The “When” of Chevron: The Missed Opportunity of County of Maui

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, DANIEL FOLSOM

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and rising 3L Daniel Folsom comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, in which the Court interpreted a provision of the Clean Water. Estreicher and Folsom argue that the case presented an opportunity to clarify the murky question of when the Chevron doctrine applies, yet the Court avoided answering that question.

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The Unnecessary Protection of Qualified Immunity

JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, SETH STOUGHTON

UCLA law professor Joanna C. Schwartz and South Carolina law professor Seth W. Stoughton address some of the arguments commonly asserted to support qualified immunity, the doctrine that shields police officers from civil liability for constitutional violations. Schwartz and Stoughton argue that eliminating qualified immunity should not affect police decision-making and that existing Supreme Court doctrine gives police officers plenty of leeway to make mistakes without violating the Constitution. Because qualified immunity applies only to unreasonable actions by police officers, eliminating or substantially restricting it should not a chilling effect on police officers’ ability or willingness to respond to critical incidents.

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People v. Alaybue

Docket: H047221(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 25, 2020

Judge: Nathan D. Mihara

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2006, Alaybue pleaded no contest to two counts of second-degree murder (Pen. Code, 187) and two counts of attempted murder (sections 187, 664(a)) and admitted a gang allegation for each count. Alaybue was sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms of 15 years to life on the second-degree murder convictions, consecutive to concurrent five-year determinate terms on the attempted murder convictions. In 2019, Alaybue petitioned to vacate his murder and attempted murder convictions under newly-enacted Senate Bill 1437. The trial court denied the petition, finding Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional because it impermissibly amended Proposition 7 (1978, increasing the penalty for first-degree murder) and Proposition 115 (1990, defining degrees of murder and addressing felony-murder liability). The court also found that Senate Bill 1437 did not apply to the crime of attempted murder. The court of appeal reversed. Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional, as it does not amend Propositions 7 and 115 and it does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by interfering with the executive’s prosecutorial functions and the finality of judgment. However, Senate Bill 1437 does not apply to the offense of attempted murder. On remand, the court may reconsider Alaybue’s petition, but only as to the murder convictions.

People v. Paige

Docket: A157494(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 25, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Penal Code section 1170.95, which became effective in January 2019, changed the application of the felony murder and natural and probable consequences theories of murder liability. It entitles certain defendants to petition the superior court for resentencing. Paige filed such a petition, which the trial court denied, based on the fact that Paige, although he was charged with felony murder, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter via a plea agreement. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments based on statutory interpretation and federal equal protection rights. The petitioning prerequisites and available relief indicate that the legislature intended to limit relief to those convicted of murder under a theory of felony murder or natural-and-probable consequences murder. Section 1170.95 is unambiguous and does not provide relief to persons convicted of manslaughter. It is not irrational to distinguish between those convicted of murder by plea and those convicted of voluntary manslaughter by plea.

Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California

Docket: A157551(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 25, 2020

Judge: Burns

Areas of Law: Education Law, Environmental Law

The California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000; CEQA) requires public universities to mitigate the environmental impacts of their growth and development, including student enrollment increases. To ensure that the University of California “sufficiently mitigate significant off-campus impacts related to campus growth and development,” the University is required periodically to develop a comprehensive, long-range development plan for each campus, based on the academic goals and projected enrollment. (Ed. Code 67504(a)(1).) The plan must be analyzed in an environmental impact report (EIR). A 2005 EIR that analyzed a development plan and projected enrollment increases for the U.C. Berkeley campus. Opponents claimed the University violated CEQA by increasing enrollment well beyond the growth projected in the 2005 EIR without conducting any further environmental review. The trial court ruled in favor of the University. The court of appeal reversed. Section 21080.09 does not shield public universities from complying with CEQA when they make discretionary decisions to increase enrollment levels. Opponents adequately pled that respondents made substantial changes to the original project that trigger the need for a subsequent or supplemental EIR. The court stated that its decision did not constitute an enrollment “cap.”

Regents of the University of California v. Public Employment Relations Board

Docket: A157597(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 25, 2020

Judge: Margulies

Areas of Law: Education Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) granted University Professional and Technical Employees' (UPTE's) petition for unit modification to add a new classification, systems administrators, into a preexisting bargaining unit. The University of California refused to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment for systems administrators. PERB granted UPTE's unfair practice charge against the University. The University appealed, arguing that the systems administrator classification did not share a community of interest with the existing bargaining unit as required under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (Gov. Code 3560) and that PERB erred in not requiring proof of majority support by the unrepresented systems administrators subject to the unit modification petition. The court of appeal denied the petition. PERB’s finding that a community of interest exists is supported by substantial evidence. The job descriptions reflect a similarity in “common skills” and “job duties” between systems administrators and employees in the unit. The University fails to cite any evidence suggesting a disparity between the job descriptions and the employees’ actual skill sets. PERB properly counted the number of systems administrators at the time the petition was filed; PERB’s holding that it lacked the discretion to require proof of majority support from UPTE was not clearly erroneous.

Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus

Docket: F077815(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 25, 2020

Judge: Donald R. Franson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate, contending that the trial court misinterpreted the conditions placed on the approved vesting tentative map for a small subdivision he is attempting to develop. The trial court interpreted the conditions to require a fire suppression system, with functional fire hydrants to be in place, before the county would approve the final subdivision map. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiff's claims of misinterpretation are not barred by the 90-day period set forth in Government Code section 66499.37. The court held that a claim of misinterpretation is distinct from a claim challenging the validity of the condition of approval and the two types of claims accrue at different times.