Latest 6 Cases: Bonsmara Natural Beef Co. v. Hart of Texas Cattle Feeders, LLC (Arbitration & Mediation), Haedge v. Central Texas Cattlemen's ...

Stay the Course: The Supreme Court Respects Abortion Rights Precedent

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in June Medical Services v. Russo, in which a 5-4 majority of the Court struck down a Louisiana law regulating abortion providers. Grossman describes the history of abortion decisions that got us to this place today and explains why the core right to seek a previability abortion without undue burden from the government remains intact.

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What Chief Justice Roberts’s June Medical Concurrence Tells Us About the Future of Abortion

JAREB GLECKEL

Jareb Gleckel assesses what Chief Justice John Roberts’s concurrence in the June Medical decision might tell us about the future of abortion in the United States. Gleckel suggests that the concurrence suggests that the Chief Justice will not vote to overrule Roe and Planned Parenthood v. Casey but cautions that the test the Chief Justice embraces could provide a roadmap for anti-abortion states going forward.

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Bonsmara Natural Beef Co. v. Hart of Texas Cattle Feeders, LLC

Docket: 19-0263

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Busby

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Civil Procedure, Contracts

In this cattle-feeding dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals overturning the trial court's denial of Appellees' post-judgment motion to compel arbitration, holding that a party does not forfeit its right to challenge a ruling on appeal from a final judgment simply by choosing not to pursue an interlocutory appeal of that ruling. Appellants brought this action alleging fraud, unjust enrichment, and other claims. Appellees moved to dismiss the suit and compel arbitration, arguing that the claims were subject to the agreement's arbitration clause. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellees did not challenge the court's ruling through an interlocutory appeal. After the trial court rendered judgment Appellees appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied their motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court order the parties to arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider the trial court's denial of Appellees' motion to compel arbitration; and (2) on the merits, the court of appeals did not err in ordering arbitration.

Haedge v. Central Texas Cattlemen's Ass'n

Docket: 19-0595

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Business Law, Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court that Petitioners pay $7,000 from a supersedeas bond over losing the underlying appeal and ordering Petitioners to pay $114,280 from the bond, holding that the court of appeals erred in calculating the amount. When Petitioners were ousted from land upon which their cattle grazed, they brought this action challenging the ouster. The trial court granted summary judgment in part for Respondents then, after a trial, rendered judgment that Petitioners take nothing. The trial court allowed Petitioners to suspend the judgment by posting a supersedeas bond, which meant Petitioners could keep their cattle on the leased land during the appeal. The trial court ruled that Respondent was entitled to $7,000 from the bond. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Respondent should recover $114,280 from the bond, basing its calculation on the expense Petitioners would have incurred if the judgment had not been superseded. At issue was how "loss or damage" is calculated on release of a supersedeas bond under Tex. R. App. 24.2(a)(3). The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's order, holding that the proper measure is the actual loss Respondent suffered because the judgment was superseded.

Innovative Block of South Texas, Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply, Inc.

Docket: 18-1211

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: John P. Devine

Areas of Law: Business Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's award of compensatory damages for Plaintiff on its defamation claim, holding that this was not a case of defamation but, rather, of business disparagement and that there was no evidence for either the award of general damages for Plaintiffs' reputation or the award of special damages connected to one of the allegedly defamatory statements. Plaintiff Valley Builders Supply, inc., sued its former business competitor, Defendant Innovative Block of South Texas, Ltd., alleging that Innovative's disparaging remarks about Valley's products contributed to its demise. Plaintiff submitted only its defamation claims to the jury, and the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor. The jury awarded general damages for Plaintiff's reputation injury and special damages for lost profits. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) disparaging the quality or condition of a business's product or service is not, standing alone, defamation per se; (2) no evidence existed to support an award of general damages for harm to Valley's reputation; and (3) the pecuniary loss for which special damages were sought were not cognizable as defamation.

In re C.J.C.

Docket: 19-0694

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Bland

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted Father's petition for writ of mandamus, holding that when a nonparent requests conservatorship or possession of a child, the child's best interest is rooted in the presumption that the fit parent, rather than a court, makes the determination whether to allow that request. Over Father's objection, the trial court entered temporary orders naming Jason a possessory conservator of Abigail with rights to possession of the child. Jason, who was in a relationship with Abigail's mother until she died, had exercised care and control of Abigail when she resided with Mother for at least six months preceding Mother's death. Father filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the trial court's orders violated his right to parent Abigail without government intervention. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ and directed the trial court to vacate its temporary orders, holding (1) the presumption that fit parents act according to the best interest of their children applies when modifying an existing order that names a parent as the child's managing conservator; and (2) because no evidence demonstrated that Father was unfit to be Abigail's parent or did not act in her best interest, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that Jason be named Abigail's possessory conservator.

Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. PHI Air Medical, LLC

Docket: 18-0216

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Busby

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

In this dispute over the amount that air ambulance providers may recover from workers' compensation insurers, the Supreme Court held that Texas law requiring that private insurance companies reimburse the fair and reasonable medical expenses of injured workers is not preempted by a federal law deregulating aviation and that federal law does not require Texas to mandate reimbursement of more than a fair and reasonable amount for air ambulance services. PHI Air Medical, LLC, an air ambulance provider, argued that the federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempted the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's (TWCA) fee schedules and reimbursement standards. An administrative law judge held that PHI was entitled to reimbursement under the TWCA's standards. On judicial review, the trial court declared that the ADA did not preempt the TWCA's reimbursement provisions. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the price of PHI's service to injured workers is not significantly affected by a reasonableness standard for third-party reimbursement of those services, the ADA does not preempt that standard; and (2) the ADA does not require that Texas compel private insurers to reimburse the full charges billed for those services.

Via Metropolitan Transit v. Meck

Docket: 18-0458

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Jeffrey S. Boyd

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court that VIA Metropolitan Transit, a governmental entity, breached its duty to act as a "very cautious, competent, and prudent person" would act under similar circumstances to a passenger who was injured while riding a VIA bus, holding that VIA was liable for the passenger's injuries in this case. Curtis Meck was injured while riding a VIA bus. Meck sued VIA, alleging that VIA was a common carrier and thus owed a duty to exercise a high degree of care. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Meck. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, VIA argued (1) the high-degree-of-care duty did not apply in this case, and even if it did, the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive governmental immunity against suits for breach of that duty; and (2) there was no evidence showing that VIA breached the high-degree-of-care duty to Meck. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) VIA is a common carrier; (2) the Tort Claims Act waived VIA's governmental immunity against Meck's claim; and (3) sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that VIA breached that duty.