| United States v. Baez-Martinez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1289 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) sentence, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Defendant's prior conviction for second-degree murder and two prior convictions for attempted murder were violent felonies, thus triggering the ACCA's fifteen-year mandatory minimum. Defendant was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The presentence investigation report stated that the ACCA applied, meaning that Defendant was subject to a statutory minimum of fifteen years' imprisonment. The district court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years. After the Supreme Court declared the residual clause of the ACCA's definition of "violent felony" unconstitutional the Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded to determine whether the ACCA still applied. On remand, the district court determined that second-degree murder and attempted murder are violent felonies and again sentenced Defendant to fifteen years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's conviction for second-degree murder and his two convictions for attempted murder satisfied the ACCA's three-predicate-felony rule. |
| |
| Johnson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-2423 Opinion Date: February 7, 2020 Judge: Rendell Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Johnson and Wright were charged with murder. Before trial, Wright confessed to his involvement in the crime and identified Johnson as the shooter. The prosecution introduced Wright’s confession at trial, substituting Johnson’s name with “the other guy” in an attempt to avoid a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation. Johnson’s identity as the “other guy” was explicitly revealed at the trial's beginning and end. The court instructed the jury to ignore Wright’s confession when considering Johnson’s culpability, but a question from the jury indicated that they were having great difficulty doing so. Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder. The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that there was no violation of the Supreme Court’s “Bruton” holding; the substitution of “other guy,” plus the jury instructions were adequate to protect Johnson’s rights under Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent. A federal district court concluded that a Bruton violation had occurred but was harmless. The Third Circuit reversed. In these circumstances. courts cannot rely on a juror’s ability to put such inculpatory statements out of their minds; the statement’s admission violates the non-confessing co-defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause and requires a new trial if he has been prejudiced by such damaging evidence. The court noted that the jury, faced with a lack of overwhelming inculpatory evidence against Johnson, and significant credibility issues with the prosecution’s key witnesses, struggled for six days to reach a verdict. |
| |
| Ragbir v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1282 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Smith Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Ragbir, a green card holder from Trinidad and Tobago, was convicted of mortgage fraud in 2000. On his attorney’s advice, Ragbir agreed that the actual loss was $350,000-$500,000, believing that his convictions alone made him deportable. The Third Circuit affirmed Ragbir’s convictions and sentence. Ragbir never sought post-conviction relief. DHS commenced removal proceedings. Ragbir then learned that his stipulation to a loss of more than $10,000 made him deportable. Ragbir’s immigration counsel represented that an attorney would be hired to attempt to vacate the underlying convictions. Ragbir still did not pursue a collateral attack. The IJ ordered him removed; the BIA and Second Circuit upheld the decision. In the meantime, Ragbir married an American citizen and obtained an immigrant visa. The BIA denied a motion to reopen. DHS eventually elected not to renew its discretionary stay of removal. Ragbir then challenged his detention, asserting that his conviction should be overturned because jury instructions given at his trial were erroneous in light of later Supreme Court rulings and asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Ragbir had the ability to bring all his claims at least six years before his 2012 petition for coram nobis. He provides no sound reason for his delay. |
| |
| United States v. Hoffert |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1720 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Scirica Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Hoffert, incarcerated since 2003, made requests for documents from various governmental entities after he began serving his sentence. Dissatisfied with the responses, Hoffert filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of that complaint. Hoffert then filed an administrative tort claim with the Torts Branch of the Department of Justice’s Civil Division, seeking $7,396,800,000 for his allegedly unlawful incarceration, which he claimed was “beyond the lawful Decrees of the Laws of Commerce and without use of a compact/contract/agreement between the Claimant and the U.S. Inc.’s subcorporation, PENNSYLVANIA.” The claim was rejected. Hoffert wrote a threatening letter to the director of the Torts Branch, then filed a “Claim of Commercial Lien Affidavit [and] Notice of Non-Judicial Proceeding” in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds, Erie County, Pennsylvania, naming five federal officials as lien debtors. Hoffert asked the U.S. Marshals Service to “begin collection/liquidation of all their movable assets” Hoffert was convicted five counts of filing or attempting to file a false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of an officer or employee of the federal government, 18 U.S.C. 1521 and was sentenced to 48 months to be served consecutive to his current sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges that section 1521 is unconstitutionally vague and an overbroad restriction of protected speech and to the sufficiency of the evidence. |
| |
| Bah v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-1877 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Rushing Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that Petitioner was removable on account of his conviction for possession of ethylene, a substance that is illegal under both Virginia and federal law, holding that Petitioner's conviction renders him removable even though Virginia's controlled substance statute is broader than its federal counterpart. Petitioner, a native and citizen of Sierra Leone, was found guilty by a Virginia court of possession of ethylene. Thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner, alleging that he was removable because he had been convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance in violation of Va. Code 18.2-250. The Immigration Judge deemed Petitioner removable. Before the BIA, Petitioner argued that the Virginia statute was overbroad and was indivisible. The BIA rejected Petitioner's argument. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that section 18.2-250(A), while overbroad, was divisible by substance, and the modified categorical approach was appropriate. |
| |
| United States v. Horton |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-11577 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: James Earl Graves, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Phillip Horton appealed his sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Horton argued the district court erred in assessing criminal history points, failing to adjust his sentence for time served on an undischarged state sentence, ordering the instant sentence to run consecutively to anticipated state sentences, and failing to adequately explain its decision to impose the sentence. After review, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found no abuse of the district court's discretion in arriving at Horton's sentence, and affirmed it. |
| |
| Robinson v. Horton |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-1979 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Robinson was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Under Michigan’s complex sentencing scheme, the judge sentenced Robinson as a fourth habitual offender to “concurrent terms of 47-1/2 to 120 years’ imprisonment for the assault and felon-in-possession convictions, to be served consecutive to two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.” The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed; the Michigan Supreme Court denied review. Robinson then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. On appeal, Robinson argued that Supreme Court and state decisions postdating his sentencing have established that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Robinson’s sentencing claim undoubtedly has merit; the Supreme Court’s Alleyne decision clearly established the unconstitutionality of Michigan’s sentencing regime. However, Robinson did not “fairly present” his sentencing claim to the Michigan Supreme Court and failed to exhaust that claim in state court. On remand, the district court should decide whether to dismiss Robinson’s sentencing claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust or to stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while Robinson returns to state court to exhaust that claim. Stay and abeyance is appropriate only “when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court” and when the claims are not “plainly meritless.” |
| |
| United States v. Ramamoorthy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1033 Opinion Date: February 7, 2020 Judge: Larsen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Ramamoorthy, an Indian citizen living in the U.S., took a redeye flight, sitting between his wife and Laura. Laura claims she suddenly awoke to find her pants unzipped and Ramamoorthy shoving his fingers into her vagina. She alerted the flight attendants. Airport police met Ramamoorthy in the jetway, asking “What’s going on?” Ramamoorthy began talking about Laura, claiming that she fell asleep on him and that he did not know where he had put his hands. Ramamoorthy made a written statement that Laura had slept on him, that he had been in a “deep sleep,” and that he did not remember where he had put his hands. The officers arrested Ramamoorthy. Before asking Ramamoorthy any questions, FBI agents gave him a written Miranda waiver form. Ramamoorthy signed it after reading his rights aloud and discussing them for several minutes. Ramamoorthy admitted that he had tried to put his fingers inside Laura’s pants. An indictment accused Ramamoorthy of both attempted and completed sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. 2242(2), which have the same punishment. Ramamoorthy moved to suppress his statements to the FBI, claiming that he did not speak English fluently. He did not seek to suppress his statements to the airport police. The court denied the motion, finding Ramamoorthy “articulate." A jury instruction explained that completed sexual abuse and attempted sexual abuse were two ways of committing sexual abuse, “all twelve of you must agree that at least one of these has been proved; however, all of you need not agree that the same one has been proved.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed Ramamoorthy's conviction and 108-month sentence, rejecting claims that his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because his indictment was duplicitous and that the statements he made to airport police and to the FBI should have been suppressed. |
| |
| United States v. Serrano |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-5186, 19-5141 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Nalbandian Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Cavazos and Serrano transported cocaine from Texas to Kentucky at the request of undercover FBI officers. Both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. The government gave notice that 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) subjected them to enhanced statutory punishments because of prior felony drug convictions. Cavazos unsuccessfully objected to basing the enhancement on his 2004 federal conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Serrano orally affirmed his prior conviction. The court calculated Cavazos’s sentencing range as 84-105 months. The statutory minimum enhanced the Guidelines recommendation to 120 months; the court imposed that sentence. The court found that Serrano’s prior federal conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver cocaine and prior Texas conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver qualified as predicate offenses under USSG 4B1.2; calculated Serrano’s guidelines range to be 262-327 months; and sentenced Serrano to 262 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Cavazos’s sentence. The court properly applied the enhancement; 21 U.S.C. 851(e) prevents any challenge to a prior conviction used to enhance the statutory penalty under section 841(b)(1)(B) when five years have elapsed between the prior conviction and “the information alleging such prior conviction.” The court vacated Serrano’s sentence. The Texas law under which Serrano was previously convicted included attempted delivery of controlled substances and was too broad to categorically qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under section 4B1.2. |
| |
| Williams v. Burt |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-1461 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for his role in a drive-by shooting outside a Detroit nightclub. The trial was marked by outbursts, threats toward witnesses, and offensive language by witnesses, spectators, and counsel. After a particularly contentious incident involving a witness and defense counsel, the court took protective action, temporarily closing the courtroom to spectators before reopening it a few days later. On direct appeal, and in this habeas proceeding, Williams argued that the temporary closure violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Williams’s trial counsel failed to object to the closure, so Williams defaulted his public trial claim in the state proceeding. He has not overcome that failure by showing that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective, which might otherwise constitute cause and prejudice excusing the default. Regardless of whether closing the courtroom was an error, Williams cannot establish that his defense was prejudiced by the closure. The vast majority of his trial took place in an open setting, transcripts were made available from the limited sessions that took place behind closed doors, and the closure had no discernable effect on the judge, counsel, or jury. Nor did the temporary closure “lead to basic unfairness.” |
| |
| United States v. Collins |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1176 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| In 2011-2016, Collins was the executive director of the Kankakee Valley Park District. The Park District, which is not tax-exempt, works with the Kankakee Valley Park Foundation, which does have tax-exempt status and raises funds for Park District programs. Collins served as treasurer for the Foundation. It came to light that he had been lining his own pockets with the Park District and Foundation’s money. He pleaded guilty to mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 42 months’ imprisonment, two-year terms of supervised release, and overall restitution of $194,383.51. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in calculating his sentencing range and that Collins forfeited the right to complain about the restitution because he failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the district court’s amended judgment. The actual loss amount easily exceeded $150,000, which is the amount associated with a 10-level boost in the base guideline level for U.S.S.G. 2B1.1. More than a guilty plea is necessary before a district court ought to award a discount for acceptance of responsibility. The court fully supported its factual finding that Collins had not fully acknowledged his crimes. |
| |
| United States v. Grayson Enterprises, Inc. |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1367 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law, White Collar Crime |
| Grayson does business under the name Gire Roofing. Grayson and Edwin Gire were indicted for visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1546 and harboring and employing unauthorized aliens, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). On paper, Gire had no relationship to Grayson as a corporate entity. He was not a stockholder, officer, or an employee. He managed the roofing (Grayson’s sole business), as he had under the Gire Roofing name for more than 20 years. The corporate papers identified Grayson’s president and sole stockholder as Young, Gire’s girlfriend. Gire, his attorney, and the government all represented to the district court that Gire was Grayson’s president. The court permitted Gire to plead guilty on his and Grayson’s behalf. Joint counsel represented both defendants during a trial that resulted in their convictions and a finding that Grayson’s headquarters was forfeitable. Despite obtaining separate counsel before sentencing, neither Grayson nor Young ever complained about Gire’s or prior counsel’s representations. Neither did Grayson object to the indictment, the plea colloquy, or the finding that Grayson had used its headquarters for harboring unauthorized aliens. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Grayson identified numerous potential errors in the proceedings none are cause for reversal. Grayson has not shown that it was deprived of any right to effective assistance of counsel that it may have had and has not demonstrated that the court plainly erred in accepting the guilty plea. The evidence is sufficient to hold Grayson vicariously liable for Gire’s crimes. |
| |
| United States v. Guzman-Ramirez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1960 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A supplier hired Guzman-Ramirez and Gonzalez to import cocaine into Wisconsin. Gonzalez was to haul the cocaine to Chicago. Guzman-Ramirez would help remove the cocaine from a hidden compartment and, with assistance, bring half of the cocaine to Milwaukee and store it at Guzman-Ramirez’s house or auto-body shop. The supplier asked another associate (a DEA informant) to assist. During the Chicago meeting, Guzman-Ramirez expressed familiarity with the amount of cocaine and how the secret compartment worked. Because of complications, Guzman-Ramirez returned to Milwaukee without the drugs. The next day, officers searched the semi-trailer and removed 50.12 kilograms of cocaine. Guzman-Ramirez pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Gonzalez also pled guilty. A probation officer concluded that Guzman-Ramirez did not have an aggravating role in the conspiracy but that his role was significant. Guzman-Ramirez unsuccessfully sought a two-level reduction because he agreed only to transport and store the drugs and had no decision-making authority. Applying the safety-valve provisions (18 U.S.C. 3553(f)) resulted in a guidelines range of 87-108 months’ imprisonment; the court imposed a sentence of 72 months. A different judge sentenced Gonzalez to 48 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court should have applied a minor-role adjustment and that, compared to his coconspirator’s sentence, Guzman-Ramirez’s sentence was unreasonable. The court was not required to consider a sentence that had not yet been imposed. |
| |
| United States v. Williams |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3318 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Two men entered a Sprint store with a gun, threatened and zip‐tied all witnesses, grabbed merchandise, and fled the store in two vehicles. Williams, a getaway driver, was indicted for obstruction of commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Judge Bruce presided over his jury trial. Williams was convicted. Months later, it became public that Judge Bruce had engaged in ex parte communications with members of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. All criminal cases assigned to Judge Bruce were reassigned. Judge Darrow presided over Williams's sentencing hearing and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Judge Bruce did not violate Williams’s due process rights on these facts. Although Judge Bruce’s conduct created an appearance of impropriety violating the federal recusal statute, there is no evidence of actual bias in this case to justify a new trial. Williams does not qualify as a career offender, but the district court’s finding otherwise was not plain error. Judge Darrow thoroughly considered the section 3553(a) factors, made clear that she would impose the same sentence even if the career offender provision did not apply, and explained her reasons for that position. There was sufficient evidence regarding the use of a firearm;Al the district court did not err in applying a firearm enhancement. |
| |
| United States v. Snow |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3577 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Stras Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in determining that defendant's prior Iowa drug convictions increased his statutory maximum and made him a career offender. The court also held that the district court did not err in making defendant's federal sentence consecutive to any term of imprisonment Iowa might impose for violating the conditions of his parole. |
| |
| Kirkpatrick v. Chappell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 14-99001 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Carlos T. Bea Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit panel filed an order amending its June 13, 2019 opinion affirming the district court's denial of William Kirkpatrick's habeas corpus petition challenging his death sentence for two counts of first-degree murder and denying Kirkpatrick's petition for rehearing, writing that, in light of the aggravating evidence, the jury still would have found that the death sentence was warranted. Specifically, the panel amended the petition to write that, in light of the substantial aggravating evidence presented in comparison to the minimal mitigation evidence, "absent improperly-considered facts," the jury still would have found that the "bad evidence" was so substantial in comparison with the "good" evidence that a sentence of death was warranted instead of life without parole. With these amendments, the Fourth Circuit denied Appellant's petition for panel rehearing. |
| |
| United States v. Gagarin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10026 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Ronald Murray Gould Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for aggravated identity theft, a three-level sentence enhancement, and the restitution order in this case, holding that sufficient evidence supported each element of the offense and that the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in the proceedings below. Defendant's convictions arose from her participation in a scheme to defraud a life insurance company by submitting fraudulent insurance applications. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) the district court did not commit significant procedural error by imposing a three-level "manager or supervisor" enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b); and (3) there was no error in the district court's restitution order. |
| |
| Johnson v. Spencer |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 17-8089 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Jerome A. Holmes Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| In 2013, a Wyoming court declared Andrew Johnson actually innocent of crimes for which he was then incarcerated. In 2017, after his release, Johnson brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming, the Estate of Detective George Stanford (“the Estate”), and Officer Alan Spencer, alleging they were responsible for violations of his constitutional rights that contributed to his conviction. While incarcerated, however, Johnson had unsuccessfully brought similar suits against Cheyenne and Detective Stanford in 1991 (“1991 Action”) and against Officer Spencer in 1992 (“1992 Action”). The central question before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was what effect the judgments against Johnson in his 1991 and 1992 Actions had on his 2017 Action. Answering this question required the Court to resolve two primary issues: (1) in addition to filing the 2017 Action, Johnson moved the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from the judgments in the 1991 and 1992 Actions, which Johnson contended the district court erred in denying; and (2) Cheyenne, the Estate and Officer Spencer each successfully moved to dismiss the 2017 Action because its claims were precluded by judgments in the 1991 and 1992 Actions, and Johnson likewise contended the court’s decision was made in error. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred by denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief, and so those orders were vacated for reconsideration under the correct legal rubric. Because of the Court’s remand of Johnson’s Rule 60(b)(6) motions did not actually grant such relief (Rule 60(b)(6) relief is discretionary), the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of the 2017 Action. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against Cheyenne and the Estate because the judgment in the 1991 action was entitled to claim--reclusive effect. The Court reversed, however, dismissal of the claims against Officer Spencer because the judgment in 1992 was not on the merits, and thus, was not entitled to claim--reclusive effect. |
| |
| United States v. Cooper |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 17-3057 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Arthur Raymond Randolph Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The DC Circuit affirmed Defendants Cooper and Bryant's appeal of their convictions and sentences for theft of public money and conspiracy to defraud the United States. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Cooper's statements could be used at trial where the evidence showed that Cooper's statements were given freely and voluntarily; a special agent's testimony did not meaningfully prejudice the defense; the district court did not err by denying Cooper's motion for a mistrial during the government's rebuttal where the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence applicable to Cooper, and the occasional inadvertent references to "these defendants" when discussing acts not attributable to Cooper were quickly remedied; and the district court's calculation of the restitution amount was appropriate. |
| |
| Beard v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 62 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of one count of rape and two counts of second-degree sexual assault and sentence of life imprisonment plus forty years, holding that the circuit court erred in overruling Defendant's objection when an investigator testified that she found the allegations of sexual abuse were true and that the victims were "very credible." On appeal, the State conceded that the circuit court erred in admitting the investigator's testimony about the victims' credibility. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the error was harmless. The Supreme Court held that where the victims' testimony was the only evidence supporting conviction it cannot be said that the circuit court's error in admitting the testimony was slight. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial. |
| |
| Halfacre v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 60 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Josephine L. Hart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err in rejecting Appellant's petition. Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery. In his habeas petition, Appellant argued that his aggravated robbery convictions were invalid because the criminal statutes under which he was convicted were unconstitutional. The circuit court rejected Appellant's argument. On appeal, Appellant further argued that the state habeas corpus statute is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the aggravated robbery statute does not violate the Arkansas Constitution; and (2) Appellant's challenge to the constitutionality of the habeas corpus statute is waived because it was not raised or ruled on below. |
| |
| Muhammad v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 61 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Josephine L. Hart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Appellant's petition. In dismissing Appellant's petition the circuit court found that the petition was defective because Appellant had failed to attach a copy of his judgment and commitment order or provide a legal excuse for the omission and, further, that Petitioner's claim was without merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that because Appellant's habeas petition failed to comply with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-103(b) the circuit court properly dismissed the petition. |
| |
| Weeks v. Thurston |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 64 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court disqualifying district judge Adam Weeks from the ballot for the judicial office of the Third Judicial District, Division Three, Circuit Judge in the March 3, 2020 election, holding that a conviction under Ark. Code Ann. 27-14-306 does not require the finder of fact to find, or the defendant to admit, an act of deceit, fraud, or false statement. The circuit court removed Weeks' name from the ballot because he was previously convicted for violating the "fictitious tags" statute, section 27-14-306. At issue was whether the statute constitutes a misdemeanor offense in which the finder of fact was required to find an act of deceit, fraud, or false statement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a violation of section 27-14-306 did not require a finding of admission of deceit, fraud, or false statement, and therefore, Weeks was eligible to run for public office. |
| |
| In re Gay |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S130263 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Kruger Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court granted Petitioner habeas corpus relief, holding that Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to the assistance of competent counsel at the guilt phase of his criminal trial, and trial counsel's deficient performance undermined the reliability of the jury's guilty verdict. Petitioner was convicted of the first degree murder of a police officer and sentenced to death. While his appeal was pending, Petitioner filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the judgment should be vacated because he had received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. During the habeas proceedings, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner's trial counsel had defrauded Petitioner in order to induce Petitioner to retain him instead of the public defender. Counsel went on to commit serious errors during the penalty phase undermining the reliability of the death verdict. The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered a new penalty phase trial. Petitioner later filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictions. The Supreme Court granted the writ and vacated Defendant's conviction for first degree murder, holding that Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of his trial. |
| |
| Alliance for Constitutional etc. v. Dept. of Corrections etc. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C087294(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Elena J. Duarte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The California Department of Corrections Rehabilitation (Department) challenged a trial court ruling striking down its regulation excluding from early parole consideration inmates serving sentences for current nonviolent sex offenses requiring them to register under Penal Code section 290. On appeal, the Department claimed its regulation was supported by Proposition 57’s overarching goal of protecting public safety and the requirement that the Secretary of the Department certify the Department’s regulations enhanced public safety. The Court of Appeal determined the regulation at issue contravened the plain language of the statute, so it affirmed the trial court’s ruling. |
| |
| California v. Johnson |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E069732(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Menetrez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Tajay Johnson and Kevin Hairston were both convicted by jury of one count of second degree robbery, one count of carjacking, one count of kidnapping to commit robbery, and one count of kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking. Johnson was 17 years old when he committed the offenses. Charges were originally filed against him in criminal court. However, after voters enacted Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 during the pendency of the criminal proceeding, Johnson’s case was transferred to juvenile court to determine whether he was fit to proceed as a juvenile or should be tried as an adult. Both defendants were ultimately sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for each of the kidnapping offenses. The sentences for robbery and carjacking were stayed under Penal Code section 654. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendants and the State that carjacking was a necessarily included lesser offense of kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking, and therefore reversed defendants’ convictions for carjacking. The Court further agreed with both parties that the abstracts of judgment had to be amended and that defendants’ sentences needed to be clarified. Defendants also challenged the imposition of various fines and fees as due process violations under California v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019). The Court concluded some of those claims were forfeited, and as to the remainder any error was harmless. A $40 crime prevention fine was stricken as unauthorized. Johnson singly argued that with respect to his being tried as an adult, he had a statutory right to a waive the juvenile fitness hearing, and his attorney could not do so in his behalf. The Court disagreed with Johnson's contention. The matter was remanded for correction of abstract, and for imposition of a statutorily mandated $10 fine instead. |
| |
| California v. Marcus |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C087059(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Elena J. Duarte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Demetrious Marcus and an accomplice broke into an apartment occupied by an elderly couple and other family members. After robbing the victims at gunpoint, defendant and his partner left with various property and were chased by the son and grandson; the son was shot during the chase. A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree robbery, assault with a firearm, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and found true several enhancements for personal use of a firearm as well as allegations that defendant had suffered a prior strike, had a prior serious felony conviction, and had served a prior prison term. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 29 years in state prison. On appeal defendant contended the trial court erred in declining to excuse a juror who expressed concern for the safety of the alleged victims during deliberation, and by failing to recognize it had discretion to impose concurrent sentences for the robbery counts. He also sought a remand to allow the trial court, under recent statutory amendments, to exercise discretion to strike the prior serious felony enhancement. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court misunderstood its discretion to impose concurrent sentences for crimes committed on the same occasion or arising under the same set of operative facts and agree with the parties that a remand is necessary to allow the court to consider striking the prior serious felony enhancement. The Court also noted the trial court failed to specify a sentence on count four and directed it to do so on remand. |
| |
| California v. Strike |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G056949(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Raymond J. Ikola Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The sole issue on appeal is whether defendant Christopher Strike’s prior gang participation conviction qualified as a strike under California's "Three Strikes" law. The State alleged defendant was convicted in 2007 of violating Penal Code section 186.22(a), and that this conviction was a prior serious felony under the Three Strikes law. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegation. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court engaged in impermissible “judicial factfinding” in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by finding facts that established his prior conviction qualified as a strike. The Court of Appeal found that at the time defendant entered his plea, an individual could be convicted of violating section 186.22(a) as a sole perpetrator. Five years later, in California v. Rodriguez, 55 Cal.4th 1125 (2012), the California Supreme Court clarified section 186.22(a) was not violated by a gang member acting alone but is violated only when an active gang member commits a felony offense with one or more members of his or her gang. During the trial proceedings in 2017, the court was tasked with determining whether defendant had admitted all the elements of section 186.22(a) as now understood, when, in 2007, he pleaded guilty to violating section 186.22(a); specifically, whether defendant had admitted committing a felony offense with at least one other member of his gang. The trial court considered not only the facts defendant admitted as the factual basis for his 2007 guilty plea, but also factual allegations in the 2007 charging document concerning the prior gang participation offense. Based on allegations in the charging document that the codefendant was a member of defendant’s gang, the court found defendant’s prior conviction constituted a strike. The Court of Appeal found that the record did not show that defendant admitted the factual allegations contained in the 2007 charging document as part of the factual basis for his guilty plea, therefore the trial court did indeed engage in impermissible judicial factfinding. Accordingly, defendant’s prior strike had to be stricken, his sentence vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
| |
| California v. Yanez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E070556M(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Fields Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Salvador Yanez IV was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the 2015 shooting death of Gilbert Lopez. The shooting followed a verbal argument between the two. In addition to murder, defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury also found true special allegations that defendant discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury or death in the commission of the murder. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant had suffered a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony pursuant to Penal Code section 667(a) and a prior strike conviction pursuant to section 667(b)-(i). Defendant was sentenced to a total of 60 years to life in state prison, representing 30 years to life for the murder conviction, an additional 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, and an additional consecutive five years for the prior serious felony conviction. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert gang testimony which should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352; (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct warranting reversal by referencing jury deliberations during argument on defendant’s motion to strike his firearm enhancement conviction; (3) defendant was not given constitutionally adequate advisement when waiving his right to a jury trial on his prior conviction and prior strike allegations; (4) the matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise discretion to impose a lesser, uncharged firearm enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53(h); and (5) the matter should have been remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike a five-year enhancement pursuant to recent amendments made to sections 667 and 1385. The Court of Appeal concurred with the latter, and remanded the matter for resentencing pursuant to amended sections 667 and 1385. In all other respects, it affirmed judgment. |
| |
| People v. Cerda |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B232572(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 7, 2020 Judge: Hanasono Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants were convicted of one count of murder and twenty-three counts of attempted premeditated murder with gang and firearm enhancements. While defendants' appeals were pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended the laws related to malice and accomplice liability for murder. The Legislature also enacted Senate Bill No. 620, which gave trial courts discretion to strike or dismiss certain firearm enhancements. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal vacated the January 23, 2015 nonpublished opinion. In the published portion of the opinion, the court discussed why the evidence was sufficient to support the kill zone theory of liability. The court held that substantial evidence supported defendants' intent to kill everyone within the respective kill zones at the Katrina Place and Morning Circle shootings. |
| |
| People v. Petri |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H045990(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Patricia Bamattre-Manoukian Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The defendant pleaded no contest to grand theft and admitted that he had served one prior prison term. In another case, he pleaded no contest to embezzlement and also admitted to one prior prison term. At a combined sentencing hearing, the court sentenced the defendant to four years in jail with 577 days of custody credits. In each case, the court ordered the defendant to pay a restitution fine of $300, a court operations assessment of $40 and a court facilities assessment of $30. The court struck the prior prison term enhancement in one case. The court of appeal affirmed but modified, rejecting an argument that the trial court violated the defendant’s due process rights under the California and federal Constitutions because it failed to find that he had the present ability to pay the amounts imposed. The court found an argument that the court erred in denying him additional presentence custody credits for time spent in custody in Ohio moot. In the second case, the prior prison term enhancement must be stricken because the enhancement no longer applies; Senate Bill No. 136 amended Penal Code 667.5(b), so the enhancement applies only if the prior prison term was “for a sexually violent offense.” |
| |
| Juarez v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 8 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Coats Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Alfredo Juarez appealed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. In 2012, Juarez pleaded guilty to one class 1 misdemeanor count of possessing a schedule V controlled substance, in exchange for the dismissal of a charge of felony possession. As stipulated in the plea agreement, he received a sentence to two years of drug court probation. At the time of his offense and plea, the defendant was a citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. A month after his sentencing, the defendant violated the conditions of his probation, received a suspended two-day jail sentence, and two weeks later, after violating the conditions of that suspension, served those two days in jail. After he received an additional three-day jail sentence for again violating his probation, federal Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) officers began removal proceedings. Defendant was eventually deported to Mexico. In October 2012 and January 2013, defendant filed motions for postconviction relief, challenging the effectiveness of his plea counsel’s representation and, as a result, the constitutional validity of his guilty plea. Over a period of three days, the district court heard these motions, including the testimony of defendant, taken by video over the internet; the testimony of his plea counsel; and the testimony of an immigration attorney retained by him in 2011, prior to his acceptance of the plea agreement. With regard to his challenge to the effectiveness of his counsel, the district court found both that defense counsel adequately advised his client concerning the immigration consequences of his plea of guilty to misdemeanor drug possession and that, in any event, there was no reasonable probability Juarez would not have taken the plea. The intermediate appellate court similarly found that counsel’s advice fell within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, but as a result of that finding, the appellate court considered it unnecessary to address the question whether counsel’s performance prejudiced Juarez. The Colorado Supreme Court thus concluded that because Juarez conceded he was advised and understood that the misdemeanor offense to which he pleaded guilty would make him “deportable,” defense counsel’s advice concerning the immigration consequences of his plea correctly informed him of the controlling law and therefore did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness required for effective assistance concerning immigration advice. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore affirmed. |
| |
| Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20124 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Ecker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the habeas court, which dismissed Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that Petitioner's federal immigration detention did not satisfy the "custody" requirement of Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-466(a). Petitioner, who was not a United States citizen, pleaded guilty to illegal possession of marijuana. After his release, Petitioner traveled outside the United States, was denied reentry, and was ordered removed on the basis of the possession of marijuana conviction. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his Connecticut conviction, arguing that his guilty plea was involuntary. The habeas court denied the petition. The Appellate Court affirmed on the alternative ground that Petitioner was not in custody pursuant to section 52-466(a)(1) at the time he filed his habeas petition and, therefore, that the habeas court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) improperly declined to review Petitioner's response to the alternative ground for affirmance advanced by the Commissioner of Correction, but the error was harmless; and (2) the habeas court properly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. |
| |
| Cannon v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Dockets: SC19-84, SC19-973 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying in part Marvin Cannon's initial postconviction motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and denied Cannon's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Cannon was not entitled to relief on his claims. Cannon was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes and sentenced to death. Cannon later filed his initial motion for postconviction relief, asserting that he was entitled to resentencing under Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), that counsel was ineffective, and that the Department of Corrections' website reflected he was still serving a fifteen-year sentence for attempted robbery even though that conviction was vacated on direct appeal. The trial court agreed with Cannon's Hurst claim and vacated his death sentence but denied the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cannon was not denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel and that the postconviction court properly denied Cannon's second claim. In his habeas petition, Cannon alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a procedurally barred claim. |
| |
| Doty v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-973 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence of death imposed in connection with his conviction for the murder of a fellow prison inmate, holding that Defendant's claims on appeal were without merit and that Defendant's death sentence was proportionate in comparison to other capital cases. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors were sufficient to warrant a death sentence and that they outweighed the mitigating factors; (2) the trial court adequately considered Defendant's request for a nonbinding recommendation to the Department of Corrections and did not act under any mistaken impression of the law; and (3) Defendant's sentence was proportional. |
| |
| Mungin v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-635 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court denying Appellant's third successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant's claims were procedurally barred as untimely. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Fourteen years later, Appellant filed his third successive postconviction motion, asserting that the State committed a Brady violation and a Giglio violation and, alternatively, that defense counsel was ineffective and that newly discovered evidence was likely to produce an acquittal at retrial. The postconviction court denied the claims on the merits after holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding that the claims raised in Appellant's third successive postconviction motion were untimely because they because discoverable through due diligence more than a year before the motion was filed. |
| |
| DeLoach v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S19A1299, S19X1300 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Arheem DeLoach was convicted by jury on two counts of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the deaths of Rashad Biggins and Jamell Law. In Case No. S19A1299, DeLoach contended the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial with respect to the crimes committed against Law, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective in two ways: (1) counsel failed to move to sever the counts involving Law from those involving Biggins, and (2) counsel failed to object or to move for a mistrial when the trial judge mentioned the appellate process before giving the final jury charge. In Case No. S19X1300, the State cross-appealed, contending the trial court erred in granting DeLoach a new trial with respect to the crimes committed against Biggins. The State argued that the trial court’s basis for granting a new trial, that the prosecutor knowingly failed to correct material, false testimony from a key witness, was is unsupported by the record. The Georgia Supreme Court concurred with the reasons given below in Division 2, affirmed that portion of the trial court’s judgment. As set forth in Division 3, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment because the record did not support the trial court’s finding that the false testimony was material. |
| |
| Georgia v. Bryant |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1145 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A grand jury indicted Archie Bryant and Jose Carrillo in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Shawn Rhinehart. The indictment charged Bryant with malice murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Bryant elected to proceed under reciprocal discovery. The State brought an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order to exclude certain evidence on the basis that the evidence was not produced until just over a month before trial, or had not been produced at all, in violation of the trial court’s pre-trial scheduling order. The trial court’s order could stand only if it properly found the State acted with bad faith and that defendant was prejudiced as a result. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court’s order was ambiguous both as to whether the court actually found bad faith on the part of the State at all and as to the basis for the trial court’s finding of prejudice to the defendant. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded for the trial court to clarify its ruling on the defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence. |
| |
| Georgia v. Lane |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1424 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Antiwan Lane was convicted by jury of malice murder and other charges for procuring the murder of Ivan Perez. The trial court granted Lane a new trial based on a host of grounds, including evidentiary errors and ineffective assistance of counsel. The State appealed, arguing that none of the claimed errors by counsel or the trial court resulted in sufficient prejudice or harm to require reversal. Given the large number of errors at issue, the Georgia Supreme Court first reconsidered and overruled its prior precedent that precluded full consideration of the cumulative effect of multiple errors at trial. The Court then concluded counsel was ineffective in at least two respects and the trial court made at least one key evidentiary error in overruling a defense objection. Lastly, given the combined prejudicial effect of multiple errors by counsel and the trial court, the Court affirmed the grant of a new trial. |
| |
| Georgia v. Williams |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19G0005 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals reversed Kenneth Williams’ conviction for aggravated sexual battery based on its conclusion that the trial court gave an erroneous charge to the jury concerning an underage victim’s capacity to consent. The State appealed, arguing the jury instruction did not constitute plain error to warrant reversal of the conviction. The Georgia Supreme Court concurred: the victim was young, the conduct was clearly sexual in nature, the adult was an authority figure in the child’s life, and the evidence was strong. The Court surmised it was unlikely that the trial court’s instruction affected the jury’s decision to return a verdict of guilty for the charge of aggravated sexual battery. “In other words, the jury instruction error did not constitute plain error here given the circumstances.” Accordingly, judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed as it pertained to Williams’ conviction for aggravated sexual battery. |
| |
| Gittens v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1044 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Joseph Gittens was convicted by jury of malice murder in connection with the death of fellow inmate Johnny Johnson. Gittens argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, that he was denied the right to communicate freely with counsel, and that newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. Finding no merit to these claims, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that each claim was without merit and affirmed. |
| |
| Howell v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1182 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Aaron Howell was convicted by jury of malice murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery in connection with the beating death of Paul Guerrant. Howell argued on appeal that the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by admitting other-act evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b). After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Howell’s murder conviction, although it vacated his convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery to correct merger errors. |
| |
| London v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1637 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| LaParrish London was convicted by jury of the malice murder of Eric Terrell. On appeal, he argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial; (3) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay; and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed London’s conviction. |
| |
| Mitchell v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1330 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Tony Mitchell was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Randy Lewis. On appeal, Mitchell contended his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because she failed to competently execute her chosen strategy of discrediting the jailhouse informant who testified that Mitchell had confessed to having killed Lewis. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
| |
| Mitchell v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1147 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Sandy Mitchell, Jr., was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Byron Brown. On appeal, Mitchell argued his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to certain trial testimony from a detective in this case on the grounds that it was improper expert opinion, and that other testimony offered by the same detective was admitted in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Mitchell also contended the trial court erred in permitting the detective to testify about the alleged Brady violation evidence and in admitting a particular autopsy photograph into evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
| |
| Naples v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1571 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Naples was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the death of 17-month-old Kaylee Johnson. Investigation revealed the child died from inoperable brain swelling from either having her head slammed against a hard object or having been thrown down a flight of stairs. Naples appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it admitted “other acts” evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”) and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
| |
| Richardson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0306 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Sylvester Richardson was convicted by jury of murder and other crimes relating to the fatal shooting of Christopher Wilson. He appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it denied a motion for a mistrial and when it admitted evidence that he was involved in a gang. Richardson also contended he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. |
| |
| Taylor v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1588 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Antonio Taylor was convicted by jury of murder and other crimes in connection with the stabbing death of Araminta Elly. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred when it admitted certain hearsay testimony and when it denied his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecution’s alleged use of his pre-arrest silence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
| |
| Thomas v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1503 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Daniel Thomas was convicted by jury for malice murder in connection with the shooting death of Elliott Mizell. Thomas argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred by admitting an involuntary custodial statement; and that trial counsel was ineffective in two ways. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, finding the evidence was sufficient to support Thomas’s convictions; the custodial statement was not involuntary; and Thomas failed to show that his trial counsel was deficient as to one ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and failed to show prejudice as to the other. |
| |
| Walker v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1520 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Otheron Walker was convicted by jury of malice murder in connection with the beating death of his ten-month-old daughter, Daijah White. On appeal, Walker contended the evidence was insufficient, that the jury was improperly charged, and that trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
| |
| White v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1257 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Lazarus White was convicted by jury of malice murder and another crime in connection with the 2012 stabbing death of Terry Bell. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding Bell’s alleged act of violence against a third party and three instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
| |
| Idaho v. Roth |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46377 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Bevan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2011, a district court granted Aaron Roth a temporary furlough while he was in jail for a probation violation. Under the furlough order, Roth was released from custody. Roth failed to return. In 2017, six years after he absconded, Roth was arrested and later charged with escape, a felony under Idaho Code section 18-2505. A jury found Roth guilty of escape. Roth then moved the district court for a judgment of acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule (“I.C.R.”) 29, or in the alternative, to dismiss pursuant to I.C.R. 48(a)(2). The district court granted the motion to dismiss under I.C.R. 48(a)(2). The State appealed the district court’s dismissal. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court abused its discretion by dismissing Roth's case. "This ruling extended the reach of due process too far. ... Due process is not a rigid standard and is satisfied when a defendant is provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. Roth had his opportunity to be heard and was sufficiently notified of the furlough order’s requirements to satisfy due process based on the district court explaining the details of the furlough order on the record at the arraignment hearing. The fact, as found by the district court, that Roth did not receive a written copy of the furlough order does not vitiate the notice that Roth had received in court from the judge." The Supreme Court reversed dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. |
| |
| Commonwealth v. Loya |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12475 Opinion Date: February 6, 2020 Judge: Barbara A. Lenk Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree and related crimes, holding that Defendant was not deprived of a meaningful defense due to the current law on criminal responsibility and that there was no reason to reduce the verdict under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 28, 33E. At trial, defense counsel unsuccessfully claimed that a mental disorder caused Defendant to suffer delusions that compelled him to plan and commit the murder. On appeal, however, Defendant argued that the law on criminal responsibility made this defense not viable. Therefore, he argued he was deprived of a meaningful defense. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not commit reversible error by denying two motions filed by Defendant that advocated for a departure from the current la regarding the defense of a lack of criminal responsibility; and (2) while Defendant suffered from a qualifying mental disorder, he was nonetheless able to conform his actions to the law and to understand the wrongfulness of his actions. |
| |
| Brent v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-KA-00095-SCT Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Chamberlin Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| James Brent was tried by jury and convicted of armed robbery and kidnapping, and he was sentenced to serve two concurrent life sentences as a violent habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99- 19-83 (Rev. 2015). Brent appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Brent’s appellate counsel filed a "Lindsey" brief, certifying no arguable issues existed in the record. Brent himself filed a supplemental pro se brief, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support each of his convictions; (2) his retrial subjected him to double jeopardy; (3) a jury instruction effectively modified an essential element of armed robbery; and (4) the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove his status as a violent habitual offender under Section 99-19-83. Finding no arguable issues from the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed conviction and sentence. |
| |
| Johnson v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-00429-SCT Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Griffis Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In March 2015, James White was shot and killed in Brad Reed’s house in Clay County, Mississippi. A jury ultimately found Johnson guilty of first-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Johnson unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict challenging the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. Johnson filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. The trial court denied that motion too. On appeal, Johnson argued: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury; (3) his grand jury indictment was improper; and (4) his jury verdict form was erroneous. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found sufficient evidence was presented to support Johnson’s murder conviction; the indictment sufficiently notified Johnson of the charged crime, and the jury was properly instructed. Accordingly, Johnson’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. |
| |
| State v. Ward |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 36 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Shea Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of partner family member assault (PFMA), holding that Defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) was not susceptible to review on direct appeal and that Defendant failed to establish that the district court allowed testimonial material into the jury room during deliberations. On appeal, Defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to witnesses' and the State's references to his probation status and, further, referenced Defendant's probation status herself. Defendant also argued that the district court abused its discretion by sending testimonial materials into the jury room during deliberations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court will not address Defendant's IAC claim on direct appeal because the record was silent as to why defense counsel did not object to the probation references and testimony; and (2) the record did not establish that testimonial material was provided to the jury during its deliberations. |
| |
| State v. Assad |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 304 Neb. 979 Opinion Date: February 7, 2020 Judge: Papik Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's motion for postconviction relief without a hearing, holding that because Appellant did not even attempt to demonstrate that he was prejudiced as a result of appellate counsel's deficient performance, Appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief. After Appellant's convictions were affirmed on appeal Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief. As the basis for his petition, Appellant argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective and that he was not required to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance. The district court denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was required to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland and failed to do so. |
| |
| New Hampshire v. Papillon |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2018-0355 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Paulson Papillon was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit murder, and as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by: (1) concluding that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel; (2) admitting evidence, in violation of New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b), that he offered to facilitate the murder of another suspected police informant; and (3) finding the evidence sufficient to support his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
| |
| People v. Francis |
| Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 00996 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Garcia Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court denying Defendant's motion to set aside his sentence of six months of incarceration, imposed upon his guilty plea to third-degree criminal possession of a weapon, on the ground that the sentence was illegally lenient, holding that the denial of Defendant's motion was not reviewable. Over a fifteen-year period, Defendant committed numerous felonies, some of them violent, yet avoided enhanced sentences. In 1997, Defendant was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender based upon his criminal convictions in 1988 and 1991. In 2015, Defendant collaterally moved to set aside his 1988 sentence of six months of incarceration under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.20 on the ground that the sentence was illegally lenient. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that because Defendant was not adversely affected by the error in sentencing on the 1988 conviction, his motion must be rejected without consideration of its merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a defendant moves to vacate a sentence on the ground that it is illegally lenient, denial of the motion is not reviewable because any purported error in the proceedings has not adversely affected the defendant. |
| |
| City of West Fargo v. Ekstrom |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 37 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Mandie Le Ekstrom appealed after a jury found her guilty of driving under the influence. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying her motion to dismiss on state and federal constitutional double jeopardy grounds. However, the Court found the court erred in sentencing her because the jury did not find her chemical breath test result was .16 or greater. Therefore, conviction was affirmed, but the sentence was vacated and the matter was remanded for resentencing. |
| |
| North Dakota v. Gratton |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 41 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State charged Nicholas Gratton after an incident occurred in December 2018. He was charged with simple assault–domestic violence, terrorizing–domestic violence, theft of property, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. After considering the complaint and testimony presented, the district court dismissed the class C felony theft of property count, finding the charge lacked probable cause. The State appealed. The North Dakota Supreme Court found, after a review of the trial court record, the State produced sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for a charge of class C felony theft. The Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. |
| |
| North Dakota v. Jensen |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 31 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Randy Jensen appealed a district court order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Jensen was not given seven days to respond to the State’s answer brief under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(2), it reversed the district court order and remanded for an opportunity to respond. |
| |
| North Dakota v. Lyon |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 34 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Branden Lyon appealed from an amended criminal judgment sentencing him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In October 2015, Lyon was charged with attempted murder, terrorizing, terrorizing-domestic violence, and illegal possession of a firearm. These charges stemmed from a 2015 incident during which Lyon barricaded himself in a home and had an extended encounter with police officers. At one point during the encounter, Lyon shot at the police officers who had surrounded the home. A jury found Lyon guilty on all counts. On appeal, Lyon argued there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, and the district court erred by not adequately considering the sentencing factors set forth in statute. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. |
| |
| North Dakota v. Pagenkopf |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 33 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Mark Pagenkopf appealed a district court’s amended criminal judgment awarding restitution. In March 2019, Pagenkopf pleaded guilty to unlawful entry into a vehicle and theft of property under $500. In October 2018, Pagenkopf broke into the victim’s 2005 Chrysler Sebring and damaged the radio, speedometer glass, and HVAC controls. He also stole $400 worth of property from the trunk of the car. The State sought restitution for the damages caused by Pagenkopf. Before the restitution hearing was held, the victim was involved in a car accident. As a result, the victim’s car was totaled, and the victim was paid $2,000 from insurance. The damages to the victim’s car caused by Pagenkopf had not been repaired before the accident. On appeal, Pagenkopf argued the district court abused its discretion in awarding restitution because the victim did not incur any actual expenses because she did not repair the damages and because her car was subsequently totaled. Pagenkopf further argued the court erred in determining N.D. Const. art. I, section 25 prohibited it from considering that the victim’s car was totaled subsequent to the damages caused by Pagenkopf. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider the subsequent accident and awarding $2,314.35 in restitution. |
| |
| North Dakota v. Sah |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 38 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Lansana Sah appealed after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition and child abuse following denial of a motion for new trial. In 2017, an eleven year old middle school student disclosed to a counselor she and her siblings had been abused by their mother and stepfather, Sah. Sah was tried in 2019. Sah moved for a new trial, arguing his motion under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 should have been granted because the instances of abuse other than the “peppering” were inadmissible. The motion was denied. He appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of abuse other than the peppering, because these incidents were "prior bad acts," and the court did not give a cautionary instruction to the jury. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined these arguments went beyond the scope of those argued in the motion for a new trial. That motion "did not state with particularity how or why the evidence was inadmissible, and did not city to any legal authority." Sah's conclusory arguments that evidence was not admissible did not preserve the issue he raised before the Supreme Court on appeal. |
| |
| North Dakota v. Thomas |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 30 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Ross Thomas appealed after a jury found him guilty of felonious restraint. In February 2017, the State charged Thomas with aggravated assault, felonious restraint, terrorizing, and reckless endangerment. The case proceeded to trial in March 2018. A jury convicted Thomas of terrorizing, and acquitted him of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. It did not reach a verdict on the felonious restraint charge. Soon thereafter, the State gave notice of its intent to retry Thomas for felonious restraint. Thomas’s second trial was continued and ultimately was held in April 2019. Thomas argued the district court abused its discretion in granting the State’s request for a continuance because the State did not move for a continuance and there was no good cause for a continuance. The North Dakota Supreme Court found no abuse of the district court's discretion, and no other reversible error. Therefore, it affirmed his conviction. |
| |
| Ouradnik v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 39 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT) appealed a district court judgment reversing an administrative hearing officer’s decision to revoke Kyle Ouradnik’s driving privileges for a period of 91 days. The NDDOT argued the district court erred in reversing the administrative decision by ruling on an issue Ouradnik failed to preserve for appeal during his administrative hearing. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred, reversed the district court and reinstated the administrative hearing officer’s decision. |
| |
| Davis v. Sheldon |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-436 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the petition did not comply with the mandatory filing requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2725.04 and that Appellant's claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. Appellant was arrested and held in jail on a felony charge. The municipal court scheduled a preliminary hearing but then granted the State's motion for a continuance. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the county sheriff arguing that he was entitled to immediate release because the municipal court had failed to conduct a preliminary hearing within ten days after his arrest and that the continuance was fatally flawed. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's petition was fatally defective and that Appellant's claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. |
| |
| Robinson v. Fender |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-458 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Lake Erie Correctional Institution, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant's habeas petition for failure to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A). Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was entitled to immediate release from prison because his sentences had expired. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with section 2969.25(A). Appellant appealed. After briefing was completed, Appellant filed a motion for certified copies of the record. The Supreme Court denied the motion and affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal of the habeas petition, holding that dismissal was proper because Appellant did not comply with section 2969.25(A). |
| |
| State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-411 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition to vacate his criminal convictions, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Appellant's claims were barred by res judicata. Appellant was convicted of four counts of forgery and four counts of tampering with evidence. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the now-retired judge who presided over his criminal case and the judge who replaced the previous judge, claiming that his judgment of conviction should be vacated because certain evidence was improperly admitted at trial, venue was not properly established, his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, and the prosecutor committed misconduct. The court of appeals dismissed the petition sua sponte. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petition was properly dismissed because (1) the common pleas court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Appellant's criminal case; (2) Appellant's appeal of his criminal convictions constituted an adequate remedy at law; and (3) Appellant's claims were barred by res judicata. |
| |
| State ex rel. Kerr v. Turner |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-459 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the habeas corpus petition. In dismissing the petition, the court of appeals concluded that Appellant had failed to attach all his commitment papers to the petition and failed to state a proper claim for relief in habeas corpus. Further, the court found that the petition was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's failure to attach commitment papers related to his convictions was a fatal defect and that Appellant's petition failed to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. |
| |
| State ex rel. Roden v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-408 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC), holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant's complaint for his failure to submit the statement of inmate account required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C)(1). Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the DRC to aggregate his prison terms "in a manner consistent with the law." The court of appeals dismissed the petition sua sponte because Appellant had failed to comply with section 2969.25(C)(1). On appeal, Appellant argued that he filed with his petition an inmate account statement that substantially with section 2969.25(C). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 2969.25(C) does not permit substantial compliance the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant's complaint. |
| |
| State v. Craig |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-455 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: DeWine Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's appeal of his conviction for two counts in an indictment because of a "hanging charge," holding that, in this case, the trial court's finding that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial on the pending charge operated as a de facto severance of that count from the counts of conviction. A jury found Appellant guilty on two counts in an indictment and hung on a third count. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment on the two counts on which he was convicted, but the third count remained pending. Because of the "hanging charge," the court of appeals dismissed Appellant's appeal from his convictions for lack of a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a defendant is convicted and sentenced on fewer than all counts of a multicount indictment and the State is prevented from retrying the defendant on the remaining counts due to a finding that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the incompetency finding effectively severs the charges, and the defendant may appeal his or her conviction and sentence. |
| |
| South Carolina v. Spears |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27945 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: James Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Eric Spears was indicted for trafficking crack cocaine between ten and twenty-eight grams. Spears moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs seized from his person on the ground he was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Spears was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Spears to thirty years in prison. A divided court of appeals reversed Spears' conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision, and reversed, thus upholding Spears' conviction. The Supreme Court found evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Spears engaged in a consensual encounter with law enforcement and that Spears' subsequent actions created a reasonable suspicion that he may have been armed and dangerous - justifying law enforcement's Terry frisk that led to the discovery of the offending crack cocaine in Spears' pants. |
| |
| State v. Lujan |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 5 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Thomas R. Lee Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery on the ground that the legal framework established in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), is no longer viable and reinstated the jury verdict on the alternative basis that any arguable error in admitting eyewitness identification evidence in this case was harmless. Defendant was convicted based on eyewitness identification testimony and other evidence admitted at trial. The court of appeals reversed the conviction under the reliability factors set forth in Ramirez and on the ground that the improperly admitted eyewitness identifications were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals, however, also raised concerns about the viability of the standard set forth in Ramirez, indicating that the Ramirez framework must be revisited. The Supreme Court endorsed the need for revising and updating the factors set forth in Ramirez based on new developments in scientific and legal research regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony. The Court then held (1) admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony is to be measured in the first instance by the rules of evidence; and (2) in this case, any error in admitting such evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| |
| Flanders v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Virginia Docket: 181228 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: William C. Mims Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Appellant's conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for felony homicide because felony hit and run may serve as a predicate offense for a felony homicide conviction. Appellant was charged with felony hit and run and felony homicide for a single incident. Counsel for Appellant moved to strike the felony homicide charge at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, arguing that a hit and run in violation of Va. Code 46.2-894 was insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction of felony homicide. In response, the Commonwealth argued that a felony homicide was proper because the homicide was within the res gestae of the predicate hit and run. The trial court denied the motion to strike and found Appellant guilty of both charges. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant committed the hit and run with malice sufficient to elevate the killing to second-degree murder and that the victim's death occurred within the res gestae of the underlying hit and run. |
| |
| City of Cedarburg v. Hansen |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP001129 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Patience D. Roggensack Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court vacating Defendant's 2005 conviction by the Mid-Moraine Municipal Court of operating while intoxicated (OWI) in violation of a City of Cedarburg ordinance, holding that the municipal court had power to adjudicate the allegation that Defendant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of a municipal ordinance. When Defendant was again charged with OWI in 2016, Defendant collaterally attacked his 2005 conviction by proving that he had a 2003 OWI conviction in Florida. Defendant argued that, therefore, his 2005 OWI conviction was factually a second offense and outside of the municipal court's limited subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the 2005 judgment was void for lack of municipal court subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2005 municipal citations invoked the municipal court's subject matter jurisdiction, which was granted by Wis. Const. art. VII, 14; and (2) even if Wisconsin's statutory progressive OWI penalties were not followed in 2005, the municipal court would have lacked competence, not subject matter jurisdiction. |
| |
| State v. Counihan |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2017AP002265-CR Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court modified the decision of the court of appeals affirming Appellant's judgment of conviction and the denial of her motion for postconviction relief and affirmed as modified, holding that Appellant appropriately raised her challenge to the circuit court's use of previously unknown information during sentencing and that there was no due process violation in this case. On appeal, Appellant claimed, among other things, that the circuit court denied her due process at sentencing by failing to provide her with notice that it would consider previously unknown information first raised by the court at sentencing. The State responded that Appellant forfeited her direct challenge to the previously unknown information considered at sentencing because she failed to object at the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) where previously unknown information is raised by the circuit court at a sentencing hearing a defendant does not forfeit a direct challenge to the use of the information by failing to object at the hearing; and (2) Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the circuit court's use of the previously unknown information. |
| |
