Latest 72 Cases This Week: United States v. Lopez-Soto (1st Cir.), United States v. McLellan (1st Cir.), United States v. Parnell (2d Cir.)

Joint Employer Liability: Notes from Australia

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, NICHOLAS SAADY

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and Nicholas Saady, LLM, conduct a comparative analysis of the doctrine of joint employer liability, looking at the rules adopted by the U.S. Department of Labor and National Labor Relations Board as compared to the approach Australia has taken in an analogous context, “accessorial liability” doctrine.

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United States v. Lopez-Soto

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 17-1663, 17-1680, 17-1668, 17-1679

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Dyk

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for three Hobbs Act robberies, conspiring to commit a Racketeer Influenced an Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation, and other offenses but vacated the district court's sentence and remanded for the limited purpose of reducing Defendant's sentence for the Hobbs Act and RICO counts, holding that the district court exceeded the statutory maximum for these offenses. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court erred in providing a medical care instruction to the jury, but the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt; (2) as to Defendant's remaining challenges to his convictions, the district court did not plainly err or abuse its discretion; but (3) Defendant's 360-month sentence for the Hobbs Act and RICO counts exceeded the statutory maximum of 240 months for these offenses, and therefore, the case is remanded for resentencing for these counts.

United States v. McLellan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 18-2032

Opinion Date: May 20, 2020

Judge: Torruella

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions of securities and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's convictions and that, to the extent that the jury instructions may have been overbroad, any error was harmless; (2) this Court need not address whether the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343, applies extraterritorially because Defendant was convicted under a proper domestic application of the statute; and (3) the district court correctly determined that it lacked the authority to order the government to lodge Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties requests with the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to seek evidence that may have been favorable to Defendant's defense.

United States v. Parnell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-649

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Park

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order of restitution, imposed after defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of wire fraud in 2018 for submitting false expense-reimbursement forms to the Department of Labor. The court held that the restitution order was proper under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act because all of the losses resulted from the same "scheme," even though some occurred outside the limitations period for the underlying crime. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to pay $72,207.16 in restitution.

United States v. St. Hilaire

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-640

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Dennis G. Jacobs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a previously convicted felon. The district court applied a four-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm with "an altered or obliterated serial number," under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). Consistent with its sister circuits, the court held that the enhancement applies if a single iteration of a serial number has been altered or obliterated, notwithstanding whether another may be legible. Moreover, the court held that "altered" means illegible to the naked eye. In this case, the court held that the district court did not err by applying the enhancement by assessing the iteration of the serial number that was most badly scored and finding as fact that it was illegible to the naked eye.

Francisco-Lopez v. Attorney General United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-2700

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Rendell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Francisco, a citizen of Guatemala, obtained lawful U.S. permanent resident status in 1989. In 2012, Francisco pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny in the second degree in New York; Francisco had obtained a stolen laptop and contacted the laptop’s owner and demanded money. During this exchange, Francisco sent the laptop’s owner sexually explicit pictures that Francisco had found on the laptop. The owner contacted the police. Francisco was sentenced to five years of probation. In 2018, Francisco returned from a trip abroad and sought admission as a returning lawful permanent resident. Instead, Francisco was classified as an arriving alien and was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Francisco filed an unsuccessful application for discretionary relief of cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed Francisco’s appeal, citing Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga (2016), in which the BIA promulgated a broader standard for determining whether a larceny offense constituted a categorical CIMT and holding that New York’s second-degree grand larceny statute defines a categorical CIMT because it requires the accused to take or withhold property with the intent to permanently or virtually permanently appropriate it or deprive the rightful owner of its use. The Third Circuit vacated, joining other circuits in ruling that the BIA should not have retroactively applied Diaz-Lizarraga. An alien defendant’s decision about whether to plead guilty, implicate distinctively weighty reliance interests; there is no discernable BIA uniformity interest in retroactively applying Diaz-Lizarraga. The BIA uniformly applied the prior standard for more than seven decades before changing course.

Hardy v. Shaikh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-1929

Opinion Date: May 20, 2020

Judge: Krause

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Hardy entered the Correctional Institute in urgent need of medical care: he had previously had part of his leg amputated due to diabetes and had developed an infected open wound. He was taken immediately to the infirmary. He was not given the inmate handbook but was told it would be in his prison block. Hardy signed a form acknowledging receipt of the handbook. When Hardy arrived at his block, the handbook was not there. Hardy’s efforts to obtain the handbook or the Inmate Grievance System Policy manual issued to Pennsylvania Corrections staff were unavailing. Hardy did not know that exhausting that grievance process requires two levels of appeals. Hardy’s wound festered; he filed a grievance explaining that a medical provider refused to give him bandages and antibiotic ointment. That grievance was rejected because it was not presented in a courteous manner.” Hardy 's next grievance was rejected as lacking “information that there were any issues not addressed during [Hardy’s] sick call visit.” Hardy filed a grievance detailing the medical staff’s failure to properly treat his leg wound, including declining to follow a doctor’s recommendation to transfer him to a medical facility, and his fear that more of his leg would need to be amputated. The grievance coordinator read the rules to require separate grievances for mental and physical harms. Hardy asked his counselor how he should respond. His counselor told him to “fill out another one.” Unaware of the appeal requirement, Hardy submitted eight new grievances, which were rejected as time-barred. Hardy's last grievance; requesting transfer to a medical facility, was deemed “[f]rivolous.” More of Hardy’s leg was amputated. The Third Circuit reinstated Hardy’s civil rights claim. Under these circumstances, the counselor’s misrepresentation rendered the grievance process “unavailable” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a).

United States v. Bradley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-2003

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Jordan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Pennsylvania Trooper Johnson stopped Bradley for speeding. Bradley admitted that his license was suspended. Johnson took Bradley to talk in the squad car. With a friendly demeanor, Johnson coaxed Bradley into admitting that he had just been sentenced to two and a half years in prison for “drugs.” After about 10 minutes, Johnson stated that he was going to give Bradley a warning ticket. Johnson later acknowledged that he would not have let Bradley leave and had, from the beginning, suspected criminal activity. Corporal Hoye arrived. Johnson asked Bradley whether there were any guns, marijuana, large sums of U.S. currency, heroin, or cocaine in the car. Bradley denied having those items. Johnson asked again, with Hoye standing next to Bradley. Flanked by state troopers, Bradley admitted he had cocaine. Johnson then recited the Miranda warnings. Johnson believed he had probable cause to search the vehicle. Bradley stated that “a lot” of cocaine was in the trunk. About a kilo of cocaine in a backpack was lying in the trunk. Bradley successfully moved to suppress his confession and the physical evidence. The Third Circuit vacated in part and remanded for the district court to decide whether supplementation of the record is needed to decide whether the cocaine would have been inevitably discovered during an inventory search, and, if so, whether police department policy sufficiently cabined the scope of the officer’s discretion in conducting the inventory search such that the search of the backpack, a closed container, would have been lawful.

United States v. Reyes-Romero

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-1923

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Krause

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law, Legal Ethics

Reyes-Romero was prosecuted for unlawful reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The district court dismissed the indictment, finding that irregularities in Reyes-Romero’s removal proceeding constituted fundamental errors that caused him prejudice. The court stated that the government’s subjective motivation for its motion to dismiss was a desire to rely on the 2011 removal order in future immigration proceedings, which“taint[ed]” the Government’s effort. The court then awarded Reyes-Romero fees pursuant to the Hyde Amendment, under which a prevailing defendant in a federal criminal prosecution can apply to have his attorney’s fees and costs covered by the government if the defendant shows that “the position of the United States” in the prosecution “was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith,” 18 U.S.C. 3006A. The Third Circuit reversed. “Although assuredly born of good intentions and understandable frustration with faulty processes in the underlying removal proceeding,” the award was not based on the type of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct with which the Amendment is concerned. Reyes-Romero’s 2011 expedited removal proceeding deviated from the required ordered, sensible process and reasonable minds may differ about how the prosecution should have reacted once those issues became apparent. Where reasonable minds may differ, however, and where the government made objectively reasonable and defensible choices, there can be no Hyde Amendment liability.

Leonard v. Deville

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-30374

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Fifth Circuit treated the petition for en banc rehearing as a petition for panel rehearing, granted the rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and substituted the following opinion. Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as time-barred. Petitioner was then granted a certificate of appealability (COA) to consider whether he was entitled to statutory tolling. The court held that when a state prisoner is implicitly granted extra time to seek supervisory writs from the denial of his state post-conviction application—and he does so within that time—his initial application therefore remains "pending" under the tolling provision in section 2244(d)(2). The court explained that its holding was supported by circuit precedent and the Supreme Court's teaching that a state post-conviction application remains pending for statutory tolling purposes as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is in continuance. In this case, petitioner was entitled to statutory tolling and his petition was therefore not time-barred.

United States v. Emordi

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-10400

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Leslie H. Southwick

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to engage in Medicare and Medicaid fraud in their operation of a home healthcare business, continuing over a period of three years and causing over $3.5 million in losses. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendants Emordi and Isidaehomen's conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendants knew of and voluntarily joined the conspiracy. The court also affirmed the district court's imposition of a two-level enhancement to Defendant Okwilagwe's sentence for an offense involving 10 or more victims; affirmed an enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) for an intended loss between $3.5 million and $9.5 million; and affirmed the restitution amount. Finally, the court affirmed Defendant Etti's sentence, holding that the district court did not plainly err by imposing the below-Guidelines sentence that was substantively reasonable.

United States v. Gomez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-11578

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's revised sentence imposed after he was convicted of drug trafficking and firearms offenses. The court rejected defendant's reading of the First Step Act of 2018 and joined its sister circuits in holding that section 403 of the Act affords no relief to defendants whose cases were pending on direct appeal on the law's December 21, 2018 effective date. The court explained that the date that matters in the section 403 inquiry is when the district court imposed defendant's sentence—not when defendant exhausted his appeals. The court applied the new Diggles framework and held that all four of the conditions of supervised release are discretionary under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), and therefore they are all subject to the oral pronouncement requirement. However, defendant's challenge did not clear even the first of the four plain error hurdles for there was no error at all. In this case, the district court pronounced defendant's conditions of supervised release when it stated that his new term of supervised release would be subject to the same terms and conditions as previously stated in his first written judgment.

United States v. Payton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-10360

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Leslie H. Southwick

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of a standard condition of supervised release requiring defendant to "permit a probation officer to visit at any time at home or elsewhere and permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view by the probation officer." The condition was imposed after defendant pleaded guilty to interference with commerce by robbery and to brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing this condition in light of defendant's violent conduct, prior drug convictions, multiple probation violations, and failure to abide by the terms of pretrial release.

Jones v. Clark County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-5143

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Eric L. Clay

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In October 2013, Lexington police tracked the source of a child pornography video to a Clark County IP address. Deputy Murray obtained a subpoena and identified Jones as the subscriber associated with the IP address. Murray secured a search warrant for Jones’ address, noting that Jones was not yet a “suspect” and did not necessarily have “possession” of devices connected to child pornography. Murray and others executed the warrant and seized devices. Jones was home alone; after completing the search, officers him to the Sheriff’s Office. Several officers later acknowledged that they knew an individual’s IP address could be hacked by a third party. After Jones was indicted, Murray received forensic testing results that failed to yield a copy of the pornographic video. It is unclear whether the prosecutors or Jones’ public defender were informed. The prosecution continued. In November 2014, the defense commissioned a forensic analysis of Jones’ phone and tablet that also found no evidence of child pornography. Unlike the first report, it reported no evidence that Jones ever used a peer-to-peer file-sharing program. After posting a reduced bond, Jones was released from jail 14 months after his arrest. In April 2015, the charges were dismissed without prejudice, on the Commonwealth’s motion. Jones sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to qualified immunity for Murray but otherwise affirmed. While there was probable cause for Jones' initial arrest. Murray knew by January 2014 that there was no evidence of child pornography on Jones’ devices. Because there is a factual dispute as to whether Murray informed the prosecutors of these results, a genuine issue exists as to whether Murray “knowingly or recklessly” withheld exculpatory evidence.

Porter v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 18-5091

Opinion Date: May 20, 2020

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Over a six-week period, Porter robbed nine different Louisville-area businesses, often using a pistol-grip shotgun. Porter eventually pled guilty to nine counts of Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 1951(a). The district court sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment, based on the Armed Career Criminal Act. Section 924(c) creates the substantive offense of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence.” Section 924(e) creates a sentencing enhancement for those who possess a firearm after three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” The district court found that both sections applied to Porter because of his convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and three prior convictions for Georgia armed robbery. Since then the Supreme Court has held that the residual clauses in both sections are unconstitutionally vague. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Porter’s sentences. His convictions still qualify as “violent felonies” or “crimes of violence” based solely on the elements clauses in sections 924(c) and 924(e). Georgia armed robbery has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Hobbs Act robbery also qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause.

Rieves v. Town of Smyrna

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Dockets: 19-5319, 19-5320, 19-5347

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Gibbons

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Rutherford County, Tennessee law enforcement officials raided stores selling legal cannabidiol (CBD) products and arrested their owners. All charges against the owners were eventually dismissed and expunged. Plaintiffs, 17 store owners, alleged violations of their constitutional rights to be free from false arrest, unlawful seizure, and unlawful prosecution, and their right to equal protection. They also alleged a civil conspiracy to violate those rights and attached documents revealing communications between law enforcement officials, expressing doubts about the CBD products’ purported illegality and concerns regarding the planned arrests and raids. The District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney claimed absolute prosecutorial immunity or qualified immunity for their alleged misconduct during the investigation; the sheriff claimed quasi-judicial absolute immunity and qualified immunity for his actions related to the investigation and arrests. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of their motions to dismiss, except with respect to the denial of qualified immunity to the sheriff, concerning equal protection. The facts, taken as true and construed in the plaintiffs’ favor, support the inference that the prosecutors erroneously advised that the plaintiffs were selling illegal CBD products even though the prosecutors knew or should have known that they had no evidence of the products’ illegality. Their actions were objectively unreasonable because their probable cause determinations rested on the inconclusive lab results. The complaint did not establish that the sheriff engaged in selective enforcement.

Stermer v. Warren

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-1075

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Eric L. Clay

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Stermer was charged with killing her husband by setting him and their house on fire. At trial, the Michigan prosecutor used a fire expert to support its claim but Stermer’s counsel never retained or consulted with an expert. In his closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly branded Stermer a liar, misrepresented her testimony, and disparaged her while bolstering other witnesses. Stermer’s counsel did not object. Stermer was convicted of felony murder in the course of committing arson and was sentenced to life in prison. Stermer sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Stermer’s petition, citing prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the district court improperly held an evidentiary hearing and applied an incorrect standard of review. Even with significant deference under habeas review, Stermer is entitled to a new trial. It was unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the fairness of Stermer’s trial was not irreparably harmed by the prosecutor’s closing. The state’s case was relatively weak, the prosecutor relied heavily on Stermer’s statements and repeatedly called her a liar while misstating her own testimony; Stermer was clearly denied due process. Trial counsel stood by while the prosecutor bolstered the credibility of other witnesses and called her a “diabolical, scheming, manipulative liar and a murderer.” The record clearly establishes that Stermer’s trial counsel was deficient in refusing to call a fire expert.

United States v. Smith

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-5281

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2006, Smith pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. Because he had a prior felony drug conviction, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years of imprisonment, even though his Guidelines advisory sentencing range would otherwise have been 168-210 months. The district court sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment. In 2018, Smith asked for review under the First Step Act, which empowers district courts to reduce a prisoner’s sentence by applying the Fair Sentencing Act, 21 U.S.C. 841, retroactively by increasing the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences. The district court concluded that Smith was eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) and the First Step Act, but declined to grant one, concluding that his original sentence remained appropriate. Smith’s guideline range after applying the retroactive amendments would be 77-96 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. If the district court decides to impose or refuse to reduce a sentence outside the applicable guideline range, “the court must 'ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”’ This variance is major. The district court did not adequately explain why Smith should not receive at least some sentence reduction. Beyond relying on the court’s analysis at the original sentencing hearing, the court only briefly discussed the nature and circumstances of Smith’s offense and the need to protect the public.

Hildreth v. Butler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 18-2660

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Hildreth, an inmate at an Illinois maximum-security prison, suffers from Parkinson’s disease. He takes a prescription medication, Mirapex, to manage his symptoms. As a specialty prescription, Mirapex was not kept in stock at the prison; it was filled by an outside pharmacy. The prison allows Hildreth to keep a monthly supply of Mirapex in his cell. To refill his prescription, Hildreth must submit a sticker within seven days of the end of the prescription. Hildreth usually receives his refill when he has three to five days of pills left. On three occasions Hildreth received his refill a few days late, causing him to experience withdrawal symptoms. His symptoms also render his handwriting illegible, so Hildreth uses a typewriter to draft documents. He requested to keep that typewriter in his cell, which the prison denied because it was considered contraband. The prison provided Hildreth with an assistant to help him draft documents and increased access to the library where he can use a typewriter. With those accommodations, Hildreth has not missed any court deadlines. Hildreth sued Wexford Health and jail administrators under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hildreth has not shown medication delays were a widespread practice or custom at the prison; he received reasonable accommodations for his Parkinson’s disease, .

McCaa v. Hamilton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-1603

Opinion Date: May 20, 2020

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Wisconsin inmate McCaa, pro se, claimed that prison officials violated Eighth Amendment rights by responding with deliberate indifference to his threats to commit suicide or to harm himself in other ways. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. In 2018, the Seventh Circuit ruled that in denying a fourth motion for recruitment of counsel, the district court had not addressed sufficiently McCaa’s ability to present his case himself in light of McCaa’s transfer to a different prison where he said he could not locate witnesses or obtain other discovery, as well as the effects of his fifth-grade reading level and serious mental illness. On remand, the district court considered the issue and reached the same decision to not attempt to recruit counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the district judge’s "detailed and persuasive opinion." He complied with the remand mandate and did not abuse his discretion. The court noted that, on remand, McCaa did not renew his own efforts to obtain counsel; he was able to “send and receive correspondence, make copies, write motions and briefs, and perform legal research;” his reply in support of his renewed motion for counsel was impressive; and he had recently obtained a GED and now reads at a ninth-grade level.

Barton v. Warden Stange

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 20-1985

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioner sought a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and concurrently sought a stay of execution. The district court entered an order granting the motion for stay of execution on the basis that it required more time to consider the merits of petitioner's claims. The Eighth Circuit questioned the applicability of the authorities the district court relied on to enter a stay solely on the basis of time constraints that purportedly prevented even a preliminary consideration of the merits of the two issues petitioner has raised to determine whether he has a significant likelihood of succeeding on either of them. Accordingly, the court vacated the stay of execution and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus relief, because the court saw no possibility of success on the merits of either of petitioner's competency claim and actual innocence claim.

Smith v. Baker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 14-99003

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Morgan Christen

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his Nevada convictions for three murders and an attempted murder, as well as his death sentence for one of the murders. The district court issued a certificate of appealability (COA) for petitioner's argument that the procedural default of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should be excused in light of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). The panel affirmed the denial of habeas relief and held that, although counsel's performance was deficient at the second penalty-phase hearing, petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. In this case, petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by the lack of an evidentiary hearing, and his claim remains procedurally defaulted. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the Martinez claim without holding an evidentiary hearing. The panel certified petitioner's claim alleging violation of the rule set out in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), but ultimately concluded that this claim does not entitle petitioner to habeas relief because the Stromberg error was harmless. The panel declined to certify the remaining claims because they do not raise substantial questions of law and the panel was not persuaded that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.

Ali v. Trump

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 18-5297

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Patricia Ann Millett

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant, an Algerian national detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2002, asks the court to hold that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause categorically applies in full to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and that his ongoing detention violates both the procedural and substantive aspects of the Due Process Clause. The DC Circuit affirmed the denial of appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and held that appellant's arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent. The court explained that the district court's decision that the Due Process Clause is categorically inapplicable to detainees at Guantanamo Bay was misplaced in light of Qassim v. Trump, 927 F.3d 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Rather, the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), unequivocally held that Guantanamo Bay detainees must be afforded those procedures necessary to ensure "meaningful review" of the lawfulness of their detention. The court noted that whether and which particular aspects of the Due Process Clause apply to detainees at Guantanamo Bay largely remain open questions in this circuit, as well as what procedural protections the Suspension Clause requires. However, appellant has chosen not to ground any of his claims for procedural protections in the Suspension Clause.

Clark v. Kelley

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 206

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Womack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal of the circuit court's dismissal of his petition to correct an illegal sentence, holding that the appeal must be dismissed because the petition was filed in the circuit court presiding over the county of Defendant's incarceration, rather than the court of conviction. Defendant was convicted by a Pulaski County jury of rape. Defendant was incarcerated at the Pine Bluff Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction in Jefferson County when he filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence in the Jefferson County Circuit Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Jefferson County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition.

Leach v. Kelley

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 200

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant did not state a ground in the petition on which the writ could issue. In 2011, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus Appellant alleged that he was mentally incompetent both when the offense was committed and at the time of trial, that the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient, and that, during the sentencing hearing, no mitigation evidence regarding his history of mental illness was submitted. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err when it rejected the petition as not cognizable under long-standing interpretation of the Arkansas habeas statute.

Martin v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 204

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Hudson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court remanded this matter involving Defendant's motion for belated appeal, holding that the proper disposition of this case requires findings of fact, which must be made in the circuit court. Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to 156 months' imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed his motion requesting leave to proceed with a belated appeal of his conviction, arguing that he informed his retained trial counsel of his desire to appeal but that she did not file a notice of appeal. Defendant's lawyer disputed the account. The Supreme Court held that the proper disposition of the motion required findings of fact and therefore remanded the matter to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.

Terry v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 202

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Karen R. Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, and theft of property, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion on a juror misconduct allegation. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Defendant to question a juror regarding her alleged head nod toward the victim's family after the jury had reached its verdicts in the guilt phase; and (3) the State rebutted the presumption of prejudice on the issue of whether the record was inadequate on jury questions during deliberations.

Von Holt v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 205

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Rhonda K. Wood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court denied Defendant's petition for permission to file a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court, holding that the petition contained no allegations of trial error warranting coram nobis relief. Defendant was convicted of drug-related offenses and was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate sentence of 2,200 months' imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant sought permission to petition for writ of error coram nobis, asserting trial error in admitting evidence of his prior felony convictions and a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Defendant's claims did not establish grounds for the writ.

Williams v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 199

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Kemp

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant did not demonstrate clear error in the circuit court's dismissal of his petition. In 2008, Appellant was convicted for rape. In 2018, Appellant filed a habeas petition alleging that he had entered his plea in Desha County and that the court in that county lacked jurisdiction to conduct the plea hearing because the crime was committed in Chicot County and the judgement was entered there. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's petition did not set out facts that would support a meritorious claim for relief.

In re White

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S248125

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Cuellar

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal finding that the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied bail to Petitioner, holding that the trial court's decision to order Petitioner detained was not an abuse of discretion. Petitioner was charged with felony offenses involving acts of violence and sexual assault. The trial court denied bail. Petitioner challenged the no-bail order by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court of appeal upheld the trial court's findings and denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Petitioner was guilty of at least one of the offenses for which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) a court could conclude by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial likelihood that Petitioner's release could result in great bodily harm to others; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Petitioner detained on this basis.

People v. Rodriguez

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S251706

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Groban

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal reversing Defendant's conviction of two counts of assault by an inmate with a deadly weapon and other offenses, holding that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for testifying officers' credibility. Specifically, the court of appeals held that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for witness credibility by asserting in closing argument that two testifying officers would not lie because each would not put his "entire career on the line" and would not subject himself to "possible prosecution for perjury." The court further held that the error was prejudicial. The Attorney General petitioned for review solely on the question of whether the prosecutor's argument constituted impermissible vouching. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's closing argument constituted improper vouching; and (2) while the court of appeals appears to have overstated the import and effect of the prosecutor's remarks, the Attorney General did not argue harmlessness, and this Court expresses no view on the appellate court's conclusions that the statements were prejudicial.

California v. Valles

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E071361(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Richard Valles got into a fight with the victim Michael Carmona, after Carmona pushed defendant’s girlfriend down at a river-side homeless camp. Defendant had to break off the fight when he felt a seizure beginning and left the camp. In the meantime, his tent-mate and one-time codefendant, Jesus Renteria, attacked the victim with a knife, inflicting multiple serious wounds. When defendant returned to the camp, he saw a piece of carpet covering the victim where he lay on the ground. Defendant obtained a firearm from his tent and shot the victim in the head, claiming he did so to put the victim out of his misery, although he thought the victim was dead. After a trial, the jury returned verdicts convicting defendant of first-degree murder and finding that in the commission of the murder defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the death of the victim. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 50 years to life and appealed arguing: (1) his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a theory of heat of passion voluntary manslaughter; (2) the court erred in imposing the minimum restitution fine and other fees and assessments without determining if defendant had an ability to pay; and (3) the term imposed for the gun discharge enhancement must be remanded to allow the court to exercise discretion to consider a lesser included enhancement. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

People v. Bonilla-Bray

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B299607(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Lavin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by summarily denying defendant's petition for recall and resentencing without following the required procedures of Penal Code section 1170.91. Pursuant to section 1170.91, sentencing courts must consider any trauma, substance abuse, and mental health problems caused by a defendant's service in the United States military as mitigating factors weighing in favor of a low-term sentence. In this case, defendant filed a petition after the statute's effective date; stated that he had served in the Marine Corps and ended up suffering from "serious mental health issues and substance abuse addiction" as a result; and attached extensive Marine Corps service records and CDCR mental health records. Therefore, as the People acknowledged, defendant's petition for resentencing met the statutory requirements under section 1170.91, subdivision (b).

People v. Smith

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B298642(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Moor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 and Senate Bill No. 1437. The statute and SB 1437 provide for vacatur of a defendant's murder conviction and resentencing if the defendant was convicted of felony murder and the defendant (1) was not the actual killer, (2) did not act with the intent to kill, and (3) was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties and held that section 1170.95 and Senate Bill 1437 do not unconstitutionally amend section 190. The court also held that the record provided no basis for the trial court's determination that the record on appeal precludes defendant from showing that he was not a major participant in the robbery and did not act with reckless indifference to human life. In this case, the jury's special circumstance finding does not preclude eligibility, and the trial court erred in summarily denying the petition based on its evaluation of facts recited in the record of conviction. The court also held that defendant should have been appointed counsel before the trial court ruled on his petition. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

People v. Smolkin

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A155891(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 20, 2020

Judge: Mark B. Simons

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Deputy D.A. Horvath prosecuted Smolkin for parole violations, including Smolkin's threat to blow up a parole office building. Smolkin was sentenced to 180 days in jail. , Horvath received a handwritten letter from Smolkin, stating that Smolkin was a member of Russian military intelligence and that Horvath had been “sentenced to death in Moscow for the crime of kidnapping a soldier of the armed forces of Russia... I am scheduled to be released... I warn you, if charges are not dropped ... my parole cancelled, I will ... effectively sentence, the entire Solano County DA’s office with kidnapping punishable by death by Russian military firing squad. Let me be crystal clear—I have no training in riflery or authorization to carry out an execution... your entire office will be arrested by Russian military police ... and sentenced to death by firing squad… My only part in the execution, ... will be to livestream it.” Small text in a margin stated, “It is clear to any rational person that I pose no threat to anybody.” Smolkin repeated, “Once again, I am not authorized to, nor will I, take any actions that violate California laws.” The court of appeal reversed Smolkin's conviction for resisting an executive officer, Penal Code 69. On these specific facts, a reasonable listener would not have found the delusional letter “a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.”

In re Colorado v. Huckabay

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 42

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Hart

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Colorado Supreme Court has previously held a defendant was entitled to a preliminary hearing if charged with driving under the influence (DUI), a class four felony, where the defendant is held in custody on that charge. The issue this case presented for the Court's review centered on whether such a defendant entitled to demand and receive a preliminary hearing if not placed in custody, but the offense requires "mandatory sentencing." The Court concluded that indeed a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing whenever he is charged with a class four, five, or six felony and the charge requires the imposition of mandatory sentencing. Further, by its plain meaning, “mandatory sentencing” involved any period of incarceration required by law. Applying these principles to this case, the Court held Donald Huckabay was entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was charged with felony DUI - a class four felony that carried mandatory sentencing.

McCulley v. Colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 40

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Monica M. Márquez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2000, as part of a plea agreement, Brian Keith McCulley pled guilty to one count of second degree sexual assault under section 18-3-403(1)(a), C.R.S. (2000) (a class 4 felony), pursuant to a four-year deferred judgment and sentence. Under the agreement, McCulley also pled guilty to one count of third degree sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-404(1)(c), C.R.S. (2000) (a class 1 misdemeanor). Accepting the plea agreement, the district court entered a judgment of conviction on the misdemeanor and sentenced McCulley to sixty days in jail and two years probation. The only condition of probation was that McCulley comply with the terms of the deferred judgment. As a condition of his deferred judgment, McCulley was required to register as a sex offender, which he did. In 2004, McCulley successfully completed the terms of his deferred judgment and sentence. The district court ordered McCulley’s guilty plea withdrawn and dismissed the felony charge. Thus, only a single judgment of conviction ultimately entered in McCulley’s case—on the misdemeanor. McCulley continued to register as a sex offender. The question in this case is whether a defendant who has successfully completed a deferred judgment nonetheless still “has [a] conviction” for purposes of the bar in section 16-22-113(3)(c), C.R.S. (2019). The Colorado Supreme Court concluded we conclude that a “conviction” for purposes of the bar in section 16-22-113(3)(c) did not include a successfully completed deferred judgment. Because the defendant in this case successfully completed his deferred judgment, he no longer “has more than one conviction” for purposes of section 16-22-113(3)(c) and was therefore eligible to petition the court to discontinue his duty to register. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent.

Phillips v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC18-1149

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court summarily denying Appellant's successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016), is no longer good law. In 1998, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In 2006, Appellant sought postconviction relief on his claim that he was intellectually disabled and, therefore, constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. The postconviction court denied relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed. In the instant postconviction petition, Appellant sought another determination of his intellectual disability. Appellant relied in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Walls v. State, in which the Court held that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hall v. Florida, 472 U.S. 701 (2014), is retroactive to cases where there has already been a finding that the defendant is not intellectually disabled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court in Walls clearly erred in concluding that Hall applies retroactively, and this Court should not continue to apply the erroneous reasoning of Walls; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying relief.

State v. Johnson

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC19-96

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Lawson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, holding that the party opposing a peremptory strike must make a specific objection to the proponent's proffered race-neutral reason for the strike, if the strike is contested, to preserve a claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the proffered reason was genuine. At issue was the proper procedure for preserving a challenge to the trial court's determination that the facially race-neutral reason proffered by the proponent of a peremptory strike was genuine under step three of Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996). During the voir dire proceedings in Defendant's case, Defendant objected to the State's peremptory strike as to a prospective African-American juror but never argued that the State's proffered explanation was not genuine. The Fourth District reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court had failed to demonstrate compliance with the duty to determine the genuineness of the proffered race-neutral reason. The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District's decision, holding that because Defendant did not make a specific objection to the State's proffered facially race-neutral reason for the strike Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the trial court's step three genuineness determination.

Carson v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0288

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Anderson Carson was tried by jury and convicted of the malice murder of Lee Solkol, and the robbery by force of Fred Hickson. On appeal, Carson argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to sever; (2) appearing to assist the State in its prosecution by recommending that the State procure material witness warrants; (3) permitting the introduction into evidence of Carson’s prior conviction for aggravated assault; (4) allowing the State to introduce into evidence a booking photograph without providing the photograph to the defense in accordance with the State’s discovery obligations; (5) denying his motion to exclude his statements to a police detective; (6) denying his motion to suppress; and (7) failing to strike a prospective juror for cause. Carson also argued the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Georgia v. Rowe

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0504

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Donnie Rowe, Jr. was accused of double murder during a prison escape. In the pending death penalty prosecution of Rowe, the trial court directed that all records of visits from Rowe’s defense team to various prisoners be placed under seal in the legal department of the Department of Corrections, rather than being maintained in the individual inmates’ files. The DOC argued that order was void because the trial court lacked the inherent authority or personal or subject matter jurisdiction to issue it and because, even if the trial court had the authority to do so, issuing it constituted an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the Georgia Supreme Court directed the parties to evaluate whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction in light of OCGA 5-7-1 limiting appeals by "the State of Georgia" in "criminal cases." The Court ultimately concluded it had jurisdiction over this appeal, and affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's order at issue. "While we conclude that the trial court had the authority to address the matter at issue here, we also conclude that the scope of the trial court’s order is nonetheless subject to review for an abuse of discretion. ... ordering the removal of the records from their usual place to the legal office was unnecessary, when the key issue was controlling the persons who were entitled to examine them. Instead, the trial court should have ... ordered the prison officials not to disclose any of the relevant visitation records to the prosecuting attorney or the prosecution team or to any person whose access to the records is not reasonably justified."

Hampton v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0482

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: David E. Nahmias

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant James Hampton was tried with Dwayne Abney and convicted of three counts of malice murder and several other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Kiana Marshall, Isaiah Martin, and Alexis Kitchens. Marshall's former roommate, Diamond Butler, asked Appellant to help her move out of Marshall's home. Butler could not fit all of her belongings into Appellant's car; appellant asked Butler whether she wanted him to shoot up the house. Appellant told Butler he had "killed all three of them." Abney was arrested following a traffic stop; appellant was found and arrested the next day. On appeal, Appellant contended the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay testimony of a jailhouse informant and by excluding the testimony of Appellant’s proposed alibi witness. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Hood v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0343

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Antione Hood was convicted by jury of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Candace McGriff. Hood appealed, contending that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to consult a certain expert on gunshot and gunpowder residue. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Hood's convictions.

Johnson v. Williams

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0457

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant, Warden Glen Johnson, challenged a habeas court’s order setting aside Larry Williams’ convictions for four counts of armed robbery, one count of terroristic threats, and one count of using a hoax device. In its order granting habeas relief, the court determined that Williams received ineffective assistance when his appellate counsel failed to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel (1) during the plea bargaining process and (2) in failing to object to improper character evidence. The habeas court determined that because the evidence presented against Williams at trial was not strong, and the only witness identifying Williams was an officer who did not see Williams commit the robbery; the officer's testimony insinuated that Williams was a repeat offender and was harmful. The habeas court went on to find that had the issue been raised on appeal, there was a reasonable probability that Williams would have been granted a new trial, asserting that, under former OCGA 24-9-20 (b), bad character evidence was disallowed against a defendant unless the defendant testified, and Williams did not do so. For these reasons, the habeas court granted Williams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of both claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Having reviewed the record, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the habeas court erred. The Supreme Court concluded Williams could not show the outcome of the plea process would have been more favorable to him had he received different legal advice from his trial counsel. And contrary to the habeas court's conclusions, the Supreme Court determined Williams could not show as a threshold matter that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the officer’s testimony on the basis that it included harmful character evidence or that such objection would have been sustained. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the habeas court's judgment.

Mahaffey v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0118

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: David E. Nahmias

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2014, Appellant Charles Mahaffey entered negotiated guilty pleas to felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the stabbing death of Christopher Reynolds. Appellant later challenged the trial court’s order denying his timely motion to withdraw his pleas, contending that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty. The Georgia Supreme Court determined that the trial court record as a whole supported the conclusion that Appellant was advised of his pertinent constitutional rights, that he understood those rights and the consequences of waiving them, and that he then knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his pleas.

Sullivan v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0309

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Monique Sullivan was convicted by jury of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault in connection with the death of Amelia Hiltz; the aggravated assaults of Maureen Floyd and Kevin Mollenhauer; reckless conduct in regard to Grayson Tucker and Olden Ganus; cruelty to children in the second degree in regard to Sullivan’s son, J.S.; and three traffic offenses. Sullivan’s Suburban sped up and continued traveling the wrong way in the left eastbound lane of Riverwatch Parkway. The path taken by the Suburban forced four drivers, including Grayson Tucker and Olden Ganus, to swerve from the left lane into the right lane in order to avoid a head-on collision. Those drivers testified that the Suburban did not slow down, swerve, switch lanes, or engage in any other evasive maneuvers to warn or avoid colliding with other vehicles. After passing those four vehicles, Sullivan’s Suburban entered a sharp curve near Eisenhower Park. At the time, three other vehicles were entering the curve heading eastbound. The Suburban collided head-on with a van being driven by Amelia Hiltz and was then propelled about five to six feet into the air above the guardrail to the right. The Suburban landed on the guardrail and started bouncing, before flipping back over into the eastbound lanes of Riverwatch Parkway. Hiltz’s vehicle suffered significant damage and was pushed into the right shoulder of the eastbound side of the road. As the Suburban lay flipped over, vehicles driven by Kevin Mollenhauer and Maureen Floyd collided with it. No information was given as to why Sullivan was driving on Riverwatch Parkway. Sullivan appealed her conviction, arguing: the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts with regard to the felony murder of Hiltz and the aggravated assaults of Floyd and Mollenhauer; the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on accident; the court erred in preventing Sullivan from presenting evidence that she did not suffer from any mental illness; and erred in permitting the State to introduce inadmissible hearsay. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Walker v. Georgia

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S20A0170

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Vashon Walker challenged his 2016 conviction for felony murder for the shooting death of his girlfriend, Jessica Osborne. He contended that the evidence was legally insufficient, that the trial court erred in admitting a shell casing and related photographs in violation of his constitutional right to confront his accusers, and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no merit to these contentions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed judgment of conviction.

State v. Gallagher

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-14-0001300

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence for criminal property damage in the second degree, holding that the risk of unfair prejudice posed by the introduction of four prior incidents of aggressive and erratic behavior by Defendant directed at the complaining witnesses and their home substantially outweighed their limited probative value. Defendant was charged with criminal property damage in the second degree for damaging the complainants' vehicle. During trial, the trial court allowed, over Defendant's objections, the State to introduce evidence of the four prior incidents. The court further permitted the State to adduce evidence of the fear the complaining witnesses experienced experienced as a result of the prior incidents and the countermeasures they undertook in response to the incidents. Defendant was convicted. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' judgments, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in its application of Haw. R. Evid. 403; and (2) the court's error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Uchima

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-17-0000081

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, holding that Defendant's untimely filing of his application for writ of certiorari was due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore, this Court may consider the merits of the issues raised in the application. Defendant sought and received an extension of time to file an application for a writ of certiorari. After the extended due date, Defendant filed his application for writ of certiorari. In his motion to accept the untimely application, Defendant argued that the Court should consider his application on the merits because the failure to file within the deadline resulted from either computer system error or his counsel's mistake. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) certiorari review is a critical stage of criminal proceedings in which a defendant has the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; (2) because defense counsel failed to ensure the timely filing of the certiorari application, Defendant was deprived of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, and this Court may consider the merits of the issues raised in the certiorari application; and (3) the ICA did not err in affirming the district court's judgment.

People v. Green

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 125005

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Burke

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Green, was convicted of two counts of the first-degree murder for the gang-related shooting death of Lewis and was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment on one of those convictions. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The trial court rejected a post-conviction petition alleging that Green’s trial counsel, Ritacca, labored under a per se conflict of interest because his trial counsel had previously represented Williams, the intended victim of the murder, who was in the vehicle with Lewis at the time of the shooting. Green neither knew about the conflict nor waived the conflict was rejected. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no per se conflict of interest. Only three situations establish a per se conflict of interest: where defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution; where defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and where defense counsel was a former prosecutor who had been personally involved with the prosecution of the defendant. Ritacca’s representation of both defendant and Williams did not fit within any of those three per se conflict situations.

Jackson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 20S-CR-315

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court revised Defendant's sentence for three counts of level 3 felony rape but otherwise affirmed the court of appeals' decision affirming Defendant's convictions and sentence, holding that exceeding the sentence the prosecutor recommended in this case, absent more significant aggravating factors, was inappropriate. Defendant's convictions arose from his having sexual intercourse with K.S. when she was between twenty-one and twenty-three years old. At issue was whether K.S., who was moderately intellectually handicapped, could legally consent to sex with Defendant. After a mistrial, a second jury convicted Defendant of three counts of rape. The prosecutor recommended that the court impose the advisory sentence of nine years for each of the three counts. The trial court instead sentenced Defendant to enhanced consecutive sentences of twelve years on each count. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's sentence to twenty-seven years, holding that the longer imposed sentence was inappropriate under the circumstances of this case.

Payne v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 20S-CR-313

Opinion Date: May 18, 2020

Judge: Goff

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) conviction to find him not guilty of reason of insanity (NGRI), holding that the State presented insufficient demeanor evidence with which to rebut the unanimous expert opinion and evidence of Payne's history of mental illness. In 2005, Defendant confessed to burning down two bridges and attempting to burn another. Defendant spent most of his life under psychiatric care for chronic paranoid schizophrenia and delusional disorder. The trial court found Defendant incompetent to stand trial until 2016. At his jury trial, Defendant asserted the insanity defense. Three mental health experts concluded that Defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong. Nevertheless, the jury rejected the insanity defense and found Defendant GMBI on all counts. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the GBMI conviction to find Defendant NGRI, holding that the well-documented and consistent history of Defendant's mental illness, along with the unanimous expert opinion, leads to the conclusion that Defendant was insane when the crimes were committed.

State v. Beres

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 19-0369

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Edward M. Mansfield

Areas of Law: Contracts, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss four additional arson charges as breach of his plea agreement with the State as to second-degree arson, holding that the State remained bound by its plea agreement under the circumstances of this case. The plea agreement provided that Defendant would plead guilty to second-degree arson, that Defendant would cooperate in an interview regarding other suspicious fires, and that the State would not bring charges regarding the other fires. Defendant pled guilty. Thereafter, the State decided not to hold the interview and advised Defendant that he would be charged with other arsons. The State gave Defendant an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement, but Defendant declined to withdraw. The State brought four additional arson charges, and Defendant moved to dismiss them as breach of the plea agreement. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State could not unilaterally withdraw from the plea agreement by declining to conduct the interview; and (2) Defendant did not ratify the State's modification of the plea agreement by refusing the State's offer of rescission.

State v. Morris

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 119911

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Eric S. Rosen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of both first-degree premeditated murder and the alternative charge of first-degree felony murder, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request for a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication because insufficient evidence supported Defendant's voluntary intoxication defense; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim's body at trial because, while the photographs may have been gruesome, they were relevant and admissible to show the manner and nature of the victim's death and to corroborate certain testimony; and (3) cumulative error did not deny Defendant a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Cousin

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12840

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court granting the Commonwealth's petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and ordering that a certain superior court judge be recused from acting on Defendant's postjudgment motion to dismiss the indictments against him or for a new trial in his criminal case, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for consideration of whether Defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's potential conflicts of interest. On remand, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictments against him or for a new trial on the basis of Brady violations. The motion judge raised the question whether she could be impartial because the prosecutor had since been appointed as a superior cour judge and was now her judicial colleague. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a motion in support of recusal. The judge denied the motion, concluding that she could be fair and impartial. The Commonwealth filed a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. A single justice allowed the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the prudent and legally correct result under the circumstances was for the judge to recuse herself.

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12318

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Cypher

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's statements made to his doctors before and after the murder regarding his mental health were not admissible for their truth. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in ruling that Defendant's statements to two doctors about his mental health were not admissible substantively and that the judge's instruction to the jury that they could not consider such statements for the truth of the matter was incorrect as a matter of law. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) the judge did not err in ruling that the statements Defendant made to the doctors were not admissible for the truth of the matter or in instructing the jury to that effect; and (2) there was no reason for the Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree.

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12795

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, the Commonwealth's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 from an order of the municipal court, holding that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the Commonwealth's petition without reaching the merits. Defendant was charged with drug possession after a confidential informant, working under the direction of the police department, carried out three controlled purchases of a substance believed to be heroin. Under information obtained in these controlled purchases, the police obtained a warrant to search Defendant's apartment. The search led to Defendant's arrest. Defendant filed a motion for rewards and promises under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(a)(1)(C) seeking information concerning the police department's dealings with the confidential informant. The judge allowed the motion in part, finding that the information was necessary to prepare a defense. The Commonwealth filed its Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Commonwealth did not show that the petition presented an exceptional circumstance requiring the exercise of the court's extraordinary superintendence power.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 21634 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12734

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court dismissing John Doe's complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, relief in the nature of mandamus, equitable relief, and extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief of the obligation to register with the Sex Offender Registry Board (Board), holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief. In denying Doe's request to be relieved of the obligation to register with the Board, the single justice noted that Doe had an adequate alternative avenue to obtain relief by way of a request to the Board to be terminated and to have an evidentiary hearing where he may be represented counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice properly denied relief.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 234076 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12762

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this appeal challenging Appellant's classification before the Sex Offender Registry Board (Board) as a level three sex offender, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter, holding that once a hearing examiner has allowed a motion for expert funds to a sex offender seeking a review hearing on his classification, expert testimony in a board hearing is admissible unless it is irrelevant, unreliable, or repetitive. After the Board notified Appellant of his duty to register Appellant requested his statutory right to a review of his classification by one of the Board's hearing examiners. Before the hearing, Appellant, who was indigent, moved for expert funds to hire an expert in forensic psychology and assessing sex offenders' risk of reoffense. The hearing examiner granted the motion but, during the hearing, significantly limited the expert's testimony. On appeal, the superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to the Board for a new hearing at which Appellant's expert may testify as to any relevant, reliable, and nonrepetitive evidence, holding that the hearing examiner improperly limited the scope of Appellant's expert's testimony.

State v. Trujillo

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 128

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Sandefur

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for attempted deliberate homicide and evidence tampering, both felonies, holding that the district court did not commit plain error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not commit plain error by not intervening sua sponte to limit or cure the State's closing argument that Defendant's failure to retreat or summon police prior to using deadly force was unreasonable; (2) the district court did not commit plain error by not intervening sua sponte to limit or cure the State's closing and rebuttal argument references to Defendant's post-Miranda silence; and (3) the State's closing argument regarding an alternative factual basis for the evidence tampering charge did not effect an improper de facto amendment of the substance of the charging information.

State ex rel. BH Media Group v. Frakes

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 305 Neb. 780

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that records related to the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services's (DCS) efforts to acquire lethal injection drugs were subject to disclosure, holding that Appellant's assignments of error were without merit. On appeal, Appellant, director of the DCS, argued that the records sought were not public records as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-712.091 and that the district court erred in determining that he failed to prove that the records should not be disclosed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the relators in this case had standing, and the district court had jurisdiction; (2) the district court did not err in concluding that the documents were subject to public records statutes; and (3) the district court did not err in concluding that Appellant failed to prove by clear and conclusive evidence that an exemption applied.

State v. Archie

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 305 Neb. 835

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence following his plea of no contest to attempted first degree sexual assault, holding that Defendant's sentence was not excessive and that this Court will not consider Defendant's assignment of error alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant; and (2) because Defendant did not specifically allege deficient performance of counsel as required by State v. Mrza, 926 N.W.2d 79 (Neb. 2019), this Court will not consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

State v. Jennings

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 305 Neb. 809

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first degree murder and other crimes, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to suppress. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from searches of cell phone records and his residence. The first motion to suppress was based on cell phone records obtained pursuant to a provision within the federal Stored Communications Act (Act), which has since been held to be unconstitutional. As to the second motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the warrant violated the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the seizure of Defendant's cell phone records under a provision within the Act was a violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, but the exclusion of the evidence was subject to the good faith exception; and (2) a majority of the provisions in the residential search warrant met the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and if certain items were seized pursuant to invalid portions of the warrant, their admission was harmless error.

New Hampshire v. Perez

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2018-0647

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Miguel Perez was convicted by jury on two counts of possessing a controlled drug with the intent to distribute, subsequent offense. On appeal, he argued the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search of his rental car following a motor vehicle stop. Prior to the stop at issue, officers observed defendant driving a rented car with Colorado license plates, tailgating a tractor trailer. Defendant twice failed to properly signal as he changed lanes to pass the truck. The officer observed multiple cell phones in the passenger seat, and smelled the odor of fresh or burnt marijuana emanate from the passenger compartment. After checking defendant's ID, the officer learned defendant was on parole for murder and there were no active warrants for his arrest. Defendant consented to a search of his vehicle; the officer noted defendant was being "overly cooperative." From this search, the officer discovered two small plastic bags containing drugs. Defendant argued in his motion to suppress evidence that the officer did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the initial stop, his questioning impermissibly prolonged the detention and changed its fundamental nature., and the subsequent consent to search the vehicle was “tainted” by this unconstitutional detention. After review of the trial court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed with defendant's contentions and affirmed conviction.

State v. Buttery

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-2998

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under Ohio Rev. Code 2950.04 does not violate a defendant's due-process and jury-trial rights guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions when the duty to register arises from a juvenile court's delinquency adjudication, holding that such a conviction is not unconstitutional. Appellant was adjudicated delinquent as to what would have been two counts of fourth-degree felony gross sexual imposition if committed by an adult. Appellant was classified as a juvenile-offender registrant and tier I sex offender and was ordered to comply with statutory registration, notification-of-address-change, and verification duties for a period of ten years. Appellant was later convicted for violating a duty to register as a sex offender. On appeal, Appellant argued that his conviction was unconstitutional based on State v. Hand, 73 N.E.3d 448 (Ohio 2016). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that Appellant's conviction for a violation of section 2950.04 for that arose from a juvenile adjudication did not violate Appellant's rights to a jury or due process under the Ohio Constitution and United States Constitution.

Pennsylvania v. Coleman

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 24 EAP 2019

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Max Baer

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Keenan Coleman petitioned for post conviction relief; he was convicted by jury of first-degree murder for the 2010 shooting death of Tobias Berry. Appellant argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, arguing the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the use of certain hearsay testimony, trial counsel failed to object to other testimony, and trial counsel failed to object to a portion of the prosecutor's closing argument. After review of the trial court record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court determined the trial court indeed erred by not instructing the jury to consider the alleged hearsay testimony for limited purposes, and the PRCA court did not adequately address the issue raised from testimony regarding Appellant's alleged ownership and use of firearms. The Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court's rejection of Appellant's ineffective assistance claim with respect to the prosecutor's closing argument. The matter was therefore remanded for further proceedings.

Pennsylvania v. Hoover

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 25 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In May 2013, Appellant Todd Hoover pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) - general impairment, and one count of DUI - highest rate of impairment. On August 13, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of five years intermediate punishment, which included 90 days incarceration at the Lycoming County Prison pre-release facility. He was also ordered to pay the costs of prosecution and a fine. In 2017, Appellant filed a motion for early termination of his sentence of intermediate punishment. On September 29, 2017, the trial court determined that Appellant had “complied with all conditions of supervision, paid all fines and costs, and completed all obligations” associated with his county intermediate punishment, and, accordingly, granted his petition. That night, however, Appellant was arrested for, and charged with, another DUI offense. The Lycoming County Adult Probation Office (“LCAPO”) contacted the trial court and orally requested that it reconsider its order granting Appellant’s petition for early termination of his sentence. The trial court granted the request the same day, and scheduled a hearing to consider “whether the Court should vacate its Order releasing [Appellant] from supervision in light of the new charges.” In the interim, the Commonwealth filed a petition to revoke Appellant’s probation, asserting that his new DUI offense constituted a violation of his probation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial court erred by vacating, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. section 5505, its prior order granting a petition for early termination of a sentence of intermediate punishment based on the court’s discovery that the defendant committed a new offense shortly after the early termination order was entered. To this, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred, and, therefore, reversed the decision of the Superior Court affirming the trial court’s order.

Pennsylvania v. Johnson

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 40 EAP 2018

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Thomas G. Saylor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2002, Walter Smith told police that Clinton Robinson killed Margaret Thomas. Later that year, Smith himself was killed when he was shot twelve times outside a Philadelphia bar. Based on ballistics evidence, the police concluded that multiple individuals had acted in concert to kill Smith. Police recovered a red baseball cap approximately nine feet from Smith’s body. The case remained unsolved until 2005, when a jailhouse informant told police he had overheard Appellant Kareem Johnson make statements implicating himself in Smith’s murder. The informant admittedly supplied this information solely in hopes of obtaining leniency when he was sentenced in federal court. DNA testing revealed that Appellant was a contributor to the DNA in the sweatband of the red cap. The Commonwealth proceeded on the understanding that there was only one baseball cap involved, and that it contained both Smith’s blood and Appellant’s DNA. A jury would convict Appellant on all counts, and sentenced him to death. Appellant moved for post-conviction relief, and was eventually granted a new trial. Appellant called as witnesses several individuals who were involved with the Commonwealth’s case at the 2007 trial or who had represented the Commonwealth in post-conviction proceedings. In questioning these witnesses, Appellant was able to uncover in some detail the extent of the Commonwealth’s mishandling of physical and DNA evidence during his trial; from this he moved to bar retrial. Appellant argued that, whether errors reflected an intentional subversion of the truth-determining process, or mere recklessness, they led to Appellant being confined on death row based on a trial the Commonwealth later conceded was constitutionally inadequate. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that although Commonwealth's acts and omissions were not made intentionally or with specific purpose to deprive Appellant of his rights, the record was consistent with the trial court's characterization that such mistakes were "unimaginable." As such, the Supreme Court found the Pennsylvania Constitution immunized Appellant from being put in jeopardy a second time.

Pennsylvania v. Taylor

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 29 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: May 19, 2020

Judge: Wecht

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The events that formed the basis of Nazeer Taylor’s prosecution occurred when he was fifteen years old. In March 2014, the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition alleging that Taylor committed numerous delinquent acts purportedly stemming from recurring incidents of sexual assault of his then-eleven-year-old foster brother, A.O. This appeal asked whether a minor’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was violated when a juvenile court granted the Commonwealth’s request to have a delinquency matter transferred to an adult court for criminal prosecution, based in part upon the minor’s decision not to admit culpability to the delinquent acts alleged. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court judgment and remanded for a determination, in the first instance, whether the harmless error doctrine was applicable to the juvenile court's "constitutionally deficient misapplication" of the Juvenile Act's transfer provisions, and if it was not, or if the error was not harmless, for consideration of the available relief under these circumstances.

State v. Holler

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 S.D. 28

Opinion Date: May 20, 2020

Judge: David Gilbertson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence of eighty years imprisonment with forty years suspended for first-degree manslaughter, holding that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the offense and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the offense of first-degree manslaughter under the Eighth Amendment; (2) at sentencing, the circuit court properly examined the events surrounding the offense, Defendant's character and history, and Defendant's rehabilitation prospects; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in crafting the sentence.

State v. Newton

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 UT 24

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: Himonas

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated assault, holding that Defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged error in the jury instruction for rape and that the State had no duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to conduct a forensic examination of the complainant's cell phone before trial. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that (1) the district court had not erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of rape, and (2) the State did not commit a Brady violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the jury instruction on the elements of rape, and, going forward, this Court endorses the use of Model Utah Jury Instruction 1605 for rape; and (2) the State did not violate Brady when it did not complete a forensic examination of the complainant's cell phone.

Taylorsville City v. Mitchell

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 UT 26

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: Thomas R. Lee

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Utah Code 78A-7-118(4), (8) providing a hearing de novo in the district court on justice court convictions but foreclosing further appeal unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, holding that the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny. Petitioner was convicted of three misdemeanors in justice court. Thereafter, Petitioner invoked his statutory right to appeal his convictions by seeking a trial de novo in the district court. In the district court, Petitioner was acquitted of one misdemeanor and reconnected of the other two. By statute, Petitioner had exhausted his right to an appeal following the district court's decision, but Petitioner nonetheless filed an appeal in the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. Petitioner sought certiorari review, arguing that 78A-7-118(8) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while the briefing in this case has highlighted some potential policy concerns with the process for filing an appeal from a justice court decision none of these concerns rises to the level of a constitutional problem.

State v. Newton

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 61

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Himonas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated assault, holding that Defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged error in the jury instruction for rape and that the State had no duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to conduct a forensic examination of the complainant's cell phone before trial. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that (1) the district court had not erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of rape, and (2) the State did not commit a Brady violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the jury instruction on the elements of rape, and, going forward, this Court endorses the use of Model Utah Jury Instruction 1605 for rape; and (2) the State did not violate Brady when it did not complete a forensic examination of the complainant's cell phone.