Latest 6 Cases: Pulte Home Corp. v. CBR Electric, Inc. (Civil Procedure), Farina v. SAVWCL III, LLC (Civil Procedure), California v. Hughes ...

Would Eliminating Qualified Immunity Substantially Deter Police Misconduct?

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the proposal that eliminating or substantially reducing the qualified immunity currently enjoyed by police officers would address racism and police brutality. Although the idea has lately garnered some bipartisan support and could potentially have some benefit, Dorf describes two reasons to be skeptical of the suggestion. He concludes that for all of its flaws, qualified immunity may actually facilitate the progressive development of constitutional rights.

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Pulte Home Corp. v. CBR Electric, Inc.

Docket: E068353(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Slough

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Construction Law, Contracts, Insurance Law

After defending the general contractor in two construction defect actions, general liability insurer St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (St. Paul) sought reimbursement of defense costs under an equitable subrogation theory against six subcontractors (defendants) that had worked on the underlying construction projects and whose contracts required them to defend the general contractor in suits involving allegations related to their work. After a bench trial, the court denied St. Paul’s claim. Relying on Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Constr. Co., 256 Cal.App.2d 506, 514 (1967), the trial court concluded St. Paul had not demonstrated it was fair to shift all of the defense costs to defendants because their failure to defend the general contractor had not caused the homeowners to bring the construction defect actions. St. Paul argued this conclusion misconstrued the law governing equitable subrogation and therefore constitutes an abuse of discretion. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: (1) a cause of action based on equitable subrogation allowed an insurer to step into the shoes of its insured and recover only what the insured would be entitled to recover from the defendants; and (2) the appropriate inquiry should have been whether defendants’ failure to defend the general contractor caused St. Paul to incur the defense costs, not whether that failure caused the underlying lawsuits. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to grant judgment in St. Paul's favor and for a determination of defense costs each defendant owed.

Farina v. SAVWCL III, LLC

Docket: B294516(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Wiley

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

Aspen brokered two loans for West Charleston, a Nevada real estate developer. Over 500 investors funded the loans, with the vast majority living in Aspen's home state of Nevada, a tenth living in California, and another 111 living in other states. Investors filed suit alleging that Aspen and Guinn conspired with Developers, raising 11 causes of action including fraud, breach of contract, and elder abuse. The trial court subsequently granted Developers' motion to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court correctly determined that Investors did not carry their burden to establish jurisdiction. In this case, no evidence shows that California has case-linked jurisdiction over Developers. The court held that Investors' arguments do not prove jurisdiction for several of the Developers, and their arguments also failed independently; because Developers did not direct Aspen's activities toward California, there is no jurisdiction in California; Developers did not purposefully avail themselves of California benefits through contracts with Investors; and, because Investors' claims do not arise out of or relate to Joint Venture's retention of California firms, jurisdiction does not exist.

California v. Hughes

Docket: E069445(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Slough

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Hughes was charged with three counts of murder, among other charges, on the theory he knew the risk of driving while intoxicated but drove anyway. He hit another vehicle whose driver failed to yield to him; three people in the car he hit died from their injuries. Hughes had been previously convicted of driving under the influence and had been drinking on the night of the accident. The critical issue at trial was whether Hughes’s drinking was a substantial factor in causing the accident. The police and highway patrol both concluded the deceased driver was the primary cause of the accident, and their testimony suggested Hughes’s speed and drinking may have played a role, but that the physical evidence suggested he was not driving at an unsafe speed and he responded appropriately in attempting to avoid the collision. After the jury heard that testimony, however, the prosecution called as an expert witness a second member of the highway patrol team which investigated the accident. The expert disagreed with his colleagues and offered new expert testimony not previously disclosed to the defense in violation of the criminal discovery statutes. Though defense counsel objected to this testimony in a timely fashion, the trial court allowed the prosecution to proceed with the questioning, and the defense had to cross-examine the expert without an opportunity to prepare adequately. The trial court ultimately denied Hughes' motion for a mistrial and attempted to remedy the discovery violation with a curative instruction to the jury. In the end, the expert’s new testimony on causation was uncontradicted, the jury convicted Hughes of three counts of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to three consecutive 15-year-to- life terms. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the mistrial: "The trial court had the opportunity to salvage the trial by continuing it and allowing the defense to locate, prepare, and seek the assistance of an expert to rebut the surprise expert causation testimony when the defense first objected. By failing to do so and allowing the prosecution to proceed in its questioning of the expert, the trial court contributed to a situation with no adequate remedy but a mistrial."

People v. Padilla

Docket: B297213(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Nora M. Manella

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Defendant was convicted of a murder he committed when he was 16 years old and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to LWOP at a second resentencing. In the interim, Proposition 57 was passed, prohibiting prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court. The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed defendant's sentence and remanded for him to receive a transfer hearing in the juvenile court. Because defendant's original sentence was vacated and his sentence is no longer final, and because Proposition 57's primary ameliorative effect is on a juvenile offender's sentence, the court held that the measure applies to preclude imposition of sentence on defendant as an adult, absent a transfer hearing. The court held that, regardless of his current age, defendant fits within the Supreme Court's holding that the voters intended Proposition 57 to apply as broadly as possible.

Taylor v. Traylor

Docket: B296537(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Wiley

Areas of Law: Legal Ethics

After an attorney representing a grieving family was fired, the family's new attorneys asked the attorney for the case files, which he refused. Instead, the attorney demanded $308,000 in attorney fees. The trial court awarded a lesser amount. The attorney contends it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to apply the written terms of his retainer agreements. The court cannot say, based on the record the attorney gave to the court, that the trial court did any such thing. Rather, it appears that the trial court properly judged the attorney's evidence to be weak and discounted it appropriately. The court held that the $17,325 award was reasonable where the attorney never hired a court reporter and thus there is no record of the hearing; the attorney never gave his files to the new attorneys; and the attorney never explained the discrepancies in his supposed recordkeeping. The court published to underline that contemporaneous time records are the best evidence of lawyers' hourly work. The court wrote that they are not indispensable, but they eclipse other proofs. In this case, the trial court was entitled to discount the attorney's belated and contradictory claims about his time on the case. The court held that the remaining issues are insubstantial.

Horne v. Ahern Rentals, Inc.

Docket: B299605(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Elizabeth A. Grimes

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

Plaintiffs filed suit against Ahern Rentals after Ruben Dickerson was killed in an accident on Ahern's premises while he was replacing the tires on one of Ahern's forklifts. Dickerson was employed by 24-Hour Tire Service as a tire changer and tire technician. Dickerson's surviving heirs were paid workers' compensation benefits by 24-Hour Tire's workers' compensation insurer. Plaintiffs alleged that Ahern's negligence was a substantial factor in causing Dickerson's death. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs failed to present evidence that Ahern affirmatively contributed to Dickerson's injuries under the retained control exception to the Privette rule under Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 202. The court also held that there is no evidence that Ahern affirmatively contributed to Dickerson's injury and death.