#MeToo and What Men and Women Are Willing to Say and Do

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb explores why people have such strong feelings about the #MeToo movement (whether they are advocates or opponents) and suggests that both sides rest their positions on contested empirical assumptions about the behavior of men and women. Colb argues that what we believe to be true of men and women generally contributes to our conclusions about the #MeToo movement and our perceptions about how best to handle the accusations of those who come forward.

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U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Keefe

Citation: 2020 ME 104

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Joseph Jabar

Areas of Law: Banking, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment entered by the superior court denying U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.'s motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal as to its foreclosure complaint against James D. Keefe, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion as untimely. In denying U.S. Bank's motion seeking an extension of time to file its notice of appeal the trial court determined determined that U.S. Bank had shown good cause for the trial court to grant its motion to extend but that its authority to grant an extension of time had expired, and therefore, the motion was untimely. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the pertinent Rules of Appellate Procedure or in denying U.S. Bank's untimely motion for an extension of time.

State v. Proctor

Citation: 2020 ME 107

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Horton

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant for failure to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 (SORNA of 1999), Me. Rev. Stat. 34-A, 11227(2), holding that, due to inadequate representation by Defendant's trial counsel, the court committed obvious error by not addressing the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999, as retroactively applied to Defendant. In 1990, Defendant was convicted of four counts of unlawful sexual contact, and in 1992, he was convicted of gross sexual assault. Neither offense required Defendant to register as a sex offender. After the Legislature enacted SORNA of 1999, Defendant 's two convictions became subject to SORNA of 1999. In 2018, Defendant was found guilty of failure to comply with a duty under SORNA of 1999. On appeal, Defendant argued that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to require him to register for life violated the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that it could not be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to Defendant's 1990 and 1992 convictions did not affect his substantial rights by virtue of a punitive alteration of his original sentences.

Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Secretary of State

Citation: 2020 ME 109

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the superior court's judgment dismissing the declaratory judgment count of Appellants' complaint seeking a declaration that a certain citizen initiative failed to meet the constitutional requirements for inclusion on the November 2020 ballot, holding that the initiative was unconstitutional and could not be submitted to the electors for popular vote. At issue was a citizen initiative that proposed a resolve that would reverse an order of the Maine Public Utilities Commission granting Central Maine Power Company's (CMP) request for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a 145-mile transmission line. Avangrid Networks, Inc., the company that owned CMP as a subsidiary, filed a complaint leading to the present litigation, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the initiative's constitutionality was not subject to judicial review before the election. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the initiative failed to meet the constitutional requirements for inclusion on the ballot because it exceeded the scope of the legislative powers conferred by article IV, part 3, section 18 of the Maine Constitution.

Payne v. Secretary of State

Citation: 2020 ME 110

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law

The Supreme Judicial Court accepted a report from the superior court submitting three questions of law concerning a people's veto effort seeking to suspend P.L. 2019, ch. 539 - entitled "An Act To Implement Ranked-choice Voting for Presidential Primary and General Elections in Maine" - through the November 2020 general election, answered the questions, and remanded the matter to the superior court for further proceedings. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court answered (1) the Second Regular Session of the 129th Legislature served as the “session of the Legislature in which [L.D. 1083] was passed,” Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, 16-17; (2) Public Law 2019, ch. 539, was set to become effective on June 15, 2020, “90 days after the recess of” the Second Regular Session and was suspended upon the filing of the people’s veto petition; and (3) Title 21-A Me. Rev. Stat. 901(1) sets only an end date for the filing of applications for a people’s veto and not a starting cutoff that would prohibit the early filing of an application prior to the Legislature’s adjournment.

State v. Peaslee

Citation: 2020 ME 105

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Humphrey

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of murder, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Defendant's motion for a new trial was based on a statement allegedly made by his brother in the presence of another individual in which Defendant's brother claimed responsibility for the victim's murder. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the brother's statement would not be admissible in a new trial and that, even if it were admissible, Defendant failed to establish that the proffered evidence would probably change the result if a new trial were granted.

State v. Plummer

Citation: 2020 ME 106

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs, holding that the the trial court did not commit obvious error in instructing the jury and did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on accomplice liability; (2) the jury instruction on a written report not admitted into evidence was not erroneous; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis that statements made during the State's closing argument impermissibly commented upon Defendant's out-of-state residence as evidence of his guilt.

In re Estate of Claudette Sheltra

Citation: 2020 ME 108

Opinion Date: August 13, 2020

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed as untimely Janet Sheltra's appeal from a summary judgment determining that her petition for formal probate was time barred and, subject to modification, affirmed a subsequent order of complete settlement. This case involved the will of Claudette Sheltra, who was survived by her son, Paul Sheltra, and her daughter, Janet. The probate court ultimately entered a judgment ordering Paul to transfer certain property to Janet and awarded attorney fees to Paul to be paid for only out of Janet's share of the Estate. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) when a final judgment is entered in a subsidiary docket, the time to appeal that judgment pursuant to Me. R. App. P. 2B(c) begins to run even if there are other pending proceedings involving the same estate or the estate has yet to be fully administered; (2) the court's summary judgment was ripe for appeal when it was entered, and Janet's notice of appeal, filed more than one year later, was untimely as to that judgment; and (3) the order of complete settlement is modified to award attorney fees out of the Estate in general, to be borne pro rata by Janet and Paul as the only two beneficiaries.