Latest 5 Cases: Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus (Civil Procedure), State v. Chapman (Civil Rights), State v. Fazenbaker (Criminal Law)

Joe, Joey, Joe-Baby, Sexist: Where’s Your Imposter Syndrome?

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman responds to a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed criticizing soon-to-be First Lady Jill Biden for using the academic title she earned. Professor Grossman dissects the op-ed, penned by a retired lecturer at Northwestern University, and explains the deep and pervasive sexism behind it.

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Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6724

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Maureen O'Connor

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Appellants - Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. and Buckeye Firearms Foundation, Inc. - did not have standing to bring an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Appellees - the City of Columbus and a Columbus City attorney (collectively, the City) - regarding two firearm-related ordinances that Appellants alleged were unlawful, holding that Appellants did not establish standing in this case. Appellants filed a complaint seeking an injunction against enforcement of the ordinances as unconstitutional, arguing that the ordinances are preempted by Ohio Rev. Code 9.68 and seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinances violate section 9.68. The trial court found one ordinance to be unconstitutional and granted a permanent injunction enjoining its enforcement but denied injunctive relief regarding the other ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant failed to establish that they had standing under Ohio Rev. Code 733.59, Ohio Rev. Code 9.68, or Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 2721. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not establish standing under section 9.68, section 733.58, or Chapter 2721 to challenge the ordinances.

State v. Chapman

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6730

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: DeWine

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court held that a condition of community control imposed on Defendant that Defendant "make all reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating a woman" during his sentence was not reasonably related to the goals of community control, nor was it reasonably tailored to avoid impinging Defendant's liberty no more than necessary. Defendant was convicted of several felony counts of nonsupport of dependents. Defendant's sentence included the anti-procreation condition at issue. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the anti-procreation prohibition impermissibly infringed upon Defendant's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the condition unnecessarily imagined upon Defendant's liberty, and therefore, the trial court must remove the anti-procreation condition but may impose other conditions that are appropriately tailored to the goals of community control.

State v. Fazenbaker

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6731

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Donnelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that entering a recreational travel trailer to commit theft does not constitute breaking and entering if the trailer is winterized, covered, and stored, holding that, contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, such a structure is an "unoccupied structure" for the purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2911.13(A). Defendant was convicted of breaking and entering under 2911.13(A). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trailer that Defendant broke into did not constitute an unoccupied structure for the purposes of the statute because it was not being "maintained" for residential use when the crime occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the recreational travel trailer was manufactured for overnight accommodation, the fact that it was not occupied at the time of Defendant's theft rendered it an unoccupied structure rather than a nonstructure; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals erred in reversing Defendant's conviction and sentence based on insufficient evidence of the "unoccupied structure" element in section 2911.13(A).

State v. Jones

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6729

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Maureen O'Connor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals vacating Defendants' sentences for involuntary manslaughter for the death of their adopted daughter, holding that the court of appeals did not have the authority to review the trial court's findings. Defendants were convicted of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to ten years in prison. The court of appeals vacated the sentences and remanded the cases for resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in holding that Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to review whether the record supports findings under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.11 and 2929.12; and (2) the judgment of the court of appeals vacating Defendants' sentences was not justified under section 2953.08(G)(2).

State v. Simpson

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6719

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Judith L. French

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, holding that the court of appeals applied the correct standard when it considered the application. On appeal, Appellant asked that the Supreme Court revisit the standard that Ohio courts of appeals must apply when considering applications for reopening. The Supreme Court declined to do so and (1) reaffirmed that the two-pronged standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which the Supreme Court adopted in State v. Reed, 660 N.E.2d 456 (1996), applies to applications for reopening under App.R. 26(B); (2) reaffirmed that courts of appeals should grant an application for reopening of the defendant shows a genuine issue was to whether she has a colorable claim that her appellate counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance caused her prejudice; and (3) held that the court of appeals applied the correct standard in this case.