| Commerce Bank v. McGowen |
| Docket: 19-1994 Opinion Date: March 12, 2021 Judge: McDonald Areas of Law: Banking |
| In this garnishment proceeding, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that Robert McGowen's deferred compensation plan benefits paid upon him reaching the age of sixty-seven were not exempt under Iowa Code 627.6(8)(e), holding that the payments made to McGowen fell within the scope of the statutory exemption. Commerce Bank obtained a judgment against McGowen in the amount of $1.5 million. Commerce Bank then caused to be issued a writ of general execution directing the sheriff to levy on McGowen's employer (the company). McGowen moved to exempt all payments made to him under the company's deferred compensation plan under section 642.15. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that McGowen's deferred compensation payments were exempt under the statute. |
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| Kostoglanis v. Yates |
| Docket: 19-2078 Opinion Date: March 12, 2021 Judge: McDonald Areas of Law: Contracts, Health Law, Medical Malpractice |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's claims for negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of contract, holding that Plaintiff's claims were subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Iowa Code 614.1(9) and were untimely. On Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Plaintiff's causes of action arose out of patient care and were barred by section 614.1(9), the two-year statute of limitations governing malpractice action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each of Plaintiff's allegations originated from representations regarding patient care and the patient care Defendants provided, and therefore, Plaintiff's claims were untimely under section 614.1(9). |
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| GreatAmerica Financial Services Corp. v. Natalya Rodionova Medical Care, P.C. |
| Docket: 19-0491 Opinion Date: March 12, 2021 Judge: Brent R. Appel Areas of Law: Contracts |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of a finance company in this contract dispute, holding that the contract was properly ratified despite any allegation of forgery. Natalya Rodionova Medical Care (NRMC) allegedly entered into a financing agreement with GreatAmerica Financial Services Corporation for the leasing of telephone and copier products. Pursuant to the agreement, NRMC made monthly payments totaling seven months worth of installments but then attempted to cancel the finance agreement. When NRMC discontinued further payments GreatAmerica sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In its answer NRMC alleged that the finance agreement appeared to be signed by NRMC's sole shareholder but that the signature was a forgery. The district court granted summary judgment for GreatAmerica, reasoning that NRMC ratified the contract through its conduct regardless of who signed the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that NRMC's failure to reject goods over a seven-month period and its payment of periodic invoices amounted to a ratification. |
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| In re A.B. |
| Docket: 20-1032 Opinion Date: March 12, 2021 Judge: Edward M. Mansfield Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights to her two children, holding that the juvenile court appropriately handled this case in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to Mother and that termination was appropriate under Iowa Code 232.116(1)(f) and (h). The court of appeals affirmed, but a dissenting judge argued that the pandemic had thwarted Mother's efforts to demonstrate that her children could safely be returned to her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the best interests of the children supported termination of Mother's parental rights; and (2) COVID-19 did not adversely affect Mother's ability to reunify. |
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| In re C.Z. |
| Docket: 20-1371 Opinion Date: March 12, 2021 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating Father's parental rights to his two-year-old daughter, holding that the phrase "the proceeding" in Iowa Code 232.114(3) includes the appeal from the order terminating parental rights. In a 2013 amendment to section 232.114(3), the statue applicable to terminations, the legislature provided that when the county attorney and the State disagree, the county attorney may continue to appear "in the proceeding" and present his or her position regarding the appropriate action to be taken. The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS), the attorney general, and Father all favored restoring Father's parental rights and placing the child in his custody under supervision. The Polk County Attorney and the child's foster parents and guardian ad litem all favored termination. At issue was whether the county attorney may be heard in this appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) the county attorney was authorized to participate in this appeal; and (2) the grounds for termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence in this case. |
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| Jones v. Glenwood Golf Corp. |
| Docket: 20-0303 Opinion Date: March 12, 2021 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Personal Injury |
| The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the district court ordering a new trial on damages in this action against a golf course for owner liability under Iowa Code 321.493 and common law premises liability, holding that the district court erred by ordering a new trial. Plaintiff was ejected from a golf cart and severely injured when the cart struck a bridge. Plaintiff settled his claims against the driver and signed a release expressly reserving his claims against the owner. Plaintiff then sued the golf course for owner liability and premises liability. A jury found the golf course not negligent for premises liability and the driver one hundred percent at fault for damages. Plaintiff moved for a new trial because the evidence showed the past medical expenses were many times the amount awarded. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for a new trial on damages against the owner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff's release of the driver extinguished the vicarious liability claims against the golf course as the golf cart owner under section 321.493 for the damages caused by the driver's negligent driving. |
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