Latest 73 Cases This Week: United States v. Ayala (1st Cir.), United States v. McCullock (1st Cir.), United States v. Dumitru (2d Cir.)

Constitutional Problems With the Kentucky Proposal (Supported by Mitch McConnell) to Change the Way U.S. Senate Vacancies Are Filled

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

In this second of a series of columns, Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on the Kentucky proposal to change the way U.S. Senate vacancies are filled. Dean Amar argues that the Seventeenth Amendment precludes such a proposal, which would allow the state legislature to substantively constrain the governor’s choices in making a temporary appointment.

Read More

United States v. Ayala

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1936

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's 2019 sentence in the District of Maine for one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent with distribute forty grams or more of fentanyl, holding that the sentence was not unreasonable. Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Under the plea agreement, Defendant and the government agreed that they would both recommend a base offense level (BOL) under the Guidelines of twenty-eight. The district court, however, adopted the presentence investigation report's calculation of Defendant's guidelines sentencing range (GSR), which was based on a BOL of thirty. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.

United States v. McCullock

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 20-1234

Opinion Date: March 18, 2021

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district judge imposing three special conditions of supervised release after the revocation of Defendant's supervised release, holding that the special conditions were not unreasonable. On appeal, Defendant argued that the imposition of the conditions was procedurally unreasonable because the judge's explanation for the special conditions was insufficient and that the contested special conditions were substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) the special conditions were procedurally reasonable; and (2) Defendant's substantive unreasonableness challenge failed.

United States v. Dumitru

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-1486

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for asylum fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) and (3), and aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The court concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated identity theft, even under the narrow view of the aggravated identity theft statute promoted by defendant. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement for the involvement of 100 or more documents in the relevant offense.

United States v. Ali

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 15-4433

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: James Harvie Wilkinson, III

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment against defendant after a jury found him guilty of four counts of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2, 1951(a); four counts of carrying a firearm in connection with a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sequester the co-defendant witnesses. The court noted that this was not the easiest situation in the world to manage, what with four codefendant witnesses and limited holding cells; in the context of defendant's requests and the building's constraints, the district court handled this issue with care; at no point did defendant move for a mistrial or request a limiting instruction with regards to sequestration; and the district court suggested removing a co-defendant from the building and allowed fulsome cross-examination, which was a fully sufficient response to defendant's request. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The court explained that, given the ample evidence that was adduced at trial against defendant, the new evidence that defendant proffered in support of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion came very late and would have hardly made any kind of difference. Finally, the court concluded that the uncertainty as to the predicate offenses for the section 924(c) convictions did not render them invalid. In this case, considering the overwhelming weight of the evidence the government presented at trial, defendant cannot meet his burden of establishing that the outcome would have been different absent the improper instruction.

United States v. Hassler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-4824

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: G. Steven Agee

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

An inmate at the Rockbridge County, Virginia Regional Jail, was badly beaten and potentially poisoned; he was taken to the hospital. Officer requested that the Sheriff’s Office investigate. Investigators discovered that another inmate also showed signs of being severely beaten but was not taken to the hospital. Virginia State Police dispatched agents to investigate. A member of the Rockbridge staff and a State Police officer, who was also a sworn member of the FBI’s violent crime unit, noticed an “incident report” created by Hassler, the jail’s head nurse, included several inconsistencies. A State Police investigator and an FBI agent interviewed Hassler, who admitted that “[he] wrote this report to cover [his] butt.” Hassler denied knowing that there was an investigation. Hassler was charged with obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1519. The court rejected Hassler’s objection to the government’s proposed jury instruction, arguing that, under “Rehaif,” he could not be convicted unless, at the time he acted, he knew or contemplated that a federal investigation—as opposed to a state or local investigation— was occurring or would occur. Hassler was sentenced to 12 months and one day of imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Knowledge of a federal investigation under section 1519 is a jurisdictional element and not a separate mens rea requirement that the jury must specifically find.

Alejos-Perez v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-60256

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's conclusion that one of petitioner's three convictions rendered petitioner removeable. At issue is petitioner's 2018 conviction for knowingly possessing a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 2-A, in violation of Texas Health & Safety Code 481.1161(a). In this case petitioner possessed MMB-Fubinaca, which, he agrees, is a federally controlled substance. However, Penalty Group 2-A also includes at least one substance that is not federally controlled. The court concluded that petitioner's 2018 conviction did not render him removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The court explained that the government failed to show that Penalty Group 2-A is divisible. Applying the categorical approach, the court concluded that Penalty Group 2-A is broader than the federal statute, and "there is no categorical match" between Penalty Group 2-A and its federal counterpart. Here, the parties agree that Penalty Group 2-A criminalizes possession of at least one substance—naphthoylindane—that the federal statute does not mention. The panel declined to terminate petitioner's removal proceedings. Instead, the court remanded for consideration of whether petitioner has shown a realistic probability that Texas would prosecute conduct that falls outside the relevant federal statute. The panel also remanded for consideration of whether petitioner's 2009 and 2013 convictions render him removable, in the event that petitioner succeeds on the realistic-probability inquiry.

United States v. Brune

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-11360

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(l) and (b)(l)(C), namely to possess with intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. However, the information cited the wrong part of section 841(b)(1): Subparagraph B—not C—criminalizes possession of a substance containing more than 50 grams of meth. In this case, the parties agree that subparagraph C is a lesser-included offense of subparagraph B. Despite that initial error and without any plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to subparagraph B, referencing it nine times. The Fifth Circuit concluded that jeopardy does not always attach upon acceptance of a guilty plea; explained the framework for analyzing attachment under Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984); and concluded that there was no double jeopardy violation in this case. The court explained that Johnson abrogated United States v. Sanchez's, 609 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir. 1980), statement about attachment; defendant's counterarguments are not persuasive; and the rule of orderliness does not preclude that conclusion. Furthermore, defendant's finality interest is low and there is no evidence of prosecutorial overreach. Therefore, jeopardy did not attach upon the district court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea and there is no violation. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in applying a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(5) for an offense involving the importation of methamphetamine.

United States v. Kieffer

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-30225

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Catharina Haynes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for offenses related to their involvement in two armored truck robberies. The court concluded that a third co-defendant's testimony alone was sufficient to support defendants' convictions; sufficient evidence supported Defendant Armstead's conviction for making a false material statement and for being a felon-in-possession of a firearm; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motions for a new trial where defendants failed to identify any inappropriate questions asked to the jury and the court saw no indication that any juror abandoned his or her role as a neutral fact-finder; and Defendant Jerome's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) was predicated solely on armed bank robbery and thus United States v. Reece, 938 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2019), was inapplicable in this case.

United States v. Manso-Zamora

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-1665

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics

In 2012, Manso-Zamora was convicted of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery, three Hobbs Act robberies, and three counts of possessing and brandishing or discharging a firearm in furtherance of those robberies, and was sentenced to 776 months' imprisonment. In 2020, Manso-Zamora sought release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), asserting that he was at high risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19. He was hospitalized for several weeks in 2019 for bone marrow aplastic anemia, inflammatory bowel disease, and low white blood cells and platelets. He noted his rehabilitation efforts and that, had he been sentenced under the 2018 First Step Act, he would not have been subject to mandatory consecutive 300-month sentences for his firearm convictions. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit allowed appointed counsel to withdraw and directed the clerk to appoint new counsel, then declined to consider Manso-Zamora’s pro se motions to voluntarily dismiss his appeal and to appoint a medical expert. Prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in collateral post-conviction proceedings or in section 3582(c) proceedings. The "Anders" procedures are not required in section 3582(c) proceedings. Counsel is entitled to withdraw to honor his ethical obligation not to pursue a claim that he honestly believes to be frivolous. Given that Manso-Zamora and his attorney “disagree” about his medical conditions, it would be “unreasonable” to compel that attorney to continue providing services.

United States v. Maxwell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-5755

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Maxwell was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and heroin. The crack-cocaine offense then generated a sentencing range of 20 years to life and the heroin offense generated a range of 10 years to life, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)–(B). Applying the 2009 Guidelines, the court treated Maxwell as a career offender and sentenced Maxwell to 30 years. While Maxwell’s appeal was pending, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the quantity of crack cocaine needed to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence but did not apply retroactively. Maxwell sought collateral relief. The Sixth Circuit ruled that his trial attorney violated Maxwell’s rights when he failed to argue that the two conspiracy counts were multiplicitous. On remand, the district court vacated Maxwell’s heroin conviction and imposed a 30-year sentence on the cocaine conviction alone. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2018, the First Step Act authorized courts to lower sentences imposed for crack-cocaine offenses “as if” the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act had been the law during the original sentencing. Maxwell unsuccessfully moved for a sentence reduction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Fair Sentencing Act does not require plenary resentencing hearings and does not expressly permit a court to reduce a sentence based on other intervening changes in the law, such as those concerning career offender status. Operating within its broad discretion, the court considered and rejected each of Maxwell’s arguments.

United States v. Wills

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-6142

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Wills was indicted for various methamphetamine-trafficking offenses. The government gave notice under 21 U.S.C. 851(a)(1) of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on Wills’s prior felony drug conviction. Wills pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846. The district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence, 240 months’ imprisonment. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Wills sought compassionate release or a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) on the basis of “extraordinary or compelling circumstances.” Wills asserted that, if sentenced today, he would not be subject to the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence because his prior felony drug conviction would not qualify as a “serious drug felony” under section 401 of the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. Denying Wills’s motion, the district court pointed out that section 401 does not apply retroactively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that other courts have found that the First Step Act’s amendment of the sentence enhancement provisions constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to warrant a sentence reduction.

United States v. Wright

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-2102

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Wright, a member of a motorcycle gang, distributed cocaine. When Wright’s co-conspirator, Moore, fought with other members of the conspiracy, Wright agreed to kill him for $50,000, drove to Ohio, and shot Moore in the head while he slept. Wright and his co-conspirators used a welding torch to destroy evidence, which they dumped into Lake Huron. Wright later helped steal several airplanes because he and his co-conspirators had stolen drugs belonging to the Medellín Cartel and needed to repay them. One plane belonged to the U.S. Forestry Service. Federal agents eventually arrested Wright and his co-conspirators. The co-conspirators cooperated; Wright was convicted of murder for hire, interstate travel in aid of a violent crime, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment, plus five years. Nineteen years into his sentence, Wright sought compassionate release, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and health problems, including obesity, cataracts, diabetes, end-stage renal disease, and peripheral vascular disease, which has led to several amputations. Collectively, the illnesses are terminal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors did not warrant relief. The district court acknowledged Wright’s recent remorse, health problems, and rehabilitative efforts, but found that other considerations— his criminal history and disciplinary violations—outweighed these factors.

Cal v. Garnett

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1047

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

On April 21, 1992, two gunmen fired multiple shots at Johnson and his friends. Both friends died. Johnson survived, identified one shooter by his street name “Duke,” and described the car he drove. Hours later, the police pulled over a vehicle matching Johnson’s description and arrested Kirkman and Cal, who matched Johnson's description. Kirkman had the name Duke tattooed on his arm. Johnson identified the men as the shooters from a photo array and at trial--the only evidence linking them to the crime. Defense witnesses testified that Cal stood observing the crime scene for 45 minutes and that a month after the shooting, Johnson stated that the defendants were not the shooters. Both defendants were sentenced to mandatory life without parole. The court later reduced Cal’s sentence to 60 years because he was 17 at the time of the crimes. Cal has been granted supervised release. After Johnson recanted, stating under oath that neither Cal nor Kirkman were the shooters, Cal brought an actual innocence claim. The Illinois court denied relief. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied Cal habeas corpus relief as it had denied Kirkman’s petition. While the Illinois court’s decision was not “flawless,” it considered that the recantation was internally inconsistent and implausible, Johnson had no motivation to lie at trial, and he backpedaled from his trial testimony out of loyalty to his former gang. Even a strong case for relief does not mean that a state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.

United States v. Bacon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1415

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Fort Wayne officers received tips about Bacon, who had previously been arrested for selling cocaine from his home. They conducted two controlled buys using confidential informants who had proven reliable in past cases. In both cases, the informant was searched before and after the buy but the actual purchases were conducted by acquaintances of the informants. Each acquaintance acquired drugs and stated that Bacon had weapons all over his apartment. The officers heard these conversations; the informant was wearing a wire. A state-court judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of the apartment. Officers found guns, ammunition, a bulletproof vest, suspected bombs, large quantities of meth, cocaine, and fentanyl, a digital scale, and a drug ledger. Officers stopped Bacon and searched his car; they found drugs and several guns. Both "acquaintances" were later arrested on drug charges, The district court denied a motion to suppress and a motion for a Franks hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While these controlled buys present novel risks, they were reliable indicators that Bacon was selling drugs from his home. By all appearances, the middlemen did not know that they were participating in controlled buys and had no apparent motive for deception. That the officers did not know or search the middlemen and that neither they nor the confidential informants saw or heard the actual purchases was “clear from the face of the affidavit” so a Franks hearing was not required.

United States v. Coe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1990

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Coe, then age 18, and two accomplices traveled from Indiana to Illinois where they robbed a Verizon store at gunpoint, fleeing with more than $25,000 in merchandise and cash. Police tracked them down. Coe pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. The district court imposed a sentence of 117 months' imprisonment, the bottom of the Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the judge improperly considered Coe's race (Black) and committed procedural error by failing to adequately consider his argument about “brain science” and the psychological immaturity of young men in their late teens. The judge gave several reasons for her decision to give little weight to the absent-father argument—most notably, Coe’s strong support from his mother and other family members. Most of the sentencing analysis focused on the violent nature of Coe’s crimes and criminal history. Read fairly and as a whole, the judge’s remarks make it clear that the sentencing decision was overwhelmingly driven by these factors and was uninfluenced by her perceptions about absent fathers in the black community. The judge reasonably concluded that Coe’s crimes could not be explained away by his youth

United States v. Jackson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-2680

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jackson made a career of armed bank robbery. A district judge concluded that only life imprisonment without the possibility of parole would end his criminality. In 1986, when he committed his final robbery, Jackson was 35. At age 70, he sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), citing “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Jackson suffers from hypertension and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, which create extra risk for someone housed in close quarters during the pandemic. The Bureau of Prisons, a district judge, and the Seventh Circuit denied relief. Jackson is not covered by section 3582, having committed his crime before November 1987, when the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 took effect. Section 3582, added to Title 18 by the 1984 Act, provides that it “shall apply only to offenses committed after the taking effect of this chapter.” People whose crimes predate November 1987 are governed by the law in force at the time of their offenses, which provides for parole, or a judge could reduce a prisoner’s “minimum term” on a motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Given his no-parole sentence, which lacks a minimum term of years, Jackson retains only the possibility of a commutation. The 2018 First Step Act permits prisoners to seek their own release but did not abolish section 3582. One other circuit has considered the issue and found that the 2018 Act does not make old-law prisoners eligible for section 3582(c)(1) release.

United States v. Sanders

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-2561

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: KANNE

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2017, Sanders pled guilty to six drug offense counts. She was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and is serving her sentence at Federal Correctional Institution Coleman Low in Florida. In 2020, Coleman Low experienced outbreaks of Legionnaires’ disease and COVID‐19. In July 2020, Sanders filed an “Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release” under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing her health problems: cardio obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), asthma, obesity, and Type II diabetes. She is 59 years old and a former heavy smoker. The government’s response indicated that Sanders had tested positive for COVID‐19 on July 15 and that any symptoms had subsided by July 23. On August 4, the district court denied Sanders’s motion, detailing her criminal history and medical history and finding that section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed against her release. The court concluded that home confinement would be unsuitable, noting that a methamphetamine lab had been found in her kitchen. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Sanders was foreclosed from addressing the medical records attached in the government’s response, the district court did not abuse its discretion or deny Sanders due process.

United States v. Wylie

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2140

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Wylie pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. He admitted that he had been hired to transport drugs and money and that he had made the trip four times before his arrest without being caught. Although he had a previous DUI arrest, he had never been convicted of any crimes. The court adopted the PSR, which noted that Wylie’s offense carried a statutory minimum of 10 years to life in prison and at least five years’ supervised release. Because Wylie met all of the requirements for the “safety valve,” 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), the court could impose a sentence below the statutory minimum. The Guidelines range was 97-121 months’ imprisonment with a two-five year range of supervised release. The court imposed a 97-month prison sentence. As for supervised release, the court proposed sentencing Wylie to five years, saying: “The crime of conviction requires that you get a term of supervised release that’s at least five years long.” Wylie’s counsel did not object. The Seventh Circuit vacated the term of supervised release, which was imposed under the erroneous belief that the court was bound by the statutory minimum, without reference to the Guidelines range.

Lopez-Chavez v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 18-3735

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Jane Louise Kelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Eighth Circuit granted a petition for review of the denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The court held that petitioner's 2003 Missouri marijuana conviction is not a categorical match for the corresponding federal offense in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), and thus the 2006 conviction for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326 does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(O). Therefore, petitioner is not statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal and the court remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Gifford

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-3768

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to producing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 2251 and to committing a felony against a minor while being a registered sex offender under 18 U.S.C. 2260A. The court concluded that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence of 300 months' imprisonment for the section 2251 conviction, which is a 60-month downward variance from the Guidelines range. As required, the district court added 120 months' imprisonment to the sentence based on defendant's section 2260A conviction, running consecutively. In this case, the district court did not give improper weight to the facts of the case, and the district court considered the mitigating factors, as well as potential sentencing disparities. The court explained that the district court has substantial latitude to determine how much weight to give each 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factor and the district court did not exceeds its substantial latitude here. The court also concluded that, although the district court plainly erred by imposing a life term of supervised release that exceeds three years, the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights.

United States v. Lyman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-2677

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Steven M. Colloton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. The district court concluded that defendant was subject to an enhanced sentence for the firearm conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had sustained at least three prior convictions for a "serious drug offense." The prior convictions at issue arose from charges that defendant sold drugs in Missouri on three occasions in 1996. The court concluded that defendant's collateral attack on the Missouri convictions was foreclosed by Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994), which held that a defendant has no right to collaterally attack prior convictions in the course of his federal sentencing proceeding. The court also concluded that, even assuming for the sake of analysis that defendant's offenses of conviction required only a mental state of recklessness, the district court did not plainly err by counting them as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error by ruling that defendant's convictions in Missouri were qualifying predicate offenses.

United States v. Furaha

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-10063

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Milan D. Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in determining that defendant's 18 U.S.C. 924(c) convictions constitutes a "controlled substance offense," as defined by USSG 4B1.2(b). In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to two drug trafficking crimes: (1) possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of the same provisions. The panel explained that, either of these crimes could serve as the predicate for defendant's section 924(c) conviction. Therefore, the panel concluded that, under the modified categorical approach, defendant's section 924(c) conviction is a "controlled substance offense" within the meaning of section 4B1.2(b). Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's application of the relevant sentencing enhancement because defendant "committed" the section 924(c) "offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a controlled substance offense[.]"

McKiver v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-14857

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Brasher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

McKiver is serving a mandatory 25-year sentence for a crime he committed shortly after he graduated high school. He admitted to stealing oxycodone pills from his neighbor; the state never disputed that he consumed those pills within 48 hours of acquiring them. A state postconviction court granted McKiver a new trial based on allegations of ineffective assistance. An appellate court reversed in a one-sentence order. McKiver filed a federal habeas petition that argued his trial counsel failed to investigate and present certain witnesses who would cast doubt on the state’s case and the criminal history of a key state witness. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court did not unreasonably apply "Strickland" in rejecting the witness-testimony claim. The only evidence before that court was McKiver’s own conclusory testimony about what the witnesses would have said and whether they would have been available and willing to testify. Fair-minded jurists could agree that McKiver’s evidentiary presentation failed to establish that he met Strickland’s test, especially with respect to its prejudice prong. McKiver cannot surmount the procedural default of his criminal-history claim. There is no reasonable probability that McKiver’s trial would have reached a different conclusion if his trial counsel had investigated the criminal history of the witness.

Morris v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-14802

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Brasher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this court's and the Florida state courts' precedent are clear that petitioner's amended state-court motion for postconviction relief relates back to his initial postconviction motion, tolling the statute of limitations for the time in between his initial motion was dismissed and his amended motion was filed. In this case, petitioner's amended rule 3.850 motion relates back to his initial motion, tolling the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's limitations period for the time in between. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the petition as untimely and remanded for further proceedings.

Turner v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-12891

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Grant

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. Petitioner argues that the district court erred by taking judicial notice of the online state court dockets without providing him an opportunity to be heard. However, the court concluded that petitioner himself provided all the information needed to show that his filing was late, and he was given a chance to argue that the district court erred. In this case, when petitioner admitted untimeliness and provided the dates to prove it, he eliminated any need for the district court to look elsewhere before dismissing his petition. Furthermore, petitioner had an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice here and simply did not take advantage of it.

United States v. Pendergrass

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-13681

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Rosenbaum

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for five counts of armed robbery and carrying a firearm in furtherance of the robberies. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to continue the trial date; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss Juror 20 for cause based on her employment with the Department of Community Supervision because she did not qualify as a member of a police department; even assuming without deciding that the Google geo-location data should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree," any error in admitting that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for the robberies; the special agent's testimony does not warrant vacatur of the convictions; and, even assuming error, cumulative error does not warrant vacatur of the convictions.

In re Humphrey

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S247278

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Cuellar

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that Petitioner was entitled to a new bail hearing, holding that the common practice of conditioning freedom solely on whether an arrestee can afford bail is unconstitutional. The trial court set Petitioner's bail at $350,000 without commenting on Petitioner's inability to afford bail. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that requiring money bail as a condition of release at an amount he could not pay was the functional equivalent of a pretrial detention order and requesting immediate release or a new bail hearing. The court of appeals reversed the bail order because the trial court failed to determine whether Petitioner could feasibly post bail. On remand, the superior court conducted a new bail hearing and ordered Petitioner released on various non-financial conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where a financial condition is necessary, the court must consider the arrestee's ability to pay the stated amount of bail and may not detain the arrestee solely because the arrestee lacked the resources to post bail; and (2) Petitioner was entitled to a new bail hearing.

California v. Andahl

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C090707(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Renner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Jason Andahl appealed a July 2019 judgment revoking his probation and executing a prison sentence of seven years eight months imposed in 2018 when he was first placed on probation. The sentence included two prior prison term enhancements of one year under Penal Code section 667.5 (b). Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 (b) to limit qualifying prior prison terms to those served for sexually violent offenses, which defendant’s prior offenses were not. The parties did not contest that Senate Bill 136 was retroactive under In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965). On appeal, defendant claimed he was entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill 136 under the California Supreme Court’s decision in California v. McKenzie, 9 Cal.5th 40 (2020). The Attorney General responded that McKenzie did not govern because the 2018 order at issue here suspended the sentence’s execution, as opposed to its imposition, and was therefore a final judgment for retroactivity purposes. The Court of Appeal concluded that by virtue of the retroactive change in the law, defendant’s one-year enhancements were unauthorized and must be stricken.

California v. Curry

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C090409(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Renner

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant David Curry was convicted by jury of robbery. Before the trial court sentenced him to state prison for 40 years to life and imposed various costs, defendant sought to file a motion for mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.36. The trial court ruled the motion was untimely and did not consider it. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the trial court erred by denying as untimely his request for mental health diversion; (2) if the diversion request was untimely, trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) the trial court violated due process principles by imposing costs without determining defendant’s ability to pay. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first contention and conditionally reversed the judgment with instructions for the trial court in considering defendant’s eligibility for mental health diversion. The Court's holding mooted defendant’s second contention. The Court disagreed with defendant’s due process challenge to costs imposed.

California v. Pettigrew

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E074122(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Art W. McKinster

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Scott Pettigrew challenged his conviction for the first degree murder of Mimie Cowen, contending substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding that the murder was premeditated, and the trial court erred prejudicially by instructing the jury with a standard “flight” instruction that it could consider defendant’s postarrest suicide attempts as evidence of a consciousness of guilt. In addition, defendant argued there was no evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that he had the ability to pay a $514.58 “booking fee,” and the court erred when calculating presentence credits to be applied to his state prison sentence of 25 years to life. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s conviction for first degree murder was supported by substantial evidence of premeditation. In addition, because there was no evidence defendant fled to avoid arrest or tried to escape from custody, the Court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. However, the Court concluded the error was harmless. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded the trial court’s order imposing a “booking fee” without finding defendant had the ability to pay, if error, was harmless. And the Court accepted the State’s concession that defendant was entitled to an additional 21 days of presentence credit. Because the Court found no reversible error, judgment was affirmed as modified to accurately reflect defendant’s presentence custody credits.

People v. Moine

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B303013(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Federman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

After a jury convicted defendant of two counts of making criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a), the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for five years. On appeal, defendant argues that his conviction must be reversed, claiming the denial of mental health diversion and the wholesale exclusion of the psychiatrist's testimony was erroneous and prejudicial. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the matter with instructions for the trial court to conduct a new hearing to consider defendant's eligibility for mental health diversion. The court noted that, in the event defendant is again found ineligible for diversion, the trial court may conduct a new trial on the criminal threats charges.

People v. Rivera

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A158284(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Humes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rivera pleaded no contest to second-degree murder and admitted a prior strike in exchange for the dismissal of special-circumstances allegations. In 2017, he was sentenced to 35 years to life in prison. Penal Code sections 188 and 189 subsequently limited liability for murder under the doctrines of felony murder and natural and probable consequences, and established a procedure, Penal Code 1170.95, for eligible defendants to petition to have their murder convictions vacated and be resentenced. The trial court denied Rivera’s petition for section 1170.95 relief, finding that Rivera failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility because he “entered a plea to second-degree murder with malice” and nothing in the record of conviction supported the conclusion that the murder was “anything other than an intentional killing in which [he] harbored such malice.” The court of appeal reversed. A defendant who entered a plea to murder “with malice aforethought” is not categorically incapable of making a prima facie showing under section 1170.95(c). Such a plea is not necessarily an admission that the crime was committed with actual malice. A defendant who stipulated to a grand jury transcript as the factual basis of the plea may make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief by identifying a scenario under which he was guilty of murder only under a now-invalid theory, even if the record of conviction does not demonstrate that the indictment rested on that scenario.

People v. Southard

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A157236(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Richman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On December 18, officers stopped a pickup truck that was driving at about 35 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, while straddling the white line. Southard emerged and ran; officers tased and arrested Southard. On December 25, Southard and his minor son were passengers in a car driven by Bonde that was stopped because the license plate lights were not working. Officer Krueger recognized Southard and was aware of the December 18 incident. Bonde’s license came back as suspended but Krueger did not cite him. Krueger requested backup. Southard refused orders to exit the car and was verbally aggressive. After several bites by a police dog and strikes with an officer’s baton, three officers tased Southard and pulled him out of the car. Southard was convicted of seven counts of obstructing a peace officer and forcible resistance of an officer—charges that require the People to prove the officers were acting lawfully—and one misdemeanor count of possession of methamphetamine. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court committed prejudicial error when it gave a special instruction based on language from an appellate opinion that acted to remove the lawful performance element of the resisting charges and gave CALCRIM No. 250 that acted to remove the knowledge element of the charged offenses. The court “reminded” trial courts of the danger of instructing a jury with language from an opinion that has nothing to do with jury instructions.

People v. Tran

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B297845(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Judith Ashmann-Gerst

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that defendant qualified as a sexually violent predator (SVP) and commitment of defendant to state hospital for treatment and indeterminate confinement. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that defendant did not forfeit his due process challenge where defendant objected to the delay and thus a federal constitutional claim regarding the deprivation of a timely trial is preserved even if no motion to dismiss is filed. On the merits, the court reached the same conclusion weighing the Mathews factors as it did with the Barker factors: defendant's right to due process was not violated. The court explained that any risk of an erroneous deprivation of defendant’s liberty was reasonably mitigated by the procedural requirements of the Sexually Violent Predator Act. Furthermore, the state's compelling interest in protecting society from the risk defendant posed to it is entitled to significant weight and tips the scales in favor of the court's finding that defendant was provided with all the process that he was due.

Colorado v. Padilla

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 CO 18

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Brian D. Boatright

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Two detectives questioned defendant Jose Padilla about his involvement in a potential sexual assault. In response, Padilla stated that he did not have sex with the victim, J.M., and that J.M. was extremely intoxicated on the night in question. He later moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The district court agreed and granted the motion to suppress, finding that Padilla was subjected to custodial interrogation without the required warnings. The State filed this interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s order. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Padilla was not in custody for Miranda purposes, it reversed the portion of the district court’s order suppressing the statements, and remanded this case for further proceedings.

State v. Ramon A. G.

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20358

Opinion Date: March 30, 2021

Judge: Kahn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's conviction of assault in the third degree, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-61, holding that the Appellate Court did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Appellate court (1) correctly concluded that Defendant had failed to preserve his claim that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by omitting a defense of personal property instruction with respect to the charge of assault; and (2) correctly concluded that Defendant waived that unpreserved claim of instructional error.

Hairston v. Delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 53, 2020

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Traynor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1994, the Delaware General Assembly enacted a statute, applicable to both criminal and civil proceedings, that eased the evidentiary burden on the proponent of controlled-substance-testing evidence. The statute, "Subchapter III," allowed for the admission of, and a favorable presumption relating to, written reports from a forensic toxicologist or forensic chemist, without the necessity of their appearance in court, so long as the report complied with certain requirements. After Stephen Hairston was indicted on several criminal offenses, including serious drug offenses, he served a written demand on the State, which, by the unambiguous terms of the statute, required the presence at trial of, among other individuals, the officer who seized and packaged the substances that formed the basis of Hairston’s drug offenses. Upon the State’s pretrial motion in limine, however, the Superior Court, believing that the seizing and packaging officer was unavailable, relieved the State of its obligation to produce him and permitted another officer who was present at the scene of Hairston’s apprehension to appear in the seizing and packaging officer’s stead. The Superior Court’s ruling, according to Hairston, erroneously relieved the State of a mandatory statutory duty and violated Hairston’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Delaware Supreme Court held the Superior Court’s interpretation of the statute in question was erroneous as a matter of law and that, absent the appearance of the witness identified in Hairston’s demand, it was error for the court to admit the forensic chemist’s report and testimony. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Idaho v. Orozco

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 47263

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Fifteen-year-old Lucas Orozco was charged with robbery and burglary, both felonies, for allegedly robbing a convenience store. After a magistrate court determined there was probable cause to charge Orozco with the felonies, it waived juvenile jurisdiction and bound him over to district court as an adult pursuant to Idaho Code section 20-509. Orozco objected to this automatic waiver, filing a motion with the district court challenging the constitutionality of section 20-509. The district court denied the motion, relying on precedent from the Idaho Court of Appeals, which previously upheld the constitutionality of section 20-509. Orozco appealed, arguing that the automatic waiver denied him procedural due process protections afforded to him by the U.S. Constitution. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court.

Idaho v. Smith

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 48358

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Melonie Smith appealed her conviction for first degree murder and destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence. On appeal, Smith claimed the district court: (1) erred when it denied her motion to suppress; (2) abused its discretion when it admitted certain testimony over her objection; and (3) committed fundamental error by (a) admitting a video and (b) not striking the prosecutor’s comments in closing arguments. Smith further argued she was deprived of her right to a fair trial due to the accumulation of errors. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed her convictions.

Harris v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 20S-CR-00546

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Loretta H. Rush

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of attempted murder, holding that the trial court did not err in not allowing Defendant's mother as a witness to stay in the courtroom during Defendant's trial. Defendant was fifteen years old when he was waived into adult criminal court and convicted. Before trial, the State listed Defendant's mother as a potential witness, and at trial, the State requested a separation of witnesses order. The court ordered Defendant's mother to leave the courtroom, and the State never called her to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a child in adult criminal court may use Ind. R. Evid. 615(c) to establish that a parent is "essential" to the presentation of the defense and is thus excluded from a witness separation order; (2) Defendant did not make the requisite showing under the rule; (3) Defendant waived his argument that a juvenile defendant has a due process right to have a parent present for criminal proceedings; and (4) Defendant's challenges to his sentence were unavailing.

Carter v. Carter

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 18-0296

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that Jason Carter was civilly liable for the death of his mother, Shirley Carter, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Jason was civilly accused by his father and brother of intentionally shooting his mother. After a jury determined that Jason was civilly liable the State charged Jason with first degree murder. As a result of discovery from that criminal proceeding, Jason was acquitted murder. Jason later filed a second petition to vacate the judgment based on newly discovered evidence. The district court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Jason’s motion for continuance, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, first petition to vacate the judgment, and motion for recusal; (2) properly denied Jason's motion to quash a subpoena to the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigations; and (3) lacked jurisdiction to hear this second petition to vacate the judgment because it was untimely.

State v. Hillery

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 19-0725

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Construction Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence and statements based on a police officer's alleged promise of leniency, holding that there was no improper promise of leniency. The officer at issue initiated a Terry stop on a public stop after observing Defendant make a possible drug buy. The officer told Defendant if he cooperated he would not be arrested that day but may be arrested later. Three months after Defendant handed over crack cocaine and marijuana the officer charged him with possession. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the evidence obtained after the officer promised leniency was fruit of the poisonous tree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer did not improperly promise leniency.

State v. Barber

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 121720

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Stegall

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree murder, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Defendant failed to establish good cause and denied his motion to withdraw plea. In his motion to withdraw his plea, Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate a voluntary intoxication theory of defense because Defendant had told counsel that he was on antidepressants at the time of the murder. The trial court denied the motion, finding counsel's investigation of Defendant's medication legally sufficient to support a finding of competent representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

State v. Cheeks

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 122621

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Wall

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction DNA testing, holding that the district court did not err. In 1993, Defendant was convicted of the second-degree murder of his wife. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion seeking postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512, which authorizes individuals who have been convicted of first-degree murder or rape to petition for such testing. The district court denied the motion because Defendant was convicted of neither offense. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in Cheeks I, concluding that Defendant's exclusion from section 21-2512 violated his equal protection rights. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court decided State v. LaPointe, 434 P.3d 850 (2019), which overruled Cheeks I. Relying on LaPointe, the district court against denied Defendant's motion for postconviction testing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LaPointe is binding precedent and overrules Cheeks I.

State v. Dunn

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 119866

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of a panel of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's sentence of seventy-eight months' imprisonment and addressing and determining the three additional issues raised by the parties on appeal, holding that the holding of the panel on two issues was merely advisory. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision and lifetime electronic monitoring and erred in failing to grant him good time credit. For the first time on appeal, the State argued that the district court imposed an illegal sentence by departing more than fifty percent from a standard guideline sentence. The panel concluded that the district court illegally sentenced Defendant to only seventy-eight months and then determined the other issues raised on appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) the panel correctly determined that the seventy-eight-month sentence imposed was illegal; and (2) because any further consideration on the merits could result in holds merely advisory, the panel's holdings on the two remaining issues on review is vacated.

State v. Queen

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 120643

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Marla J. Luckert

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that no exceptions extended the statutory speedy trial period in this case and that Defendant must be discharged from liability on the charges against him, holding that the State violated Defendant's statutory speedy trial rights. Defendant was charged with premeditated first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. The State did not bring Defendant to trial until 153 days after his arraignment. After he was convicted, Defendant appealed, arguing that the State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed Defendant's convictions, holding that, under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3402(a), Defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated.

State v. Tonge

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 119543

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Standridge

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's sentence and remanding the case to the district court for resentencing, holding that the court of appeals panel lacked the requisite authority to reform the plea agreement after finding the sentence imposed was illegal. Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State in which Defendant agreed to plea no contest to aggravated robbery. The district court imposed a 180-month prison sentence as the State recommended. Defendant appealed his sentence, claiming for the first time on appeal that the district court erred by scoring his two pre-1993 Kansas burglaries convictions as person felonies for purposes of calculating his criminal history score. The panel agreed and sua sponte nullified the sentencing recommendation portion of the plea agreement. The court then held that the parties were free on remand to argue for a correct presumptive sentence. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals exceeded the scope of its authority when it reformed the parties' plea agreement as part of its remand order.

Davis v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-SC-0530-MR

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Michelle M. Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of one count of theft of mail matter and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree and sentencing him to twenty years' imprisonment, holding that the circuit court did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's request for a lesser jury instruction on theft by unlawful taking under $500; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Batson challenge to the commonwealth's strike of Juror $4070; (4) any error in the admission of victim impact testimony during the guilt phase of Defendant's trial did not amount to reversible error; and (5) a clerical error in Defendant's judgment did not rise to the level of palpable error.

Fisher v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-SC-0738-MR

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: John D. Minton, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment convicting Defendant of complicity to murder and tampering with physical evidence, holding the trial court did not err in admitting unreacted out-of-court statements in which Defendant's co-defendant incriminated herself and Defendant to a cellmate who testified at trial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in ruling that the Confrontation Clause was not implicated because the co-defendant's out-of-court statements to her cellmate were not testimonial and sufficient corroboration otherwise supported the admissibility of the statements; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting a jail phone call of Defendant; and (3) the Commonwealth's Attorney improperly questioned a witness, but the error did not render Defendant's trial fundamentally unfair.

State v. Silva

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2021 ME 15

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Ellen A. Gorman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dispositional order imposed after an adjudication that juvenile Timothy Silva committed manslaughter, holding that the court did not err in committing him to detention. Silva was sixteen years old when he lost control of a vehicle and caused the death of three passengers and serious injuries to a fourth. The juvenile court adjudicated Silva to have committed one count of manslaughter and committed him to Long Creek Youth Development Center for an undetermined period of up Silva's twenty-first birthday. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court's disposition was neither error nor an abuse of discretion.

Garcia v. Commonwealth

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12863

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the county court for entry of a judgment allowing Defendant's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and ordering that the superior court judge's order hospitalizing Defendant under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 16(a) be vacated, holding that Defendant's substantive due process rights were violated. A grand jury returned a twelve-count indictment charging Defendant with two counts of armed carjacking and multiple related charges. After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental illness. Thereafter, the judge granted the Commonwealth's motion to hospitalize Defendant for evaluation pursuant to section 16(a) for forty days. Defendant filed a petition pursuant to section 3 requesting relief from confinement. A single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter, holding that there was no constitutionally adequate justification to temporarily commit Defendant under section 16(a).

Johnston v. State

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A19-0672

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: McKeig

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for postconviction relief after determining that his stay of adjudication and discharge from probation was not a conviction, holding that Appellant's stay of adjudication was not a conviction. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to domestic assault-intentional infliction of bodily harm. The district court accepted Appellant's plea of guilty and stayed adjudication under the parties' agreement. After Appellant successfully completed and was discharged from probation he received notice that he was scheduled for immigration removal proceedings. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The postconviction court concluded that Appellant had not been convicted of a crime and was therefore not eligible for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain meaning of the phrase "a person convicted of a crime" in Minn. Stat. 590.01, subd. 1 means a person who has a conviction under Minnesota law; and (2) Appellant's stay of adjudication did not meet this definition.

Lesage v. Twentieth Judicial District Court

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 MT 72

Opinion Date: March 23, 2021

Judge: Sandefur

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for writ of supervisory control reversing an order of the Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court denying Petitioner's motion to substitute the presiding judge, the Honorable Deborah Kim Christopher, in the underlying matter, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the writ. Petitioner was the defendant in the underlying matter. The district court denied Petitioner's motion for substitution of judge, concluding that it was not timely filed in accordance with the statutory filing fee requirement set out in Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804(3). The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Petitioner did not timely file her substitution motion in accordance with the statutory filing fee requirement and therefore declined to exercise supervisory control under the circumstances in this case.

State v. Warlick

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 308 Neb. 656

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed all of Defendant's convictions with the exception of the misdemeanor violation of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1202, which the court reversed and remanded with directions to vacate, holding that the insufficient to support the conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court for York County was the proper venue in which to bring charges against Defendant; (2) the district court did not err by commencing the trial without appointing him counsel or standby counsel; (3) the district court did not violate Defendant's right to be present when it commenced trial with Defendant's representing himself pro se and when it continued with the trial after Defendant failed to reappear following noon recess; and (4) while the evidence was sufficient to support the majority of Defendant's convictions, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Defendant was carrying a weapon concealed on or about his person.

Hildt v. Eighth Judicial District Court

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 137 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 12

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: James W. Hardesty

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus ordering that his conviction for misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence charge be vacated and that he receive a jury trial, holding that the new rule in Andersen v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 448 P.3d 1120 (Neb. 2019), applied to Petitioner. In Andersen, the Supreme Court announced that persons charged with a misdemeanor domestic battery offense are entitled to a jury trial. Anderson was decided three weeks after the district court affirmed Petitioner conviction of appeal. Petitioner then brought this petition arguing that the municipal court and district court erred by denying him a jury trial. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding (1) Andersen announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure; and (2) because Andersen was decided before the time period to appeal had expired, Petitioner's conviction was not final and the rule in Andersen applied to his conviction.

Breeze v. NDDOT

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 43

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Joshua Breeze appeals a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges based on a conviction for driving under the influence. On appeal, Breeze argued that Waltz, a UND police officer, was outside of his jurisdiction when he stopped Breeze, and therefore had no authority for the stop or the subsequent chemical test. The Department argued that Waltz was in “hot pursuit” and therefore had authority for the stop. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Waltz did not have authority to arrest Breeze: "a reasoning mind could not have reasonably concluded the preponderance of the evidence supports that Waltz was in 'hot pursuit,' as defined by section 15-10-17(2)(d), N.D.C.C., when he continued beyond his jurisdictional boundary to arrest Breeze." The Department's order suspending Breeze's driving privileges, and the district court's judgment affirming the Department's order were reversed.

Campbell v. North Dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 45

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Anthony Campbell appealed after the district court summarily dismissed his application for post-conviction relief. In 2016, a jury found Campbell guilty of murder, a class AA felony. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. In November 2017, Campbell filed an application for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The State opposed the application and moved for summary disposition. In December 2017, Campbell amended his application. By the time of a January 2019 status conference, Campbell’s attorney informed the district court that he wanted to have a blood sample tested. The court gave him 30 days to submit information with regard to the testing; nothing was submitted. In April 2019, the State renewed its motion. At an October 2019 hearing on an order to show cause, Campbell’s attorney represented that the private lab would accept the blood sample only if the State submitted it. In March 2020, the court ordered the State to cooperate with the lab and the production of a DNA profile. At a June 2020 status conference, Campbell was unable to attend because of restrictions on transporting inmates due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Campbell’s counsel was present and acknowledged taking no action on the order to cooperate. The State renewed its motion at the hearing. The court held Campbell failed to meet his burden and granted the summary dismissal. The court requested the State to draft the order dismissing the application. On appeal, Campbell argued his application was dismissed because the district court agreed with the State that his post-conviction counsel did not submit evidence to support the application or respond to the State’s motion. He argued, however, there was a reasonable inference that blood present at the crime scene, if properly tested, would exonerate him. He further contended issues not related to blood testing regarding his trial counsel’s ineffective performance were viable and supported, and that summary disposition had already been denied on those claims. He argued that an evidentiary hearing as to those issues should have been held. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court’s order and judgment summarily dismissing the application was conclusory: in summarily dismissing, the court did not address the specific claims of Campbell’s amended application alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel; did not undertake any analysis under Strickland; and did not adequately explain why an evidentiary hearing on the application, which had originally been ordered in September 2018, was no longer necessary. The judgment was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

North Dakota v. Bee

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 61

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

Dakota Bee appealed a criminal judgment entered on a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal a district court order denying her motion to suppress evidence. Burleigh County Social Services (BCSS) contacted the Bismarck Police Department requesting assistance in removing a child from Bee’s care. Officers accompanied BCSS social workers to Bee’s residence and informed her that they were there to remove her child. Bee refused, backing up into the home, picking up the child, and then running towards the rear of the home. Officers pursued Bee through the home and out the back door. Fleeing out the back, Bee fell while holding the child, and officers separated her from the child. After Bee had been detained outside the residence, a social worker entered the residence to obtain personal belongings for the child, and an officer followed. Once the officer was inside, the social worker pointed out a glass smoking pipe. Bee was subsequently charged with Child Neglect; Possession of Methamphetamine; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and Refusal to Halt. The district court found that the officers entered “the residence with BCSS to retrieve personal belongings for the child” after Bee had been detained and the child was in BCSS’s custody. The court further found that the officers observed the glass smoking device on a shelf in plain view. The court concluded the officers’ actions did not violate Bee’s Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Bee argued the court erred in concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the officers entered her home. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that during the first entry to the residence, the officers observed nothing that Bee sought to suppress. The second entry of the residence was justified only by a need to collect clothing and other personal items needed by the child. Because the search was concededly warrantless and no exception applies, the Court concluded Bee was entitled to claim the protection of the exclusionary rule. The district court erred by denying Bee’s motion to suppress the results of the warrantless search. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Bee to withdraw her guilty plea.

North Dakota v. Borland

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 52

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Jon J. Jensen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jordan Borland was convicted by jury of criminal vehicular homicide at the conclusion of a third jury trial on the charge. Borland argued: double jeopardy barred his retrial; the district court erred by denying his requested jury instruction and special verdict form seeking a jury finding on double jeopardy; and he was denied the right to a speedy trial. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

North Dakota v. Glasser

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 60

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Andrew Glasser appealed a district court’s corrected, amended criminal judgment modifying his sentence for conviction of gross sexual imposition and from an amended criminal judgment for conviction of possession of certain materials prohibited. On appeal, Glasser contended the court lost jurisdiction upon announcement of his original sentence, and thus had no authority to amend his judgments. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not have jurisdiction to amend the criminal judgments to modify Glasser’s sentences. The Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgments reinstating Glasser’s original sentences.

North Dakota v. Martinez

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 42

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The North Dakota Supreme Court consolidated two criminal cases because both involved whether a defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Former school teacher Everest Moore appealed three criminal judgments after a jury found him guilty of eight counts of gross sexual imposition with respect eight of his students. Moore argued the district court closed two pretrial hearings and parts of his trial without the pre-closure analysis required by Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), thus violating his public trial right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Juan Martinez appealed after a jury found him guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The victim was thirteen or fourteen at the time; there had been no public disclosures of her identity, the allegations were very personal, involving multiple penetrative sexual acts. During a hearing on the State’s motion, Martinez’s attorney stated that he did not oppose the motion to close the courtroom for the victim’s testimony. A representative from the Williston Herald newspaper expressed opposition to the motion. The court stated the public, including the media, had an interest in the motion and it would wait to decide the motion to give the media an opportunity to file an objection. Martinez argued the district court erred by ultimately closing the courtroom to the public during the testimony of the minor victim and the victim’s counselor. With respect to Moore, the Supreme Court concluded the exclusion of the public without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver or Waller findings articulated on the record before the closures negatively affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the criminal justice system. With respect to Martinez, the Court found the district court's findings in support of a second closure were clearly erroneous: "the court simply accepted the asserted interest without articulating how it overrides the defendant’s and public’s right to open proceedings. Both judgments were reversed and the matters remanded for new trials.

North Dakota v. Richter

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 55

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Tyler Richter appealed a criminal judgment entered after he pled guilty to the charge of luring minors by computers, and conditionally pled guilty to the charge of attempted promotion of obscenity to minors. Richter reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of attempted promotion of obscenity to minors. He argued attempted promotion of obscenity to minors was not a cognizable offense. Specifically, Richter argued there was an inconsistency in the elements of the criminal attempt and promotion of obscenity to minors offenses which was impossible to rectify. He claimed attempt required the actor have an intent to complete the commission of the underlying crime, promoting obscenity only requires the actor to act recklessly which did not require an intent to commit a particular objective, and a person cannot intend to commit an offense that can be committed without any intent. The State opposed Richter’s motion. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concurred that the attempted promotion of obscenity to minors was not a cognizable offense, and the district court erred in denying Richter's motion to dismiss. Judgment convicting Richter of attempted promotion of obscenity to minors was reversed, and the matter remanded to allow Richter to withdraw his guilty plea to the attempt offense and dismiss the attempt charge.

North Dakota v. Stands

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 46

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Lee Stands appealed a judgment and an order denying his motion to suppress evidence after entering a conditional plea of guilty to possession with intent to manufacture or deliver methamphetamine and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, Stands argued he did not consent to the search of his person. He also argued the traffic stop was unlawfully extended when police asked if he had anything on him, if she could search him, and subsequently searched him. Additionally, Stands argued the stop was unlawfully extended when officers detained him and waited for a drug dog to arrive on the scene. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed judgment and the trial court's order denying Stands' motion to suppress.

North Dakota v. Walbert

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 49

Opinion Date: March 24, 2021

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Russell Walbert appealed an amended criminal judgment after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition. At a pretrial conference, the State moved to stop people from entering and exiting the courtroom while the victim testified during trial. The State made clear it was “not asking for the courtroom to be closed, just that we don’t have those interruptions while she’s testifying, if there’s no objection to that. Whoever is in, stays in. Whoever is out, stays out.” Walbert agreed to the State’s request. The court did not enter a written order and did not analyze its decision under the four-factor test found in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). Walbert argued the district court created a structural error by denying his constitutional right to a public trial. He claimed the court was required to engage in a Waller analysis before closing the courtroom, and the court’s failure to do so requires reversal. The North Dakota Supreme Court found judges possessed broad power to control their courtrooms, minimize disruptive behavior, and maintain security, and here, the district court's actions did not constitute a closure. Judgment was thus affirmed.

Pennsylvania v. H.D.

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 33 MAP 2020

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Thomas G. Saylor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law

In the pendency of divorce proceedings, Appellee and her husband entered into agreement governing the shared custody of their five-year-old child. Appellee repeatedly and intentionally violated this custody agreement, eventually absconding with the child ultimately to Florida, where the child remained for forty-seven days separated from her father. Appellee claimed the father was abusive, her attempts to secure assistance from the local children and youth agency had been rebuffed, and she had no option but to remove the child from the father’s care. Appellee was apprehended and charged with interference with custody of children. At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from the father, a clinical psychologist, a social worker, and a detective to the effect that Appellee’s allegations were false and/or unfounded. Appellee said she had been advised by a nanny the child had disclosed an incident of offensive touching by the father, and that subsequently the child repeatedly made statements to Appellee personally which were indicative of abuse. Appellee also presented the nanny’s corroborative testimony, and her cousin attested the child had apprised her of inappropriate touching too. The Pennsylvania Legislature prescribed that a defendant was innocent of the crime of “interference with custody of children” when he or she believed that intrusive actions were necessary to spare the subject child from danger. Appellee was convicted as charged and sentenced; in post-conviction proceedings, the Superior Court reversed sentence and ordered a new trial. The Commonwealth contended that the belief element of the offense should have been construed to encompass only beliefs that were held reasonably. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Commonwealth’s arguments "are too tenuous to be credited." The Superior Court judgment was affirmed.

Pennsylvania v. Johnson

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 23 EAP 2020

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Thomas G. Saylor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

This appeal concerned the application of the statutory compulsory joinder rules, which generally require a prosecutor to pursue, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a single criminal episode occurring within the same judicial district, subject to enumerated exceptions. In 2015, as the result of a traffic stop, Appellant Dewitt Johnson was arrested and charged with driving with a suspended license, possession with intent to deliver heroin (“PWID”), and knowing and intentional possession of heroin (“K&I”). Before the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, he was found guilty, in absentia, of the summary traffic offense. The Municipal Court’s jurisdiction was capped at criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; because of this, the Commonwealth pursued the drug offenses in the common pleas court. Appellant moved to dismiss, contending the prosecution was required to try all of the offenses simultaneously, per the compulsory joinder requirements of Section 110 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. The Commonwealth conceded it was foreclosed from pursuing the K&I charge, because that crime, like the traffic offense, fell within the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argued that PWID remained viable, since the Municipal Court had lacked jurisdiction over that offense. In this regard, the Commonwealth invoked Section 112(1) of the Crimes Code, which served as an exception to Section 110’s general prohibition. The Superior Court accepted this argument and affirmed with respect to PWID. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the matter for dismissal of the PWID charge: "the Commonwealth must generally assure that known offenses are consolidated at the common pleas level, when they arise out of a single criminal episode and occur in the same judicial district."

Pennsylvania v. Mason

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 69 MAP 2019

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Max Baer

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act made inadmissible a a covertly obtained audio recording of Appellee Beth Ann Mason while she worked as a nanny in the home of the family that employed her. Because Appellee failed to demonstrate that she possessed a justifiable expectation that her oral communications would not be subject to interception by a recording device located in the children’s bedrooms, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Wiretap Act did not preclude the Commonwealth from introducing these recordings as evidence at Appellee’s trial for allegedly abusing the children in her care. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment, which held that the trial court properly suppressed the subject audio recording. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Pennsylvania v. Mayfield

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 15 EM 2020

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Wecht

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a probation revocation case, the trial court entered an order removing the District Attorney’s Office and appointing a private criminal-defense attorney to represent the Commonwealth as a “special prosecutor.” Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the court lacked the authority to make such an appointment, the trial court’s order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Pennsylvania v. Moore

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 14 EAP 2019

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Mundy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in this case to determine the propriety of raising a claim in a habeas corpus petition that the sentencing statute under which Appellant was sentenced was unconstitutionally vague, or if such a claim was properly considered an illegal sentence claim cognizable solely under the mandates of the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Appellant Ingram Moore was convicted by jury of first degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime for the 1993 murder of Kevin Levy. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. He filed a federal writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed as time barred. In April 2015, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum. Appellant’s petition lay dormant until he filed a Motion to Compel Disposition on March 12, 2016. Appellant then filed another Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 15, 2016 raising a claim that his continued incarceration was illegal as the statute he was sentenced under was unconstitutionally vague for failing to give defendant notice that a sentence of life imprisonment meant without parole. A trial court ultimately dismissed Appellant’s petitions on May 31, 2017 “pursuant to the [PCRA].” Appellant appealed pro se. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal and held the trial court correctly viewed Appellant’s petitions for habeas relief as petitions for post-conviction relief under the PCRA. In making this determination, the Superior Court noted a writ of habeas corpus was properly considered a PCRA petition if the issue raised was cognizable under the PCRA. Appellant conceded that an issue cognizable under the PCRA must be brought through the PCRA’s procedures. Appellant asserted his claim that the statute he was sentenced under was void for vagueness was not a claim that fell within the specified claims available for relief under the PCRA and therefore was properly brought in a habeas petition. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding his arguments fell within the PCRA's purview. The trial court correctly dismissed his petition; the Superior Court's order was affirmed.

Pennsylvania v. Shaw

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 21 MAP 2020

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Thomas G. Saylor

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellee Anthony Shaw was tried jointly with a co-perpetrator for the 2009 attempted murder of Alex Adebisi. At the pretrial stage, Appellee’s counsel filed a notice of alibi. At trial, only one of two identified alibi witnesses in the notice was called by the defense to testify. During her cross-examination of the testifying witness, the prosecutor referred to the notice of alibi to impeach the alibi's veracity. Defense objected, arguing the notice was not the witness' statement. After the Commonwealth concluded the cross-examination, Appellee’s counsel asked for a sidebar conference and moved for a mistrial. After Appellee was convicted and an unsuccessful direct appeal was concluded, he lodged a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, claiming he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to amend the alibi notice prior to trial to remove the reference to a non-testifying alibi witness. The PCRA court denied relief on the post-conviction petition, Appellee appealed, and the Superior Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. With respect to trial counsel’s performance, the Superior Court found the alibi notice counsel had submitted failed to reflect his own contemporaneous understanding of the circumstances. And although counsel expressed a belief that an alibi witness could not be cross-examined with an alibi notice, the court referenced its own prior decisions which it read for the proposition that “it is well-established that an alibi notice can be used for impeachment purposes.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, agreeing with the Commonwealth that the matter should have been remanded to the post-conviction court for Appellee to be afforded the opportunity to create an evidentiary record to meet his burden of demonstrating the ineffectiveness, particularly in terms of the reasonable-basis criterion. "We also find that the Superior Court should have provided the post-conviction court with the opportunity to assess prejudice in the first instance. ... Although certainly it is possible that the jurors relied on the notice to discredit the defense... it is most appropriate for the PCRA court to pass, in the first instance, on whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Appellee's trial would have been different had counsel correctly handled the alibi notice."

Haas v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 191580

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of raping and taking indecent liberties with a minor, holding that any error in the circuit court's ruling excluding certain testimony was harmless. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred by excluding the testimony of the complaining witness's aunt to impeach the complaining witness's credibility. The court of appeals ruled that the statement was not admissible impeachment evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, assuming without deciding that the court of appeals erred by ruling that the proffered testimony was inadmissible, any such error was harmless.

Washington v. Coryell

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 98256-2

Opinion Date: March 25, 2021

Judge: Barbara Madsen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The issue this case presented centered on the test to be applied when determining whether to instruct the jury on a lesser included or lesser degree offense. Under Washington v. Workman, 584 P.2d 382 (1978), a defendant was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction if: (1) each of the elements of the lesser offense was a necessary element of the offense charged (legal prong); and (2) evidence in the case supported an inference that the lesser crime was committed (factual prong). Although the Washington Supreme Court continued to follow the Workman test, confusion arose after some of its opinions expressed Workman’s factual prong as requiring evidence “that only the lesser included/inferior degree offense was committed to the exclusion of the [greater] charged offense.” Tanner Coryell was charged with two counts of assault. The first count was second degree assault by means of strangulation and the second count was fourth degree assault. Coryell requested a lesser included offense instruction for fourth degree assault for count one. In support of his request, Coryell argued that any force he used was in self-defense and defense of his property or that his actions did not prevent Autumn Hart’Lnenicka from breathing. The Supreme Court determined Coryell was still entitled to a lesser included offense instruction when a jury could reasonably find, based on evidence submitted and the jury’s decision about whether it was credible or not, that the defendant committed only the lesser offense. Coryell’s conviction was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Stanger v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 WY 43

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Gray

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court remanded this criminal case to the district court sentencing Defendant for methamphetamine possession, holding that this Court could not reach the issue on appeal of whether the district court erred when it used Defendant's prior Missouri conviction as a basis for an enhanced sentence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 35-7-1031(c)(i). Defendant entered into a conditional guilty plea agreement reserving the right to appeal his conviction based on his argument that his prior Missouri convictions did not subject him to enhanced penalties b because they were not violations of a "similar law" under the Wyoming statute. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the Court could not determine from the record which statutes or ordinances underlay Defendant's prior convictions.