Why the Supreme Court was Right Last Week to Deny Review of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decisions Handed Down Prior to the 2020 Election

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, JASON MAZZONE

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone argue that the U.S. Supreme Court correctly denied review last week of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions handed down before the 2020 election. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone explain why the majority denied review and point out that the dissenting opinions unwittingly demonstrate the rightness of the majority.

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LaChance v. Town of Charlton

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 20-1103

Opinion Date: March 3, 2021

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants - police officers and their employer - on the basis of qualified immunity in this case alleging, among other things, excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that the district court erred in granting Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff sued the officers who pushed him onto a sofa-recliner, which toppled over, and who then kneeled on his back. The district court concluded that the push and the kneel constituted two discrete uses of force, granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to Defendants as to the push, and entered a directed verdict for Defendants on the remaining counts, finding that Plaintiff failed to prove that any injury he suffered was caused by the kneel. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) the push was not a clearly established violation of Plaintiff's right to be free of unreasonable seizures; but (2) there was enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that it was more likely than not that the kneel caused Defendant some additional injury.

Smith v. RecordQuest LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2084

Opinion Date: February 26, 2021

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Health Law, Personal Injury

Smith suffered an injury from a car accident, retained an attorney for a personal injury lawsuit, and authorized her attorney to obtain her healthcare information. The attorney requested Smith’s medical records from MHS, on three occasions. RecordQuest, not MHS, answered those requests and charged Smith’s attorney (who paid on her behalf) a $20.96 handling fee and an $8.26 certification fee each time. Smith brought a class action, alleging these charged fees contravened the permissible fee schedule set out in Wis. Stat. 146.83(3f)(b) for healthcare records requests and resulted in the unjust enrichment of RecordQuest. The district court dismissed both claims, reasoning that the statute imposes a duty upon only healthcare providers.” RecordQuest is not a healthcare provider but is the agent of MHS; “no principle of agency law holds that a principal’s liability is imputed to the agent when the agent performs the act that results in the principal’s liability.” Smith’s unjust enrichment claim failed because any unjust benefit that Smith allegedly conferred to RecordQuest belonged to MHS. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals subsequently expressly disagreed with the district court’s analysis of Smith’s statutory claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the statutory claim but affirmed as to Smith’s unjust enrichment claim. Under section 146.83(3f)(b), Smith has a remedy at law for any “injustice” that allegedly resulted from excessive payments; the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment is derivative of and predicated upon the statutory claim.

Johnson v. White

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-14436

Opinion Date: February 26, 2021

Judge: Newsom

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

Plaintiff, an inmate in a federal prison, filed suit against several corrections officers, the prison’s warden, and the United States, claiming that the officers restrained him, removed his clothes, and fondled his genitals and buttocks in violation of, among other things, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he suffered a physical injury as required by 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(2). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that plaintiff's argument—that allegations amounting to "sexual contact," but not a "sexual act," necessarily constitute "physical injury" within the meaning of section 1346(b)(2)—defies the FTCA's language and structure. The court also concluded separately that Congress's inclusion of the term "sexual act" in the 2013 amendment to section 1346(b)(2) implies an intention to exclude the conduct of the sort that plaintiff has alleged—"sexual contact." Therefore, plaintiff has failed to satisfy section 1346(b)(2) and his claim does not fall into the category of cases with respect to which the government has waived its sovereign immunity under the FTCA. The court noted that it does not for a moment condone the corrections officers' alleged misconduct, but rather condemned it in the strongest possible terms.

France v. Industrial Commission of Arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CV-20-0068-PR

Opinion Date: March 2, 2021

Judge: Gould

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) denying the claim for benefits filed by deputy John France, who developed post-traumatic stress disorder after he shot and killed a man, holding that the administrative law judge erred by failing to apply the standard required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1043.01(B). Under section 23-1043.01(B), employees may receive compensation for mental injuries if an unexpected, unusual or extraordinary employment-related stress was a substantial contributing cause of the mental injury. An ALJ denied France's claim for benefits, concluding that the shooting incident was not "unusual, unexpected, or extraordinary." The Supreme Court set aside the ICA's decision, holding (1) under section 23-1043.01(b), a work-related mental injury is compensable if the specific event causing the injury was objectively "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary"; (2) under this objective standard, an injury-causing event must be examined from the standpoint of a reasonable employee with the same or similar job duties and training as the claimant; and (3) the ALJ erred by limiting her analysis to whether France's job duties encompassed the possibility of using lethal force in the line of duty and failing to consider whether the shooting incident was unexpected or extraordinary.

State v. Rovin

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 29/20

Opinion Date: March 2, 2021

Judge: Shirley M. Watts

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this case stemming from a lawsuit brought by Respondent against the State and the law enforcement officers and prosecutors who were responsible for charging her with assault and juror intimidation, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the State and the two prosecutors as to any action in the complaint alleged to have been taken by the prosecutors. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to the prosecutors' entitlement to absolute common law immunity in the form of prosecutorial immunity; (2) the two officers were not entitled to absolute common law immunity in the form of prosecutorial immunity or absolute common law immunity in the form of judicial immunity; (3) state personnel statutory immunity under the MTCA barred Plaintiff's claims against the officers and the prosecutors in their individual capacities and, as such, the State does not have immunity under the MTCA; and (4) whether the State was liable for any actions taken by the officers was a matter to be resolved by further proceedings in the circuit court.

Rhoden v. Winfield

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC98327

Opinion Date: March 2, 2021

Judge: George W. Draper, III

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Plaintiffs on their claim that Missouri Delta Medical Center (MDMC) and two physicians it employed caused their father's death, holding that no error occurred. Plaintiffs, as family representatives, brought this suit for the wrongful death of Decedent, raising issues related to Decedent's need for surgery and the quality of his post-surgical care, which led to his death. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiffs' favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs submitted substantial evidence to support the submission of aggravating circumstances damages to the jury; (2) the circuit court did not err in submitting the instruction for aggravating circumstances damages; (3) Plaintiffs established "but for" causation; and (4) Plaintiffs were not entitled to reversal on their remaining claims of error.

WSI v. Sandberg, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 ND 39

Opinion Date: March 3, 2021

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) appealed a district court judgment affirming an ALJ’s revised order on remand, entered after the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State by & through Workforce Safety & Ins. v. Sandberg, 2019 ND 198, 931 N.W.2d 488 (“Sandberg I”). The ALJ’s revised order made additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, and again found John Sandberg had sustained a compensable injury and was entitled to benefits. Under its deferential standard of review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part; however, in light of the ALJ’s revised order, the Court remanded the case to WSI for further proceedings on whether benefits should have been awarded on an aggravation basis and the proper calculation of those benefits under N.D.C.C. 65-05-15.

Meyers v. Ferndale Sch. Dist.

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 98280-5

Opinion Date: March 4, 2021

Judge: Johnson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Personal Injury

Gabriel Anderson, a student of the Ferndale School District (Ferndale), was killed by a vehicle while on an off campus walk with his physical education (PE) class. Anderson’s estate alleged negligence by Ferndale. The trial court dismissed the claim, granting Ferndale summary judgment based on a lack of duty. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that there were sufficient factual issues on duty and proximate causation. Ferndale challenged the Court of Appeals’ analysis of proximate cause. The issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether Ferndale was entitled to summary judgment dismissal based on proximate causation. While the Court of Appeals erred in analyzing legal causation, the Supreme Court found it properly concluded that material issues of fact existed concerning proximate causation. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse summary judgment dismissal of the negligence claim against Ferndale.