| United States v. Hercules |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1965 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence imposed in connection with his plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances and possession with intent to distribute the same, holding that a defendant's potential future deportation is a factor that a sentencing court may consider under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). By the time of sentencing, a detainer had been filed against Defendant with an eye toward subsequent deportation. Defendant requested that the sentencing court consider his future deportation and the possibility of a downward variance on that basis. The district court determined that it would not give weight to Defendant's potential deportation when fashioning Defendant's sentence. The court then imposed an eighty-seven-month term of immurement. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) under appropriate circumstances, a defendant's potential deportation may properly be considered pursuant to section 3553(a)(1); and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it would not give weight to Defendant's potential future deportation. |
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| United States v. Santiago |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1802 Opinion Date: January 3, 2020 Judge: Boudin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed in connection with Defendant's plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, holding that Defendant's appeal waiver barred this appeal. Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Defendant to thirty-seven months' imprisonment and ordered that the sentence run consecutively to a seven-year sentence Defendant had previously received for an unrelated state drug offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by imposing a consecutive, rather than a concurrent, sentence. The government argued that Defendant's appeal was barred because, as part of his guilty plea, he expressly waived his right to appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that enforcement of the appeal waiver did not result in a miscarriage of justice. |
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| United States v. Anderson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-1839 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Dennis G. Jacobs Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was sentenced to 120 months in prison for federal drug offenses and the district court recommended that his federal sentence run concurrently with a yet-to-be-imposed state sentence for a parole violation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erroneously assumed that it lacked the authority to impose a sentence that was concurrent or consecutive with the state sentence. The government consented to a partial remand to the district court because the district court erroneously assumed that it lacked authority to impose rather than merely recommend concurrent or consecutive sentences with respect to the yet‐to‐be‐imposed state sentence. However, the government did not consent to a remand for the district court to reconsider a related Guidelines issue, arguing that defendant waived his right to appeal procedural sentencing errors as part of his plea agreement. The Second Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for the district court to consider both issues because they were closely related and it was within the court's discretion to control the scope of its mandate. |
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| United States v. Bell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 17-3792 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Greenaway Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Bell and Robinson entered a Philadelphia store, wearing stockings over their faces. Bell grabbed an employee’s neck, pointed a weapon and threw the employee to the ground, then took cash from the register. The employee grabbed Bell. Bell hit the employee with the weapon, causing the weapon to break. The employee then realized the firearm was actually a plastic gun; he stood and attempted to stop the robbery. Bell and Robinson fled the store with $1,000.00 in cash. Bell dropped his hat, which was seized by the police for DNA testing. Approximately one year later, the police obtained a warrant for Bell’s DNA. Officers went to Bell’s residence to execute the warrant and found Bell hiding on the roof outside his bedroom window with a bag containing ammunition. Bell pled guilty as a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and to Hobbs Act robbery, section 1951(a). The court imposed a two-level enhancement for physical restraint, U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and a four-level enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, section 2B3.1(b)(2)(D). The court calculated a sentencing range of 77-96 months and imposed a sentence of 86 months. The Third Circuit remanded for resentencing, affirming the application of the dangerous weapon enhancement but reversing the enhancement for physical restraint. While grabbing the victim and forcing him down satisfied the physical force requirement, the victim was not left with no alternative and the restraint was quite limited in time without sustained focus on the victim. Objects that appear to be dangerous weapons are considered dangerous weapons for purposes of section 2B3.1. |
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| Long v. Hooks |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-6980 Opinion Date: January 8, 2020 Judge: Richardson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the state's motion for summary judgment and rejected petitioner's claim that a state post-conviction court unreasonably applied Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when evaluating evidence disclosed to him for the first time thirty years after his trial. The court held that, although petitioner showed that the state court's summary conclusion misstated the burden of proof for Brady claims, that error did not entitle petitioner to habeas relief. In this case, the state court found the cumulative effect of any new evidence with any value was so minimal that it would have no impact on the outcome of the trial. The court held that the state court's reasonable finding supported the state court's decision that any newly disclosed evidence fell short of the kind of materiality that Brady required. |
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| United States v. George |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4125 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Floyd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and dismissing the aggravated identity theft count. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1) prohibits the unauthorized use of the means of identification of deceased, as well as living, victims. In light of its plain, ordinary meaning and the statutory context, the court held that the term "person" is unambiguous and includes deceased persons as victims of identity theft. Furthermore, the legislative history bolsters the court's interpretation of the term. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Sueiro |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4525 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Floyd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit held that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider defendant's interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of his Faretta motion. In this case, defendant was charged with four federal child pornography counts and wants to represent himself at trial. The court explained that, given the narrowness of the collateral order doctrine in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has only held that four types of orders are immediately appealable: orders denying a Double Jeopardy Clause challenge, orders denying a Speech or Debate Clause challenge, orders denying a motion to reduce bail, and orders allowing for the forced medication of criminal defendants. The court pointed to the strongly worded dictum in Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984), in which the Supreme Court specifically cited a Faretta order as an example of a decision that would be effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The court concluded that it was bound by this stricter interpretation and therefore solely relied on collateral order jurisprudence within the criminal context. |
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| Chavez-Mercado v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 17-60212 Opinion Date: January 6, 2020 Judge: James L. Dennis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order dismissing an appeal from the IJ's denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings and order of removal. The Fifth Circuit held that res judicata did not preclude DHS from seeking to remove petitioner on the basis of his burglary conviction, because the convictions for evading arrest with a motor vehicle and burglary of a habitation underlying his removal proceedings were not based on the same nucleus of operative facts. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review in part. The court dismissed the petition for review in part based on lack of jurisdiction, because petitioner argued for the first time on appeal that DHS was precluded from filing a second notice to appear. |
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| United States v. Foley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-20129 Opinion Date: January 3, 2020 Judge: Jacques Loeb Wiener, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A district court errs when it relies on a bare allegation of a new law violation contained in a revocation petition unless the allegation is supported by evidence adduced at the revocation hearing or contains other indicia of reliability, such as the factual underpinnings of the conduct giving rise to the arrest. The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's 24 month sentence for violating a condition of his supervised release. The court held that the district court erred because it gave significant weight to the bare allegations contained in the revocation petition regarding defendant's arrest on the assault and possession charges and because this impermissible factor was a dominant factor in its decision. However, the court ultimately affirmed the sentence because the error was not clear under existing law. |
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| United States v. Griffin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 17-60452 Opinion Date: January 8, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Mississippi aggravated assault is a felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, in which petitioner argued that the Mississippi statute, MISS. CODE ANN. 97-3-7(2)(a), does not require the use of physical force because it allows conviction only on causing serious bodily injury. The court's recent en banc decision in United States v. Reyes-Contreras, 910 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc), which held that both direct force and indirect force constitute physical force, foreclosed petitioner's claim. |
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| United States v. Tapia |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-10161 Opinion Date: January 6, 2020 Judge: Kurt D. Engelhardt Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Applying the plain error standard of review, the court held that whether the government's use of defendant's proffer information constitutes clear or obvious error was of little consequence because his substantial rights were not affected. In this case, although the district court did not specifically articulate how the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the drug quantity was at least 45 kilograms, it did adopt the presentence report and addendum without change. Therefore, defendant failed to carry his burden of proving that he would have received a lesser sentence had the government not referenced the proffer information. |
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| Williams v. Catoe |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-40825 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Jerry E. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a district court's interlocutory order denying a motion for appointment of counsel is not immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. The Fifth Circuit held that the panel opinion in Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1985), is overruled and dismissed this interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that, even in the small percentage of cases in which the lack of counsel in the district court may restrain a section 1983 plaintiff in the assertion of his rights, the fact that a ruling may burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final judgment has never sufficed to breach the collateral-order doctrine. |
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| Adams v. Blount County |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5306 Opinion Date: January 8, 2020 Judge: Jane Branstetter Stranch Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Tarbett, wanted for assaulting an officer, was last known to be staying at Winchester Drive and allegedly had threatened to kill any officer who made contact with him. Burns was patrolling when a radio call described suspicious individuals walking near Winchester Drive. Burns responded and saw two men walking toward him. Burns says one tried to hide his face. Burns exited his car and engaged the men. Edwards identified himself as “Joe Eldridge,” while snickering. Burns patted down Edwards, who “took off” but fell as Burns caught up. The two struggled. Edwards said he was having a seizure. Other officers arrived. Burns eventually handcuffed Edwards. Edwards asked Burns to call 911; Burns threatened him with a taser. Edwards responded, “I feel like I’m going to pass the [expletive] out.” Five people were present when Deputies Burns and Patty escorted Edwards to Patty’s SUV. Edwards got away and began running. Burns grabbed him, his feet lifted off the ground kicking. Edwards kicked Patty near the groin. Burns and Edwards then fell to the ground. Witnesses disagreed on what happened. Sergeant Boyd arrived and saw Edwards lying on the ground, bleeding from his ears. Edwards’s treating physician said that Edwards would not survive because his “skull was fractured in the rear near the spinal cord” and that his injuries were inconsistent with a backward fall unless “he had been on a ladder.” A medical examiner found multiple contusions around Edwards’s head, chest, back, and abdomen, and two “linear, full-thickness fractures” to the occipital bone at the base of the skull and categorized the manner of death as a homicide. Edwards had, earlier that day, jumped across the hood of a running car. In a suit by Edwards’s survivors, the district court denied qualified immunity on an excessive force claim, finding the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact regarding reasonableness and violation of Edwards’s clearly established rights. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was premised on factual disputes and not questions of law. |
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| Cardin v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-5389 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Raymond M. Kethledge Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Sixth Circuit affirmed Cardin’s fraud conviction and 78-month sentence. Cardin worked with his sister, Natalie, to prepare a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The filing deadline was June 8, 2016. On June 6, Cardin was unexpectedly hospitalized. The following day, Natalie filed the motion, signed “Walter A. Cardin by Natalie J. Cardin,” stating “under penalty of perjury” that she was Walter’s “attorney in fact,” and that Cardin was “otherwise unavailable to sign this motion and submit it in a timely manner.” About two months later, the court sua sponte indicated that it was considering dismissing the motion. Cardin filed a pro se motion for leave to add Cardin's signature to the original motion, with a letter from his prison case manager affirming that Cardin had been hospitalized. Cardin attached a 2015 document, by which he granted Natalie “unlimited” power of attorney to act on his behalf. Twenty-one months later, the court denied both motions. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Natalie satisfied the requirements of a 'next friend’: an adequate explanation of why the real party in interest could not appear and “truly dedicated to the best interests of the [defendant].” That a putative next friend bears the burden of proving her status does not mean that the prisoner’s views, after the 2255 motion was filed, are irrelevant. Federal courts routinely enter show-cause orders directing parties, after a filing, to provide facts necessary to the court’s jurisdiction. |
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| Hueso v. Barnhart |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-6299 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Murphy Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2010, Hueso was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for drug crimes. In 2013, Hueso unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. His second unsuccessful petition, in 2018, argued that his state convictions were not “felony drug offenses” and that his mandatory minimum should have been 10 years. A 2019 Ninth Circuit case subsequently undercut the substantive portion of the district court’s denial of relief. Hueso filed another petition. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 permits a second 2255 motion only if there is new evidence of innocence or a new rule of constitutional law from the Supreme Court. Prisoners seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 must show that section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention.” Hueso argued that prisoners barred from filing a second 2255 motion may seek habeas relief under section 2241 based on new circuit court decisions. The Fourth Circuit has accepted that position. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Hueso’s cited circuit court cases do not render a 2255 motion “inadequate or ineffective” within the meaning of section 2255(e); the two circuit decisions cannot establish section 2255’s inadequacy and his cited Supreme Court decision issued when his direct appeal was pending, so he could have cited it in the ordinary course. |
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| In re: Boland |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-3211, 19-3205 Opinion Date: January 3, 2020 Judge: McKEAGUE Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Criminal Law |
| Attorney Boland was a technology expert for defendants charged with possessing child pornography. Boland started with innocuous online stock photographs of young girls (Doe and Roe) and manipulated the photographs on his computer to create images of the girls engaged in sex acts, to support arguments that it was possible the pornography his clients downloaded was also doctored. An Oklahoma federal prosecutor claimed that the exhibits were actionable. The judge told Boland to delete the images. Boland instead shipped his computer to Ohio and continued using the exhibits in court although 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(C) defines “child pornography” as any image which is morphed to make it appear that a real minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Ohio federal prosecutors offered Boland pre-trial diversion in lieu of prosecution; Boland admitted he violated federal law. Federal prosecutors identified the girls and told their parents what Boland had done. They sued Boland under 18 U.S.C. 2255, which provides minimum damages of $150,000 to child pornography victims. They won a combined $300,000 judgment. Boland filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit reversed the discharge of the debt, citing 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). The debt arose from “willful and malicious injury by the debtor.” The court rejected Boland’s “implausible pleas of ignorance.” The act itself is the injury. Doe and Roe had to prove only that Boland knew he was dealing with child pornography and knew the girls' images depicted real minors. |
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| United States v. Chalhoub |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-6180 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Nalbandian Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law, Public Benefits |
| A jury convicted Dr. Chalhoub of defrauding health care benefit programs under 18 U.S.C. 1347. A Kentucky cardiologist, Chalhoub implanted permanent pacemakers in patients who did not need the devices or the tests that he ordered before and after surgery. On appeal, Chalhoub claimed that the district court repeatedly admitted evidence unduly prejudicial to him—and to which he could not effectively respond. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that “some of the government’s tactics here leave something to be desired.” Noting Chaloub’s failure to cross-examine, the court rejected a due process challenge to the admission of testimony by a doctor who claimed to have examined 20 of former Chaloub’s patients but could not name those patients. Chalhoub was not denied a right to be heard and the government did not base its case solely on allegations about those 20 victims. Chalhoub argued that he was severely prejudiced by testimony that he misbilled insurers for other unspecified procedures, but he did not seek clarification or additional information at trial. The court upheld the admission of testimony about Chaloub’s income and expenditures and testimony about his installation of a pacemaker in a former patient. |
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| United States v. Potts |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-1961 Opinion Date: January 8, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Potts broke into homes to implement identify-theft schemes. One scheme required him to break into a home three times in order to “verify” fraudulent charges he made on the victim’s credit card. He pleaded guilty to unauthorized-access-device fraud and two counts of aggravated identity theft. Aggravated identity theft is not subject to a Guidelines calculation but carries a mandatory two-year sentence, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. Potts’s criminal history category was VI, the highest Guidelines category, resulting in a sentencing range of 30-37 months for unauthorized-access-device fraud. The district court indicated its intent to exceed the Guidelines. Following argument, the court departed upward four levels under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, finding that Potts’s criminal-history category under-represented the seriousness of his criminal history and/or the likelihood that he would commit another crime. The new Guidelines range was 41-51 months; the court varied upward an additional nine months, imposing a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment for unauthorized-access-device fraud. For two counts of aggravated identity theft, the court ordered that Potts’s sentences run consecutively, for a total of nine years of imprisonment. The court specified that Potts’s nine-year federal sentence would be served consecutively to his undischarged term of state imprisonment for domestic violence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable. Potts’s pattern of committing the same crimes in the same way justified the district court’s conclusion that Potts would likely recidivate. |
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| Subdiaz-Osorio v. Humphreys |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-1061 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Subdiaz‐Osorio stabbed his brother to death during a drunken fight in Wisconsin. He attempted to flee but was stopped in Arkansas while driving to Mexico. At Subdiaz‐Osorio’s request, the interview in Arkansas was conducted in Spanish. Neither Subdiaz‐Osorio nor Officer Torres had any trouble understanding each other. Subdiaz‐Osorio signed a waiver of his Miranda rights, indicating that he understood his rights. During the interview, after discussing the extradition process, Subdiaz‐Osorio asked in Spanish, “How can I do to get an attorney here because I don’t have enough to afford for one?” The officer responded: If you need an attorney‐‐by the time you’re going to appear in the court, the state of Arkansas will get an attorney for you. The interview continued for an hour with Subdiaz-Osorio’s full cooperation. Denying a motion to suppress, the court concluded that Subdiaz‐Osorio’s question about an attorney was not a request to have an attorney with him during the interview; he was asking about how he could obtain an attorney for the extradition hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, that Subdiaz‐Osorio did not unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Subdiaz‐Osorio’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The state court finding was not contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent. |
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| United States v. Guerrero |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1676 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2013, Guerrero, a Chicago police officer who participated in drug trafficking, pleaded guilty to conspiring to participate in racketeering activity, conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, interfering with commerce by threats or violence, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence and drug trafficking. Guerrero’s guideline range for the first three counts was life in prison and for the fourth count was 60 consecutive months. He provided substantial assistance in prosecuting co-conspirators and the government recommended that he serve 228 months. Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782 became effective in 2014, retroactively reducing by two levels the offense levels for most drug-trafficking crimes. Guerrero sent the district court a letter requesting that he be appointed counsel in order to seek resentencing under the amendment. The district court rejected Guerrero’s 2015 request and additionally found that Guerrero was eligible for a two-level reduction under Amendment 782 but that the reduction would make no difference to his ultimate sentence: Guerrero filed a motion for clarification. The court construed that as a late motion to reconsider and denied it. In 2018, Guerrero tried again, with counsel. The district court denied the motion without considering the merits. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The 2015 proceedings should not be counted against Guerrero as his one chance to seek relief under Amendment 782. |
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| United States v. Outlaw |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2958 Opinion Date: January 8, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute heroin and aiding and abetting the distribution of heroin. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdicts. In this case, ample evidence showed that defendant knowingly and intentionally joined a conspiracy to distribute heroin, and a jury could reasonably infer that defendant knew in advance that he was driving to a drug transaction and intentionally facilitated his associate's transfer of heroin. The court also held that the district court did not err by applying a four-level sentencing increase under USSG 3B1.1(a) for an aggravating role in the offense, and a two-level sentencing increase under USSG 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a downward variance. |
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| United States v. Parsons |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3669 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, because the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. In this case, there was sufficient evidence to establish a nexus between defendant and the firearm found on his plane. The court held that defendant knowingly possessed the gun where recorded jail calls showed that he referenced items that needed to be removed from the plane and where he admitted at trial that the gun looked like the firearm he had previously purchased. Furthermore, defendant had dominion over the plane, the gun was found near personal items that belonged to defendant, and defendant had recently absconded from Tennessee while awaiting trial on a state charge for being a felon in possession of a firearm. |
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| United States v. Mayea-Pulido |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-50223 Opinion Date: January 3, 2020 Judge: Friedland Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry by a previously deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326, and the revocation of supervised release. Defendant argued that he should have automatically become a United States citizen as a result of the naturalization of one of his parents prior to the reentry at issue. However, because his parents were married, and the derivative citizenship statute at 8 U.S.C. 1432(a) required married parents to both naturalize to confer citizenship to their child, he did not become a citizen. Defendant claimed that, by making his parents' marital status a factor in the derivative citizenship determination, section 1432(a) violates the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. The panel held that rational basis review applies to section 1432(a) for reasons separate and apart from those relied on in Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, Barthelemy's holding that section 1432(a) is rational is not irreconcilable with Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). Therefore, the panel was still bound by that portion of Barthelemy's reasoning and by its ultimate holding that section 1432(a) is constitutional. Even if the panel were not bound by the holding in Barthelemy, the panel concluded that section 1432(a) is rational because protecting the parental rights of the non-citizen parent is plainly a legitimate legislative purpose. |
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| United States v. Garcia |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-6033 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Jerome A. Holmes Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-Appellant Jason Garcia appealed the sentence he received after pleading guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to ninety-six months in prison. He claimed the district court erred in considering his earlier possession of two handguns as relevant conduct and that the sentence the court imposed on him was substantively unreasonable. After review, the Tenth Circuit rejected Garcia’s challenges: the Court reviewed Garcia’s relevant-conduct argument for plain error and concluded that the district court did not plainly err in treating his prior incident of handgun possession as relevant conduct as to his offense of conviction; and (2) the district court’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Robertson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-2165 Opinion Date: January 6, 2020 Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-Appellant Jeremias Robertson pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, and was sentenced to a term of 84 months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release. On appeal he challenged the district court’s findings that he pointed a gun at an officer, thereby resulting in a four-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon), and a six-level enhancement for assaulting the officer in a manner creating a substantial risk of bodily injury. To the Tenth Circuit, he argued: (1) the district court should have required proof by clear and convincing evidence; (2) under any standard of proof, the evidence did not support the district court’s findings; and (3) the district court erroneously drew a negative inference from his silence at the sentencing hearing. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. |
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| Paez v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 16-15705 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit published this opinion in place of its previous opinion, which was vacated by order of the court. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief, holding that a district court may, on its own initiative and without hearing from the State, decide that the statute of limitations bars the petition. In this case, petitioner was provided ample notice and opportunity to explain why his petition was timely in his form petition and again when he was given the opportunity to respond to the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation that his petition be summarily dismissed as untimely. Furthermore, the Secretary was notified of the court's action, had an opportunity to respond, and remained silent. No one contests that the petition was untimely and the State has never indicated a desire to waive the limitations bar. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition. |
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| United States v. Brown |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-15470 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Rosenbaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a juror after the juror stated that the Holy Spirit had "told" him to return a certain verdict irrespective of what the evidence showed. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to question Juror 13. The court held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that Juror 13 was not capable of returning a verdict based on the evidence adduced at trial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Juror 13 after finding that he was not capable of reaching a verdict based on the evidence. The court also held that Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to the court's inquiry into Juror 13's statement. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment by excusing Juror 13. Finally, the court held that the district court did not plainly err in issuing the forfeiture order. |
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| United States v. Hill |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-10647 Opinion Date: January 3, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's supervised release after defendant was arrested while on supervised release for unlawful possession of marijuana in the first degree, certain persons forbidden to possess a firearm, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At issue was whether the evidence seized during defendant's arrest should have been suppressed during his revocation of supervised release proceedings. The court held that neither this court nor the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule applies in that context. Furthermore, defendant failed to offer anything to indicate why, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in the state parole revocation context, the exclusionary rule should apply to the supervised release revocation proceedings at issue here. |
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| United States v. Oliver |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-15565 Opinion Date: January 6, 2020 Judge: Charles R. Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit reversed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. The court held that defendant's prior Georgia conviction for making terroristic threats under O.C.G.A. 16-11-37(a) (2010), is not a predicate violent felony under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The court held that because section 16-11-37(a) is indivisible and overbroad under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016), a violation of that statute categorically does not constitute a predicate offense under the elements clause. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Santos |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-14529 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Hull Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for procuring naturalization unlawfully, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a), and misuse of evidence of an unlawfully issued certificate of naturalization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1423. The court held that the annotated Form N-400 was (1) admissible non-hearsay as an adopted admission of a party-opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, and, (2) alternatively, was properly admitted under the public record hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803. Furthermore, the officer's red marks in the annotated Form N-400 Application was not testimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting defendant's post-Miranda statement, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction as to Count 1. |
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| United States v. Carr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 18-3053 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Rao Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that defendant's prior bank robbery convictions were crimes of violence and affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for post-conviction relief. The court need not reach defendant's constitutional objection, because in 2003, when he was sentenced, a prior conviction could be a crime of violence under either the residual clause or the Guidelines' independent elements clause, which defines a crime of violence as one that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The court explained that the federal bank robbery statute requires proof that a defendant took property by force and violence, or by intimidation. In order to satisfy this requirement, defendant must have at least knowingly threatened someone with physical force (or have attempted to do so), which squarely placed the offense within the Guidelines' elements clause. |
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| United States v. Marshall |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 18-3012 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Rao Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The DC Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for six counts of sex trafficking and related crimes against minors, rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the existing record left no doubt that counsel's failure to challenge the qualifications of an expert witness was not ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, an objection to the expert's qualifications would have been meritless under the applicable legal standard; the expert's curriculum vitae listed extensive medical training in pediatrics, decades of on-the-job experience, and specialized knowledge reflected in peer-reviewed publications, other publications and expert reports, and dozens of lectures on the dynamics of child sex trafficking and victimization; and the court's cases clearly supported qualifying an expert witness on these facts. Furthermore, counsel's decision to press the defense by challenging the expert on three grounds other than qualifications fell within the reasonable range of professional assistance. |
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| Pitts v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 7 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that Appellant did not show an abuse of discretion in the denial of the writ. In 1979, Appellant was convicted of capital felony murder. After the Supreme Court gave Appellant leave to proceed with a coram nobis petition, Appellant filed his petition, alleging a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court determined that no Brady violation had occurred and declined to issue the writ. On appeal, Appellant claimed that the trial court failed to conduct a proper analysis when it did not treat the admission of certain evidence as structural error and failed to apply the law of the case doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the error in this case was not structural and that the court was correct in its analysis. |
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| Andrew M. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A158129(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 6, 2020 Judge: Barbara J.R. Jones Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Shortly before turning 18 Andrew committed an armed robbery; his accomplice shot and killed a police officer. After his conviction, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus 24 years. The court of appeal reversed one special circumstance. On remand, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to LWOP plus 24 years. After a second remand following the U.S. Supreme Court's Miller decision (2012), Judge Brady imposed LWOP plus 23 years, finding Andrew’s actions “were not those of an irresponsible or impulsive child," nor the product of peer pressure, coercion, or surprise and finding no realistic chance of rehabilitation. The court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court returned the case with directions to consider whether legislation rendering juvenile LWOP defendants eligible for parole suitability hearings mooted Andrew’s challenge. While Andrew’s appeal was pending Proposition 57 eliminated a prosecutor’s ability to “direct file” charges in criminal court against minors of a certain age. These minors may be tried in criminal court only after the juvenile court conducts a transfer hearing to consider specific factors. The court rejected Andrew’s LWOP challenge but concluded he was entitled to a Proposition 57 hearing. The superior court granted the prosecution's motion to assign that hearing to Judge Brady. The court of appeal rejected a mandamus petition. A conditional reversal and limited remand for a Proposition 57 transfer hearing are not a “new trial” under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.61, which permits parties in civil and criminal actions to move to disqualify an assigned trial judge based on an allegation that the judge is prejudiced against the party. |
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| California v. Roles |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C086645(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 8, 2020 Judge: Ronald B. Robie Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Bradley Roles was found guilty by jury of ten counts of making criminal threats (nine counts against Jennifer B. and one count against Heather S.), one count of stalking, and one count of making annoying phone calls. Defendant appealed contending: (1) he could be convicted of only one criminal threats charge against Jennifer B. because she heard all the threats at the same time and experienced a single period of sustained fear; (2) he could not be convicted of a criminal threats charge against Heather S. because there was insufficient evidence to show he intended for Jennifer B. to relay the threats to Heather S.; (3) the criminal threats punishment should have been stayed under Penal Code section 654; and (4) he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first three contentions but disagreed with the fourth. Accordingly, the Court reversed the nine criminal threats convictions and stayed the punishment on the remaining criminal threats conviction. In all other respects, judgment was affirmed. |
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| People v. Cornelius |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296605(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Tangeman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and the jury found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. After the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code 1170.95. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition for resentencing, holding that defendant was ineligible for relief because he was not convicted of felony murder or murder as an aider or abettor under a natural and probable consequences theory. In this case, the jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and found true that he personally and intentionally used a firearm to commit the crime. Therefore, the jury implicitly found that defendant was the "actual killer," and the changes to Penal Code section 188 and 189 were inapplicable. |
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| People v. Harper |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A152284(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Miller Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A jury found Harper (who had been charged with five codefendants) guilty of conspiracy to commit human trafficking (Pen. Code 182(a)(1), 236.1 (b) and multiple kidnapping and sex offenses. Harper argued that the conduct underlying the kidnapping and kidnapping-for-extortion charges could be prosecuted under the more specific statute, Penal Code 266a, which prohibits “tak[ing] any person against his or her will and without his or her consent . . . for the purpose of prostitution.” Harper cited the “Williamson rule,” which holds that if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, courts infer that the Legislature intended the conduct to be prosecuted only under the special statute. Alternatively, Harper argued his conduct did not constitute extortion and that the jury instruction, CALCRIM No. 1202, was an incorrect statement of law. The court of appeal held that the Williamson rule did not bar the convictions. Kidnapping for extortion contemplates more culpable conduct than is required for a section 266a violation. Harper’s conduct constituted extortion; Harper ultimately wanted money from forced prostitution services. Although the challenged jury instruction contained an incorrect statement, it did not contribute to the verdict. There was sufficient evidence of kidnapping. The court struck certain enhancements as improperly imposed. |
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| People v. L.W. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B294336(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Perren Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| After L.W. was charged in a juvenile wardship petition with committing sexual battery against two minor females, the juvenile court issued temporary restraining orders against defendant as to the two alleged victims under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 213.5 and rule 5.630 of the California Rules of Court. The Court of Appeal held that because the People presented no evidence of an emergency or other urgency and made no attempt to give defendant prior notice of their intent to seek the temporary restraining orders, the juvenile court erred in issuing those orders without notice. However, the court held that the juvenile court did not err in issuing the pre-adjudication three-year restraining order, because the order was a reasoned and reasonable response to defendant's conduct and the other relevant facts of the case. Furthermore, the order was entirely consistent with the public policy objectives underlying the juvenile delinquency laws generally and section 213.5 specifically. Accordingly, the court affirmed the three-year restraining order. |
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| People v. Lewis |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B295998(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 6, 2020 Judge: Frances Rothschild Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 and requested the appointment of counsel. Section 1170.95 established a procedure for vacating murder convictions that were based upon the natural and probable consequences doctrine and resentencing those who were so convicted. The Court of Appeal held that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that he fell within the provisions of section 1170.95. The court also held that defendant was not entitled to appointed counsel, because the trial court denied defendant's petition based upon his failure to make a prima facie showing that the statute applied to his murder conviction. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that defendant was ineligible for relief, and affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition without appointing counsel or holding a hearing. |
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| People v. Palomar |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B292450(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 3, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction of second degree murder, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding of implied malice. Defendant punched the victim who fell down and hit his head on the curb. The court held that the evidence of defendant's conduct and his mental state satisfied the elements of implied malice. The court stated that defendant announced his intention to attack the victim, and he did so in no uncertain terms. |
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| People v. Taylor |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B293881(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 6, 2020 Judge: Wiley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction for kidnapping, holding that the victim's four steps backwards was merely incidental to the robbery. The court applied the two-part test for kidnapping for robbery in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1138: first, the defendant must move the victim beyond movement "merely incidental" to the robbery, and second, this movement must increase the victim's risk of harm beyond the risk necessarily present in the robbery. In this case, defendant used a gun to back the victim up four steps towards a dark alley where defendant took the victim's wallet. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's request to strike his prior conviction under the Three Strikes law; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss the five-year serious felony enhancement under Penal Code 667(a)(1); and defendant forfeited his claims under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157. |
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| People v. Venegas |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B292976(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Wiley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants Venegas and Santana appealed their convictions and sentences related to the murder of Fabian Acevedo. The Court of Appeal rejected Venegas's claims of evidentiary errors and held that the trial court did not err by imposing a concurrent term on count two instead of staying the sentence under Penal Code section 654. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support Santana's conviction for aiding and abetting the murder; the trial court gave a proper reasonable doubt instruction; the trial court correctly cited People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1073, in support of admitting evidence of a disassembled assault rifle and magazines found at Venegas's house; and, although Senate Bill 1393 applies to Santana retroactively, remand was unnecessary. Finally, the court declined sentencing remands under Senate Bill 620, and held that defendants have forfeited their arguments regarding fines and fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments. |
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| State v. Pacchiana |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-655 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Charles T. Canady Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruling that a peremptory strike was constitutionally impermissible because it was based on the prospective juror's religion, holding that the issue of the constitutionality of a religion-based strike was not properly preserved in the trial court and that the district court erred in reversing on the basis of an unpreserved argument. The district court concluded that the trial court erred in allowing the peremptory strike of the prospective juror at issue, basing its decision in part on its conclusion that the strike involved an unconstitutional religious test. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that Defendant's religion-based objection to the strike was not properly preserved. |
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| State v. Sheffield |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCAP-17-0000707 Opinion Date: January 2, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of kidnapping, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the "restraint" required to support a kidnapping conviction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 707-720(1)(d) is restraint in excess of any restraint incidental to the infliction or intended infliction of bodily injury or subjection or intended subjection of a person to a sexual offense. Defendant was charged with one count of kidnapping and one count of third degree assault in connection with a single incident. The third degree assault count was dismissed before trial, and, after a trial, Defendant was found guilty on the kidnapping count. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the circuit court plainly erred in not instructing the jury that Defendant's restraint of the complaining witness had to be restraint in excess of restraint incidental to any intended infliction of bodily injury or a sexual offense upon the complaining witness. |
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| State v. Williams |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-17-0000226 Opinion Date: January 3, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction on the charge of assault in the third degree, holding that the deputy prosecuting attorney's elicitation of evidence regarding Child Welfare Services' involvement in violation of a defense motion in limine was improper and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was charged with assault in the second degree against his minor son. A jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree. On appeal, Defendant argued that the family court plainly erred by failing to strike certain improper opening statements made by the deputy prosecuting attorney and by admitting certain x-rays into evidence without the necessary foundation. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, holding (1) the prosecutor improperly elicited evidence, and the error affected Defendant's substantial rights and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) there was insufficient foundation for admission of the contested x-rays into evidence; and (3) the conviction of assault in the third degree was supported by substantial evidence. |
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| Moore v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-00121-SCT Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Ishee Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Corey Moore disappeared from his trial after the court refused to grant him a continuance. He was convicted in abstentia and sentenced to twenty-five years as a habitual offender. On appeal, Moore argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court erred by not ordering a competency hearing, sua sponte, based on Moore’s diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and vague, general assertions about Moore’s mental state from lay witnesses. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined Moore based the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on facts outside the record; thus, those claims were suitable only for postconviction review, not direct appeal. Furthermore, the Court found no basis to doubt the trial judge’s finding that Moore’s absence from the trial was “willful, voluntary, and deliberate.” |
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| Nash v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-01587-SCT Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Maxwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury found Willie Nash guilty of possession of a cell phone in a correctional facility. Nash did not appeal the jury’s verdict; he challenged only the twelve year sentence he received. He claimed the twelve-year sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. Though harsh, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Nash’s sentence fell within the statutory range of three to fifteen years. And the judge based his sentencing decision on the seriousness of Nash’s crime and evidence of Nash’s criminal history. Because Nash has not shown that a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, no further analysis was mandated, and the Court affirmed the sentence. |
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| Taylor v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2017-CT-01596-SCT Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Beam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury found Dante Taylor guilty of first-degree murder for the death of his uncle Willie Lee Taylor. Dante appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. Dante petitioned for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review, challenging the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the trial court’s grant of a pre-arming jury instruction. Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the trial court’s decision to grant this instruction constituted reversible error. Accordingly, it reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a new trial. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that pre-arming instructions would no longer be permitted in criminal trials in Mississippi. |
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| State v. Marquart |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 1 Opinion Date: January 7, 2020 Judge: Beth Baker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of burglary, theft, and violating an order of protection, holding that Defendant waived his right to be present at all critical stages of his criminal proceedings and that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant did not unequivocally assert his right to represent himself. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court denied his constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of his criminal proceedings when it held a hearing in his absence and without defense counsel and denied him the right to represent himself when he unequivocally waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant voluntarily waived his right to be present at the hearing; and (2) substantial evidence existed to support the district court's determination that Defendant did not intend to represent himself, and therefore, the district court did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to do so. |
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| State v. Iddings |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 304 Neb. 759 Opinion Date: January 3, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's third motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that there was no merit to Appellant's claims on appeal. Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and other felony offenses and sentenced to death. In his third postconviction motion, Defendant alleged that the Legislature's statute providing for the repeal of the death penalty, 2015 Neb. Laws, L.B. 268, changed his death sentence to life imprisonment and that the rejection of L.B. 268 by public referendum imposed a death sentence, the referendum was constitutionally impermissible, and he was harmed thereby. The district court concluded that Defendant failed to allege sufficient facts that demonstrated a violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying postconviction relief. |
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| State v. Torres |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 304 Neb. 753 Opinion Date: January 3, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's third motion for post conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that there was no merit to Appellant's claims on appeal. Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and other felony offenses and sentenced to death. In his third postconviction motion, Defendant alleged that the Legislature's statute providing for the repeal of the death penalty, 2015 Neb. Laws, L.B. 268, changed his death sentence to life imprisonment and that the rejection of L.B. 268 by public referendum imposed a death sentence, the referendum was constitutionally impermissible, and he was harmed thereby. The district court concluded that Defendant failed to allege sufficient facts that demonstrated a violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying postconviction relief. |
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| State v. Gumkowski |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 18-42 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Paul A. Suttell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and first-degree arson, holding that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice was clearly wrong when she denied his motion for a new trial because the weight of the evidence did not support the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported a finding that Defendant was the perpetrator and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence because the evidence supported a finding of premeditation. |
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| State v. Medina |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 18-138 Opinion Date: January 6, 2020 Judge: Gilbert V. Indeglia Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of one count of domestic assault with a dangerous weapon, holding that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in her evidentiary rulings. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred by granting two of the State's motions in limine precluding the jury from hearing evidence of the victim's arrest for gun charges and viewing videos of the victim having engaged in acts of violence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion when she (1) prevented any mention that Defendant had been arrested on the gun charges, and (2) excluded the videos. |
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| Washington v. Pierce |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 96344-4 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Steven González Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Biehoff and Karl Pierce were tried by jury and convicted of first degree murder. Before the Washington Supreme Court, they both contended (among other things) that their jury was not fairly selected because the State improperly elicited a conversation about the death penalty during voir dire and improperly used a peremptory strike to dismiss an African-American juror. The Court of Appeals found the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting a conversation about the death penalty in a noncapital case, and that the trial court abused its discretion in not curtailing that conversation. Since that conversation led to the dismissal of at least two jurors, the Court of Appeals reversed both men's convictions. The Washington Supreme Court found that while the prosecutor did not explicitly raise the death penalty during voir dire, as a direct result of his questions, ten jurors all expressed concerns about sitting on a possible death penalty case. As a result of the questions, all of the potential jurors' minds were drawn to the possible sentence, which could have had an "unfair influence on a jury's deliberations" sufficient to violate Washington v. Townsend, 142 Wn.2d 838 (2001). The Washington Supreme Court found the jurisprudential landscape had changed in two relevant ways since Townsend was tried: (1) it was error to tell potential jurors during selection that they were not being asked to sit on a death penalty case; and (2) in the wake of "increasing evidence" that the Batson rule did not adequately protect Washington's jury selection process from racial bias, the Supreme Court promulgated GR 37. The Supreme Court held that Townsend was incorrect and harmful because it "artificially prohibits informing jurors whether they are being asked to sit on a death penalty case," and overruled it. And because an "objective observer could conclude that race was a factor" in the State's peremptory challenge to juror 6, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in result and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Coffee |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2017AP002292-CR Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Annette Kingsland Ziegler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order denying Defendant's postconviction motion for resentencing, holding that Defendant did not forfeit his ability to challenge inaccurate information raised by the State at his sentencing but that the circuit court's reliance on the inaccurate information was harmless error. In his postconviction motion, Defendant argued for the first time that the circuit court violated his due process rights when it relied on inaccurate information at sentencing. The postconviction court concluded that the State introduced inaccurate information at the sentencing hearing, that the circuit court actually relied on the inaccurate information, but that the error was harmless. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant forfeited his claim because he failed to object at the sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the forfeiture rule does not apply to previously unknown, inaccurate information first raised by the State at sentencing; and (2) the circuit court's error in relying on the inaccurate information at sentencing was harmless. |
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