A Constitutional Commitment to Access to Literacy: Bridging the Chasm Between Negative and Positive Rights

EVAN CAMINKER

Michigan Law dean emeritus Evan Caminker discusses a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in which that court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause secures schoolchildren a fundamental right to a “basic minimum education” that “can plausibly impart literacy.” Caminker—one of the co-counsel for the plaintiffs in that case—explains why the decision is so remarkable and why the supposed dichotomy between positive and negative rights is not as stark as canonically claimed.

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Eversole v. Commonwealth

Docket: 2018-SC-000656-MR

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Wright

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for first-degree fleeing or evading, first-degree wanton endangerment, reckless driving, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender, holding that the trial court erred by depriving Defendant of the right to be represented during a critical stage of the trial. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that he was denied representation at a critical stage of his trial through the trial court's ex parte discussion with a juror who had been offered a bribe. The trial court's interview with the juror was conducted outside of Defendant's presence. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded this matter to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court's failure to take action to include counsel during the bench conference and the failure to admonish the juror to disregard her encounter and not to discuss the attempted bribe with fellow jurors violated Defendant's right to a fair trial as guaranteed by his rights to representation and right to be present at all critical stages of trial.

Breazeale v. Kentucky

Docket: 2019-SC-000113-MR

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Lambert

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Charlie, the one-year-old son of Breazeale's girlfriend Samantha, was not Breazeale’s son. When he and Charlie had strep, Breazeale babysat Charlie. Breazeale was the only person in the home with Charlie that day. The next morning, when she removed Charlie’s clothing, Samantha saw bruises all over his body. Breazeale said that he tripped and landed on Charlie. Breazeale would not allow Samantha to take Charlie to the hospital. Charlie began spitting up blood, so Samantha and her mother took him to the emergency room. Charlie had life-threatening injuries and was flown to Kosair Children's Hospital in Louisville. After surgery, Charlie was hospitalized for 12 days. He was placed on a ventilator but survived. The Medical Director in Chief of the Division of Child Maltreatment at the University of Louisville testified that Charlie’s injuries were consistent with an intrusion injury: a stomp, kick, or punch to his stomach. Breazeale was convicted of first-degree assault and first-degree criminal abuse. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his 30-year sentence, rejecting Breazeale’s argument that his two convictions violated his rights against double jeopardy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to instruct the jury on justifiable force or by allowing evidence of Breazeale’s prior bad acts and photographic evidence Breazeale’s right to a unanimous verdict was not violated; all 12 jurors had to find that Breazeale intentionally committed some violent act against Charlie; it was not required to identify the specific act.

Commonwealth v. Honorable Mary Shaw

Docket: 2019-SC-000218-MR

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Vanmeter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals denying the Commonwealth's petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's issuance of an order granting Defendant's request for an in camera review of the alleged victim's therapy records, holding that the trial court had no authority to order the Commonwealth to provide it with the names of the victim's therapy providers. Defendant was indicted on four counts of incest, one count of sodomy in the first degree, and one count of rape in the first degree. Defendant filed a motion requesting that the trial court conduct an in camera review of any therapy or mental health records of the victim. The trial court granted the motion as to the records from the relevant time period. The Commonwealth petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a reasonable belief existed that exculpatory information may be found in the records; but (2) the trial court lacked authority to order the Commonwealth to retrieve the names of the healthcare providers directly from the victim.

Mulazim v. Commonwealth

Dockets: 2018-SC-000466-MR, 2018-SC-000471-MR

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Hughes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing Defendants for several counts of first-degree robbery, tampering with physical evidence and of being first-degree persistent felony offenders, holding that any error in the trial proceedings was harmless. Defendants in this case were Dawan Q. Mulazim and Quincinio Deonte Canada. After a jury found them guilty, the trial court sentenced Mulazim to sixty years in prison and Canada to fifty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting a pre-trial identification of Canada; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the first-degree robbery charges; (3) the Commonwealth's closing argument did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof; (4) the trial court did not err in refusing to strike jurors for cause; (5) the information presented in the penalty phase complied with Mullikan v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2011); and (6) the trial court's decision to shackle Defendants during sentencing was an abuse of discretion, but the error was harmless.

Zapata v. Commonwealth

Docket: 2018-SC-000666-MR

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Wright

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant entered a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), to the murder of his wife. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging deficiencies in representation. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court again denied Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel's alleged conflict of interest, or Appellant's incorrect belief that he could withdraw his guilty plea at any point prior to sentencing; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his plea.

Sneed v. University of Louisville Hospital

Docket: 2019-SC-000048-DG

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Michelle M. Keller

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants - a hospital and various doctors and nurses - and dismissing Plaintiff's medical malpractice claims, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed. When she was in active labor Plaintiff was admitted to the University of Louisville Hospital. The next day, Plaintiff delivered her baby. During her delivery, Plaintiff suffered a fourth-degree laceration, and two weeks later she was diagnosed with a rectovaginal fistula. Plaintiff sued several healthcare defendants, including the doctors under whose care Plaintiff delivered her baby. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's claims against her treating physicians were time barred; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the treating physicians were ostensible agents of the hospital, and therefore, the lower courts correctly dismissed the claims against the hospital.

Hauber v. Hauber

Dockets: 2018-SC-000394-DG, 2019-SC-000154-DG

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Vanmeter

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' second action against Defendants, the trustees of their parents' trust, because a prior action had been filed in and decided by the district court, holding that Plaintiffs' filing in the circuit court was appropriate under the circumstances. In the earlier action, Plaintiffs filed a notice-order-motion to remove trustees and for other relief, alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The district court denied the requested relief. The circuit court affirmed. While Plaintiffs' appeal was pending in the circuit court they filed the instant proceeding in the circuit court alleging that Defendants breached their statutory and common law duties. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and remand to the district court on the grounds that Ky. Rev. Stat. 386B.2-030 vested the district court with exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising from the same trust matter which had been before it. The circuit court denied the motion but remanded the matter to the district court, concluding that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the underlying matter and claims in the two cases were different, and therefore, Plaintiffs' filing in the circuit court was appropriate.