Gay Pride, Gay Rights

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, DEBORAH L. BRAKE

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and University of Pittsburgh law professor Deborah L. Brake comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. In this first of a two-part series of columns, Grossman and Brake discuss the history of court decisions interpreting the meaning of “because of sex” under Title VII and describe the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bostock v. Clayton County.

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Mr. Dooley Meets Mr. Justice Gorsuch: Will the Election Returns Follow the Supreme Court?

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses a claim by Missouri Senator Josh Hawley that the purpose of originalism and textualism is to provide a mechanism for obtaining results that religious conservatives favor on ideological grounds. In light of two recent Supreme Court decisions that disappointed conservatives, Dorf considers how conservatives might respond to these decisions and expresses hope that they might rethink their support for Trump. Dorf observes that while Supreme Court rulings do sometimes follow election returns, the reverse is also sometimes true, and we can’t yet know which direction this year will flow.

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Home Invasion: Warrantless Searches in Brazil and the United States

IGOR DE LAZARI, ANTONIO G. SEPULVEDA

Igor De Lazari, a Brazilian legal scholar, and Antonio Sepulveda, Professor of Law at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and at the Fluminense Federal University, offer a comparative analysis of warrantless searches in Brazil and the United States. De Lazari and Sepulveda call for guidance from each country’s high court to help clarify the law and facilitate uniform and predictable rulings on the constitutionality of certain warrantless searches.

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State v. Baker

Docket: SCWC-16-0000115

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the third degree, holding that Defendant's confession should not have been admitted against him at trial. Defendant gave his confession during a custodial interrogation. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated by the admission of his confession. The ICA affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the confession was voluntarily given. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) due to law enforcement's coercive tactics and deception about incontrovertible physical evidence Defendant's confession was involuntary under the totality of the circumstances; and (2) the admission of Defendant's statement was not harmless error.

State v. Kato

Docket: SCWC-15-0000329

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of reckless endangering in the second degree, holding that the circuit court erred by excluding Defendant from presenting third-party culpability evidence at trial. In precluding Defendant from presenting third-party culpability evidence the circuit court determined that the evidence failed to establish a "legitimate tendency" that the third party committed the crime. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding (1) admissibility of third-party culpability evidence is properly governed by Haw. R. Evid. 401 and 403, without having also to satisfy a legitimate tendency test; (2) the circuit court erred in precluding the defense from adducing third-party culpability evidence that another person assaulted the complaining witness; and (3) the circuit court and the ICA improperly weighed the third-party culpability evidence offered by Defendant.

Erum v. Llego

Docket: SCWC-17-0000762

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this appeal challenging the circuit court's grant of Defendant's ex parte oral motion to dismiss a personal injury action with prejudice, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, filed a personal injury claim against Defendant. During a pretrial conference at which Plaintiff did not attend Defendant filed his oral motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Defendant's oral motion to dismiss with prejudice because the record did not provide a valid basis for the dismissal order, and the court failed to make the request findings of fact that would be required to support such an order; and (2) in general, motions must be made in writing with notice provided unless the motion is made during a hearing or trial.

Sakal v. Association of Apartment Owners of Hawaiian Monarch

Docket: SCWC-15-0000529

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In this case arising from the nonjudicial foreclosure of Petitioner's apartment based on unpaid assessments the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) partially affirming the trial court's dismissal of the Petitioner's claims against the apartment owners' association and the purchaser of the property for wrongful foreclosure, holding that the complaint stated a claim against both defendants. Petitioner's claim for wrongful foreclosure was based on the association's lack of a valid power of sale. The district court found that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 667, which governs foreclosures, contained a statutory bar that precluded Petitioner's claims. The ICA concluded that the statutory bar did not preclude Petitioner's claim for damages against the association but did not preclude Petitioner's claim to title of the property against the purchaser. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner's wrongful foreclosure claim was not limited by chapter 667, and chapter 667's provisions do not bar a claim of wrongful foreclosure based on the lack of a power of sale; and (2) therefore, the complaint did state a claim against both the association and the purchaser of the apartment.

In re Elaine Emma Short Revocable Living Trust Agreement

Docket: SCWC-15-0000960

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) upholding an order and judgment of the probate court that modified a trust provision regarding the distribution of trust principal without issuing findings of fact to explain or support its ruling, holding that the ICA erred. On appeal from the judgment of the ICA, Appellants argued that the ICA erred by weighing conflicting evidence to determine the settlor's intent and ignoring other evidence to resolve an ambiguity in the trust without holding a hearing and by affirming the probate court's decision to deny Appellants any financial information regarding the trust despite the trustee's statutory duty to produce this information. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal, holding (1) the absence of factual findings by the probate court did not enable to the ICA to meaningfully review the basis of the probate court's order modifying the trust, and the ICA erred in relying on selective extrinsic evidence; and (2) the ICA erred when it concluded that the terms of the trust can supersede the trustee's statutory duty to provide accounts information to contingent beneficiaries of the trust.