The Biggest Threat to Herd Immunity Against COVID-19 May Be the Religious Freedom Restoration Act(s) and State Religious Exemptions

MARCI A. HAMILTON

Marci A. Hamilton—a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the country’s leading church-state scholars—argues that the biggest threats to herd immunity against COVID-19 are federal and state religious liberty statutes and religious/philosophical exemptions. Hamilton describes how the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and its state-law equivalents came to be in the United States, and she calls upon legislators at all levels to amend RFRA so that once we have developed an effective and safe vaccine, we might as a country develop herd immunity and prevent more unnecessary deaths.

Read More

Williams v. 3620 W. 102nd Street, Inc.

Docket: B297824(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Wiley

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Landlord - Tenant

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, the property owners, claiming that the property they rented had bed bugs and other problems. The property owners then moved to compel arbitration based on agreements in plaintiffs' leases. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the property owners' motion for arbitration, holding that state public policy prohibits arbitration provisions in residential lease agreements. The court held that the arbitration agreements in the leases were void under Civil Code 1953, subdivision (a)(4), and that Jaramillo v. JH Real Estate Partners, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 394, and Harris v. University Village Thousand Oaks, CCRC, LLC. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 847, 850, specifically identified the right to have a jury trial as a procedural right that may not be waived or modified under section 1953, subdivision (a)(4).

Riverside County Transportation Comm. v. Southern Cal. Gas Co.

Docket: E069462(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Riverside County Transportation Commission (Commission) sought to extend its Metrolink commuter rail line from Riverside to Perris, using the route of a preexisting rail line that it had acquired. At five points, however, the new rail line would cross gas pipelines owned by the Southern California Gas Company. The Gas Company had installed these pipelines under city streets decades earlier, pursuant to franchises granted by the relevant cities and, in some instances, pursuant to licenses granted by the then-owner of the preexisting rail line. The new rail line could not be built as long as the pipelines remained in place. The Commission terminated the licenses and demanded that the Gas Company relocate its pipelines at its own expense. The parties agreed that the Gas Company would relocate its pipelines, to other points also owned by the Commission, and the Commission would pay the estimated expenses, but only provisionally; the Commission could still sue for reimbursement, and the Gas Company could then sue for any additional expenses. The trial court ruled that the Gas Company had to bear all of the costs of relocation; however, it also ruled that the Gas Company had never trespassed on the Commission’s land. Both sides appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal held the Gas Company did have to bear all of the costs of relocation. However, the Court also held that, at those points where the Gas Company held licenses for its pipelines, once the Commission terminated the licenses, the Gas Company could be held liable for trespass.

Akopyan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

Docket: B304957(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Feuer

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order granting real party in interest's peremptory challenge to Judge Anthony J. Mohr under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 filed after this court conditionally reversed the judgment entered after a jury trial in favor of petitioner on real party's claim for medical malpractice. The court agreed with petitioner that the trial court has not yet been "assigned to conduct a new trial" on remand under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). Therefore, the court held that the trial court should have waited to rule on the peremptory challenge until it conducted the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, then granted the disqualification motion only if it ordered a new trial.

California v. Belche

Docket: C088829(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 21, 2020

Judge: Louis Mauro

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Stephen Belche admitted violating probation in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence of three years on the original conviction. The trial court approved the admission agreement, formally revoked defendant’s probation, and ordered that probation would not be reinstated. While defendant was awaiting sentencing on the original conviction, he exposed himself to a jail nurse. The probation department filed a new petition to revoke probation based on the indecent exposure. The trial court found the new allegation true, again revoked defendant’s probation, and sentenced him to six years in state prison. On appeal of that sentence, defendant argued: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to find he violated probation based on his indecent exposure after the trial court formally revoked his probation and ordered that it not be reinstated; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him to six years in state prison because he only agreed to a sentence of three years when he admitted the probation violation. After review, the Court of Appeal determined: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to find defendant violated probation based on his indecent exposure because defendant’s probation had been formally revoked and not reinstated, terminating probation; and (2) the Court had to vacate the six-year prison term and remand for the trial court either to impose a three-year term or allow defendant to withdraw his admission made under the agreement.

Shih v. Starbucks Corp.

Docket: B299329(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Segal

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

Plaintiff filed suit against Starbucks after she spilled a cup of hot tea she purchased from a Starbucks store and suffered second degree burns, alleging causes of action for products liability and negligence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that any alleged defect in the Starbucks cup did not cause plaintiff's injuries. The panel held that Starbucks met its burden of negating an element of plaintiff's products liability cause of action by showing the alleged defects in the cup of tea it served her were not a proximate cause of her injuries. In this case, plaintiff spilled her drink because, after she walked to the table with the two hot drinks in her hands, put her drink down, and removed the lid, she bent over the table, pushed out her chair, lost her balance, grabbed the table to avoid failing, and knocked her drink off the table. The court also held that Starbucks' alleged negligence by serving the allegedly defective cup was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.