Latest 6 Cases This Week: Martin v. Martin (Ala.), Williams v. Mari Properties, LLC (Ala.), Trenk v. Soheili (Cal. Ct. App.)

The Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Real Rigging of Georgia’s Election

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar explains why Georgia’s law allowing persons 75 years and older to get absentee ballots for all elections in an election cycle with a single request, while requiring younger voters to request absentee ballots separately for each election, is a clear violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Dean Amar acknowledges that timing may prevent this age discrimination from being redressed in 2020, but he calls upon legislatures and courts to understand the meaning of this amendment and prevent such invidious disparate treatment of voters in future years.

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COVID Comes to Federal Death Row—It Is Time to Stop the Madness

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—explains the enhanced risk of COVID-19 infection in the federal death row in Terre Haute, not only among inmates but among those necessary to carry out executions. Professor Sarat calls upon the Trump administration and other officials to focus on saving, rather than taking, lives inside and outside prison.

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Martin v. Martin

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1181002

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates

Thomas Martin ("Thomas") appealed a circuit court judgment dismissing his declaratory-judgment action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Henry Thomas Martin ("Henry") died and was survived by his wife, Sheila Martin ("Sheila"), and his two children, Thomas and Dawn Michelle Martin ("Dawn"). Among other dispositions, Henry's will created a testamentary trust for the benefit of Dawn ("the testamentary trust"). The will directed the trustee to hold 25% of Henry's residuary estate in trust and to pay Dawn, in estimated equal monthly installments, the net income from the trust along with any surplus net incomes. Following Henry's death, Dawn died without a will. Henry's will was silent, however, about what happened to the principal of the testamentary trust upon Dawn's death. While the probate court proceedings were pending, Thomas filed a complaint at circuit court seeking a judgment to declare: (1) his interest in reversions held by Henry's heirs; (2) the proper distribution of any property held in such an reversionary trust; and (3) the various rights of the parties to Henry's assets at the time of Henry's death. Shiela, as personal representative to the estate, moved to dismiss Thomas' suit, arguing the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, finding that although certain probate courts in Alabama were vested with jurisdiction to hear cases involving testamentary tryst, the probate court in this case was not one of them. As a result, only the circuit court held subject-matter jurisdiction to consider arguments about whether the testamentary trust continues or has terminated.

Williams v. Mari Properties, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190555

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

Eleanor Williams appealed a probate court order denying her request for redemption of certain real property. In 2003, the State purchased property located in Birmingham ("the property") at a tax sale after the then owners, Benjamin and Marzella Rosser, failed to pay ad valorem taxes. The State sold the property in 2016 for $1,000 to Waynew Global Holdings, LLC ("WGH"). In February 2017, WGH sold the property to Mari Properties, LLC ("Mari"), for $5,000, and Mari recorded the deed to the property. Williams claimed that she inherited the property from the Rossers in or around March 2003. In September 2017, Williams petitioned for redemption of the property under section 40-10-120, Ala. Code 1975, with which she tendered $1,100. The probate court granted Williams petition, thereby ordering Mari to compute and submit the amount of those items and stated that, upon receipt of those figures, the probate court would enter an amendment to the order and direct payment by Williams. The probate court did not vest title of the property in Williams. Mari, however, moved to vacate the probate's order, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the redemption petition because, it argued, Williams was required under 40-10-120 to redeem the property through statutory redemption within three years of the May 13, 2003, tax sale. Mari contended in the motion that the only redemption process available to Williams was judicial redemption under section 40-10-83, Ala. Code 1975, and that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over that process. Despite Mari's filing of the notice of appeal to the circuit court, the parties continued filing documents in the probate court. By March 6, 2020, the probate court reversed course, vacating its earlier judgment in favor of Williams for redemption under 40-10-120, and holding that Williams should have filed her redemption petition with the circuit court. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that once Mari appealed to the circuit court, the probate court's jurisdiction was divested, making all orders filed after Mari's circuit court suit void.

Trenk v. Soheili

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B295434(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 21, 2020

Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

Maryam Soheili and Morteza Sohyly (appellants) appeal from a judgment quieting title to a house owned by respondents Joseph and Dinah Trenk. After Sohyly filed suit against Joseph Trenk for malpractice, the parties settled and Joseph agreed to pay $100,000 and executed a promissory note and a trust deed on the property to secure the obligation. Sohyly’s sister, Maryam Soheili, was designated as the beneficiary of the trust deed. After Joseph stopped regular payments on the note after 2003, Sohyly began nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings in 2018. The Trenks then filed this action to clear title to their house, alleging that the trust deed was no longer enforceable. The trial court quieted title in the property in favor of the Trenks, ruling that both the statute of limitations and the Marketable Record Title Act barred enforcement of the trust deed. The Court of Appeal held that a power of sale in a trust deed is enforceable even if the statute of limitations has run on the underlying obligation. In this case, because the trust deed did not state the last date for payment under the promissory note, under Civil Code section 882.020, subdivision (a)(2), appellants would have 60 years to exercise the power of sale in the trust deed. However, the court held that the power of sale is not enforceable for another reason. The court explained that the property presumptively is community property, appellants did not rebut that presumption at trial, and because Dinah did not execute the trust deed, she has the power to void it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

In re Estate of Lorraine R. O'Neill

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0590

Opinion Date: December 22, 2020

Judge: James P. Bassett

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

Appellant Paul O’Neill, acting as trustee of the Lorraine R. O’Neill Revocable Trust – 2004, appealed a probate court order granting a petition for ancillary estate administration of certain New Hampshire real estate. O’Neill argued, among other things, that the probate division lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the petition because it was filed on behalf of the estate of a non-New Hampshire decedent, and the petition did not represent that a court outside of New Hampshire had made a judicial determination that the estate was insolvent. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the grant of administration and remanded all remaining issues to the probate division for further proceedings.

Clark (Est of M. Clark) v. Stover, et al

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 2 MAP 2020

Opinion Date: December 22, 2020

Judge: Thomas G. Saylor

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Trusts & Estates

The underlying controversy entailed will-, estate-, and insurance-contest litigation commenced in 2008 by Appellee Jeffrey Stover in his capacity as the attorney for Appellant, David Clark, who was the testator’s brother. In 2010, Appellee Stover also lodged a second complaint on behalf of Monica Clark, the testator’s mother, now deceased. After the claims in both actions failed, Appellant and Mrs. Clark filed this legal malpractice action in 2015, advancing claims of professional negligence and breach of contract against Appellee Stover and his law firm. Upon Appellees’ motion, the common pleas court awarded summary judgment in their favor, finding, as relevant here, that Appellant and Mrs. Clark were aware of the alleged negligence and the asserted breach more than four years before they lodged the malpractice action. Since the applicable statutes of limitations provided for commencement of a negligence action within two years after accrual, and a contractual action within four years after breach, the county court found the claims to be untimely. The Superior Court affirmed on the "occurrence rule." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to address the "continuous representation rule," under which the applicable statutes of limitations would not run until the date on which Appellees' representation was terminated. Appellant maintains that this rule should be adopted in Pennsylvania to permit statutes of limitations for causes of action sounding in legal malpractice to be “tolled until the attorney’s ongoing representation is complete.” While the Supreme Court recognized "there are mixed policy considerations involved, as relating to statutes of limitations relegated to the legislative province, we conclude that the appropriate balance should be determined by the General Assembly." The Superior Court judgment was affirmed.

In Re: Passarelli Family Trust

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 71 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: December 22, 2020

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Trusts & Estates

In this discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to determine the burden of proof for a settlor of an irrevocable trust in order to void the trust on grounds of fraudulent inducement in the creation of the trust. The corpus of the Trust at issue here consisted of numerous assets totaling approximately $13 million, including two real estate property companies called Japen Holdings, LLC, and Japen Properties, LLP (collectively “Japen”). Although acquired during the marriage, Japen was owned 100% by Husband. Unbeknownst to Wife, among Japen’s assets were two residential properties in Florida. When presented with the Trust inventory of assets, Wife did not question its contents, which included Japen, but not a listing of its specific holdings, e.g., the Florida Properties. Approximately four months after the creation of the Trust, Wife discovered that Husband had been having an affair and that his paramour was living in one of the Florida Properties. Wife promptly filed for divorce. A month after that, she filed an emergency petition for special relief to prevent dissipation of the marital assets, including assets in the Trust. Wife argued that Husband’s motive in creating the Trust was to gain control over the marital assets and avoid equitable distribution. A family court judge accepted Wife’s argument by freezing certain accounts included in the Trust and directing Husband to collect rent from his paramour. The Supreme Court held that a settlor averring fraud in the inducement of an irrevocable trust had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of common-law fraud. In doing so, the Court rejected the analysis set forth in In re Estate of Glover, 669 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996), because it represented an inaccurate statement of the elements required to establish fraud in the inducement. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling that the complaining settlor did not prove fraud in the inducement.