Latest 55 Cases This Week: United States v. Aybar-Ulloa (1st Cir.), United States v. Diaz (2d Cir.), United States v. Stillwell (2d Cir.)

Impeaching a Former President Is Plainly Constitutional

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that the text of the Constitution makes clear that Congress has the power to impeach and convict Donald Trump, even though he is no longer President. Buchanan describes the unambiguous textual support for this conclusion, which Buchanan (and others) argue is also amply supported by the Constitution’s purpose, structure, and other interpretive approaches.

Read More

United States v. Aybar-Ulloa

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 15-2377

Opinion Date: January 25, 2021

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for two counts of drug trafficking in international waters while aboard a stateless vessel in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70501-08, holding that international law does not generally prohibit the United States from prosecuting drug traffickers found on a stateless vessel stopped and boarded by the United States on the high seas as if the drug traffickers had been found on a United States vessel subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) Defendant's prosecution in the United States for drug trafficking on a stateless vessel stopped and boarded by the United States in waters subject to the rights of navigation on the high seas violated no recognized principle of international law; but (2) because Amendment 794 to the Sentencing Guidelines applies retroactively, this case must be remanded for resentencing so that the district court can have an opportunity to apply the new factors.

United States v. Diaz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-3841

Opinion Date: January 27, 2021

Judge: Dennis G. Jacobs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment revoking defendant's supervised release and sentencing him principally to 24-months in prison. The court concluded that, even though the procedures used to obtain the victim's two out-of-court identifications were unduly suggestive, both identifications were nonetheless reliable. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by admitting them. Furthermore, because the victim testified at the supervised release hearing, the district court was not required to find good cause before admitting his hearsay statements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C). The court also concluded that, although the district court erred by admitting certain hearsay statements without first finding good cause, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.

United States v. Stillwell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Dockets: 18-3074, 18-3489, 19-790

Opinion Date: January 27, 2021

Judge: Jose A. Cabranes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendants Stillwell, Samia, and Hunter appealed their convictions for murder-for-hire and related crimes. Long after defendants filed their appeals, the NDDS filed a notice in the Second Circuit, advising the court that the district court had entered a sealed protective order upon the filing of an ex parte motion by the NDDS, which barred prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and defense counsel from reviewing certain documents. The court later vacated the protective order and ordered disclosure of the material to the U.S. Attorney and then to defense counsel pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and related authorities. In this appeal, defendants claim that the prosecution withheld exculpatory information in violation of Brady. The court declined to consider, let alone resolve, defendants' Brady claims, which are raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to consider the claims in the first instance.

United States v. Senke

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-1287

Opinion Date: January 25, 2021

Judge: Julio M. Fuentes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Senke was arrested after starting an online conversation with an officer posing as an underage boy. Senke requested naked photographs of the boy, asked about the boy’s sexual experiences, transmitted graphic photographs of himself, and offered to buy the boy gifts. Senke traveled to meet the boy. Detectives took Senke into custody. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), 2422(b), 1470. His public defender moved to withdraw. After interviewing Senke, the court permitted him to proceed pro se, with the public defender as standby counsel. Senke filed multiple unsuccessful pretrial motions before agreeing to accept appointed counsel (Comerford). Senke later asserted that Comerford tried to pressure him to take a plea, did not take or return phone calls, refused to go over evidence, calling it “to[o] disgusting,” failed to turn over discovery, and was not preparing a defense strategy. Senke did not specifically request the appointment of new counsel. Defense counsel did not present any evidence at trial, relying solely on an entrapment defense. The Third Circuit affirmed Senke’s convictions. The district court’s failure to address Senke’s complaints regarding Comerford was an abuse of discretion but the court declined to review the error for prejudice on direct appeal in the first instance. Senke was not prejudiced by the court’s failure to verify on the record that Senke and his attorney discussed the presentence report. The court vacated in part; special conditions of supervised release banning Senke’s computer and internet use violated Circuit precedent.

United States v. Smukler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-2151

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Matey

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Election Law, White Collar Crime

Attorney Smukler ran political campaigns for 30 years and developed expertise with Federal Election Commission law. In 2012, U.S. Representative Brady ran for reelection in Pennsylvania’s First Congressional District in Philadelphia. Brady's challenger, Moore, struggled to raise money and personally loaned his campaign about $150,000. Brady agreed to give Moore $90,000 to drop out of the race. To steer the money to Moore, Smukler devised a plan that involved a bogus corporation, “dummy invoices,” and funneling cash through a political consulting firm. In the 2014 Democratic Primary for the Thirteenth Congressional District of Pennsylvania, Smukler dipped into the general election reserve on behalf of former U.S. Representative Margolies, then used friends and family as strawmen to evade federal election laws. Smukler was convicted on nine counts of election law violations. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, plus fines and assessments. The Third Circuit vacated the convictions on two counts but otherwise affirmed. The court upheld the jury instructions defining the term “willfully,” except with respect to counts that charged Smukler with violating 18 U.S.C. 2 and 1001(a)(1) by causing the false statements of others within the Brady and Margolies campaigns. A proper charge for willfulness in cases brought under those sections in the federal election law context requires the prosecution to prove that defendant knew of the statutory obligations, that he attempted to frustrate those obligations, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful.

United States v. Haas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4077

Opinion Date: January 27, 2021

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempted sex trafficking of a minor and three child pornography offenses. The court upheld the district court's denial of a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of law enforcement's declarations in two warrant affidavits, because defendant failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that the law enforcement agent acted with the requisite intent in omitting a confidential informant's criminal history from the warrant affidavits. The court also held that substantial evidence supported defendant's attempt conviction where his words strongly corroborated his intent to recruit, entice, or solicit children to engage in commercial sex acts. The court further held that there was no error in the district court's application of a five-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 4B1.5(b) for being a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors. However, the court vacated defendant's sentence because the district court should not have applied a four-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2G1.1 for an offense involving a minor who had not attained the age of twelve years. The court explained that the district court erred in applying the enhancement, because neither subparagraph (A) or (B) of the application note defining "minor" for section 2G2.1 encompass a situation in which a private citizen represents that a fictitious child could be provided to engage in sexual conduct.

United States v. Hamilton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4852

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: James Harvie Wilkinson, III

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment followed by a lifetime of supervised release. On appeal, defendant challenges three special conditions of supervised release: the employment restriction, the Internet restriction, and the location restriction. The Fourth Circuit held that the employment restriction, requiring that defendant must not work in any type of employment without the prior approval of the probation officer, is overbroad and lacks a sufficient nexus to the nature and circumstances of the offense. However, the court upheld the Internet restriction and location restriction. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. On remand, the district court is instructed to craft more precisely an employment restriction that bears a nexus to defendant's particular misconduct without jeopardizing the salient goal of safeguarding children's safety.

United States v. McDonald

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Dockets: 19-7668, 19-7673, 19-7715

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Stephanie Dawn Thacker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's orders partially granting defendants' motions for sentence reductions pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act. In each case, the district court granted defendants' motions pursuant to a standard "AO 247" form in which the district court checked the box for "granted" and reduced the term of supervised release on each of defendants' sentences by one year. However, the district court did not alter the underlying sentences. Applying de novo review, the court held that the district court failed to provide individualized explanations to each defendant in the face of newly presented, post-sentencing conduct. The court agreed with defendants that their cases are factually similar to the defendants' cases in United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 2019), and thus the court should vacate the district court's orders with instructions for the district court to provide individualized explanations consistent with Martin. The court explained that the presentation of post-sentencing mitigation evidence in each of defendants' motions is sufficient to rebut the Legree presumption that the district court, in fact, considered all of the relevant evidence.

United States v. Myers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 18-4940

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Niemeyer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the legality of defendant's arrest under Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003), which held that when a law enforcement officer finds illegal drugs in an automobile that the officer has legally stopped and searched and none of the occupants claim ownership of the drugs, it is "entirely reasonable" for the officer to infer that all the automobile's occupants are in a common enterprise and therefore to arrest them on probable cause that they are committing a crime. In this case, defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was legally stopped and search, where officers found 300 grams of fentanyl in the vehicle. The court explained that the officers reasonably believed that, in the absence of any claim to owning it, defendant and the driver were in a common enterprise that involved possession of the fentanyl, and that such circumstances are sufficient to support particularized probable cause that the two were committing a crime under Pringle.

Vandross v. Stirling

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 18-6916

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Niemeyer

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 2254, rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Petitioner contends that his trial counsel failed to call any forensic experts to testify on his behalf and asserted that such failure was not a strategic decision but was made out of counsel's ignorance of the availability of funding to pay experts. Even though the district court did not restrict its review by considering only the state court record, as required in the circumstances, but instead considered an affidavit of a forensic expert that petitioner presented for the first time in the district court, the court nonetheless agreed with the district court's conclusion that the expert failed to show prejudice with evidence or a proffer of evidence "of what a defensive forensic expert would have testified to and how that could have altered the trial." The court explained that the forensic expert only identified investigatory issues that he or another forensic expert could have explored and did not test or challenge any evidence actually presented to the jury so as to support a conclusion that testimony from him or another forensic expert could have made a difference.

Munoz-Rivera v. Wilkinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-60376

Opinion Date: January 27, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for review, holding that the use of an unauthorized social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) such that petitioner is ineligible for cancellation of his removal to Mexico. Reviewing de novo, the court explained that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, a section 408(a)(7)(B) offense categorically constitutes a CIMT because it necessarily involves intentional deception. The court concluded that the offender's deceptive intent is dispositive. Even assuming arguendo that the conviction requires a further aggravating element beyond deceptive intent, the court was satisfied that such an element is present where a conviction under section 408(a)(7)(B) necessarily involves conduct that obstructs the function of government. Therefore, petitioner's application for cancellation of removal is pretermitted.

United States v. Coto-Mendoza

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-10451

Opinion Date: January 25, 2021

Judge: Catharina Haynes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's 37-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. The court held that defendant failed to show the district court committed significant procedural error in declining to explicitly address his arguments for a shorter sentence. In this case, the district court gave defendant a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range after adopting the presentence report's factual findings and the probation officer's conclusions; read the sentencing memorandum submitted by defendant's counsel and heard both counsel's argument and personal request for a more lenient sentence; and explained how it considered the advisory guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.

United States v. Warren

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-10805

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Don R. Willett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendant Martinez and Warren's convictions and sentences for multiple federal charges for their roles in a telemarketing timeshare-exit scam that bilked millions from owners eager to escape timeshares they could no longer afford. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Martinez's convictions for conspiracy (Count One), mail fraud (Counts Two through Six), and wire fraud (Counts Seven and Eight); the district court did not err or abuse its discretion by permitting the timeshare owners to testify about their conversations with telemarketers; the district court did not err by imposing consecutive six-month sentences under 18 U.S.C. 2326(1); the district court did not clearly err in determining that Warren was a "manager or supervisor" and applying a three-level increase to his offense level under USSG 3B1.1(b); and Martinez's contention that the district court's restitution order violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

United States v. Quintanilla-Navarro

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-5640

Opinion Date: January 28, 2021

Judge: Richard Allen Griffin

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, Quintanilla pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and illegally reentering the U.S. after having been removed subsequent to a felony conviction. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and did not appeal. In April 2020, Quintanilla sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Court-appointed counsel asserted that Quintanilla has underlying medical conditions that put him at high risk, including diabetes, obesity, and hypertension; that his facility, FCI Oakdale, was among those hardest hit by the pandemic; and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release. The government argued that he had not demonstrated sufficiently extraordinary and compelling reasons and that he is a danger to the community, so his release would be inconsistent with section 3553(a). The district court denied the motion, stating on a form order that it had considered the applicable section 3553(a) factors and policy statements and conducted a “complete review” of the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Quintanilla’s request for compassionate release and the denial thereof reflects a “conceptually simple” matter suitable to resolution via a form order; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Quintanilla’s motion.

United States v. ____ ____

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-____

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: John M. Rogers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

X pleaded guilty in 2014 to possession with intent to distribute Oxycodone and was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment. While serving his sentence at a North Carolina federal correctional institution, X heard another inmate state that “if you ever want to get rid of a body, hogs is the way to go” and that “it was easy to kill someone without leaving evidence.” X told the FBI and police about the comments. X subsequently persuaded the inmate to confess to the murder of his adopted daughter. The inmate led the police to where he and his wife had disposed of the body. The inmate and his wife pleaded guilty to the murder. The government filed a motion to reduce X’s sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) based on his substantial assistance and recommended that the court reduce X’s prison sentence by 12-18 months. The district court granted the motion the same day that the motion was filed and reduced X’s prison sentence by 12 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded and issued a redacted opinion. The district court erred in ruling without giving X the opportunity to present evidence and argument.

Watkins v. Healy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-1074

Opinion Date: January 28, 2021

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1975, schoolteacher and drug dealer Ingram was robbed and shot dead in her Detroit home. Watkins’s 20-year-old high school classmate, Herndon, testified that he and Watkins robbed and murdered Ingram together. Detroit Evidence Technician Badaczewski testified that a hair found on Ingram’s clothing matched Watkins's hair sample. After Watkins’s conviction, Herndon repeatedly recanted. In sworn affidavits, letters, and testimony, Herndon attested that Wayne County Prosecutor Healy and Detective Schwartz threatened to charge him with Ingram’s murder and another murder if Herndon did not implicate Watkins and testify at Watkins’s trial. Watkins’s efforts to overturn his conviction had no success for four decades. In 2017, Watkins presented new evidence that Badaczewski’s hair analysis methods were seriously flawed. The Michigan court dismissed the case against Watkins without prejudice. Months later, Watkins filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Healy, Schwartz's estate, Badaczewski, and Detroit. The district court denied Healy’s motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider most of Healy’s arguments but held that Healy is not entitled to absolute immunity and that Healy forfeited the issue of qualified immunity at this stage. Even considering Healy’s equitable contentions that it would not be “fair” to hold him to today’s standards, the 1975-76 standards of prosecutorial immunity were the same: a prosecutor engaged in certain investigative activities enjoys, not the absolute immunity associated with the judicial process, but only a good-faith defense comparable to the policeman’s.”

Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2592

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: KANNE

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In 2015, inmate Peterson suffered from genital warts. Davida, a Stateville Correctional Center physician employed by Wexford, prescribed a topical medication (Podocon-25), which is caustic and should be applied sparingly, then removed thoroughly. PODOCON-25's packaging states that “PODOCON-25© IS TO BE APPLIED ONLY BY A PHYSICIAN” and warns of multiple potential “ADVERSE REACTIONS.” Davida did not apply the Podocon-25, nor did the nurses, who instructed Peterson to apply the treatment himself. He did so and suffered personal injuries. In 2016, Peterson filed a pro se complaint against Davida, the nurses, and Illinois Department of Corrections officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He alleged that the officer-defendants destroyed his shower pass permits, issued as part of his treatment, or failed to intervene to correct the situation. The court granted Peterson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his claims except as to three correctional officers. After obtaining counsel, Peterson filed an amended complaint, adding Wexford. The parties stipulated to dismissal without prejudice on January 25, 2018. On January 21, 2019, Peterson filed the operative complaint, claiming deliberate indifference under section 1983 and negligence under Illinois law against Davida, the nurses, and Wexford. The district court dismissed, finding that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege that the defendants had the requisite state of mind for deliberate indifference and that Peterson’s negligence claims were untimely because his 2016 complaint did not contain those allegations; the relation-back doctrine governs only amendments to a complaint, not a new filing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claims but reversed as to the negligence claims. The court did not consider 735 ILCS 5/13-217, under which plaintiffs have an “absolute right to refile their complaint within one year” of its voluntary dismissal.

United States v. Blake

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-2145

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Blake is serving a sentence of 420 months’ imprisonment for cocaine offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence. Five years later, the court rejected Blake’s effort to set aside his sentence on collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Blake was sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and did not benefit from its changes to the statutes and Sentencing Guidelines for persons convicted of crack cocaine offenses. The First Step Act of 2018 made the 2010 Act retroactively applicable. The district judge concluded that Blake, who has a history of violence, does not deserve a benefit from the 2018 Act. Blake’s lawyer sought leave to withdraw, arguing that the appeal was frivolous. The court granted that motion, rejecting Blake’s opposition, but did not dismiss the appeal. Once the direct appeal is over, the Constitution no longer requires the government to ensure that the defendant has a lawyer. The statute authorizing many retroactive sentencing adjustments, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), is not part of the process of conviction or direct appellate review. Blake is entitled to represent himself or to seek the aid of another lawyer.

United States v. Sanford

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-2445

Opinion Date: January 25, 2021

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In 2014, Sanford was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment— 82 months below the bottom of the U.S.S.G. range. Sanford is incarcerated in the Victorville, California federal prison. On April 28, 2020, the Victorville warden received two written requests from Sanford seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Without waiting for a response from the warden or letting 30 days lapse without a response (as the statute requires), Sanford filed a compassionate-release motion in court on May 1. Appointed counsel stated that Sanford “suffers from several health conditions, including stomach pain, shortness of breath, and anxiety.” No details were provided. On May 14. the warden denied Sanford’s request, explaining that the medically stable 38-year-old did not establish “extraordinary and compelling” reasons and that “extraordinary measures” were being taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and explained the process for administrative appeal. Victorville prison did not then have any COVID-19 cases. The district court denied Sanford’s motion, concluding that the “mere presence” of COVID-19 in prison is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds. Sanford failed to exhaust administrative remedies within the Bureau of Prisons before filing his motion; section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a mandatory claim-processing rule and must be enforced when properly invoked.

United States v. Thomas

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2969

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The mobile home park is a one-square-mile residential community of fewer than 100 dwellings, in North Judson, Indiana. In 2004-2013, Thomas was connected to eight fires there. He collected insurance proceeds on properties that he owned or that were owned by relatives: $75,000, $50,000, $60,000, and $426,227. In 2018, he was charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, because he had used the mail to collect the insurance proceeds. The district court ruled that two “distractor” fires were part of the scheme and did not implicate Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) but that the 2004 fire was too far removed in time to be part of the scheme. The 2004 fire was admissible as modus operandi evidence and to prove identity. A jury convicted Thomas on all counts. He was sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the fires were not part of a scheme because they were not a chain of continuous and overlapping events, but rather discrete episodes of alleged criminality and that the fires were inadmissible character evidence. Thomas was charged with mail fraud, not arson. The district court properly decided that six of the fires were part of Thomas’s scheme and not “other acts.”

United States v. Wilkinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1037

Opinion Date: January 25, 2021

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime

In 1999-2016, Wilkinson convinced approximately 30 people to invest $13.5 million in two hedge funds that he created. By 2008, Wilkinson lost the vast majority of their money. Wilkinson told them that the funds’ assets included a $12 million note with an Australian hedge fund, Pengana. The “Pengana Note” did not exist. Wilkinson provided fraudulent K-1 federal income tax forms showing that the investments had interest payments on the Pengana Note. To pay back suspicious investors, Wilkinson solicited about $3 million from new investors using private placement memoranda (PPMs) falsely saying that Wilkinson intended to use their investments “to trade a variety of stock indexes and options, futures, and options on futures on such stock indexes on a variety of national securities and futures exchanges.” In 2016, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed a civil enforcement action against Wilkinson, 7 U.S.C. 6p(1). Indicted under 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, Wilkinson pleaded guilty to wire fraud, admitting that he sent fraudulent K-1 forms and induced investment of $115,000 using fraudulent PPMs. The court applied a four-level enhancement because the offense “involved … a violation of commodities law and ... the defendant was … a commodity pool operator,” U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(20)(B). Wilkinson argued that he did not qualify as a commodity pool operator because he traded only broad-based indexes like S&P 500 futures, which fit the Commodity Exchange Act’s definition of an “excluded commodity,” “not based … on the value of a narrow group of commodities.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wilkinson’s plea agreement and PSR established that Wilkinson was a commodity pool operator.

United States v. Stein

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-3030

Opinion Date: January 25, 2021

Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendants-Appellants Patrick Stein, Curtis Allen, and Gavin Wright appealed their convictions for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction against people and property within the United States, and knowingly and willfully conspiring to violate civil rights. Wright also appealed his false statements conviction. In October 2016, defendants were arrested in connection with a scheme to bomb an apartment complex and mosque in Garden City, Kansas. The arrests were the result of an extended FBI investigation involving an undercover information to joined defendants' militia, Kansas Security Force (KSF), to monitor what the FBI considered a threat to public safety. In June 2016, defendants began planning their attack on local Muslims in response to a nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida. The cases were tried before a jury. The government called 15 witnesses, including the undercover informant, and introduced more than 500 exhibits. Defendants called 10 witnesses, and introduced nearly 40 exhibits, but did not testify themselves. The district court found defendants failed to establish an evidentiary basis for entrapment, and declined to instruct the jury on that defense, at defendants' request. All three defendants challenged their convictions and sentences on three grounds: (1) the method of petit jury selection violated the Jury Act, (2) the district court improperly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment, and (3) the district court erred in applying the terrorism enhancement at sentencing. Wright raised several additional challenges in which his co-defendants do not join. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions.

Maves v. Department of Public Safety

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17492

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Peter J. Maassen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 1997, Kelley Maves was convicted of two sexual assaults in Colorado. He moved to Alaska in 2015, where the Department of Public Safety required him to register for life as a sex offender under the Alaska Sex Offenders Registration Act (ASORA). Maves appealed the Department’s decision to the superior court, arguing that one of the two convictions could not be used as the basis for a lifetime registration requirement because it had been set aside; with one conviction he would be required to register for only 15 years. His argument on appeal included a challenge to a 1995 departmental regulation that defined “conviction” as including those that had been set aside. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decision requiring the Maves to register for life. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the 1994 version of ASORA was not plainly intended to apply to offenders whose convictions have been set aside, and that the 1995 regulation extending the Act’s reach to those convictions was not necessary to carry out the Act’s purposes. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision upholding the requirement that Maves register under ASORA for life.

Gay v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ARK. 3

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, holding that the circuit court failed to make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on Appellant's last claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to investigate and challenge aggravation factors. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court failed to make findings of fact or conclusions of law addressing Appellant's last claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as required under Rule 37.5(i). The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of an order that complies with Rule 37.5(i).

Kellensworth v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ARK. 5

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Rhonda K. Wood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction fo multiple drug crimes, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions because the State's expert identified the drugs only via visual inspection and that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search warrant was defective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported both possession convictions; (2) the incorrect information on the warrant was mitigated by the fact that the officers executing the warrant knew which home was to be searched; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it limited certain evidence.

People v. Hernandez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B302815(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Segal

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from the superior court's order denying his petition under Penal Code section 1170.95, which allows certain defendants convicted of murder under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory to petition the court to vacate their convictions and for resentencing. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the petition under section 1170.95, concluding that the superior court correctly ruled that Penal Code section 189, subdivision (f), does not require the prosecution to prove the defendant acted with malice. The court also concluded that, contrary to defendant's contentions, the law of the case doctrine did not preclude the superior court from finding he could be convicted of first degree felony murder under current law and that the superior court did not apply the wrong legal standard in determining whether he had the requisite knowledge under section 189, subdivision (f).

People v. Jaimes

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F077504(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 25, 2021

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendants Gonzales, Jaimes, and Magana were convicted of crimes related to their involvement in a robbery, and the jury found true several gang and firearm enhancements. The Court of Appeal accepted each of the People's concessions of insufficient accomplice corroboration, a legally inapplicable firearm enhancement, and Senate Bill No. 136 retroactivity. The court concluded that the evidence sufficiently proved the gang enhancement. However, the court concluded that the trial court's response to the jury's request for assistance was prejudicial error because it focused the jury's attention towards the association between Gonzales and Jaimes and away from the requisite association between the crime and the gang. Accordingly, the court reversed the gang enhancements and remanded for further proceedings.

People v. Montelongo

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B294095S(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 28, 2021

Judge: Segal

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Defendant, when he was 18 years old, stabbed and killed a 15-year-old boy while trying to take his backpack and bag containing football gear. Defendant was convicted of robbery and felony murder with a special circumstance finding under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), which mandates a sentence of death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus one year for using a deadly or dangerous weapon. The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's sentence, concluding that the felony murder special circumstance statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. In this case, defendant had notice of the conduct proscribed by section 190.2 and does not claim discriminatory prosecution. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence is not cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment; defendant forfeited his right to challenge the restitution fine and assessments; and the trial court's sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment must be corrected.

People v. Taylor

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H047540(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Elia

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Proposition 64, “the Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act" (2016), added Health and Safety Code section 11362.1. With specified exceptions, section 11362.1(a) declares it “lawful under state and local law" .for persons 21 years of age to possess, process, transport, purchase, obtain, or give away to persons 21 years of age, without compensation, not more than 28.5 grams of cannabis. Section 11361.8 establishes a post-judgment procedure to recall or dismiss a sentence when “[a] person currently serving a sentence for a conviction . . . would not have been guilty of an offense, or . . . would have been guilty of a lesser offense under" the Act. Taylor moved to dismiss a 1999 felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance in prison, Penal Code 4573.6, and a 2000 felony conviction of conspiracy to commit a crime. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motions. Penal Code 4573.6 makes exceptions to the prohibited possession in prison and other custodial settings only where possession is authorized by the rules of the Department of Corrections, rules of the institution, or by specific authorization. Proposition 64 does not address that prohibition. The most logical inference is that the Legislature sought to keep unauthorized substances out of custodial settings to maintain institutional supervision, discipline, and safety.

People v. Williams

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A157283(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Petrou

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

M.T. found the door of his house open and two black men walking in the adjoining alley. He lost sight of them as they got into a red Mustang. M.T. could only see their silhouettes. Jewelry and a cash box had been stolen. A window had been pried open; its lock was broken. The responding officer lifted fingerprints from the broken window. A fingerprint analyst compared those fingerprints with Williams’s fingerprints taken from an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) report generated when Williams was previously arrested. The report listed Williams's address as 0.3 miles from M.T.’s house. Williams’s home was not searched for the stolen property. None of the property was located in Williams’s possession. Williams did not have a red Mustang registered in his name. There was no evidence tying Williams to the burglary other than the fingerprints. Williams, charged with felony burglary, unsuccessfully argued that fingerprint analysis does not pass muster under "Frye." The court of appeal reversed Williams’s conviction. The trial judge improperly aligned itself with the prosecutor in the minds of the jury by the manner of his questioning of the fingerprint expert, repeatedly interrupting the defense’s cross-examination and implying that the defense could have hired its own expert. The questioning constituted prejudicial misconduct.

Daniels v. Delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 531, 2019

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Traynor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After Harold Daniels pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, the Superior Court sentenced him to a mandatory term of imprisonment as a third-time offender. The court based its finding that Daniels had committed two prior offenses, in part on its determination that Daniels had been convicted in New Jersey in 2012 under a statute that was “similar” to Delaware’s driving-under-the-influence statute. On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Daniels argued that, because the New Jersey statute under which he was convicted prohibited conduct that was not against the law in Delaware — permitting another person to operate a vehicle while under the influence — the Superior Court erred by counting the New Jersey conviction against him. To this, the Supreme Court agreed with Daniels and vacated his sentence.

Araiza v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-17-0000695

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the circuit court's order denying Petitioner's petition to vacate, set aside, or correct illegal sentence through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Haw. R. Penal P. 40, holding that counsel did not properly advise Petitioner about the consequences of an aggravated felony conviction. Petitioner pleaded no contest to theft in the first degree, an aggravated felony under federal immigration law, and to welfare fraud. Petitioner's counsel's advice conveyed that there was a realistic possibility Petitioner would not be deported, but, in reality, Petitioner was precluded from discretionary relief from deportation due to her conviction. The Supreme Court held that Petitioner was entitled to relief under the totality of the circumstances and offered guidance as to an issue relating to qualifications of interpreters.

State v. Waigand

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 19-0089

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the restitution order of the district court, holding that the State failed to prove the full amount of restitution was caused by the crime of conviction. Defendant pled guilty to ongoing criminal conduct and admitted that the victim bank's losses totaled $288,000. The bank obtained a civil deficiency judgment of $988,636. The district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution in the full amount of the bank's loss rather than the amount Defendant admitted converting. The Supreme Court vacated the restitution amount in excess of $288,000 and remanded the case for entry of an amended restitution award in that amount, holding that the district court's order was not supported by substantial evidence.

State v. Wieneke

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 20-0126

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence for domestic abuse assault while displaying a dangerous weapon, holding that the district court exceeded its statutory sentencing authority in this case. The district court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed two years, suspended all but six days of the sentence, and placed Defendant on probation for two years. On appeal, the court of appeals noted that the imposed sentence appeared to be an illegal split sentence but declined to resolve the issue. The Supreme Court exercised its discretion to correct the illegality in this case, holding that the district court imposed a statutorily unauthorized sentence by suspending a portion of Defendant's indeterminate sentence.

Hargroves v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Dockets: 2019-SC-0181-MR, 2019-SC-0279-DG

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Nickell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder, first-degree assault, and first-degree wanton endangerment of a child, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying requested instructions on extreme emotional disturbance and voluntary intoxication; (2) the prosecutor did not improperly reenact Defendant's theory of the shooting during the direct examination of the medical examiner; and (3) the trial court properly applied the law in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

Lousiana v. Cohen

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-K-00949

Opinion Date: January 27, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Sixteen-year old Donasty Cohen was charged with second-degree murder for the death of her 27-day-old infant son. After trial, a jury found her guilty of manslaughter. The district court sentenced her to serve 17 years imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility. The court of appeal affirmed after deleting the restriction on eligibility for parole. On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, defendant argued only that the district court erred in denying her challenge for cause of one prospective juror. In the course of reviewing the record, it became apparent that the verdict in this case was non-unanimous. The sealed jury polling slips contained in the record showed defendant was found guilty of manslaughter by vote of 11-1. The State conceded the verdict was not unanimous. The Court held defendant was entitled to a new trial. The appellate court's judgment was reversed, the conviction and sentence vacated, and the matter remanded fur further proceedings.

Washington v. Louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-KK-01792

Opinion Date: January 27, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Jamal Washington was indicted for racketeering; human trafficking; and conspiracy to commit human trafficking. With regard to racketeering, the indictment alleged that defendant, his codefendants, and other persons, known and unknown, engaged in conduct that furthered a criminal enterprise involved in narcotics distribution and prostitution. Defendant pleaded guilty to racketeering, and the State in exchange dismissed the remaining charges and agreed to forego recidivist sentence enhancement. The district court sentenced defendant in conformity with the plea agreement to serve eight years imprisonment at hard labor. The court of appeal affirmed. Thereafter, defendant sought clarification that the court had not designated the offense as a crime of violence. A minute entry indicated that the district court had designated the offense as a crime of violence. However, no such designation was evident in the sentencing transcript. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeal determined that racketeering was not a crime of violence because it was not enumerated as such in La. R.S. 14:2(B), and because the use (or attempted use) of physical force was not an element of racketeering, as that crime was defined by statute. Therefore, the court of appeal found that the crime was incorrectly designated as a crime of violence in the district court's minute entry. The Louisiana Supreme Court found defendant did not admit to human trafficking when he pleaded guilty to racketeering, and the State dismissed the charge of human trafficking. Defendant also did not admit that he personally performed any violent acts in the factual basis for his guilty plea. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeal, which reversed the district court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to correct the sentencing minute entry to reflect that the offense was not designated as a crime of violence, and which remanded to the district court for correction of the minute entry.

Commonwealth v. Manolo M.

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12967

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that "a first offense of a [minor] misdemeanor" in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 52 refers to a first episode of minor misdemeanor level misconduct. Four juveniles with no prior offenses were charged with several offenses, including several minor misdemeanors and a felony charge of inciting a riot, all arising from the same episode. A juvenile court judge dismissed the charges of inciting a riot against all three juveniles and decided not to immediately arraign on the minor misdemeanor charges. At issue was which of the charges constitutes a first offense of a minor misdemeanor pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 52. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) all of the minor misdemeanors arising out of the single episode for each juvenile constituted a first offense for which the legislature intended a second change and must be dismissed, but the Commonwealth may proceed directly to arraignment on the greater offenses; (2) there was no probable cause to support the charge of inciting a riot; and (3) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 264, 11 must be read consistently with the limitations in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Commonwealth v. Tate

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12133

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree on the theory of felony murder and other crimes, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) several challenged statements made by the prosecutor in his closing argument did not constitute prejudicial error; (2) the trial judge did not err by denying Defendant's request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on self-defense, reasonable provocation, or sudden combat; and (3) this Court declines to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial on the grounds that Defendant was only nineteen years old at the time of the murder.

Commonwealth v. Teixeira

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-11279

Opinion Date: January 20, 2021

Judge: Barbara A. Lenk

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree by deliberate premeditation and of unlawful possession of a firearm, holding that a new trial was not required because there was no error and that there was no reason for the Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err by declining to give a requested instruction on self-defense; (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the prosecutor to introduce prior bad act evidence; (3) the prosecutor's remarks in her opening statement and closing argument did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) trial counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance; and (5) a new trial was not warranted based on purported newly discovered evidence.

Commonwealth v. Williams

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12378

Opinion Date: January 20, 2021

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgments entered against Defendant in this criminal case, holding that the trial judge abused his discretion in excusing a juror who claimed to be unable to begin deliberations anew after the discharge of another juror. A jury convicted Defendant of murder in the first first degree on a theory of felony murder, as well as assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury and possession of a firearm. On appeal, Defendant argued that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the trial judge erred in excusing a juror. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgments entered against Defendant, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; but (2) the trial court's discharge of the juror in question was error, and the error was prejudicial to Defendant.

Malary v. Commonwealth

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13034

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief from a superior court judge's order denying his motion to continue the third day of an evidentiary suppression hearing, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion. At issue before the single justice was whether the trial judge's directive to Petitioner to make a choice whether to appear for an evidentiary hearing in person or via video conference was sufficiently important and extraordinary as to warrant the exercise of the Supreme Judicial Court's extraordinary power pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying Petitioner's petition.

State v. Mercier

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 MT 12

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: James A. Rice

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions for deliberate homicide and tampering with physical evidence, holding that Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated, requiring reversal of his conviction of tampering with physical evidence. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was denied his right under the United States and Montana Constitutions to confront witnesses against him when the State presented a foundational witness in real time by two-way videoconference. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) furtherance of an important public policy to allow the witness to testify via two-way videoconferencing was not demonstrated in this case, and therefore, the first prong of the analysis set forth in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), was not satisfied; and (2) Defendant's right to a fair trial was not undermined by the prosecutor's closing argument.

New Hampshire v. Parry

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0407

Opinion Date: January 27, 2021

Judge: Donovan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Melanie Parry was convicted by jury of possessing a controlled drug. On appeal, she argued (1) the trial court erred by denying her requested jury instruction on the voluntary-act requirement set forth in RSA 626:1 (2016); and (2) the prosecutor's statement during closing argument that voluntariness was not an element of possession and was contrary to the law. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, finding a voluntariness instruction was not necessary unless there was evidence suggesting the defendant's conduct was involuntary. Because no such evidence was presented here, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on RSA 626:1, and the prosecutor's statement was not contrary to the law.

New Jersey v. Brown

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: a-39-19

Opinion Date: January 25, 2021

Judge: Jaynee LaVecchia

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Consolidated appeals presented a common issue: whether state or federal constitutional ex post facto prohibitions permitted the defendants in these cases to be charged with and convicted of the enhanced third-degree offense of failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements when each defendant’s registration requirement arose from a conviction that occurred before the penalty for noncompliance was raised a degree. In 1995, Rodney Brown (R.B.) was convicted of sexual assault. In 2000, Hakum Brown (H.B.) was convicted of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. As a result of those predicate convictions, H.B. and R.B. were subject to the sex offender registration requirements imposed by Megan’s Law. At the time of H.B.’s and R.B.’s sex-offender convictions, failure to comply with the registration requirements was punishable as a fourth-degree offense. However, in 2007, the Legislature upgraded failure to register to a third-degree offense. In 2014, H.B. failed to timely register with his local police department. R.B. similarly failed to register in 2015. Each was charged with third-degree failure to register. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined defendants suffered no ex post facto violation as a result of being charged with failure-to-register offenses bearing the increased degree. "The Legislature is free to increase the penalty for the offense of failure to comply with the regulatory registration requirement -- which is separate and apart from defendants’ predicate sex offenses -- without violating ex post facto principles as to those predicate offenses."

New Jersey v. Singh

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: a-37-19

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Faustino J. Fernandez-Vina

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In January 2015, a man entered a gas station store wielding a machete and told the cashier to give him the money. The man took the money and fled. The events were captured on the gas station’s surveillance video, which police retrieved that night. Officers dispatched to the scene noticed and chased an individual in dark clothing. After losing sight of the suspect, one of the officers found an individual, later identified as defendant, wearing dark clothing, sweating, and breathing heavily in a nearby backyard. Defendant resisted arrest. Detective Jorge Quesada, who also responded to the dispatch, joined the effort to subdue defendant. Investigators found a machete and the robbery proceeds in the area where defendant was arrested. Police recovered a sweatshirt, one glove, and sneakers with a white sole and stripes from defendant. At defendant’s trial, the cashier narrated the gas station’s surveillance footage for the jury. Detective Quesada also narrated the footage, referring to an individual depicted in the video as “the defendant” twice. Defense counsel did not object. The prosecutor next showed the detective a pair of sneakers admitted into evidence and Detective Quesada testified, “[t]hese were the sneakers that the defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest.” Defense counsel objected, but the trial judge permitted Detective Quesada to testify about the similarities between the sneakers he saw on the video and the sneakers worn by defendant at the time of his arrest. Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and other offenses. On appeal, he challenged Detective Quesada’s testimony as “improper lay-witness opinion testimony as to the content of the surveillance video and the identity of the robber.” The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court granted certification limited to the lay-witness opinion issue and concluded the detective should not have referenced defendant in his summary of the surveillance footage. However, the Court found that fleeting reference did not amount to plain error in light of the other evidence produced. And the detective’s testimony regarding the sneakers was proper.

Oregon v. Pittman

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S067312

Opinion Date: January 28, 2021

Judge: Martha Lee Walters

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In connection with a criminal prosecution for delivery of methamphetamine, a trial court ordered defendant Catrice Pittman to unlock a password-protected cell phone that was found in her purse. Defendant resisted, contending the order would violate her right against self-incrimination. The trial court concluded the order was lawful and held defendant in contempt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt judgment. Although the Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the State that there were circumstances in which such an order would not violate the Constitution, the trial court record did not conduct the necessary factfinding to allow the Supreme Court to conclude those circumstances were present here. Accordingly, judgment was reversed.

State v. Segrain

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 19-13

Opinion Date: January 27, 2021

Judge: William P. Robinson, III

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court declaring Defendant to be a probation violator and sentencing Defendant to the nine years remaining on his suspended sentence, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion. On appeal, Defendant argued that the order to serve the nine years remaining on his suspended sentence was improperly based on the new charges alone, without proper attention being given to the original conviction for which he was on probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice acted within her discretion by executing the full nine years of Defendant's original suspended sentence.

State v. Smith

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-64

Opinion Date: January 27, 2021

Judge: Francis X. Flaherty

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of possession of child pornography and sentencing him to a term of imprisonment of five years, with two years suspended, with probation, holding that the trial justice erred by denying Defendant an opportunity to address the jury with an opening statement. Defendant chose to proceed pro se at trial. Immediately after the State delivered its opening statement, Defendant also sought to offer an opening statement. Following a colloquy, the trial justice refused to allow Defendant to make an opening statement. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that the trial justice erred when he did not make a proper inquiry of Defendant before precluding him from making an opening statement to the jury.

Frye-Byington v. Rapid City Medical Center

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 S.D. 3

Opinion Date: January 20, 2021

Judge: Salter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court entering judgment in favor of Rapid City Medical Center (RCMC) and three of its doctors (collectively, Defendants) in this negligence action, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's request to call two rebuttal witnesses and refusing Plaintiff's proposed jury instruction on agency. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants did not inform her of a growing mass in her chest that caused persistent issues with her throat and chest until the mass was removed. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiff's request to call two rebuttal witnesses in an attempt to lay foundation for medical records not offered during Plaintiff's case-in-chief; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it limited the agency instruction relative to the claims Plaintiff raised against Defendants.

State v. Malloy

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 UT 3

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Thomas R. Lee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of felony driving under the influence (DUI) and possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia, holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply where law enforcement relied reasonably on then-existing precedent. In affirming Defendant's conviction, the court of appeals held that the police had the reasonable suspicion necessary to temporarily detain Defendant in his vehicle and ask him to step out of it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court repudiates the sweeping language of its opinion in State v. James, 13 P.3d 576 (Utah 2019), and holds that the identity of the opener of a car door may affect the reasonableness of any given police encounter; but (2) the evidence here was not subject to exclusion because the police acted objectively reasonably in reliance on the Supreme Court's opinion in James.

In re Pers. Restraint of Garcia-Mendoza

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 98026-8

Opinion Date: January 28, 2021

Judge: Steven González

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In 2007, petitioner Alejandro Garcia Mendoza pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He moved to withdraw the plea on grounds his counsel did not advise him as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356 (2010). Petitioner also argued he did not need to show prejudice under RCW 10.40.200. The Court of Appeals concluded petitioner was raising two claims: a constitutional claim that was exempt from the time bar, and a statutory claim that was not. It dismissed his challenge as mixed without reaching the merits. The Washington Supreme Court concluded petitioner made one claim for relief: ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea. The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that under RCW 10.40.200 he did not need to show prejudice to bring this claim, but since he made a prima face showing of ineffective assistance in a challenge that is time exempt, the dismissal of his petition was vacated and this matter was remanded back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Washington v. Pratt

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 98066-7

Opinion Date: January 28, 2021

Judge: Yu

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on the eligibility criteria of the special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), which required offenders to have an established relationship with, or connection to, the victim such that the sole connection with the victim was not the commission of the crime. Petitioner Cory Pratt and his victim shared a family member in common, but did not have a direct relationship. In 2016, Pratt and his daughter attended his cousin’s birthday party. Several young girls spent the night after the party, including M.B., the 10-year-old daughter of Pratt’s aunt’s stepsister. Pratt slept in a backyard tent with the girls. The next day, M.B. told her grandmother and parents that Pratt touched her in the tent. Pratt was charged with one count of first-degree child molestation, and convicted after a two-day bench trial. Pratt requested the SSOSA sentence at issue here. The State contended he was not eligible because he did not have an “established relationship” with M.B. as required by statute: the State noted Pratt had met the child hours of the party; Pratt contended his connection was established through “familial ties.” The trial court sentenced Pratt according to SSOSA, reducing his sentence from 57 months of confinement to 12 months. The State appealed. Concluding Pratt was not “connected” to his victim as contemplated by the applicable statute, the Washington Supreme Court determined he was not eligible for a SSOSA sentence. The Court of Appeals was affirmed and the matter remanded for resentencing.

Bird v. Lampert

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 WY 11

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's pro se complaint filed under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act alleging that the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC) inmate classification policies are invalid rules, holding that the WDOC's inmate classification policy is not a rule required to be filed with the Wyoming Secretary of State. Plaintiff pled guilty to kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences. In his complaint for declaratory judgment Plaintiff alleged that the failure to file WDOC policies and procedures with the Secretary of State rendered them, and any actions taken pursuant to them, void. Therefore, Plaintiff claimed that his recent inmate classification was void. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WDOC was not required to file the inmate classification policy at issue with the Secretary of State's office, and therefore, Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Raczon v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 WY 12

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the judgment of the district court accepting Defendant's plea of no contest to stalking but declining to enter a conviction on the plea, deferring the proceedings, and placing Defendant on one year of unsupervised probation, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction. On February 27, 2020, the district court signed the sentencing order and, the next day, e-mailed the sentencing order to the district court. On March 3, 2020, the hard copy of the sentencing order was filed of record. On April 2, 2020, Defendant filed her notice of appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Defendant's appeal was untimely, and therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction.