In Ruth We Trust: How the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Can Promote Women’s Equal Citizenship and Justice Ginsburg’s Legacy

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

In honor of the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman explains how the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) can promote women’s equal citizenship and protect Justice Ginsburg’s legacy of shaping gender equality. Grossman argues that the PWFA could help break down entrenched occupational segregation in the American economy, and, in so doing, honor Justice Ginsburg’s lifelong commitment to ensuring that women can be full members of society.

Read More

A Half Century After Its Publication, What Can “The Greening of America” Tell Us About the United States Today?

RODGER CITRON

In recognition of the 50-year anniversary of the publication of Charles Reich’s “The Greening of America,” Touro law professor Rodger D. Citron explains what Reich actually said in “The Greening,” explains why it generated such a strong response, and reflects on what the piece has to say about the fractures of our current moment. Citron cautions that the promise of a new consciousness is as alluring—and may be as illusory—as it was when Reich wrote the article and book, 50 years ago.

Read More

In re Samuel A.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B302700(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Dennis M. Perluss

Areas of Law: Family Law

Mother petitioned under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 388 and 390 to set aside jurisdiction findings concerning her alcohol abuse and mental instability and to terminate dependency jurisdiction after a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation found that she was not mentally ill and did not meet the diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorder. The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's order summarily denying mother's section 388 petition and held that the juvenile court incorrectly characterized her petition as an untimely new trial motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 659. The court remanded for the juvenile court to determine whether mother has made the required prima facie showing that terminating dependency jurisdiction would be in the child's best interests. If such a showing has been made, the juvenile court is to conduct a hearing on the merits of the petition.

Sharpe v. Westmoreland

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 124863

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Rita B. Garman

Areas of Law: Family Law

Sharpe and Westmoreland were married and had a child, A.S. The marriage was dissolved in 2013. Sharpe and Westmoreland agreed to a joint parenting agreement. The parents shared equal parenting time. A.S.’s legal residence was with Sharpe. Sharpe entered into a civil union with Fulkerson. A.S. continued to reside with Sharpe, Fulkerson, and Fulkerson’s children. Sharpe died in 2017. After Sharpe’s death, Westmoreland no longer let A.S. live with or visit Fulkerson and Fulkerson’s children. Fulkerson sought visitation and an allocation of parental responsibilities. The appellate court responded to certified questions, finding that a party to a civil union lacks “step-parent” standing as defined by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/101, to request visitation with her deceased partner’s child or to request parental responsibilities. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. in enacting the Civil Union Act, the General Assembly intended to create an alternative to marriage that was equal in all respects. That intent was not limited to partners’ rights as to each other. When a child’s parent enters into a civil union with an individual who is not the child’s other parent, that individual becomes the child’s stepparent as defined by the Dissolution Act and meets that aspect of the standing requirement to petition the court for visitation, allocation of parental responsibilities, or both.

In re Adoption of B.H.

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 UT 64

Opinion Date: September 16, 2020

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals setting aside the adoption decree in this case, holding that the district court's conclusions of law in support of the adoption decree were inadequate. Mother, a Montana resident, gave birth to a child in Montana. Mother placed the child for adoption with Respondents, two Utah residents. On a form required under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), Utah Code 62a-4a-701 to -711, Mother did not list Petitioner, the child's legal father, as the child's father. Respondents filed an adoption petition and petitioned to terminate Petitioner's parental rights. The district court terminated Petitioner's parental rights and finalized the adoption. The court of appeals set aside the adoption decree because it did not state that the requirements of the ICPC had been complied with, as required by the Adoption Act. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case, holding (1) there was no jurisdictional defect under the ICPC or the Adoption Act; but (2) the district court's conclusions of law in support of the adoption decree were inadequate.

Brown v. Jerding

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 123

Opinion Date: September 23, 2020

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Mother's Wyo. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment requiring that the parties' child name not be changed after the court previously granted Father's motion to change the child's name, holding that the district court abused its discretion. Siobham Jerding (Mother) was married to someone else when she entered into a relationship with Terrance Brown (Father). Mother later gave birth to MFJ. The birth certificate listed Mother's husband as the child's father. Father filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, and visitation and to change MFJ's surname to Brown. The district court granted Father's motion to change MFJ's name to Brown. Thereafter, Mother filed her Rule 59 motion, arguing that the district court did not make a finding of good cause. The district court granted Motion's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that none of the grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion were present in this case.

Niland v. State, ex rel. Department of Family Services

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 121

Opinion Date: September 17, 2020

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Appellant's parental rights, holding that the district court violated Appellant's due process rights when it determined the best interests of the child without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. The district court found that the Department of Family Services established statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, Appellant argued that he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the question of whether termination was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court held (1) neither the termination statutes nor Wyoming case law require a separate hearing to determine the best interests of the child; but (2) Appellant's due process rights were violated when he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the question of best interests.