Not Letting Felons Vote Damages Democracy for All Citizens

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat— Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—argues that disenfranchising felons, as most American states do in some way, does substantial harm to everyone in our democracy. Sarat praises a recent decision by a federal district court in Florida striking down a state law requiring people with serious criminal convictions to pay court fines and fees before they can register to vote, but he cautions that but much more needs to be done to ensure that those who commit serious crimes can exercise one of the essential rights of citizenship.

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Eloquence Corp. v. Home Consignment Center

Docket: A156925(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Fujisaki

Areas of Law: Business Law, Commercial Law, Contracts

Under a 2008 consignment agreement, Eloquence would consign jewelry and loose diamonds to HCC for resale. HCC was to send a monthly sales report of each item sold. Upon receipt of that report, Eloquence would prepare an invoice setting forth the payment due from HCC. The Agreement required HCC to pay the invoices within 30 days and provided for a bi-annual reconciliation of the inventory of consigned goods. Following a reconciliation, two invoices dated November 10, 2009, identified “items reported as missing” from an HCC store: 16 pieces of jewelry ($64085). Eloquence gave HCC a five-month extension for payment. Delivery of consigned goods to HCC continued for seven years, totaling $616,633.30 in sales invoices. In 2017, Eloquence sued HCC and its general partners, asserting “breach of written agreement” and “open book account” by failing to pay the November 2009 invoices, in the total amount of $64,085 and that it “furnished to HCC, at its request, on an open book account, merchandise of the agreed value of $64,085. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment. Eloquence’s breach of contract cause of action time-barred because the agreement contemplated a series of discrete transactions each evidenced by a separate invoice. The doctrine of continuous accrual applies; the statute of limitations expired in May 2014. There was no agreement by the parties to enter into an open book accountt.

Hester v. Public Storage

Docket: G057335(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

Plaintiff David Hester was a reality television star on “Storage Wars.” Plaintiff made the winning bid and purchased the contents of a self-storage unit at an auction held by defendant, Public Storage. Defendant learned it had mistakenly sold the goods about half an hour after the sale was complete. The unit’s occupant had paid his past due rent weeks before the auction, but defendant’s computer system incorrectly marked the unit for sale. Due to this error, defendant immediately rescinded the deal based on two documents plaintiff had signed that contained clauses allowing defendant to void the sale for any reason. Plaintiff claimed defendant’s rescission was invalid and sued for breach of contract and conversion, among other claims. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the contract and conversion claims on grounds it had properly voided the sale under the null and void clauses. The trial court granted defendant’s motion. Plaintiff appealed, arguing summary judgment was inappropriate because the null and void clauses were invalid because: (1) they were precluded by various statutes governing self-storage auction sales; and (2) he agreed to them under duress. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed, and rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant was required to file an unlawful detainer action to retake possession of the purchased goods after it rescinded the sale.

In re B.J.

Docket: B293545(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Welfare and Institutions Code section 733, subdivision (c), is clear: DJJ commitment is permitted only if the minor's most recent offense is listed in Penal Code section 290.008, subdivision (c), or Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal vacated the commitment order, because the latest offense defendant committed is listed in neither statute. In this case, defendant committed kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking, kidnapping to commit robbery, second degree robbery, and unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. Prosecutors also alleged that defendant restricted or obstructed a peace officer later the same night. The court remanded for a new dispositional hearing.

Boermeester v. Carry

Docket: B290675(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Tricia A. Bigelow

Areas of Law: Education Law

After plaintiff was expelled from USC for committing intimate partner violence against Jane Roe, he petitioned for writ of administrative mandate to set aside the expulsion. The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court's denial of plaintiff's petition, holding that USC's disciplinary procedures at the time were unfair because they denied plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine critical witnesses at an in-person hearing. The court explained that, at bottom, this case rests on witness credibility. Given the conflicting statements, the court could not say that the record contains such overwhelming evidence as to render harmless the errors identified in this case. Therefore, the court remanded with directions to the superior court to grant the petition for writ of administrative mandate.

Valero Refining Co. v. Bay Area Air Quality

Docket: A151004(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 28, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

An oil refinery, Valero, undertook a three-year construction project to comply with a consent decree with the federal government and to upgrade its facility. The project resulted in a significant reduction in air pollution. After the construction, Valero sought approval from the regional air quality management district to bank the resulting emissions reductions as environmental credits. It was denied a significant portion of the requested credits. The superior court set aside the hearing board’s decision, holding that the board did not apply the correct standard of review in declining to consider evidence that denial of the banking application was “unfair” under the circumstances. The court of appeal reversed. The agency official charged with considering the application in the first instance denied the credits; applying a local air district regulation that prescribes the methodology for measuring emissions reductions, the official calculated a significantly lower reduction in air pollution than the refinery calculated. The hearing board upheld that interpretation of the regulation; its standard of review neither requires nor empowers it to consider whether applying the regulation to the particular case is "fair." The board is limited to a quasi-judicial inquiry entailing the exercise of its independent judgment to decide if the agency official’s interpretation of the regulation was correct. The board could, and did, appropriately consider Valero’s evidence regarding the fairness of applying the regulation to Valero in addressing Valero’s claim that the district was equitably estopped from applying it.