| Kondjoua v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 16-296 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Sexual assault in the third degree under CGS 53a-72a(a)(1) necessarily includes as an element the use or threatened use of violent force and thus categorically constitutes a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a). The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. The court declined to remand for the agency to consider in the first instance whether petitioner's conviction of Connecticut third-degree sexual assault is a crime of violence under the alternative definition in 18 U.S.C. 16(a), but rather considered that legal question de novo and held that it categorically satisfies that definition. The court vacated the petition and denied the pending motion for stay of removal as moot. |
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| United States v. Oneal |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-1710 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Robert A. Katzmann Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. The court found no plain error with respect to the plea agreement, but held that the limited facts relied upon by the district court were insufficient to support application of a three-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, USSG 2B3.1(b)(2)(E), and a two-level enhancement for physical restraint, USSG 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), in calculating defendant's Sentencing Guidelines range. |
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| Williams v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-2535 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Susan Laura Carney Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision ordering petitioner removed based on his 2016 Connecticut state conviction for carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 29-35(a). The court held that Section 29-35(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes is not a categorical match for the generic federal firearms offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C). The court held that the Connecticut statute criminalizes conduct involving "antique firearms" that the INA firearms offense definition does not, precluding petitioner's removal on the basis of the state conviction. The court also held that, under Hylton v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2018), the realistic probability test has no bearing here, where the text of the state statute gives it a broader reach than the federal definition. Accordingly, the court vacated the order of removal and remanded with directions to terminate the removal proceedings. |
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| United States v. Portanova |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1381 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Julio M. Fuentes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Portanova admitted to downloading child pornography onto his cell phone, on which investigators found 63 videos depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Portanova subsequently pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1), which carries a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence if that person “has a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” or “relating to . . . the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.” Portanova had previously been convicted of possessing and distributing child pornography under Pennsylvania law. The court concluded that his state conviction triggered section 2252(b)(1)'s mandatory minimum enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that his conviction triggered the mandatory minimum provision. Under the Third Circuit’s “looser categorical approach,” section 2252(b)(1)’s “relating to” language does not require an exact match between the state and federal elements of conviction, and that provision is not unconstitutionally vague. |
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| United States v. Wilson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-1079 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Bibas Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| In November 2013, three men robbed a Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania bank. A bank employee, Kane, later admitted to assisting them. The next morning, the three were pulled over in North Carolina. Wilson stated they were driving to Georgia and admitted that they had a lot of cash in the car. The officer, suspecting that they were going to buy drugs in Atlanta, searched the car, found the stolen cash, turned it over to federal agents, then released the men. A week later, three men robbed a Phoenixville, Pennsylvania bank. The police got a tip from Howell, whom Wilson had tried to recruit for the heists. Howell provided Wilson's cell phone number. Police pulled his cell-site location data, which put him at the Bala Cynwyd bank right before the first robbery and showed five calls and 17 text messages to Kane that day. Howell identified Wilson and Moore from a video of the robbery. Kane and Foster took plea bargains. Wilson and Moore were tried for bank robbery, conspiracy, and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Moore was sentenced to 385 months’ imprisonment. Wilson received 519 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. Counsel’s stipulation that the banks were federally insured did not violate the Sixth Amendment, which does not categorically forbid stipulating to a crime’s jurisdictional element without the defendant’s consent or over the defendant’s objection. |
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| United States v. James |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-31011 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Jerry E. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of government authorization to administer antipsychotic medication to defendant involuntarily for the sole purpose of restoring her competency for trial. The court held that all four Sell factors support the administration of the antipsychotic medication because the government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important; involuntary medication will significantly further those interests; the involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests; and administration of the drugs is medically appropriate. In this case, the administration of Risperdal Consta is medically appropriate and defendant's case does not present any of the recognized risk factors for side effects linked to Risperdal Consta, which itself has fewer serious side effects than do earlier generation antipsychotics. |
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| United States v. Lavalais |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-30161 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: James C. Ho Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court held that, to the extent that defendant argues his indictment is fatally defective because it did not contain an element of the offense under section 922(g), he failed to preserve that claim by pleading guilty. The court also held that defendant cannot show how the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights. In the factual basis and the rearraignment, defendant admitted that he was a felon convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying a two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) for a stolen firearm; defendant's sentence is procedurally reasonable where, even if the upward departure was improper, the error is harmless because the heightened sentence was imposed as a variance as well; and defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court specifically considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion by imposing an 105-month sentence. |
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| United States v. Nicholson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-60365 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Leslie Southwick Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for eleven federal tax offenses. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in a conspiracy to commit tax fraud by filing false tax returns. The court held even if there was error in admitting summary testimony and charts, the error was harmless; the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of every count; and there are no cumulative errors requiring reversal. |
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| United States v. Perez-Rodriguez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-4203 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Jane Branstetter Stranch Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Perez-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was ordered removed in June 2016. He reentered the country days later and was arrested and convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1546 for reentry after deportation and false personation in immigration matters. He was sentenced to time served (140 days) and removed again in December 2016. In June 2018, Perez-Rodriguez was arrested in Ohio on a failure to appear warrant for child endangering. He pled guilty to illegal reentry, Perez-Rodriguez had one prior conviction in 2015 for operating a motor vehicle under the influence (DUI), for which he received probation. Based on this criminal history, his prior count of reentry, and his acceptance of responsibility, Pretrial Services recommended a Guidelines range of 8-14 months' imprisonment. The district court entered a sentence of 24 months, noting Perez-Rodriguez’s DUI conviction, that he “apparently violated his probation,” and the need to deter individuals who demonstrate “a pattern of continuing to violate our laws.” The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing, finding Perez-Rodriguez’s sentence substantively unreasonable, Perez-Rodriguez had one DUI conviction before his first deportation, and he had not been convicted of anything that would endanger the public since that conviction. Perez-Rodriguez does not exhibit an extensive “pattern” of deportation and reentry nor do his past actions present that ongoing risk of harm to the public. |
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| United States v. Smithers |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5849 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Murphy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2006 Smithers pleaded guilty to two aiding-and-abetting counts involving cocaine. The government had notified him that it would seek life imprisonment because he had four prior “felony drug offenses,” 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 851. In the plea deal, the government withdrew its reliance on three of the convictions. Smithers’s remaining “felony drug offense” triggered a mandatory-minimum sentence of 240 months. Smithers also qualified as a “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines; his guidelines range was 262-327 months. The court imposed a 262-month sentence. T he 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger Smithers’s 20-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams. Because Smithers had pleaded guilty to possessing 50 grams, his mandatory-minimum sentence would have dropped 10 years. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive and gives district courts discretion over whether to reduce this type of sentence. The probation office found that Smithers did not qualify for relief under the Act. His status as a career offender kept his guidelines range the same even after the reduction in his mandatory-minimum sentence. The district court found that Smithers was “eligible for consideration of a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B)” but held that Smithers did not warrant that discretionary relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court declined to address whether the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3742(a), limited Smithers’s appeal; the government waived that argument. The court did not abuse its discretion when denying Smithers a reduced sentence. |
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| Waid v. Snyder |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-1533, 19-1425, 19-1472, 19-1477 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Karen Nelson Moore Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2014-2015, Flint and Michigan state officials caused, sustained, and covered up the poisoning of a community with lead- and legionella-contaminated water after the city began delivering Flint River water to its predominantly poor, African-American residents, knowing that it was not treated for corrosion. Flint residents reported that there was something wrong with the way the water looked, tasted, and smelled and that it was causing rashes. In response, the city treated the water with additional chlorine—exacerbating the corrosion, which contaminated the water with hazardous levels of lead and caused an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease. State and city officials failed to stop the delivery of Flint River water and assured the public that the water was safe, knowing it was not. Flint's children will likely be permanently developmentally stunted. Six years later, corroded pipes still infect the water and poison Flint residents. In a consolidated class action, claiming deliberate indifference to the residents being poisoned in violation of their substantive due process right to bodily integrity, the district court denied motions to dismiss with respect to every defendant except State Treasurer Dillon. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but remanded the issue of whether Dillon should be dismissed in light of recent holdings; Dillon was not Treasurer at the time of the switch to river water . No legitimate government purpose justifies the city and state officials’ actions. |
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| Woods v. Cook |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3254 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| On October 27, 2010, Spears drove Smith and Chandler to Cincinnati to buy drugs. Chandler left the car and returned, stating that “his man was coming.” The men then heard a voice: “Chandler, where’s my money[?]” Smith saw a bearded African American man in his thirties, of average build. Bullets ripped through the side window., hitting Chandler’s spinal cord. Spears rushed Chandler to the hospital, where doctors placed him on life support. Days later, Chandler regained consciousness. He could control movement only in his eyes. Doctors worked out a system of communicating by blinking. Chandler answered questions from his doctors and communicated with Father Seher, a priest and long-time friend. Chandler communicated that he understood his “likelihood of death” and requested Last Rites rather than the Sacrament of the Sick. Chandler later communicated to police that he knew his shooter; he blinked the letter “O.” Police showed him a photo of Woods, a dealer known on the streets as “O.” Chandler confirmed that Woods shot him. Woods had sold Chandler drugs many times. Chandler owed him money; Woods warned Chandler that “something was going to happen.” The shooting happened 100 feet from Woods’ house. Chandler subsequently suffered an aneurysm. On November 12, he died. Police arrested Woods 200 miles away from his home In jail, Woods told his cellmate (an informant) that he shot someone over a drug debt. At trial, the court admitted Chandler’s identification of Woods as a dying declaration. The jury convicted Woods. The Sixth Circuit rejected his habeas petition, rejecting Woods’ claims that the admission of Chandler’s deathbed identification violated the Confrontation Clause and that the state impermissibly struck a black juror based on race. |
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| United States v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1238 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Barr was charged with a fraudulent real-estate-selling scheme in Chicago. FBI officers discovered Barr was living in Saudi Arabia. Before they could get to Barr, Saudi Arabian officials detained him for unrelated conduct. Barr spent months in a Saudi Arabian prison. When he was released and returned to the U.S., he pled guilty to making false statements to a financial institution. He then unsuccessfully asked the court to allow more time for counsel to obtain government clearance and review classified materials, to dismiss the indictment, and to withdraw his plea. At his sentencing, Barr tried to argue that his time in Saudi Arabia should be a mitigating factor. The court disagreed and prevented Barr from advancing that argument. Barr unsuccessfully sought the judge’s recusal. The judge sentenced Barr to 87 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even if Barr’s U.S. crimes somehow led to his detention in Saudi Arabia, that detention time was not punishment for Barr’s U.S. crime; it was a consequence of Barr’s not paying his debts in Saudi Arabia and did not relate to any of the legitimate aims of sentencing. There was no reasonable probability that allegedly suppressed evidence about Barr’s detention in Saudi Arabia would have changed the result of Barr’s sentencing hearing. Essentially, Barr thought the government would not be able to prove as much loss, which would have produced a lower guidelines range; Barr presented no legitimate reason to withdraw his plea. |
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| United States v. Cross |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3633 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Cross unlawfully obtained $516,000 by opening accounts at out-of-state banks, then opening accounts at Illinois banks. He wrote checks on the out-of-state accounts and deposited them in his Illinois accounts, knowing that there were insufficient funds to cover those checks, then withdrew the money from the Illinois banks. He was charged with five counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1). After eight months, the court allowed his appointed attorney to withdraw. While represented by another attorney, Cross entered his guilty plea. Months later, the court allowed that attorney to withdraw, appointing a third counsel. Days later, Cross filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, which the court struck, advising Cross that the court would entertain only motions that had been filed by counsel. Days before his scheduled sentencing hearing, Cross nonetheless filed pro se: “Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea,” “Motion To Terminate Counsel,” and “Motion To Dismiss Case Per A, Mauro, Violation.” At the sentencing hearing, the court gave Cross, his counsel and the government opportunities to address the motions. It denied the Motion to Terminate Counsel on the merits and denied the Motion to Dismiss because Cross had filed it pro se while represented by counsel. The court denied the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea both on the merits and because Cross had filed it pro se while represented. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court was within its discretion in denying the motions that were filed pro se when Cross was represented by competent counsel who had refused to file the same motions for cogent reasons. |
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| United States v. Falls |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3050 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Joel Martin Flaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Falls began serving supervised release after he was released from prison. Two years later, probation officer Hoepker filed a petition to revoke Falls’s supervised release, alleging that Falls committed the offense of attempted possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. At Falls’s revocation hearing, the government presented Hoepker's testimony that she learned of the alleged criminal conduct from DEA Agent Neff and learned that Falls was in DEA custody. Hoepker had listened to an audio recording of a DEA interview and identified the voice of the person interviewed as Falls. Falls objected, unsuccessfully arguing that because the recording contained hearsay, FRCP 32.1(b)(2)(C) and Seventh Circuit precedent (Jordan) required the court to balance the government’s proffered reason for not calling the interviewing officer with Falls’s interest in confronting and cross-examining him. The government introduced the first 10 minutes of the recording. The court concluded that it was reliable and that it was more likely than not that Falls committed the attempted-possession-with-intent-to-distribute violation, resulting in a sentencing range of 46-57 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 57-month sentence. Jordan does not apply because the probative statements in the audio recording were Falls’s own non-hearsay statements. Falls has not shown that his interviewing officer was an “adverse witness” that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) entitled him to question subject to an interest-of-justice determination. |
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| United States v. Withers |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 17-3448 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Brennan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Withers trafficked women and girls for sex. After months of abuse, several victims were identified by law enforcement. Withers was arrested and charged with nine counts of sex trafficking. The government proposed jury instructions on four of those counts that would have allowed Withers to be found guilty if he either knew or recklessly disregarded that force, threats of force, or coercion would be used to cause the women to engage in commercial sex acts. The “recklessly disregarded” mens rea element was absent, however, from the superseding indictment against Withers. The district court ruled, and the parties agreed, that the jury instructions would not include that phrase. Nonetheless, at trial, the court’s instructions included this phrase, and neither the court nor the parties recognized the error. A jury found Withers guilty on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the four convictions that included inaccurate instructions. While the jury instructions were plainly wrong, the error did not affect Withers’ substantial rights or otherwise prejudice his trial. The “jury was presented with overwhelming evidence of Withers’ knowledge and more than sufficient facts to convict Withers of the offenses charged in the four challenged counts.” |
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| McCoy v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 16-3953 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit held that voluntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. 1112 qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) because it has an element of force against the person of another. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that there is no material difference between the force clause at issue in United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d at 956, and the force clause under section 924(c)(3)(A). |
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| Thomas v. Payne |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 17-1833 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After the district court granted petitioner partial habeas relief, both petitioner and the state appealed. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that petitioner's guilt-and-penalty ineffective-assistance claims were procedurally defaulted. However, the court held that no procedural default was triggered in the initial Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 proceedings. In this case, habeas relief cannot be granted on petitioner's guilt-and-penalty ineffective-assistance claims because he cannot establish cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying petitioner a hearing for his jury-pool ineffective-assistance claim where petitioner received a constitutionally adequate jury and he was not prejudiced. Finally, the court held that petitioner's McCoy-type claim is procedurally defaulted and the court rejected his request for a hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
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| United States v. Banks |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 19-1750, 19-1969 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018 from 55 years to 40 years in prison. The court held that the Act applies to offenses, not conduct. Because the statute of conviction in defendant's case required only proof that he conspired to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, and the Act reduced the penalties for a 50-gram conspiracy, he is eligible for a reduction. The court also held that, although the district court did not address defendant's argument regarding whether his sentence was based on post-sentence rehabilitation, resentencing was not warranted on this record. In this case, the district court implicitly rejected defendant's contention that earning a certificate in General Education Development, completing education and personal betterment courses, and other mitigating factors warranted a greater reduction. Furthermore, the district court concluded that a sentence within the advisory range was appropriate in light of several aggravating factors, and no further explanation was required. |
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| United States v. Sauceda |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 19-2287, 19-3328 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of cocaine. The court also affirmed defendant's sentence for obstruction of justice for retaliating against a witness. The court held that the district court did not procedurally err in declining to grant a downward departure for the time defendant spent in county jails; the district court's factual findings that the case was delayed because defendant refused to get along with his appointed counsel and made multiple requests for new counsel were consistent with the record and not clearly erroneous; defendant's sentence for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances was not substantively unreasonable; and the district court did not abuse its substantial sentencing discretion in making defendant's separate sentence for obstruction of justice run consecutive to the drug conspiracy offense. |
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| United States v. Sherman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2145 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and sentenced to 240 months in prison. The district court considered the sentence appropriate and subsequently denied defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not improperly calculate the advisory guideline range by finding that defendant was accountable for more than 30 kilograms of cocaine base; the district court did not clearly err in applying a base offense level of 38 given the testimony at trial and defendant's role as a supplier for the conspiracy; and the district court did not err by declining to respond explicitly to defendant's plea based on alleged post-sentencing rehabilitation. |
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| United States v. Zurheide |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2956 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography. The court held that the prosecutor's comments at sentencing did not breach the plea agreement where the government was not obligated to zealously defend the joint recommendation in the face of the sentencing court's hostility. Furthermore, even if error was assumed, defendant would not merit relief because he has failed to show "a reasonable probability that the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence had the government not breached the agreement." In this case, the district judge had already expressed doubt about the joint recommendation in light of the disturbing and concerning facts of the case. |
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| United States v. Grey |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-50328 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Tashima Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The panel held that where, as here, law enforcement officers are asked to assist in the execution of an administrative warrant authorizing the inspection of a private residence, they violate the Fourth Amendment when their "primary purpose" in executing the warrant is to gather evidence in support of a criminal investigation rather than to assist the inspectors. The panel need not address defendant's argument that the warrant itself was invalid under state law nor whether LASD exceeded the scope of the warrant. The panel only held that the LASD's execution was unreasonable and thus the district court properly granted defendant's motion to suppress. |
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| United States v. Goebel |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-2125 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jeffrey Goebel was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress, which the district court denied. He pleaded guilty conditioned on his ability to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, Goebel argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, contending the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and his statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Further, Goebel argued the district court committed plain error by applying the wrong standard of review to the motion. After review, the Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed judgment of conviction. |
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| United States v. Sandoval |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-2041 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law |
| Defendant-Appellant Jordan Sandoval pleaded guilty to committing an assault in Indian Country which resulted in serious bodily injury. He was sentenced to a prison term of 27 months. Sandoval appealed the district court’s sentence as disproportionate by noting crimes either committed with greater intent or causing death are afforded only slightly higher sentencing ranges under the Guidelines. In the alternative, he argued his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Finding that the district court carefully considered Sandoval's arguments before sentencing, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in arriving at his sentence. |
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| United States v. Trujillo |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-2057 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Baldock Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2018, Defendant Frank Trujillo pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The district court sentenced him to a term of 120 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed both his conviction and sentence. With respect to his conviction, Defendant argued his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid because he was not advised of the true nature of his charge. As to his sentence, Defendant argued the district court plainly erred by applying U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(a)(1) to calculate his base offense level because he did not commit the instant offense “subsequent to” sustaining at least two felony convictions for crimes of violence. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction but remanded for resentencing only. Defendant’s advisory guideline range was erroneously calculated at 140 to 175 months’ imprisonment. "It is reasonably probable that the district court’s error caused Defendant to receive a higher sentence, and 'we can think of few things that affect . . . the public's perception of the fairness and integrity of the judicial process more than a reasonable probability an individual will linger longer in prison than the law demands only because of an obvious judicial mistake.'” |
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| United States v. Bates |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-12533 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Huck Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, assaulting a federal officer, discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court joined five sister circuits and held that an assault conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111(b) qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c); the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence relevant to defendant's self-defense theory at trial; the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction on the section 111 and 924(c) counts; defendant's prior Georgia convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana qualified as predicate offenses for both the Armed Career Criminal Act and the Sentencing Guidelines; the district court did not clearly err in denying defendant a two-level sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty to the possession charges; defendant's 360-month sentence was substantively reasonable and the district court did not abuse its discretion; and Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), does not require vacating defendant's conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon. |
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| State v. Lietzau |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CR-19-0132-PR Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Ann Timmer Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that Arizona's standard conditions of probation, which permit warrantless searches of a probationer's "property," apply to cell phones and that the search in this case was compliant with the Fourth Amendment. While Defendant was on probation, an adult probation department surveillance officer arrested Defendant for violating several conditions of probation. En route to jail, the officer looked through incriminating text messages and photos on Defendant's phone. The State subsequently indicted Defendant on sex counts of sexual conduct with a minor. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence gathered from the cell phone search. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain meaning of "property" in one of Defendant's conditions of supervised probation included cell phone, and Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), did not vary that meaning; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances, the officer's search of Defendant's cell phone was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. |
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| Carter v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 218 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on postconviction DNA testing results, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion and in not granting an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion. Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated robbery, and burglary more than thirty years ago. In 2012, Defendant moved for postconviction DNA testing under Act 1780 of 2001 seeking to test for "touch DNA" on the knife found at the crime scene. The circuit court entered a stipulated order for postconviction DNA testing on the knife and several hairs and hair fragments. After testing was complete, Defendant moved for a new trial, relying on the DNA testing results. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for new trial; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding that an evidentiary hearing was not required. |
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| Harmon v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 216 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for various drug and drug-related offenses and sentencing him to an aggregate term of forty years' imprisonment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the presence of filmmakers at the search of Defendant's residence. When DEA officers and other law enforcement officers executed a warrant for the search of Defendant's home, they found drugs and drug paraphernalia. An HBO documentary film crew was present at the search under an agreement with law enforcement. The filmmakers did not participate in the search, nor did they include footage of the search in a documentary that later aired on HBO. On appeal from his convictions, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to order the State to obtain the HBO video footage of the search of Defendant's home and to identify the filmmakers who were present. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in declining to order the State to obtain the video; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request for a continuance; (3) did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion to exclude testimony about the film; and (4) erred in giving a nonmodel instruction, but the error was harmless. |
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| Marek v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 203 Opinion Date: May 21, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court remanded this matter - which regarded Petitioner's pro se motions seeking to belatedly appeal his conviction, permission to proceed in forma paupers, and appointment of counsel - to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the proper disposition of the matter required findings of fact. In his motion for belated appeal, Petitioner alleged that after he was convicted for aggravated assault on a family/household member he advised his retained attorney that he wished to appeal but that his attorney had failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The record did not contain an order relieving his attorney, so the question at issue was whether and when Petitioner communicated to his attorney that he wished to appeal and whether his attorney acted within an objective standard of reasonableness in not pursuing an appeal. The Supreme Court held that the proper disposition required findings of fact, and therefore, the matter must be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. |
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| People v. Miles |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S086234 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Groban Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to modify the jury's verdicts of burglary and first degree murder, first degree forcible rape, second degree robbery and false imprisonment by violence and sentencing Defendant to death, holding that considering assumed errors altogether, reversal was not warranted. Defendant, an African-American, was charged with raping and murdering a White woman. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the prosecutor improperly exercise peremptory challenges to excuse two prospective jurors, who were African-American, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, and People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor struck the potential jurors for reasons other than his race; (2) there was no error in the trial court's decision to excuse two jurors for cause; (3) there was no merit to Defendant's allegations of error during the guilt phase; and (4) any assumed errors during the competency phase and penalty phase were not prejudicial and, considered cumulatively, did not require reversal. |
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| California v. Palmer |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D074240(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Richard D. Huffman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Joshua Palmer was convicted by jury of first degree murder. The jury found true Palmer committed the murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of rape, sodomy, and sexual penetration by force, fear or threat. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Palmer contended he was entitled to a new trial under McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018), which prohibited counsel from conceding guilt when a defendant insisted on maintaining innocence. He also claimed he was entitled to an additional 10 days of custody credit. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Palmer's contention he was entitled to relief under "McCoy." The State conceded, however, Palmer was entitled to ten days of custody credit. Except for instructing the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to capture the additional 10 days of custody credit, the Court otherwise affirmed the judgment. |
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| California v. Prado |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G058172(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Moore Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Manuel De Jesus Prado filed a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition, stating that he was convicted of murder and was entitled to a dismissal because of the Legislature’s amendments to Penal Code sections 188 and 189. The court denied defendant’s petition, finding the Legislature violated the constitutional limitation on amending or repealing initiative statutes when it passed Senate Bill 1437. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding "Sections 188 and 189 were enacted by the Legislature; ergo, sections 188 and 189 are legislative statutes. The Legislature did not violate the constitutional limitation on amending initiative statutes when it passed Senate Bill 1437 and amended sections 188 and 189 because they are not initiative statutes." Section 1170.95 was a new statute that established a procedure for eligible defendants convicted of murder to petition for relief. The Court determined the Legislature did not violate the constitutional limitation on amending or repealing an initiative statute when it passed Senate Bill 1437 and enacted section 1170.95 because it was itself a legislative statute that neither amended nor repealed any other statute. |
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| In re B.J. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B293545(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Welfare and Institutions Code section 733, subdivision (c), is clear: DJJ commitment is permitted only if the minor's most recent offense is listed in Penal Code section 290.008, subdivision (c), or Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal vacated the commitment order, because the latest offense defendant committed is listed in neither statute. In this case, defendant committed kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking, kidnapping to commit robbery, second degree robbery, and unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. Prosecutors also alleged that defendant restricted or obstructed a peace officer later the same night. The court remanded for a new dispositional hearing. |
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| In re Smith |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E073871(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury found petitioner Tom Smith guilty of first degree murder, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, dependent adult abuse, conspiracy to commit murder, custodial possession of a weapon, custodial manufacture of a weapon, and misdemeanor damage to prison property, along with various enhancements, arising from an attack on a fellow inmate at Patton State Hospital. Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 168 years to life. He appealed, raising, among other issues, the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel based on defense counsel’s closing argument, in which he conceded petitioner’s guilt of the crime but asked the jury to find him guilty of second degree murder, rather than first degree. The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner did not seek review by the California Supreme Court. However, he did file multiple petitions seeking to collaterally attack the judgment. One such attack, filing a habeas petition in light of the federal Supreme Court's decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ___ (2018). When that petition was denied, he raised the same issue to the Court of Appeal, which denied the petition. Petitioner then pursued the issue with the California Supreme Court, which issued an order to show cause to the Court of Appeal as to why petitioner was not entitled to relief based on McCoy, and why McCoy should not have applied retroactively to final judgments on habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal disagreed McCoy applied to this case; according to petitioner, his trial testimony demonstrated his intent to assert his innocence of the murder, as did his statements made in open court after counsel’s closing argument. The Court found the record did not show petitioner made an express and unambiguous intent to maintain factual innocence at that time. Thereafter, defense counsel made his closing argument, conceding petitioner’s involvement in the murder, at which point petitioner objected. "While petitioner did object during closing argument, it was after the concession had been made, so it cannot be said that at the time counsel made the concession, it was over petitioner’s intransigent and unambiguous objection." |
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| People v. Duarte-Lara |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157186(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Petrou Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Duarte-Lara was convicted of the felony offense of sexual penetration with a foreign object of a minor 14 years or older accomplished by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily injury. (Pen. Code 289(a)(1)(c)1.) He was sentenced to the lower term of six years' imprisonment. The court of appeal affirmed and rejected an argument that the court assessed fines and assessments without determining his ability to pay. There was no substantial evidence of equivocal conduct on the part of the victim and no substantial evidence from which the jury could find that he reasonably and in good faith, albeit mistakenly, believed the victim had consented to sexual penetration with a foreign object. In context, the prosecutor’s closing argument is more akin to drawing inferences from the evidence than arguing facts not in evidence. Given the court’s admonition and instructions as to how the jury was to consider the prosecutor’s arguments, it is not reasonably likely the jurors understood or applied any of the complained-of remarks referring to rape in an improper or erroneous manner. Objections to the prosecutor’s closing remarks were either forfeited for review or the remarks were fair comment on the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. |
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| People v. Lee |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B297928(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Bendix Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of a petition under Penal Code section 1170.95, which permits defendants convicted of murder under the felony murder rule or natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing based on changes to the Penal Code enacted under Senate Bill No. 1437. The court held that petitioner was convicted under the provocation act doctrine, which requires proof of malice, distinguishing it from felony murder and natural and probable consequences murder. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to resentencing under section 1170.95. |
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| People v. Lima |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B293030(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Kim Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant challenged his conviction for attempted murder in light of Senate Bill No. 1437 which abrogated the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Defendant argued that, even if SB 1437 did not abrogate the natural and probable consequences doctrine as to attempted murder, the trial court and prosecutor committed errors. The Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court so it may exercise its discretion whether to strike any of defendant's Penal Code section 12022.53 firearm enhancements; ordered the sentencing minute order modified to reflect that defendant was awarded 116 days of conduct credit; and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. |
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| People v. Machuca |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076580(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Jennifer R.S. Detjen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A violation of Vehicle Code section 23153 is not a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated when, as here, the offenses involve separate victims. Defendant contends that his convictions for driving under the influence causing bodily injury (count 3) and driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more and causing bodily injury (count 4) must be reversed because they are lesser included offenses of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The Court of Appeal held that defendant's convictions were proper because counts 3 and 4 arose from injuries to a different victim than the conviction on count 2. |
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| People v. Smith |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A155689(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Mark B. Simons Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Smith pled no contest to assault with intent to commit rape and admitted prior conviction and prison term allegations. Before his release on parole in 2010, he was declared a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Welfare and Institutions Code 6600 and was committed to Coalinga State Hospital. He was released in November 2015 and placed in the Conditional Release Program. In March 2016, Smith sought unconditional discharge. The court found Smith had established probable cause that he was no longer a public safety risk. The matter was continued to allow the state to prepare an expert evaluation. In May 2017, the government filed a petition to revoke conditional release. The court granted the petition and recommitted Smith, then determined that the unconditional discharge petition was superseded by the hearing. Smith filed a Marsden motion based on his counsel’s failure to pursue an unconditional discharge. The court determined its previous ruling that Smith's petition was superseded was erroneous and set a jury trial. The government successfully sought reconsideration, arguing the court had inherent authority to reconsider its probable cause finding and that an SVP must be on conditional release for at least one year before seeking unconditional discharge. The court of appeal affirmed, in favor of the government. The statute requires a committed person to have been on conditional release for at least one year when the unconditional discharge petition is filed and to remain on that status throughout the duration of the unconditional discharge proceedings. |
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| People v. Son |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076252(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant raised several claims of error related to his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant's contention that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter; there was no impropriety in the trial court's inquiry and rulings; and imposition of court operations and facilities assessments, without first giving defendant an opportunity to request an ability to pay hearing to show he cannot pay them, is unconstitutional. The court remanded to give defendant an opportunity to request an ability to pay hearing. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. |
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| Salari v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Dockets: B295511(Second Appellate District) , B295653(Second Appellate District) , B295731(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Tricia A. Bigelow Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal granted writs of mandate directing the superior court to dismiss the untimely filed information against petitioners under Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(1). The court held that the statutory texts are unambiguous and in harmony with the related statutes and rules. In this case, the information was filed on August 14, 2018, 25 days after the July 20, 2018 holding order, and 10 days too late. Furthermore, the People concede that they failed to file the information within the time frame required by section 1382, and they do not assert they had good cause to file the information late. The court also stated that it was not aware of any authority, and the People presented it with none, that holds a party impliedly waives the right to the timely filing of an information by agreeing to a later arraignment. |
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| Colorado v. Espinoza |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 43 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Coats Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State petitioned for review the court of appeals' judgment reversing a trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences for respondent Martin Espinoza's ten convictions of attempted first degree murder of ten different people. Espinoza was charged with first degree arson, third degree assault, and attempted first degree murder (extreme indifference), with corresponding crime-of-violence counts, arising out of an incident in which a fire raged through his mother’s apartment. Respondent started a fire on the balcony of his mother’s apartment, which spread throughout the apartment building and to a neighboring building. The ten people who were named victims of the attempted murder counts were inside the defendant’s mother’s apartment building during the fire but were able to escape and survive. Reasoning that Espinoza’s ten attempted murder convictions were separate crimes of violence, the trial court considered itself bound by statute to impose consecutive sentences. The intermediate appellate court, however, found that because the ten convictions were premised on a “single act of fire-setting,” they were supported by identical evidence, notwithstanding the fact that each conviction required proof that the defendant attempted to kill a different person. Further concluding that convictions for multiple crimes of violence that were supported by identical evidence did not fall within the statutory mandate to sentence consecutively, the intermediate appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because offenses defined in terms of their victimization of another and committed against different victims were not capable of being proved by identical evidence within the contemplation of section 18-1-408(3), C.R.S. (2019), and because even according to the appellate court’s understanding of the term “separate crimes of violence,” Espinoza’s convictions therefore required consecutive sentences pursuant to section 18-1.3-406(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019), the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. |
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| Chavis v. Delaware |
| Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 402, 2019 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Vaughn Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Dakai Chavis appealed his conviction of first-degree criminal trespass. He raised one issue on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court: the Superior Court erred during his jury trial by admitting evidence of two prior convictions under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b). After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court determined the evidence of Appellant's prior convictions should not have been admitted, and thus reversed the superior court order. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Enos |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-18-0000407 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanding Defendant's criminal case to the circuit court, holding that it was within the circuit court's discretion to dismiss the drug charge against Defendant as de minimis. Defendant was charged with criminal trespass onto state lands and promotion of a dangerous drug in the third degree. Defendant moved to dismiss his drug charge as de minimis pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-236. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that attendant circumstances weighed in favor of dismissal. In addition, the circuit court determined that criminal trespass onto state lands was not a property crime and accordingly did not constitute a "harm" or "evil" with which the drug statute was concerned. The ICA remanded the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was within he circuit court's discretion to dismiss the charge against Defendant as de minimis; (2) while there were errors of fact in the circuit court's order dismissing the charge, those errors were harmless; and (3) while criminal trespass onto state lands is a property crime, it is not the type of property crime that motivated the legislature to criminalize possession of any amount of a dangerous drug. |
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| Johnson v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 20S-CR-61 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court denying Defendant's request to file a belated notice of appeal of his twelve-year sentence, holding that the general waiver of Defendant's "right to appeal" was insufficiently explicit to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of Defendant's right to appeal his sentence. Defendant pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine and was sentenced to the maximum term of twelve years incarceration. Defendant did not timely file a notice of appeal. Defendant later sought permission to file a belated notice of appeal, arguing that he was only recently made aware of his right to appeal his sentence. The trial court denied Defendant's request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the general waiver of Defendant's "right to appeal," particularly when contained in the same sentence as an unenforceable waiver of post-conviction relief, was insufficient to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of Defendant's right to appeal his sentence. |
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| Doe v. State |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1413 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court granted Jane Doe's petition for writ of certiorari, sustained the writ, and vacated the order of the district court denying Doe's application to expunge her criminal record as to three separate cases pursuant to Iowa Code 901C.2, holding that the court erred in denying the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. In the three separate cases at issue the charges were all dismissed. Doe later filed an application for expungement of the record in each of the cases. The district court denied the application on the ground that Doe had "[m]onies owed in other matters." The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order denying expungement, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Doe, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), filed today, the requisite condition for expungement requires that the defendant establish only that he satisfied all of the court-ordered financial obligations in the criminal case for which expungement was sought; and (2) in the instant case, the district court erred in concluding that Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(a)(2) required Defendant to establish that she also satisfied all court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. |
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| Doe v. State |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1402 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court granted Jane Doe's petition for writ of certiorari, sustained the writ, and vacated the order of the district court denying Doe's application to expunge her criminal record as to a particular case pursuant to Iowa Code 901C.2, holding that the court erred in denying the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. In 2011, Doe was charged with one count of unauthorized use of a credit card. The charge was dismissed, and Doe subsequently satisfied all of her financial obligations in the dismissed case. In 2019, Doe filed her application to expunge the criminal record. The district court denied the application because Doe had court-ordered financial obligations remaining in other cases and thus did not meet the requisite condition set forth in section 901C.2(1)(a)(2). The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) required Defendant to establish that she satisfied all financial obligations in both this case and in any other case; and (2) erred in denying Doe's application on that ground. |
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| Doe v. State |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1407 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court granted John Doe's petition for writ of certiorari, sustained the writ, and vacated the order of the district court denying Doe's application to expunge his criminal record as to a particular case pursuant to Iowa Code 901C.2, holding that the court erred in denying the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. In 2000, Doe was charged with escape. The charge was later dismissed. In 2019, Doe filed an application for expungement of the record. The district court denied the application on the ground that Doe had court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order denying expungement, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Doe, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), filed today, the requisite condition for expungement requires that the defendant establish only that he satisfied all of the court-ordered financial obligations in the criminal case for which expungement was sought; and (2) in the instant case, the district court erred in concluding that section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) required Defendant to establish that he also satisfied all court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. |
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| State v. Delong |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-1763 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Brent R. Appel Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court ordering restitution in the amount of $2740.95 based upon testimony and exhibits submitted by the Crime Victim Compensation Program (CVCP), holding that the restitution order was not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree and supplying alcohol to a minor. The State filed a motion for restitution. The district court approved of the restitution claim in its entirety, largely relying on testimony about the general process conducted by the CVCP in evaluating potential restitution. The Supreme Court vacated the restitution order, holding (1) the CVCP fell short of establishing restitution in the amount of $2740.95; and (2) based on the Court's review of the record, the record supported only $285.50 in restitution. |
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| Carlisle v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2018-SC-000680-MR Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of three counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence that was found on Defendant's person during a warrantless search. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1) the officer illegally extended the traffic stop beyond its original purpose, (2) the continued detention of Defendant after the traffic stop constituted an illegal seizure, and (3) the officers did not have probable cause to search his person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lawful traffic stop had not concluded at the time consent was obtained to search the vehicle, and the officer did not inquire into matters unrelated to the stop's mission; (2) Defendant's detention during the search of the vehicle was reasonable; and (3) a search of Defendant's person was warranted under the circumstances. |
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| Curry v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-000306-MR Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Lambert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for one count of murder and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, holding that the trial court did not err by failing to give the jury a no duty to retreat instruction and by failing to strike two jurors for cause. A jury convicted Defendant of murder and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant was found to be a first-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's request for a "no duty to retreat" jury instruction; and (2) the trial court did not err by failing to strike two jurors, Juror 5 and Juror 50, for cause. |
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| Norton Healthcare, Inc. v. Disselkamp |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Dockets: 2018-SC-000274-DG, 2019-SC-000102-DG Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Labor & Employment Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's age-discrimination claim, holding that the trial court committed reversible error by requiring the jury, rather than the court itself, to make the specific factual determination about whether Defendant, Plaintiff's former employer, replaced Plaintiff with a substantially younger person. Plaintiff sued Defendant for age discrimination in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act and for retaliation, alleging that she was terminated for complaining about her former supervisor's behavior before she was replaced. During trial, Plaintiff relied on circumstantial evidence to support her age discrimination claim. The jury rendered a verdict for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury to decide the element under the McDonnell Douglas framework that Defendant replaced Plaintiff with a substantially younger person. |
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| In re: Grand Jury Subpoena |
| Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2019-KK-00962 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Bernette J. Johnson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2018, the target of a grand jury investigation was charged by Bill of Information with one count of molestation of a juvenile, a violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2, arising from an incident in 2003 in which he allegedly molested his children’s babysitter. The target was subsequently arrested and pled not guilty. In conjunction with the grand jury proceeding, the state issued a subpoena to the target’s wife, to appear before the grand jury. The wife filed an “Affidavit of Spouse” wherein she asserted “her lawful privilege to refuse to give evidence in any criminal proceeding against her husband, pursuant to Louisiana Code of Evidence article 505.” The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of this matter to determine whether the spousal witness privilege in Article 505 could be invoked in a grand jury proceeding investigating the molestation of a juvenile. Because the grand jury proceeding involved an allegation and investigation of the sexual abuse of a child, the Court found the spousal privilege was abrogated by Ls. R.S. 14:403(B). The Court reversed the district court, which found the spousal privilege applied. |
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| State v. Westgate |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 74 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Joseph Jabar Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of five counts of unlawful sexual touching and one count of visual sexual aggression against a child, holding that Defendant received a fair trial with properly admitted expert testimony and a clear guilty verdict. After a third trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in accepting the jury's verdict, that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial, and that the court erred in admitting the State's expert witness's testimony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not clearly err in finding the State's witness to be a qualified expert witness. |
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| Perry v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12832 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking review of a Housing Court judge's order denying his motion for waiver of an appeal bond, setting the bond, and ordering payment of use and occupancy during the pendency of Petitioner's appeal from an adverse summary process judgment, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused her discretion. Petitioner sought and received review of the Housing Court judge's order from a single justice of the Appeals Court. In challenging the order, Petitioner neither appealed to the Appeals Court from the dismissal of his summary process appeal, nor did he raise his claims concerning the bond and the use and occupancy payments in the direct appeal from the summary process judgment in the Appeals Court. Because Petitioner had other adequate and effective routes to seek relief, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice properly denied relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. |
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| Snell v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institute, Shirley |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12807 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of a single justice of the court treating Petitioner's requests for declaratory, injunctive, and other relief concerning certain inmate mail regulations as a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and denying relief, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused her discretion. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Petitioner's memorandum filed pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, did nothing to establish the inadequacy of the ordinary process of trial and appeal; and (2) the single justice acted within her discretion in concluding that there was no reason to exercise the court's extraordinary authority to grant the preliminary injunction or otherwise grant the relief requested by Petitioner in the first instance. |
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| State v. Grutell |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 843 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Stacy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), fourth offense, holding that there was no plain error in how either the trial court of the court of appeals addressed Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,108(1). On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court plainly erred by failing to address the provisions of section 60-6,108,(1), which provides that Nebraska's DUI statutes "shall apply upon highways and anywhere through the state except private property which is not open to public access." The court of appeals affirmed, finding no plain error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exception set out in section 60-6,108(1) is not a material element of the crime of DUI such that the State must always disprove the exception in order to prove the crime of DUI. |
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| Dixon v. Bowerman |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3049 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals dismissing Appellant's petition seeking habeas relief, holding that the Sixth District correctly dismissed the petition. Appellant was convicted of multiple crimes and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of twenty-one years. After his convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting several grounds for relief. The Sixth District dismissed the petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The next year, Appellant filed a second petition seeking habeas relief. The Sixth District dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant's claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata and that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that res judicata barred Appellant's successive habeas corpus petition. |
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| State ex rel. City of East Cleveland v. Dailey |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3079 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that it lacks original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions and dismissing the City of East Cleveland's petition for declaratory judgment sua sponte, holding that it is well settled that courts of appeals lack original jurisdiction over claims for declaratory judgment. The City of East Cleveland brought criminal charges against Randolph Dailey and Patricia Coleman, both of whom were sergeants in the Cleveland police department. A jury found Coleman not guilty. In an attempt to obtain review of the trial court's evidentiary rulings before Dailey went to trial, East Cleveland filed a petition for declaratory judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals lacked original jurisdiction over the City's claim for declaratory judgment. |
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| State ex rel. Kendrick v. Parker |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3081 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by Appellant challenging the court of appeals' denial of his motion to certify a conflict, holding that this Court lacked the authority to review of the court of appeals' decision. Appellant was serving sentences for seven rape convictions when he filed a petition in the Second District Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus alleging that the trial judge in his case patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to sentence him for one of the offenses. The Second District granted summary judgment for the judge. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant, in the meantime, filed a motion asking the Second District to certify that its judgment conflicts with other appellate decisions. The Second District denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the Court lacks the authority to review a court of appeals' decision declining to certify the existence of a conflict. |
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| State v. Jones |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3051 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals holding that the trial court erred in allowing the state to strike a juror from the panel after the state had waived its final peremptory challenge, holding that while the appellate court incorrectly required Defendant to demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the trial, the appellate court's error was itself harmless. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's error in allowing the state to exercise a peremptory challenge out of sequence was structural in nature and therefore per se reversible. The First District held (1) the error was not a constitutional error and therefore could not amount to a structural error, and (2) the error was harmless because Defendant had failed to demonstrate that he had been prejudiced by it. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding (1) the First District correctly concluded that the error was not structural; (2) the First District erred in failing to require the state to demonstrate that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial court proceedings; and (3) because allowing the state to exercise an additional peremptory strike did not affect the outcome of Defendant's trial, the appellate court's error was harmless. |
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| State v. Hirning |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 29 Opinion Date: May 27, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance, holding that the circuit court judge did not err when he continued to preside over Defendant's case after Defendant filed an affidavit for change of judge. Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The circuit court, the Honorable Tony Portra presiding, received Defendant's guilty plea. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, instead of consulting his appointed counsel, Defendant filed an affidavit for change of judge. Judge Portra denied Defendant's request for change of judge. Thereafter, Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance. Defendant later filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court granted the writ and ordered that Defendant be resentenced. The court imposed the same sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Judge Portra violated S.D. Codified Laws 15-12-22 by presiding over the hearing on Defendant's affidavit for a change of judge and determining that Defendant's affidavit was not properly filed; but (2) because Defendant was not entitled to file the affidavit, Judge Portra's non-compliance with section 15-12-22 did not deprive the court of authority to accept Defendant's guilty plea and impose a sentence. |
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| State ex rel. Tackett vs. Honorable Darl W. Poling |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-0882 Opinion Date: May 22, 2020 Judge: Jenkins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this original jurisdiction action in mandamus the Supreme Court reaffirmed that an indigent inmate who has entered a plea of guilty is entitled to one free copy of transcripts and other matters of record that are not protected from disclosure for purposes of preparing a post conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus and that discovery may not be used to obtain court records for purposes of preparing a post conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to certain crimes. As a self-represented litigant, Petitioner petitioned the circuit court for the "production of documents" to file his habeas corpus petition in which he intended to claim that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made. The presiding judge asserted that Petitioner was not entitled to discovery but may be entitled to certain documents. The Supreme Court granted, as moulded, a writ of mandamus requested by Petitioner, holding that, to the extent Petitioner was an indigent inmate who had never received a copy of a transcript of the proceedings against him or other matters of record, he was entitled to those records with the exception of any material that was subject to protection from disclosure. |
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| State ex rel. Yurish v. Honorable Laura Faircloth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-1160 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Walker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' requested writ seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing an order disqualifying Petitioners' joint counsel from representing Petitioners, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err when it applied Rule 44(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure to disqualify Christian Riddell from representing Petitioners, jointly, at this stage of the proceedings. Petitioners June Yurish, Kristin Douty, and Christina Lester, were each charged with failure to report. All three charges arose from the same set of facts. Christian Riddell appeared in court as counsel for each petitioner. The State moved to disqualify Riddell from appearing in Petitioners' cases, arguing that the joint representation created a current conflict among Petitioners' interests and threatened future conflicts that would jeopardize the integrity of the proceedings. The circuit court granted the State's motion. The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' requested writ, holding that the Petitioners did not show that the circuit court's order disqualifying Riddell from jointly representing them in their criminal cases was either a clear error of law or a flagrant abuse of the circuit court's discretion. |
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| State v. Holden |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-0574 Opinion Date: May 26, 2020 Judge: Margaret L. Workman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting the State's motion to dismiss the indictment against Defendant without prejudice and denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the indictment without prejudice. Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and two counts of conspiracy to commit said offense. One day before trial, the State filed a motion to dismiss the indictment without prejudice on the ground that the State was unable to prosecute Defendant without testimony from his codefendant, who would not be released from her incarceration in Ohio until the next year. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the State did not act with great dispatch in securing the codefendant's presence or her testimony at Defendant's trial, the State did not act in bad faith; and (2) the circuit court's decision granting the State's motion to dismiss without prejudice was based upon facts and circumstances known to the court and with due consideration for the rights of all parties. |
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| Black v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 65 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions of one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and four counts of delivery of a controlled substance based on transactions with a confidential informant, holding the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on Defendant's entrapment theory of defense. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the evidence created a fact issue on the questions of inducement and predisposition. The Supreme Court held (1) the evidence created a fact issue for the jury on the question of government inducement; (2) the evidence created a factual dispute concerning Defendant's predisposition to commit the crimes at issue; and (3) therefore, the defense of entrapment was in play and was a question on which the jury should have been instructed. |
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