Which Laws Apply to Broker-Dealers? Federal Laws? State Laws? Both? General Principles Leading to an Answer

TAMAR FRANKEL

BU Law emerita professor Tamar Frankel explains the law of preemption as it pertains to broker-dealers and their investor clients. She predicts, among other things, that either the clients will demand that broker-dealers adhere to a fiduciary duty, or else that states will impose that duty on them.

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Dolin v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC

Docket: 19-2547

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Dolin was prescribed Paxil, the brand-name version of the drug paroxetine, to treat his depression. The prescription was filled with a generic paroxetine product. Six days later, Dolin died by suicide. Federal law preempted an "inadequate labeling" state-law claim against the generic manufacturer. Mrs. Dolin sued GSK, the manufacturer of brand-name Paxil, arguing that GSK was responsible for the labeling for all paroxetine, no matter who made and sold it, and had negligently omitted an adult suicide risk. The Seventh Circuit reversed her jury verdict, based on preemption, citing the complex regulation of drug labels and of Paxil/paroxetine’s label in particular. GSK had attempted to change the Paxil label in 2007 to add an adult suicide warning. The FDA rejected that change. The court concluded that GSK lacked new information after 2007 that would have allowed it to add an adult-suicidality warning under the existing regulations. Eight days after denying Dolin certiorari, the Supreme Court decided another case, further explaining the “clear evidence” standard for impossibility preemption for prescription drug labels. Dolin filed an unsuccessful motion under FRCP 60(b)(6), arguing that the 2018 judgment should be set aside based on a change in law so that GSK could not establish its defense of impossibility preemption. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and did not impose sanctions. The Supreme Court provided important guidance but did not break new ground that would change the result in Dolin’s case. Her motion was not frivolous.

Holleman v. Zatecky

Docket: 19-1326

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Holleman, a “jailhouse lawyer,” has been awarded thousands of dollars in prior lawsuits. In 2015, Pendleton Correctional Facility (Superintendent Zatecky) transferred Holleman to Wabash. Zatecky stated that Holleman had written letters complaining of the conditions at Pendleton and, given the age of the facility, the only viable solution was to transfer Holleman to a more modern facility. Zatecky claims to have believed that the transfer was in Holleman’s best interest. Holleman was housed in the general population at both maximum-security prisons, with similar restrictions. Holleman claims he witnessed more violence at Wabash and that Wabash inmates are afraid to report violence; that Holleman was the victim of violence from his new cellmate (he did not report this incident); that he only had access to the Wabash law library for four hours per week, as opposed to seven hours per week at Pendleton; and that at Pendleton he had an individual cell. Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that the transfer did not violate Holleman’s clearly established right to be free from retaliation for protected First Amendment activity, such that his suit can overcome qualified immunity. Holleman complained about inadequate conditions at Pendleton; the Defendants responded by transferring him. Even taking the facts in the light most favorable to Holleman, they do not support a finding that the transfer was motivated by the fact that he engaged in protected activity rather than the substance of his complaints.

Spiegel v. Kim

Docket: 18-2449

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Consumer Law, Legal Ethics

Spiegel served as a homeowners’ association directed until the members voted him out. The association sued Spiegel in Illinois state court, alleging that he falsely held himself out as president, attempted to unilaterally terminate another board member, froze the association’s bank accounts, sent unapproved budgets to unit owners, and filed unwarranted lawsuits on behalf of the association. The association sought to enjoin Spiegel from interfering with board decisions or holding himself out as a director and to recover damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees. A declaration that Spiegel signed when he bought his unit provided that owners who violated the board’s rules or obligations would pay any damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees that the association incurred as a result. Spiegel filed complaints and motions against the association, its lawyers, and other residents. The state court dismissed his claims and enjoined him from interfering with the board’s activities, characterizing Spiegel’s filings as “a pattern of abuse, committed for an improper purpose to harass, delay and increase the cost of litigation.” The court ordered Spiegel to pay $700,000 in fees and sanctions. Spiegel filed this federal suit against the association’s counsel, citing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5). The district court dismissed, concluding that the attorneys’ fees Kim requested were not a “debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. An award of attorneys' fees does not constitute a “debt” under the FDCPA’s limited, consumer-protection-focused definition.

United States v. Simon

Docket: 19-1317

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Simon, a CPA, was convicted of filing false tax returns, mail fraud related to financial aid, and federal financial aid fraud. The court imposed a prison term, and restitution of $886,901.69 to the IRS, $48,070.35 to the Department of Education, $17,000 to Canterbury School, and $101,600 to Culver Academies. Simon made no objections to the restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Simon’s convictions. Simon had not challenged his restitution obligations. Simon later unsuccessfully moved to vacate his conviction, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, but not with respect to restitution. At the government's request, the court removed Canterbury as a payee, directing Simon’s restitution payments to Culver (private victims receive restitution ahead of the government, 18 U.S.C. 3664(i)) and approved an updated balance of $48,376, without a hearing. Days later, Simon received notice of the order. Seven months later, Simon moved for reconsideration, arguing that he had a due process right to be heard on the government’s motion and that the amended balance constituted a new obligation. The schools had disclaimed any interest in restitution. Simon urged the court to eliminate his restitution and requested that the court strike all restitution to the Department of Education, claiming that his daughter had paid off her student loans so the Department was no longer at risk. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Most of Simon’s challenges could and should have been raised at sentencing and on direct appeal and were waived; the remainder were untimely.

Alvarez-Espino v. Barr

Docket: 19-2289

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Immigration Law, Legal Ethics

Alvarez-Espino, born in Mexico in 1970, entered the U.S. in 1996 without permission. Since then he and his wife have had four children, and he supports his family by running an upholstery business. In 2002, two men robbed him at gunpoint at a Chicago gas station. Five years later, he was arrested for drunk driving and, following a probation violation, ended up with a one-year prison term. In removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), his lawyer failed to realize that Alvarez-Espino had a chance at receiving a U visa for his assistance in solving the 2002 robbery. Alvarez-Espino changed lawyers, but after protracted proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied multiple requests for relief, leaving Alvarez-Espino at risk of removal and having to await a decision on his U visa application from Mexico. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review. In denying relief, the Board held Alvarez-Espino to an unduly demanding burden on his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel but the law is equally clear that Alvarez-Espino’s ability to continue pursuing a U visa means that he cannot show prejudice from his attorney’s performance.

Sugarloaf Fund, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Docket: 19-2468

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Tax Law

Rogers designed and implemented a scheme to generate artificial but tax‐deductible losses for high‐income U.S. taxpayers. The “DAD” scheme worked through a partnership’s acquisition of highly distressed or uncollectible accounts receivable from retailers located in Brazil and subsequent conveyance of interests in the receivables to U.S. taxpayers, who deemed them uncollectible and used the concocted loss to reduce their tax liability. DAD schemes were outlawed in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Rogers then devised a modified transactional structure employing trusts. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that the structural modifications only perpetuated fraudulent tax avoidance and that the Sugarloaf partnership was a sham before and after purported changes. All of Sugarloaf’s income for 2006, 2007, and 2008 should be allocated to an entity wholly owned by Rogers that served as Sugarloaf’s tax matters partner. The court warned that the IRS, Tax Court, and Seventh Circuit “have devoted substantial resources over multiple proceedings to deciphering foreign and domestic transactions, understanding complex tax structures, and separating the fair from the fraud. None of this has gone well for Rogers or his partnership, the Sugarloaf Fund ... caution to those who persist in pressing claims lacking any merit.”