Department of Justice Once Again Proves Its Loyalty to the President, Not the Rule of Law

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—comments on the recent news that the Justice Department will seek dismissal of charges against Michael Flynn. Sarat suggests that because the decision does not seem to advance the fair administration of justice in this case, the court should take the unusual step of refusing to grant the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss.

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Hiona v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A158689(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 6, 2020

Judge: Barbara J.R. Jones

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

In 2018, Landlord served Tenants with a Notice of Termination of Tenancy “in furtherance of [Landlord’s] withdrawal of the Property from residential rental use.” After the withdrawal date, Landlord filed unlawful detainer (UD) actions against Tenants under the Ellis Act. (Gov. Code, 7060) as unlimited civil cases. Landlord brought summary judgment motions for restitution of the premises based on Tenants’ holdover under the Ellis Act and the San Francisco rent ordinance. Landlord waived damages, estimated at $92-105 per day. After those motions were granted, Tenants moved to reclassify the actions as limited civil cases, arguing Landlord waived all unlawful detainer damages and that it was impossible for Landlord to meet the $25,000 minimum judgment amount for an unlimited civil matter. The trial court denied the motions for reclassification and entered judgments for possession in favor of Landlord. The court of appeal denied Tenants’ petition for a writ of mandate. Under the plain language of Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040(e), a UD action, filed as an unlimited civil case, need not be reclassified as a limited civil case if the landlord waives its claim to damages for the purpose of obtaining a judgment for possession by way of a motion for summary judgment.

Winston Affordable Housing, LLC v. Roberts

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 267PA19

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Earls

Areas of Law: Landlord - Tenant

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment evicting Tenant and granting possession of the apartment in which she lived to Landlord based on nonpayment of rent for January 2017 and the first part of February 2017, holding that eviction was improper. The apartment complex in this case was a project-based Section 8 property. In late 2016, Landlord sought to evict Tenant by terminating her lease for alleged breaches relating primarily to her conduct. On January 9, 2017, Tenant was served with a notice to pay rent or quit, claiming Tenant was in default under the rental agreement. The district court determined that Landlord had waived its claims as to Tenant's alleged lease breaches. The court then entered a judgment evicting Tenant and granting possession of the apartment to Landlord. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Landlord did not waive his right to terminate the lease based on Tenant's alleged breaches; (2) terminating a lease or a federal subsidy for a tenant in a federally-subsidized housing arrangement requires compliance with federal law as incorporated in the terms of the lease; and (3) there were insufficient findings to support the conclusion that Landlord was entitled to possession on the basis of nonpayment of rent.

Shadow Industries, LLP v. Hoffman, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 83

Opinion Date: May 7, 2020

Judge: Jon J. Jensen

Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Civil Procedure, Contracts, Landlord - Tenant

Shadow Industries, LLP, appealed a district court judgment dismissing its eviction action and holding the tenants David and Chris Hoffman had timely exercised their option to extend the term of the parties’ lease agreement. Shadow argued the district court erred in finding the parties’ lease agreement to be ambiguous, finding the option to extend the lease expired on February 1, 2019, and finding the Hoffmans timely exercised their option to extend the lease. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court’s interpretation of the lease as having ambiguity as to when the lease terminated was premised upon the court’s observation that “[w]hen 'crop years’ end and begin is undefined.” To this, the Supreme Court disagreed that the lease was ambiguous and failed to define the end of the lease. The Supreme Court found the lease terminated at the end of the 2018 crop year. "While determining when the end of the 2018 crop year occurred may be a question of fact, the term is not ambiguous simply because it requires a future event or contingency." There was testimony that the crop year ended no later than October 2018; following the harvesting of their crops and still in 2018, the Hoffmans deep ripped the land, tilled to create fall bedding, and applied fertilizer to prepare for the 2019 crop year. "On the basis of these facts, and the absence of any contrary facts in the record, we conclude as a matter of law the 2018 crop year ended and the lease terminated in 2018." Because the facts of this case compelled a finding the 2018 crop year ended in 2018 and the lease terminated at the end of the 2018 crop year, the Court found the exercise of the option in January 2019 was not timely and the lease terminated. It therefore reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

CFS 915, LLC v. Unetixs Vascular, Inc.

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-237

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: William P. Robinson, III

Areas of Law: Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court for possession of certain property in favor of Plaintiff pursuant to the granting of summary judgment for Plaintiff, holding that when Plaintiff purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, all interests inferior to the foreclosed mortgage were extinguished and that no genuine issue of material fact remained. In 2008, MCH Realty, LLC, the then-owner of the property, entered into a lease agreement with Unetixs Vascular, Inc. to lease the property. In 2013, MCH executed a mortgage deed to DBS Bank Ltd. secured by its interest in the property. DBS later assigned its interest in the mortgage to CFS. In 2016, MCH and Unitexs extended the term of the lease. In 2017, CFS foreclosed on the mortgage and purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. CFS then filed a complaint seeking to evict Unetisx and another tenant (together, Tenants) and MCH from the property. A hearing justice granted the motion, ruling that the mortgage was superior to the Tenants' unrecorded leases and that, therefore, the leases were extinguished upon foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CFS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

20 Thames Street LLC v. Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017, LLC

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 55

Opinion Date: May 5, 2020

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Contracts, Landlord - Tenant

In this commercial forcible entry and detainer action brought by 20 Thames Street LLC and 122 PTIP LLC (collectively, 20 Thames) the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award lease-based attorney fees upon finding for Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017, LLC, holding that the superior court did not err. Ocean State rented a commercial retail space from 20 Thames. 20 Thames later filed its compliant for forcible entry and detainer, alleging that Ocean State breached the terms of its lease. The business and consumer docket found in favor of Ocean State. The court awarded Ocean State costs and $206,076 in attorney fees based on a provision in the lease. The superior route affirmed the judgment for Ocean State but vacated the attorney fee award, concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award lease-based attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6017 did not provide authority for the district court to award lease-based attorney fees.