Why It is Unconstitutional for State Bars, When Doling out Bar-Exam Seats, to Favor In-State Law Schools

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar explains why it is unconstitutional for state bars to favor in-state law schools when deciding who may sit for the state bar exam while complying with social distancing requirements, based on the Supreme Court’s precedents on the dormant Commerce Clause.

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Gateway Hospitality Group Inc. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co.

Citation: 2020 MT 125

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: James A. Rice

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law

The Supreme Court accepted supervisory control over this matter and affirmed the district court's ruling denying Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the district court did not err by holding that Montana had specific personal jurisdiction over Philadelphia under Montana's long arm statute and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the underlying action, Appellees were sued for failing to distribute to employees eighteen to twenty percent service charges (the Walter Class Action). Appellees submitted a claim to Philadelphia requesting defense and indemnity, but Philadelphia denied the claim. After Appellees settled the Walter Class Action and paid the judgment entered against them Appellees brought suit against Philadelphia arguing that Philadelphia had a duty to defend them in the Walter Class Action. Philadelphia filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the case qualifies for and merits review pursuant to the Court's constitutional power of supervisory control; and (2) a Montana court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Philadelphia regarding Plaintiffs' claims.

State v. Trujillo

Citation: 2020 MT 128

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Sandefur

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for attempted deliberate homicide and evidence tampering, both felonies, holding that the district court did not commit plain error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not commit plain error by not intervening sua sponte to limit or cure the State's closing argument that Defendant's failure to retreat or summon police prior to using deadly force was unreasonable; (2) the district court did not commit plain error by not intervening sua sponte to limit or cure the State's closing and rebuttal argument references to Defendant's post-Miranda silence; and (3) the State's closing argument regarding an alternative factual basis for the evidence tampering charge did not effect an improper de facto amendment of the substance of the charging information.

Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC

Citation: 2020 MT 131

Opinion Date: May 20, 2020

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court accepted a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and answered that, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils do not constitute "minerals" for the purpose of a mineral reservation. Mary Ann and Lige Murray owned the surface estate of sizable property in Garfield County. The mineral estate was held by BEJ Minerals, LLC and RTWF LLC (collectively, BEJ). The Murrays found and excavated several valuable dinosaur fossils on their property. When BEJ claimed an ownership interest in the fossils the Murrays sought a declaratory judgment affirming that the fossils were owned solely by the Murrays. BEJ filed a counterclaim requesting a declaratory judgment that, under Montana law, the fossils were "minerals" and thus part of the mineral estate. The federal district court granted summary judgment to the Murrays. On appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed. The Murrays then filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The Ninth Circuit certified the question to the Supreme Court for resolution under Montana law. The Supreme Court "decline[d] to stretch the term 'mineral' so far outside its ordinary meaning as to include dinosaur fossils," concluding that, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils do not constitute "minerals" for the purpose of a mineral reservation.

In re C.S.

Citation: 2020 MT 127

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, C.S., holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the proceedings below. After a hearing, the district court implicitly determined C.S. was an abused or neglected child, found the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division, need not make reasonable efforts to provide preservation or reunification services due to Mother's chronic, severe neglect of C.S., and terminated Mother's parental rights to C.S. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) C.S. was properly determined to be an abused or neglected child; and (2) Mother was not denied due process in determining reunification efforts were not necessary and terminating Mother's parental rights to C.S. due to chronic and severe neglect.

In re D.D.

Citation: 2020 MT 126

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the termination of Mother's parental rights to her child, D.D., holding that D.D. was not an abused or neglected child as provided in Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-102(2)(a), (7)(a)(i)-(iii) and (21)(a)(i)-(vi), and therefore, the district court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights to D.D. D.D. was residing with his father and had not been in Mother's care for nearly eight years when the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division filed is petition for termination of Mother's parental rights. At the close of a hearing, the district court implicitly determined D.D. was an abused or neglected child, found the Department need not make reasonable efforts to provide preservation or reunification services, and terminated Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because D.D. was not residing with mother at the time of her alleged neglectful conduct and was not at risk of doing so, D.D. was not an abused or neglected child.