One More for the Road: Why Congress Must Impeach Donald Trump (Again)

DEAN FALVY

Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, makes the case for impeaching Donald Trump again, after the failed insurrection of January 6. Falvy describes three possible ways to disempower Trump from undermining democracy in our nation and explains why immediate impeachment by the House and removal by the Senate is the most appropriate course of action.

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Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern California

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B302782(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 6, 2021

Judge: Dennis M. Perluss

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

After plaintiff was struck by another vehicle while waiting in his disabled car on the shoulder of the freeway for roadside assistance, plaintiff filed suit against Auto Club and Brent-Air for negligence. The trial court assumed, without deciding, that plaintiff could amend his discovery responses to state that Auto Club's delay in responding to his call was a substantial factor in causing his injuries. The trial court nonetheless held, as a matter of law, no special relationship existed between the Auto Club and plaintiff, and thus the Auto Club had no duty under tort law to provide any assistance. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of Auto Club, holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on an issue not presented in the moving papers. In this case, the trial court improperly decided the issue of duty where the contract had nothing to do with the question of causation identified by Auto Club's motion and its separate statement, nor did the reasonableness of plaintiff's reliance on Auto Club to timely provide roadside assistance. The court affirmed the judgment as to Brent-Air because plaintiff does not address Brent-Air on appeal.

Wilsonart, LLC v. Lopez

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC19-1336

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Muniz

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court held that there should not be an exception to the present summary judgment standards applied by Florida state courts that would allow for summary judgment in favor of the moving party when the movant's video evidence negates or refutes any conflicting evidence presented in opposition to the summary judgment motion and there is no evidence that the videotape evidence has been altered or doctored. In this case arising from a fatal rear-end car crash the trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, relying on video evidence from the front car's forward-facing dashboard camera that appeared to refute Plaintiff's version of the events. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the trial court improperly weighed competing evidence on material facts. The Supreme Court approved the result, holding that there was no reason to adopt an ad hoc video evidence exception to the existing summary judgment standard.

Wagner v. State

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 19-1278

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Edward M. Mansfield

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court provided answers to certified questions of law in a federal case brought against the State and a Department of Natural Resources (DNR) officer who shot and killed Plaintiff's son during an armed standoff, concluding that the legislature intended the Iowa Tort Claims Act (Act) to serve as the gateway for all tort litigation against the State. The federal court dismissed all claims against the State and the DNR officer in his official capacity, finding as a matter of law that the officer was acting within the scope of his employment when he shot and killed Plaintiff's son. The federal court dismissed Plaintiff's negligence claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Act but declined to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the DNR officer in his individual capacity. The Supreme Court answered the federal court's certified questions of law by holding (1) the Act applies to Plaintiff's state constitutional tort causes of action; (2) the available remedy under the Act for excessive force by a law enforcement officer is adequate; (3) Plaintiff's claims under the Iowa Constitution are subject to the administrative exhaustion requirement in Iowa Code 669.5(1); and (4) plaintiffs are required to bring their Iowa constitutional claims in the appropriate Iowa district court under Iowa Code 669.4.

Egan v. County of Lancaster

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 308 Neb. 48

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court finding that E. Jane Egan lacked standing to challenge the Lancaster County Board of Commissioners' issuance of a special use permit allowing Randy Essink to construct and operate a poultry production facility on land within the county's agricultural zoning district and that the permit was appropriately issued, holding that the district court did not err. Egan and Janis Howlett challenged the Board's decision in the district court, asserting that the proposed poultry production facility would lead to adverse effects on the environment, properly values, public health, and local infrastructure. The district court affirmed the issuance of the special use permit, concluding that Egan did not have standing and that the permit was appropriately issued. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by failing to find that Egan had standing and finding that the special use permit was properly approved.

Associated Risk Management, Inc. v. Ibanez

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 91

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, International Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reaffirmed in this case that undocumented aliens who are injured while working for a Nevada employer may be eligible for monetary disability benefits, holding that these monetary benefits, paid by the insurer, do not conflict with federal law or undermine the Legislature's intent. Respondent, an undocumented Nevadan, was severely injured while working for High Point Construction and applied for permanent total disability (PTD) status. Associated Risk Management (ARM), High Point's insurance administrator, denied the request. An appeals officer reversed and granted Respondent PTD status pursuant to the "odd-lot doctrine." ARM petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the appeals officer committed legal error by granting PTD to an undocumented alien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) undocumented aliens are not precluded from receiving disability benefits under Nevada's workers' compensation laws; (2) although federal law prohibits employers from knowingly employing an undocumented alien, it does not prohibit insurers from compensating undocumented aliens for injuries they sustain while working; and (3) the appeals officer's decision was based on substantial evidence.

Kosor v. Olympia Companies, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 83

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Kristina Pickering

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's special motion to dismiss under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.660, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute, holding that each of Defendant's statements was "made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum." See Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.637(4). The statements at issue were Defendant's criticisms of the homeowners' association and developers/managers of Southern Highlands in Clark County. Plaintiffs - Olympia Companies, LLC and its president - sued Defendant for defamation and defamation per se. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under section 41.660. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant met his prima facie burden to demonstrate that his statements were all made in public forums on a matter of public interest. The Court remanded the case with direction to consider whether Defendant made his communications in good faith.

Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc. v. Cash

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 88

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court held that when a tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff, the tortfeasor may then assert a claim for contribution against a doctor who allegedly caused new injuries in treating the original injury. Marie Gonzales was injured in an accident involving a truck driven by an employee of Republic Silver State Disposal. Dr. Andrew Cash treated Gonzales's original injury and allegedly caused further injuries. Gonzales sued Republic and its employee, and the parties settled. The settlement agreement expressly discharged Gonzales's claim against her medical providers and reserved Republic's rights under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.225-.305. Republic then sued Cash for contribution. The district court granted summary judgment for Cash, concluding that contribution was not available between successive tortfeasors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the right of contribution exists when the two parties are jointly or severally liable for the same injury, and whether the parties are joint or successive tortfeasors is immaterial; and (2) because Republic and Cash were jointly or severally liable for the injuries Cash allegedly caused and Republic settled those claims, Republic may pursue an action for contribution against Cash.