International Criminal Court Lacks Authority to Proceed Against Israel

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, GEORGE BOGDEN

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and JD candidate George Bogden, PhD, comment on a recent filing by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) asking the court to exercise jurisdiction and grant permission to pursue an investigation of alleged war crimes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Estreicher and Bogden argue that because Israel is not a state party to the action and Palestine is not a state recognized by international law, the ICC lacks territorial jurisdiction under the Rome Statute.

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McHenry v. Asylum Entertainment Delaware, LLC

Docket: B292457(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 12, 2020

Judge: Brian M. Hoffstadt

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Entertainment & Sports Law, Personal Injury

After a seaman's hands were injured on a commercial fishing vessel out on the Gulf of Mexico and he ultimately loss some of his fingers due to infection, he filed suit against the vessel's owner and the production company that was filming a reality TV show on the vessel. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the production company, holding that the production company was not liable under the Jones Act because plaintiff was not an "employee" or a "borrowed servant" to the production company. The court declined to construe the borrowed servant doctrine in the maritime context to impose a duty upon passengers and observers on a vessel to undertake acts inconsistent with the orders of the vessel's captain. The court also held that the production company was not liable under maritime tort law because there were not genuine issues of material fact as to whether the production company had a "special relationship" with plaintiff, the production company's rescue attempts were grossly negligent, and the production company acted negligently in taking charge of a "helpless" person.

Lange v. Monster Energy Co.

Docket: B294091(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 12, 2020

Judge: Victoria Gerrard Chaney

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Monster Energy's motion to compel arbitration of a disability discrimination action brought by plaintiff. While the court agreed with Monster Energy that the trial court relied on an erroneous understanding of applicable law regarding the number of unconscionable provisions that may render an arbitration agreement irreparable by severance, the court held that there has been no argument here about the alternative ground for the ruling. Therefore, the court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Monster Energy's motion. Rather, the court agreed with the trial court that the parties' arbitration agreement is permeated with too high a degree of unconscionability for severance to rehabilitate.

Montoya v. Ford Motor Co.

Docket: G056752(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 12, 2020

Judge: William W. Bedsworth

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Class Action, Products Liability

Gabriel Montoya bought a 2003 Ford Excursion in April 2003. A jury found that as of November 30, 2005, he knew it was a lemon. The statute of limitations for breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability was four years. Montoya didn’t sue Ford for another seven-and-one-half years, waiting until June 2013. Yet he was able to obtain a judgment against Ford of almost $59,000 for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. This was roughly an $8,000 return over what he had originally paid for the vehicle 10 years earlier. This was possible because there were two periods during which the statute of limitations was tolled while separate national class actions were pending against Ford, both of which were applied to Montoya’s case. The Court of Appeal determined a second class action filed in this case did not toll Montoya's claim. "The four-year statute of limitations therefore expired no later than 2010. He sued in 2013. His claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability was therefore untimely presented."

Coats v. New Haven Unified School District

Docket: A150490(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 12, 2020

Judge: J. Anthony Kline

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Juvenile Law, Personal Injury

When E.D. was 17 years old, a high school teacher began engaging in sex with her in his classroom. The situation was discovered after several months. The teacher admitted engaging in sexual intercourse with E.D. 10-20 times while she was a minor. The principal had previously disciplined the teacher for inappropriate contact with a student but the conduct had not been reported to authorities; no steps were taken to monitor the teacher’s contact with other female students. E.D. brought claims against the teacher for sexual abuse, against the school defendants for negligence and breach of statutory duties in failing to adequately supervise teachers and protect students, and against all the defendants for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; her foster mother joined in the claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. They alleged that they were not required to present a claim to the School District under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code 810) due to the exemption for claims of sexual abuse of a minor, section 905(m). The District had enacted its own claim presentation requirement, purportedly overriding section 905(m) The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of E.D.’s causes of action. The Legislature has consistently expanded the ability of childhood sexual abuse victims to seek compensation but it is not clear that it intended to provide relatives the same rights as direct victims.

California v. Smith

Docket: D075372(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 12, 2020

Judge: Patricia D. Benke

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In December 2014, police entered a casita belonging to Skyler Smith and saw drugs in plain view. The Riverside County District Attorney filed an information charging Smith with multiple drug possession counts. The trial court subsequently denied Smith's suppression motion relating to the search of his casita. In September 2015, Smith was in an accident while riding his motorcycle. A search of the motorcycle revealed drugs. In December 2016, Smith was charged with drug possession charges. The State further alleged that Smith suffered two prison priors. During trial, the court denied a second suppression motion concerning a search of Smith's motorcycle in the second case. A jury found Smith guilty of all counts and the court found true the two prison priors. The trial court sentenced Smith to 10 years eight months in prison. Smith appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his suppression motions. Relying on California v. Duenas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019), Smith also argued that the trial court could not legally impose a $10,000 restitution fine and a $300 court facilities assessment fee without first determining his ability to pay. In an opinion issued in May 2019, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Smith petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of California v. Ovieda, 7 Cal.5th 1034 (2019). In the meantime, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 136, which amended Penal Code section 667.5 (b) to limit one-year prior prison terms to cases where the prior was for "a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code[.]" Smith argued that the warrantless entry into his casita was objectively unreasonable because an unattended car running in a driveway did not constitute exigent circumstances or suggest a medical emergency, claiming that the officer acted upon an unparticularized suspicion devoid of articulable facts. The Court of Appeal agreed, concluding that the evidence seized during this warrantless search should have been suppressed because the State did not meet its burden to justify the search under the emergency aid or exigent circumstances exceptions, or the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. With respect to Smith's his one-year prior prison term enhancements imposed on two prior convictions pursuant to section 667.5(b), he argued they had to be stricken in light of Senate Bill No. 136. The Attorney General concedes this issue. The Attorney General conceded to this latter issue. Therefore, the Court vacated its original opinion issued May 31, 2019, and issued a revised opinion addressing Smith's arguments in section II and newly added section V.

People v. Quinonez

Docket: F076433(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 12, 2020

Judge: Charles S. Poochigian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of multiple felony offenses for punching a sheriff's deputy while she was in custody and sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years in prison. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the jury instructions correctly stated the legal definition of great bodily injury, the prosecutor's closing argument was consistent with those definitions, defendant's substantial rights were not violated, and counsel was not prejudicially ineffective for failing to object to the instructions. The court struck the true findings on the prior prison term enhancements and otherwise affirmed.

Canyon Crest Conservancy v. County of Los Angeles

Docket: B290379(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 12, 2020

Judge: Audrey B. Collins

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Legal Ethics, Real Estate & Property Law

Canyon Crest filed suit challenging the approval of a conditional use permit and an oak tree permit granted to real party in interest Stephen Kuhn. Canyon Crest, a nonprofit organization established by Kuhn's immediate neighbors, alleged that defendants violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by granting the permits. Kuhn subsequently requested that the county vacate the permit approvals, because he could not afford to continue the litigation. Canyon Crest then sought attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that Canyon Crest failed to establish any of the requirements for a right to fees under the statute. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the litigation did not enforce an important right affecting the public interest. Furthermore, Canyon Crest failed to establish that this action conferred a significant benefit on the general public.