distorted vision. To treat his keratoconus, Donald had left-eye corneal transplant surgery in 2011. A few years later, Donald was convicted of drug crimes. He began his prison sentence at Illinois River Correctional Facility in 2014. His eye problems started flaring up, causing redness and poor vision. He was subsequently seen by Illinois River’s optometrists and at Illinois Eye Center several times. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with a rupture of the globe, an irreversible loss of vision in his left eye. After surgery, pathological tests revealed that the infection that led to the ruptured globe was caused by bacteria that can act very quickly and cause perforation in as few as 72 hours. Donald filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The undisputed evidence shows that the defendants did not act with deliberate indifference toward an objectively serious medical condition and the district court appropriately exercised supplemental jurisdiction to dispose of the malpractice claim.

Sanders v. Eckstein

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2596

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1995, Sanders, age 15, forcibly entered his victims’ homes while they slept, suffocated and raped them, and then robbed them. His youngest victim lived in a foster home. Another had given birth only a few weeks earlier. Sanders admitted that he committed his crimes near the first of the month, believing the victims would have just received public assistance checks. Fingerprints recovered from three homes led the police to Sanders. Charged as an adult with five counts of sexual assault and one count of armed robbery, Sanders entered an Alford plea. Wisconsin courts rejected Sanders’s argument that his Alford plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, then denied post‐conviction relief, rejecting ineffective assistance claims. In 2011, Sanders, who will be eligible for parole in 2030, sought federal habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, reviving his challenge to his Alford plea, and arguing that his sentence did not conform with the Supreme Court’s 2010 "Graham" holding, which requires that states give juvenile nonhomicide offenders “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” and that the sentencing court violated the Eighth Amendment by not considering his youth in sentencing him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Sanders, who will be eligible for parole in his early 50s, has not been denied a meaningful opportunity for release under the rule announced by the Supreme Court.

United States v. Barrett

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2254

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2016 agents found Barrett with nearly 15,000 images and 2,450 videos of child pornography. A search of his computer also uncovered a “Pedophile’s Handbook.” Barrett pled guilty to possessing child pornography under a plea agreement with a provision waiving any appellate challenge “on any ground” to “all components” of his sentence. Barrett confirmed that he understood the waiver during his plea colloquy. The district court sentenced Barrett to 97 months’ imprisonment followed by 10 years of supervised release. Barrett brought a First Amendment challenge to “Condition 31” of supervised release that will prevent him from viewing any material depicting “sexually explicit conduct,” defined in 18 U.S.C. 2256(2) to include adult pornography. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Barrett’s sentence, citing its previously-announced “clear and precise rule” that such conduct constitutes waiver, rendering the challenge unreviewable on appeal. Barrett confirmed at sentencing that he received advance notice of all 34 proposed conditions of supervised release and discussed them with his counsel. The district court invited objections; Barrett responded with several. The objections resulted in a colloquy with the judge and ended with rulings on each challenge. Barrett expressed no reservation with and asked no questions about, Condition 31. That Barrett asserts the First Amendment is irrelevant.

United States v. Holder

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-3418

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in 2008 to conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of her motion to reduce her sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Most of defendant's arguments on appeal were rejected in the Eighth Circuit's recent decisions resolving First Step Act issues. However, the court agreed with defendant's contention that the district court erred in determining her amended guidelines sentencing range under the Act. Because the record does not permit the court to determine whether this error was harmless under the Supreme Court's rigorous standard governing procedural Guidelines errors, the court remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Collazo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Dockets: 15-50509, 16-50048, 16-50117, 16-50195, 16-50345

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: Sandra Segal Ikuta

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Five defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841. The en banc court concluded that the jury instruction in this case was erroneous, clarifying the requirements for conspiracy under section 846 and the facts that trigger the penalties under section 841(b)(1)(A)–(B). The en banc court explained that to convict defendants of conspiracy under section 846 in this case, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant agreed with another person that some member of the conspiracy would commit a section 841(a) offense, and that each defendant had the requisite intent necessary for a section 841(a) conviction. The en banc court further explained that a defendant convicted of conspiracy under section 846 is subject to a penalty under section 841(b)(1)(A)–(B) if the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the underlying section 841(a)(1) offense involved the drug type and quantity set forth in section 841(b)(1)(A)–(B). The government does not have to prove that the defendant had any knowledge or intent with respect to those facts. The en banc court clarified that a conviction under section 846 does not require proof of a level of criminal intent greater than that required for the underlying offense merely because it is a conspiracy conviction. The en banc court overruled United States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1993), and its progeny to the extent they depart from this decision. In this case, the erroneous jury instructions could amount to harmless error if there was overwhelming evidence that each defendant entered into an agreement involving the requisite drug type and quantity. Given the numerous issues raised on appeal and the extensive record from the ten-day jury trial, the en banc court found it appropriate to return this case to the three-judge panel to reconsider both the harmless error issue and the balance of the issues raised by the parties in light of this opinion, and to enter an appropriate judgment.

United States v. Lozoya

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 17-50336

Opinion Date: December 3, 2020

Judge: Mark J. Bennett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The en banc court affirmed defendant's conviction for misdemeanor assault within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Defendant was traveling on a commercial flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles when she argued with another passenger and slapped him in the face. The en banc court held that venue for in-flight federal offenses is proper in the district where a plane lands. The en banc court explained that, for crimes committed on planes in flight, the Constitution does not limit venue to the district directly below the airspace where the crime was committed, and thus venue "shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." The en banc court joined the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and concluded that the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) applies to federal crimes committed on commercial aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Such in-flight crimes are covered by section 3237(a) and may be prosecuted in the flight's landing district.

United States v. Price

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 15-50556

Opinion Date: November 27, 2020

Judge: Kim McLane Wardlaw

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, and filed an Amended Opinion and Concurrence. The panel affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for knowingly engaging in sexual contact with another person without that other person's permission on an international flight, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2244(b). The panel rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred in giving the Ninth Circuit Model Instruction on the elements of section 2244(b), which does not require that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant subjectively knew that his victim did not consent to his conduct. The panel rejected defendant's reading of the statute as contrary to its text, the structure of the statutory scheme and its very purpose in penalizing those who sexually prey upon victims on the seas or in the air within federal jurisdiction. Because unwanted sexual contact of the type defendant engaged in—touching first, and asserting later that he "thought" the victim consented—is precisely what section 2244(b) criminalizes, the panel rejected defendant's claim of instructional error. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), does not alter the panel's conclusion. The panel also concluded that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, that he was properly Mirandized, and that the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to read back to the jury portions of the victim's testimony.

United States v. Gomez-Arzate

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-2119

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-Appellants Guillermo Martinez-Torres and Jesus Gomez-Arzate entered conditional pleas of guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, reserving a right to appeal the district court’s denial of their motions to suppress physical evidence and statements made during a traffic stop. Each was sentenced to 63 months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release. On appeal, they contend that their initial traffic stop was invalid, the resulting detention was unlawfully extended and without valid consent, and the deputies’ search of their car exceeded the scope of consent. After review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed.

United States v. Tignor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-1158

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: Robert Edwin Bacharach

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Scott Tignor pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. At the time he pled guilty, Tenth Circuit case law held a person would incur guilt by knowingly possessing a firearm after obtaining a felony conviction. Under this law, defendants would remain guilty even if they had not known that their prior convictions involved felonies. Soon after the guilty plea, the case law changed when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), which held the government needed to prove that the defendant knew his status prohibited possession of a firearm. Given that holding, in this case, the government needed t prove Tignor had known his prior conviction was punishable by more than a year in prison. Invoking Rehaif, Tignor asked the Tenth Circuit to vacate his guilty plea because he wasn’t told about the newly recognized element. For this issue, the parties agreed that the plain-error standard applied. Under this standard, the Tenth Circuit considered whether Tignor showed a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if he’d known that the government needed to prove knowledge of his prohibited status. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Tignor lacked a plausible defense, and affirmed his conviction.

Nance v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 20-11393

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Georgia's lethal injection protocol, as applied to his unique medical situation, violates the Eighth Amendment and that the firing squad is a readily available alternative. At issue was whether a method-of-execution claim that would have the necessary effect of preventing the prisoner's execution should be brought as a civil rights action under section 1983, or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing the complaint as untimely and held that a section 1983 claim for relief that would prevent a state from executing a prisoner under present law must be reconstrued as a habeas petition. Because plaintiff's requested relief would prevent the State from executing him, implying the invalidity of his death sentence, it is not cognizable under section 1983 and must be brought in a habeas petition. Furthermore, because the petition is second or successive, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In this case, plaintiff did not move this court for permission to file his petition and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction.

United States v. Bobal

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-10678

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempting to persuade a minor to engage in sexual activity and committing a felony involving a minor while required to register as a sex offender. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied defendant's motion for a new trial where neither of the prosecutor's two statements at closing were improper. Even if the statements were improper, the district court cured the problem. The court also held that a restriction on computer usage as a special condition of a lifetime term of supervised release is not plainly unconstitutional. Furthermore, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), was distinguishable from this case because defendant's computer restriction does not extend beyond his term of supervised release. Rather, it is tailored to defendant's offense and he can obtain the district court's approval to use a computer for permissible reasons.

United States v. Johnson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-10915

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: Rosenbaum

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Recently, in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019), the Supreme Court clarified that a domestic-violence misdemeanant does not violate the prohibition on firearm possession if he does not know he is a domestic violence misdemeanant at the time he possesses a gun. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that a person knows he is a domestic violence misdemeanant, for Rehaif purposes, if he knows all the following: (1) that he was convicted of a misdemeanor crime; (2) that to be convicted of that crime, he must have engaged in at least "the slightest offensive touching;" United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 163 (2014), and (3) that the victim of his misdemeanor crime was, as relevant here, his wife. In this case, the record establishes that defendant knew all of these things at the time he was found in possession of a gun. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's challenge to his conviction for being a domestic-violence misdemeanant while possessing a firearm and affirmed the conviction. The court also found no merit in defendant's equal protection and Commerce Clause arguments.

United States v. Watkins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-14336

Opinion Date: December 3, 2020

Judge: Edward Earl Carnes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Law enforcement agents had placed a GPS tracking device in two packages after finding cocaine hidden in them. The agents put both packages into the mail stream and attempted to track the packages. Even assuming the warrantless monitoring of the GPS tracking device signal from the package once it entered the house was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the court held that there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered anyway. The court explained that the evidence incriminating defendant would have been discovered through ongoing investigation and the pursuit of leads that were already in the possession of the agents at the time the device started functioning and they monitored it. In this case, defendant was the lead suspect; the agents had already looked up information about her and had obtained her address; they were discussing doing a knock and talk at her house, which would not have required a search warrant; at the moment the tracking device reactivated, they were actively discussing doing it; and it is not as if the knock and talk is a novel or unfamiliar investigative technique: collectively the agents had done hundreds of them.

In re Long

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S249274

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Goodwin Liu

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal reversing the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and reinstating Defendant's conviction, holding that trial counsel rendered objectively deficient performance that prejudiced Defendant's case. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years to life. Defendant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant had stated a prima facie case for relief and issued an order to show cause. The trial court vacated Defendant's conviction, finding that Defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The court of appeal reversed, finding no deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that counsel's failure to investigate the victim's time of death, in a case where the timeline was crucial, was an error sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

People v. Turner

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S154459

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Carol Corrigan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of fetal murder and affirmed his convictions of ten counts of murder, holding that hearsay was improperly admitted on the question of fetal viability. Defendant was convicted of murdering ten women and one viable fetus and sentenced to death. The primary issues on appeal were whether the trial court erred in admitting statistical evidence about the significance of DNA matches and in admitting hearsay testimony about the fetus's viability. The Supreme Court reversed the fetal murder conviction and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the challenged testimony admitted in this case was hearsay, and the error in admitting the testimony was prejudicial; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error.

In re D.H.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E074178(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: Carol D. Codrington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Defendant-appellant D.H. (minor) had a history of defiant and criminal behavior, resulting in him being placed on formal probation in two juvenile delinquency matters. Throughout his probationary period, D.H. violated the law and the terms and conditions of his probation. While still on probation, the juvenile court dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions and terminated D.H.'s probation as unsuccessfully completed based on a joint request from the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) and the probation department to transfer jurisdiction to the dependency court under section 300. D.H. requested the juvenile court seal his section 602 juvenile delinquency records, and the juvenile court denied his request. On appeal, D.H. argued the juvenile court was required to seal his records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 (e). Alternatively, he contended the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion to seal his records under section 786(a). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

People v. Abbate

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A152421(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 3, 2020

Judge: Fujisaki

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Abbate was convicted of second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit a felony by active street gang participants, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court of appeal remanded to allow the trial court an opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion under Senate Bill 620, to strike the firearm enhancement as to count 1. The court upheld the admission of evidence of a prior murder under Evidence Code section 1101(b); the evidence had substantial probative value with respect to establishing Abbate’s intent to kill and was no more inflammatory than the charged murder. Section 182.5, which criminalizes participation in a criminal street gang conspiracy, is not void for vagueness and does not violate the principle of personal guilt. The jury instructions permitted a murder conviction if Abbate aided and abetted the commission of, or conspired to commit, murder or an assault with a firearm, the natural and probable consequence of which was murder. About a year after Abbate was sentenced, Senate Bill 1437 “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine ... to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” Relief under SB 1437 must be obtained via the statutory petitioning procedure set out in section 1170.95.

People v. Avila

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B294632(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Dhanidina

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted robbery and attempted extortion, and his sentence of 25 years to life plus 14 years. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's Romero motion to strike a prior conviction. In this case, defendant's prior strikes were remote and committed when he was of diminished culpability based on his age, a factor the trial court erroneously concluded was inapplicable to the formulation of his sentence. Furthermore, despite the trial court's characterization of the facts, defendant's current offenses were not violent and, on the spectrum of criminal behavior, fall closer to the end of less reprehensible conduct. The court also held that the sentence imposed on defendant is cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution. The court considered the Lynch technique and concluded that defendant's sentence lacks proportionality to his crimes. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing with the direction to the trial court to strike two of defendant's prior strike convictions and to reconsider his sentence.

People v. Griffin

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A159104(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Simons

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A 2018 complaint charged Griffin with possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of materials with the intent to make an explosive, and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person. A 2019 complaint charged entry with intent to commit larceny, malicious destruction of personal property, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and assault with a firearm, with allegations that Griffin personally discharged a firearm and that two prior prison term enhancements applied, based on convictions for weapons offenses. Another 2019 complaint charged Griffin with felony transportation of methamphetamine with intent to sell, other drug crimes, and extortion, alleging two prior prison terms. In two cases Griffin pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance for sale. In the third case, Griffin pled no contest to burglary and admitted a prior prison term. The stipulated term comprised six years for burglary and a one-year Penal Code 667.5 prison term enhancement. The court imposed the sentences in October 2019. Senate Bill 136, effective January 2020, eliminated section 667.5(b)'s enhancement for prior prison terms except those based on sexually violent offenses. The court of appeal reversed the sentence. The enactment is retroactive. The prosecution may withdraw from the plea agreement but it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to impose a longer sentence than the original agreement if a new plea agreement is entered.

State v. Rivera

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20277

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: D’Auria

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's conviction of breach of the peace in the second degree, criminal mischief in the third degree, and threatening in the second degree, holding that there was no error. On appeal, Defendant argued that the Appellate Court erred in determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Defendant from cross-examining the state's key witness about the facts underlying the witness's prior misdemeanor convictions. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the facts underlying the witness's prior misdemeanor conviction were not relevant to veracity, motive, intent, or a common scheme or pattern; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding this evidence.

People v. Knapp

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 124992

Opinion Date: December 3, 2020

Judge: Thomas L. Kilbride

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Knapp and Rodriguez were charged with attempted first-degree murder, mob action, and aggravated battery in connection with the stabbing of Avitia, who survived the attack and identified the assailants. At a McHenry County jury trial, the prosecution argued that the defendants were members of the Norteños street gang and that they attacked Avitia based on his alleged association with a rival street gang. At the state’s request, the court admonished Knapp concerning his right to testify. Knapp acknowledged that he had discussed the issue with his attorney and made a choice not to testify. On appeal, Knapp unsuccessfully argued that his counsel was ineffective because counsel “elicited inadmissible other crimes evidence that was similar to the charged offense and also false” and failed to “pursue a ruling on the State’s motion to introduce gang evidence or renew his objection to the admission of such evidence.” Knapp then filed a pro se post-conviction petition, raising claims of actual innocence, involuntary waiver of his right to testify, and ineffective assistance. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the summary dismissal of the petition. While a pro se petitioner is not required to use precise legal language alleging a “contemporaneous assertion of the right to testify” to survive first-stage summary dismissal, summary dismissal is warranted when the record positively rebuts the allegations. The record contains nothing to suggest that Knapp ever alerted the court of his desire to testify, that he had any questions about that right, or that he otherwise was unsure about waiving his right to testify.

People v. Reed

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 124940

Opinion Date: December 3, 2020

Judge: Lloyd A. Karmeier

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Reed was charged with armed violence, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Reed agreed to plead guilty to armed violence in exchange for a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. As its factual basis, the prosecution averred that Officer Daniels would testify that Reed fled and entered a house; Daniels followed, locating a shotgun and cocaine. The shotgun had Reed’s DNA on it. The court confirmed the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily and accepted the plea. Reed’s initial post-conviction petition, asserting actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel, was summarily dismissed. Reed sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, alleging that he did not reside at the residence in which the gun and drugs were found and did not know what was within that residence. No DNA links Reed to the drugs. The gun was found not on his person but under the bed in a different room. Reed attached an affidavit in which Callaway averred that he owned the cocaine and that Reed had no knowledge of its presence. Callaway wrote the affidavit after he was imprisoned with Reed. The court denied Reed’s petition, finding Callaway’s testimony new but not credible. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, first holding that a plea agreement does not preclude a subsequent claim of actual innocence. Pleas are no more foolproof than trials. The factual basis to support a plea requires only a basis from which the court could reasonably conclude that defendant actually committed the acts constituting the offense. Reed, however, did not provide new, material, noncumulative evidence that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that a trial would probably result in acquittal.

Johnson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 20S-CR-655

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: Mark S. Massa

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of "dealing in a look-a-like substance," a level five felony under Ind. Code 35-48-4-4.6, holding that trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. At a casino, Defendant offered to sell a substance to a stranger, who reported the incident. Thereafter, a Gaming Enforcement Agent led Defendant to an interview room and proceeded to pat him down. The trial court admitted the evidence discovered as a result of the pat down. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the search and seizure proceeded within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence obtained as a result.

Commonwealth v. Chesko

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12030

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err by not providing, sua sponte, an instruction on felony murder in the second degree; (2) the admission of Defendant's cell site location information did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to admit privileged psychiatric records; (4) there was no prejudicial error in the judge's decision prohibiting Defendant from eliciting certain testimony as hearsay on cross-examination; (5) the judge did not err in instructing the jury on inferences; (6) trial counsel provided effective assistance; and (7) there was no reason for the Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce Defendant's verdict or order a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Henderson

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-11702

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and unlawful possession of a firearm, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below. On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, that the judge erred in allowing the introduction of certain evidence, and that the judge abused his discretion in allowing the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) there was no reversible error from the admission of the challenged evidence; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that Defendant did not establish a prima facie case of excluding black jurors; and (4) there was no basis for the Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E.

Commonwealth v. Wilson

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-11985

Opinion Date: November 30, 2020

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and improper disposition of a human body, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his cell site information (CSLI) because it was obtained by police without a warrant and that a subsequent search pursuant to a warrant for the same information was tainted by the initial warrantless search. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in failing to suppress Defendant's CSLI, and the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial and for an evidentiary hearing on this same basis; (2) trial counsel's failure to move to suppress the fruits of the initial illegal search did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (3) there was no reason to grant a new trial or set aside the jury's verdict under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E.

New Hampshire v. Fay

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2018-0402

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Christina Fay appealed her convictions on seventeen counts of cruelty to animals. The Wolfeboro Police Department executed a search warrant at defendant’s residence in June 2017 with the aid of the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) and others, pursuant to which over seventy Great Danes were seized. One of defendant's employees informed the police that there were seventy-eight dogs living at the residence. She stated that the dogs rarely went outside and were not housebroken, and that the residence was covered in animal waste. She reported that the dogs only received water when they were let outside, but that it was not uncommon for the dogs to remain inside for an entire weekend. She also stated that the dogs were fed spoiled meat, and that many vomited often, were underweight, and had liquid stool. In addition, the employee stated that there were riding crops located throughout the house to break up fights among the dogs, and that one dog would bite anyone other than defendant who got near it. Because police did not have resources to execute a search warrant and seizing seventy-eight dogs, HSUS was called to assist in the search. Every member of the police department, the Wolfeboro Fire Department, members of the ambulance team, employees from other town agencies, and staff from HSUS and the Pope Memorial SPCA, executed the warrant on June 16, 2017. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search, arguing, among other things, that HSUS’s involvement violated her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. After a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.

State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-5452

Opinion Date: December 1, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting the motion filed by Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas judge William T. McGinty to dismiss Appellants' action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent McGinty from enforcing a discovery order, holding that a writ of prohibition was not the correct mechanism to challenge Judge McGinty's order. Kaylynn Counts, who allegedly assaulted Appellants, was awaiting trial before Judge McGinty when she filed a motion requesting an order allowing her to inspect and photograph Appellants' home to aid in "forensically recreating the incident" for her case. Judge McGinty granted the motion. Appellants then filed this action, arguing that Marsy's Law and the Fourth Amendment deprived Judge McGinty of the authority to issue the order permitting Counts and the defense team to have access to Appellants' residence. The court of appeals dismissed the prohibition action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while crime victims have a right under the Ohio Constitution to judicial review of discovery orders affecting their Marcy's Law rights, a writ of prohibition was not the appropriate remedy to challenge Judge McGinty's discovery order, and moreover, Appellants had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of an appeal.

Steele v. Harris

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-5480

Opinion Date: December 2, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. Appellant, an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional Institution, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his transfer from juvenile court to adult court was void and that, therefore, his resulting convictions were also void. The court of appeals held that Appellant's conviction was barred by res judicata. Further, the court rejected Appellant's claim on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on this Court's decision in Smith v. May, 148 N.E.3d 542, Appellant failed to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus.