New York Sues the Trump Administration Over “Trusted Traveler” Eligibility

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on New York’s lawsuit against the federal government over the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to exclude New York residents from eligibility for Trusted Traveler programs. Dorf describes some of the interesting legal questions the lawsuit raises in terms of administrative law, judicial standing, and constitutional law.

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33 Carpenters Construction, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.

Docket: 17-1979

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Contracts, Insurance Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati Insurance Company in this insurance dispute, holding that, for the reasons set forth in 33 Carpenters Construction, Inc. v. State Farm Life & Casualty Co., __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), an assignment contract entered into by a residential contractor acting as an unlicensed public adjuster is void under Iowa Code 103A.71(5). After a hailstorm and windstorm damaged Gregg Whigham's residence, Whigham and 33 Carpenters Construction, Inc. entered into an agreement under which 33 Carpenters would repair the damage in exchange for Wigham's insurance proceeds. A 33 Carpenters representative and Whigham then signed an assignment of claim and benefits. Later, 33 Carpenters sued Whigham's insurer, Cincinnati, claiming that Cincinnati breached the insurance policy by failing to by 33 Carpenters all benefits due and owing under the policy that had been assigned to it. The district court granted summary judgment to Cincinnati, concluding that the purported assignment of Whigham's insurance claim was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because 33 Carpenters was operating as an unlicensed public adjuster, the assignment contract was unenforceable.

33 Carpenters Construction, Inc. v. IMT Insurance Co.

Docket: 19-0678

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Contracts, Insurance Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of an insurer on the grounds that the plaintiff's contractual assignment was unenforceable, holding that a residential contractor acting as an unlicensed public adjuster cannot enforce its post-loss contractual assignment of insurance benefits against the homeowner's insurer. The contractor in this case represented homeowners as an assignee of their insurance claim for storm damage to their home. The district court concluded that the contractor's contractual assignment was invalid because the contractor acted as an unlicensed public adjuster. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in ruling that the contractor acted as an unlicensed public adjuster and that the assignment contract was void and unenforceable under Iowa Code 103A.71(5).

33 Carpenters Construction, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

Docket: 18-1354

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Contracts, Insurance Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for an insurer on the grounds that the plaintiff's contractual assignment was unenforceable, holding that a residential contractor acting as an unlicensed public adjuster cannot enforce its postloss contractual assignment of insurance benefits against the homeowner's insurer. Iowa Code 103A.71(5) declares void contracts entered into by residential contractors who perform public adjuster services without the license required under Iowa Code 522C.4. The contractor in this case represented homeowners as an assignee of their insurance claim for hail damage to their home. The district court concluded that the contractor's contractual assignment was invalid under section 103A.71(5) because the contractor acted as an unlicensed public adjuster. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in ruling that the contractor acted as an unlicensed public adjuster and that the assignment contract was unenforceable and void under Iowa law.

In re 2018 Grand Jury of Dallas County v. Doe

Docket: 18-1534

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Brent R. Appel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this appeal challenging several district court rulings in a grand jury proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court, holding that the State cannot subpoena a criminal defense expert but that the prosecution's contact with the expert does not merit recusal and that there was no basis to quash the grand jury proceeding. Before the grand jury proceedings, the prosecutor contacted an expert witness retained by John Doe, who faced possible criminal charges, and asked the expert her opinions about the matter. When the expert declined to substantively respond, the prosecutor served the expert with a subpoena to appear before the grand jury. Doe moved to quash the subpoena and to disqualify the prosecutor from the proceeding. Doe also sought to quash the grand jury proceedings. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in not quashing the grand jury subpoena of Defendant's retained expert; (2) the issuance of the subpoena did not amount to the kind of misconduct that requires the disqualification of the prosecutor; and (3) the district court did not err in declining to quash the grand jury.

Irland v. Iowa Board of Medicine

Docket: 18-0353

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision affirming the district court's dismissal of a physician's petition for judicial review of the Iowa Board of Medicine's decision to use a "confidential letter of warning" to impose conditions on the physician's return to the practice of medicine over his objection, without a finding of probable cause, and without judicial review, holding that the district court erred by ruling that the Board's letter was not judicially reviewable. Before the physician voluntarily ceased practicing medicine the Board had opened an investigation into the physician. The Board closed the investigation without a finding of probable cause that the physician had violated any rule or standard of practice. In its letter, the Board told the physician that if he returned to practicing medicine he must complete a comprehensive clinical competency evaluation. The physician sought judicial review, contending that the Board's letter constituted illegal agency action. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the letter was not a disciplinary sanction subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court vacated the decision, holding that the Board's letter was subject to judicial review because the physician was aggrieved by the Board's action where he was unable to resume practicing his profession without triggering the competency evaluation.