| United States v. Newton |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1305 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Boudin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the district court did not err in imposing a sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm "in connection with another felony offense." Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. The sentencing court applied a four-level enhancement for handling at least eight firearms, a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, and a two-level enhancement for obstructing justice. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's application of the four-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the finding that Defendant committed "another felony offense" and possessed a firearm "in connection with" such offense. |
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| United States v. Alarcon Sanchez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-671 Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Pooler Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions, after pleading guilty, of conspiring to engage in drug trafficking activity in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Defendants challenged the adequacy of their unconditional guilty pleas. The court held that the government has met its evidentiary burden in establishing that defendants' boat was a stateless vessel and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; Section 70506(b) of the MDLEA encompasses land-based conspiratorial conduct, which Congress is authorized to proscribe under the Necessary and Proper Clause; although due process requires a sufficient nexus with the United States for those not on board a stateless vessel to be prosecuted under the MDLEA, in this instance, defendants' prosecutions satisfy due process; and Congress did not exceed its legislative authority in enacting the MDLEA pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause. |
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| United States v. Birkedahl |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-2304 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Richard J. Sullivan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant, who is serving a 24 month sentence for possession of child pornography, challenges three conditions of his supervised release, including a verification testing condition that permits the use of a computerized voice stress analyzer to assess his compliance with the terms of his supervised release. The Second Circuit dismissed defendant's challenge to the computerized voice stress analyzer, holding that the challenge is not ripe for review because the efficacy of computerized voice stress analyzers in promoting sentencing goals is subject to change with technological advances. Furthermore, the notification of risk condition is also not ripe because any allegedly improper delegation is conditioned on the district court finding, during defendant's term of supervised release, that he poses a risk of committing further crimes against another person -- a contingency that may never occur. The court held that defendant's challenges to the remaining conditions of supervised release are foreclosed by court precedent and affirmed as to the remainder of the district court's sentence and judgment. |
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| United States v. Caraher |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-511 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Peter W. Hall Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for eight counts related to his possession of child pornography. The court held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress fruits of the Network Investigative Technique (NIT) warrant based on the court's opinion in United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 111 (2d Cir. 2019), where the court concluded that suppression of the evidence derived from an NIT warrant was not required; the warrant at issue was supported by probable cause; even assuming that the government had improperly suggested that the Playpen site was a "hidden" website and could not be accessed without prior knowledge, multiple additional pieces of evidence supported the issuance of the warrant; and the description of the site's logo was support for the probable cause determination, not the triggering event. The court also held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and rejected defendant's contention that the government's operation of the Playpen site was outrageous government conduct. Finally, the court held that defendant's below-Guidelines sentence of 90 months in prison and 20 year term of supervised release was not substantively unreasonable. |
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| Delade v. Cargan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1908 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Porter Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2014, a sniper attacked Pennsylvania State Troopers at the Barracks, killing one and severely injuring the other. The next day, Troopers received a report that a man (DeLade) with a rifle was walking down a highway 15 miles from the Barracks. Trooper Cargan ran DeLade’s name through a criminal-history database and learned that the Escambia County, Florida sheriff’s department had issued a warrant for DeLade’s arrest, with a “no extradition” status. Cargan called and requested that the department change the status of the warrant to “full extradition.” The department complied. Troopers arrested DeLade, alleging that he had been charged with a crime in Florida. DeLade remained in pretrial detention for five days awaiting his extradition hearing—his first court appearance. Escambia County indicated that it would not extradite DeLade, so the Commonwealth dropped the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge. Another complaint was filed, charging him with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm; the court released him on bail. DeLade later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. A court sentenced him to 12 months’ probation. DeLade filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Cargan violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause by fabricating evidence to support the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge. The district court granted Cargan summary judgment on DeLade’s Fourth Amendment claims, finding that probable cause existed to justify charging DeLade as a prohibited person in possession of a firearm but declined to grant summary judgment or qualified immunity to Cargan on DeLade’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Third Circuit reversed in part. A claim alleging unlawful arrest and pretrial detention before a detainee’s first court appearance sounds in the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause. |
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| Rosen v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-3111 Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Theodore Alexander McKee Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2001, Rosen stabbed his wife to death in their home, then called the police and claimed that home invaders had stabbed his wife. Within hours, he confessed to the stabbing but claimed it was an unintentional response to his wife swinging a knife at him. The prosecution requested a psychiatric exam of Rosen in preparation for his first murder trial, where he raised a diminished capacity defense. After his first conviction was overturned, he abandoned his diminished capacity defense. In his federal habeas corpus petition, Rosen argued that the second trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when it ruled that his statements from the court-ordered psychiatric exam were admissible to impeach Rosen if he chose to testify at his second trial. Electing not to testify, Rosen was again convicted of murder. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court in denying relief. Rosen cannot demonstrate that using his statements to the psychiatric expert at the second trial for the limited purpose of impeachment would violate clearly established Fifth Amendment law. Rosen both initiated an evaluation and introduced psychiatric evidence at his first criminal trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could reasonably find that the Fifth Amendment waiver triggered by Rosen’s mental health defense at his first trial extended to his second trial, at least with respect to the issues raised by his own expert. |
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| Weimer v. County of Fayette |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1823 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: D. Michael Fisher Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2001, Connellsville police found Haith, lying dead on the sidewalk. District Attorney Vernon helped direct the investigation. Officers interviewed Weimer, who had what looked like blood on her clothes. Weimer told officers that she had given Haith a ride to a party. Others confirmed her story. None of the crime scene DNA matched Weimer. Months later, Beal, whom Weimer had previously dated, told police that Weimer and Gibson killed Haith. Reviewing autopsy photos, an investigator saw an apparent bite mark on Haith’s hand. A bite-mark expert reviewed Beal’s statement, photos of Haith’s hand, and teeth impressions from Gibson and Weimer. He concluded the bite mark matched Weimer and had occurred minutes before Haith’s death. Beal then changed his story. Months later, Blair contacted police, stating that a fellow inmate, Stenger, was involved. Despite three conflicting statements, officers charged Weimer with murder; Vernon approved. Beal recanted his previous statements, testifying that an officer “coaxed me.” The judge dismissed the charges. Investigators continued to investigate Weimer. Stenger told police he would implicate Weimer in exchange for a lighter sentence for unrelated convictions. Officers again charged Weimer. In 2006, a jury convicted her. In 2015, a judge vacated Weimer’s convictions. Significant exculpatory evidence was uncovered. Stenger conceded he knew nothing about Haith’s murder and that police had walked him through his testimony. The bite-mark expert disavowed his testimony. The charges against Weimer were “dropped with prejudice.” Weimer filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, held that former D.A. Vernon is not protected by absolute immunity. Aside from Vernon’s approval of the criminal complaint, Weimer alleges Vernon engaged in investigatory conduct. Vernon is entitled to qualified immunity as to Weimer’s failure to intervene claim and as to Vernon’s alleged conduct in directing officers to investigate bite-mark evidence. |
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| Farkas v. Warden |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-6347 Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Richardson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas application, rejecting his claim that he is entitled to habeas relief based on United States v. Chamberlain, 868 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), and the Sixth Amendment. In Chamberlain, the court held that the criminal forfeiture statute permits freezing only those assets traceable to the charged offense. The court held that petitioner failed to show that section 2255 would be "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." In this case, the court's existing "savings clause" jurisprudence makes abundantly clear that a section 2255 motion is fully adequate to address alleged Sixth Amendment violations. Furthermore, petitioner's statutory claim still fails the court's "savings clause" tests. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the section 2241 application for lack of jurisdiction. |
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| Long v. Hooks |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-6980 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Stephanie Dawn Thacker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner has been in prison for 44 years for a rape and burglary that he consistently maintained that he did not commit, claiming that police deliberately suppressed exculpatory evidence. The district court dismissed his petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, concluding that the MAR (Motion for Appropriate Relief) Court's decision did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The MAR Court concluded that the cumulative effect of the withheld Brady evidence would have had no impact on petitioner's trial. The Fourth Circuit held that the MAR Court's analysis subjected petitioner to an enhanced burden, unreasonably applied Supreme Court law, and was objectively unreasonable. In this case, considering both the exculpatory and impeachment effects of the suppressed evidence, together with the shortfalls in the victim's identification and consistent testimony from alibi witnesses, the withheld evidence "could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the petition. Because the district court failed to address the issue of whether the petition can survive the threshold requirements pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the court remanded for the district court to consider the issue in the first instance and to permit further discovery requested by petitioner. |
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| United States v. McLeod |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-6423 Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Diana Jane Gribbon Motz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2) cannot be used to challenge the terms or conditions of supervised release on the ground that they are unlawful. After defendant pleaded guilty to two counts related to his role in a commercial sex operation and received a sentence of 70 months' imprisonment and five years' supervised release, the district court required that he register as a sex offender as a condition of supervised release. Defendant moved to modify the conditions of his supervised release under section 3583(e)(2), contending that the sex offender registration condition was illegal as applied to his offense of conviction. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed. The Fourth Circuit held that defendant's motion for modification attacked the registration requirement on the ground that it was unlawful, using a motion under section 3583(e)(2) as a pathway to bring such a challenge presumably because other pathways (including a direct appeal) are now foreclosed. The court stated that defendant's current section 3583(e)(2) challenge is impermissible because it rests on the factual and legal premises that existed at the time of his sentencing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. |
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| United States v. Medley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4789 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Roger L. Gregory Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. After defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, the Supreme Court issued Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Defendant then filed a supplemental brief raising further constitutional challenges, arguing that Rehaif invalidated his indictment and conviction. The Fourth Circuit applied plain error review and held that the asserted Rehaif errors violated defendant's substantial rights. The court stated that sustaining defendant's conviction under the present circumstances would deprive defendant of several constitutional protections, prohibit him from ever mounting a defense to the knowledge-of-status element, require inappropriate appellate factfinding, and do serious harm to the judicial process. Therefore, the court exercised its discretion to notice the errors and vacated defendant's conviction, remanding for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Miselis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Dockets: 19-4550, 19-4551 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Albert Diaz Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendants conditionally pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States with the substantive offense being a violation of the Anti-Riot Act. Defendants' charges arose from their violent participation in three white supremacist rallies during 2017. The Fourth Circuit held that, while the category of speech that lies at the core of the Anti-Riot Act's prohibition, called "incitement," has never enjoyed First Amendment protection, the statute sweeps up a substantial amount of speech that remains protected advocacy under the modern incitement test of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), insofar as it encompasses speech tending to "encourage" or "promote" a riot under 18 U.S.C. 2101(a)(2), as well as speech "urging" others to riot or "involving" mere advocacy of violence under section 2102(b). However, the court held that, in all other respects, the statute comports with the First Amendment. Because the discrete instances of overbreadth are severable from the remainder of the statute, the court held that the appropriate remedy is to invalidate the statute only to the extent that it reaches too far, while leaving the remainder intact. Finally, the court held that defendants' convictions stand because the factual basis of defendants' guilty pleas conclusively establish that their own substantive offense conduct—which involves no First Amendment activity—falls under the Anti-Riot Act's surviving applications. |
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| Valentino v. Clarke |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-7295 Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Richardson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion for habeas relief, raising Sixth Amendment claims. Petitioner was convicted of beating, shooting, and robbing a prostitute in a hotel room. The court held that the state court's adjudication of petitioner's claims on the merits was neither unreasonable nor inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. In this case, petitioner alleged that his lawyer should have sought forensic testing of various items in the hotel room to bolster his story. The court held that the state court reasonably determined that counsel's performance was not deficient as to the items found in the hotel room, and the state court reasonably determined that the failure to test petitioner's sock did not cause prejudice. |
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| United States v. Angeles |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10937 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's below-Guidelines sentence of 280 months in prison imposed after she pleaded guilty to drug trafficking. The court rejected defendant's argument that the district court coerced her into withdrawing objections to her presentence report by threatening to deny an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction where the district court treated withdrawal separately from acceptance and the district court did not pressure defendant into abandoning her objections by conveying before the hearing its tentative conclusion that her objections were without merit. Therefore, the court found no error, much less the clear or obvious mistake necessary to overcome plain error review. |
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| United States v. Davis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-70010 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Andrew S. Oldham Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Defendant, a former police officer, used his position and the police department's resources to orchestrate a murder. The Fifth Circuit denied defendant a certificate of appealability (COA) on his claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at his 1996 guilt-phase trial. The court held that no reasonable jurist could debate that defendant suffered no prejudice. The court also denied defendant a COA on his claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was compromised by the adverse impact of external influences and misconduct during his 1996 guilt-phase trial. In this case, defendant failed to point to any external influences in this COA briefing. Finally, the court denied defendant a COA on his claims that the government withheld key evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the Brady claims had no evidentiary basis and were merely defendant's conclusions and speculations. Because the court cannot issue a COA, the court has no power to say anything about defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing. |
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| United States v. Lima-Rivero |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10759 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his 180 month sentence for conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err by applying the reckless engagement sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG 3C1.2. However, the court held that the district court clearly erred in refusing to grant a safety valve reduction. In this case, the district court misapprehended the legal standard by being under the impression that it lacked discretion to apply the reduction if the government was not satisfied that defendant met the requirements for safety valve relief. Rather, the question of whether defendant had satisfied 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(5) is one for the district court. Even if the district court had applied the proper legal standard, the court held that the district court erred in its determination that defendant did not provide truthful information based on a case agent's mere speculation. |
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| Atkins v. Parker |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-6243 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Raymond M. Kethledge Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law |
| Hepatitis C is a contagious, progressive virus that can lead to cirrhosis of the liver, liver cancer, and ultimately death. There is no vaccine for hepatitis C. Doctors previously treated the virus using interferons; that treatment brought little success and severe side effects. In 2011, the FDA approved new direct-acting antivirals that halt the progress of hepatitis C and eventually cause the virus to disappear. In 2015, the cost of a single course of treatment using direct-acting antivirals was $80,000-$189,000. By the time of trial, those prices was $13,000-$32,000. A 2016 policy specified that the Tennessee Department of Corrections would provide the antivirals only to infected inmates with severe liver scarring. By 2019, approximately 4,740 of Tennessee's 21,000 inmates had hepatitis. Under a 2019 guidance, every new inmate is tested for hepatitis C. Inmates who test positive undergo a baseline evaluation; an advisory committee of healthcare professionals evaluates each infected inmate and determines his course of treatment. The guidance establishes criteria that make antivirals available to “individuals [who] are at higher risk for complications or disease progression," includes a series of procedural steps for local providers, and provides for continuous care and monitoring of infected inmates, regardless of their treatment plan. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of inmates' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The 2019 guidance showed reasonable medical judgment to care for the class of infected inmates. While the best course of action might be to treat all infected inmates with antivirals, the defendant could not spend more than was allocated and had repeatedly sought budget increases. |
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| Taylor v. Simpson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 14-6508 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Batchelder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1984, two 17-year-old Caucasian students were car-jacked, sodomized, robbed, and murdered by Taylor and Wade, both African-Americans. A witness picked Wade from a line-up. Wade confessed, naming Taylor as the sole shooter. Convicted, Wade received a life sentence. Taylor’s trial began in 1986, before "Batson," The controlling law about racial animus in peremptory challenges was "Swain." In selecting Taylor’s jury, the prosecutor had nine peremptory challenges; he used four to strike African-Americans, leaving only one African-American on the jury after Taylor’s counsel removed an African-American woman with a peremptory challenge. Taylor’s counsel raised a fair-cross-section challenge. The prosecutor responded, “almost incoherently.” The court rejected the challenge, stating: “I believe the issue being addressed ... [Batson] as to whether it is permissible to exercise your peremptory strikes whichever way you wish to. I don’t know, but the record is clear as to what has been done in this case.” The prosecutor presented overwhelming evidence of Taylor’s guilt. The judge found Wade unavailable to testify pending his direct appeal and allowed the prosecutor to play Wade’s tape-recorded police statement. The jury convicted Taylor. The court sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Taylor’s Batson and Confrontation Clause claims. On collateral attack, Taylor also raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Based on Taylor’s limited argument, the prosecutor’s otherwise non-discriminatory conduct, and the absence of an indisputable pattern of discriminatory strikes, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s denial of Taylor’s Batson claim was not necessarily an unreasonable application of Batson. Even if evidence that Taylor produced at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing had been presented at trial, Taylor could not have prevailed on a Swain claim, so his counsel was not ineffective for failing to produce that evidence. Any Sixth Amendment error was harmless. |
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| United States v. Abdalla |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5967 Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Nalbandian Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Tennessee Judicial Drug Task Force and the Drug Enforcement Administration investigated Abdalla for suspected narcotics trafficking. The Tennessee judge who signed the warrant permitting officers to search Abdalla’s residence on New Hope Road only had jurisdiction in DeKalb County but the warrant, in one place, listed an address on Carey Road in Trousdale County. This error resulted from the officer using a previous warrant as a template and failing to erase all vestiges of that document. Abdalla argued that a warrant cannot be valid if it contains a mismatch between the residence in the authorization section and the residence that the police searched and that a judge’s failure to notice an address outside his jurisdiction in a warrant’s authorization section demands the inference that the judge impermissibly rubber-stamped the warrant. The affidavit supporting the warrant listed the correct address and county at the top of the first page; the warrant itself directed officers to the correct address by providing step-by-step directions along with a detailed description of Abdalla’s residence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, Abdallah’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, and his 168-month sentence. The warrant’s singular incorrect address posed almost no chance of a mistaken search. Despite the government’s irregular mistake, this clerical error case demands the usual result for technical mistakes that threaten no constitutional harm. |
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| United States v. Somerville |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-5983, 19-5815, 19-5817 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Eric L. Clay Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Sherrill, Poindexter, and Somerville were indicted on multiple counts arising out of their attempted robbery of Edwards, a drug dealer, during which Edwards was killed. Following a jury trial, all three were convicted of attempting to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Hobbs Act) and the knowing use or carry of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C.924(c) and 2, or aiding and abetting those crimes. Somerville was also convicted of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, section 924(j)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Upholding the district court’s decision not to sever the trials, the court rejected a Confrontation Clause claim. The prosecution appropriately redacted all names from Poindexter’s statement, which was introduced at trial, and substituted neutral terms that could have referred to any of the individuals allegedly involved in the robbery. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find that the probative value of photographs purportedly suggesting that Sherrill was affiliated with a gang equaled or outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the reasonableness of the sentences. |
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| United States v. Williams |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5803 Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2005, Williams pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). Williams’s PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 262-327 months' imprisonment. The government filed a notice of a prior felony drug conviction under 21 U.S.C. 851, which made Williams subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum term of life imprisonment. The court sentenced Williams to 262 months. The 2018 First Step Act authorized district courts to reduce defendants’ sentences for certain drug offenses, 132 Stat. 5194. Although the Act reduced Williams’s mandatory minimum sentence to 10 years, his Guidelines’ range remained the same. Williams sought resentencing under the Act, citing his good conduct in prison: he had not failed a single drug test, had helped 13 other prisoners earn their GEDs, and had held the same job for over eight years. The district court explained that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and concluded that “the 262-month within guideline sentence originally imposed remains sufficient and necessary to protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, to provide just punishment, and to provide deterrence.” The court did not address Williams’s post-conviction conduct. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Williams's post-conviction conduct occurred after his initial sentencing, so the record for his initial sentence provides no indication of the court’s reasoning. |
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| Willman v. U.S. Attorney General |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-2405 Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Richard Allen Griffin Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1993, Willman was convicted for violating a Michigan sexual assault law. He served 10 years in prison and completed parole. Willman registered on Michigan’s sex offender registry. Congress, in 2006, passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901 to “make more uniform" a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration systems, that had resulted in an estimated 100,000 sex offenders becoming missing or lost. SORNA “made it a federal crime for a sex offender who meets certain requirements to 'knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration’” Willman challenged the Michigan law and SORNA. The district court dismissed the Michigan defendants and directed them to not enforce the 2006 and 2011 amendments to Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act against Willman. The court declared that the duration of Willman’s registration under Michigan law had ended and that he should be removed from that registry. The court later dismissed the federal claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A sex offender’s obligations under SORNA are independent of any duties under state law. The court rejected Willman’s arguments that SORNA is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law, as double jeopardy, as violating the Fifth Amendment, as cruel and unusual punishment, as overbroad and vague, as violating his privacy rights, and as violating his right to travel. |
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| Harrington v. Duszak |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 16-4120, 19‐2379 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Bauer Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Officers Duszak and Weber initiated a traffic stop because the light over Harrington’s license plate was out. Dispatch notified the officers that there was no record of Harrington’s license plate. The officers attempted to identify the vehicle through the VIN number and asked Harrington to exit the vehicle. Harrington fled. The officers chased him down; one tased him and the other hit him with a baton. Harrington’s gun fell to the ground. Officers handcuffed Harrington and took him to the hospital for his injuries. Harrington sued, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene. The jury ruled in favor of the officers. Harrington’s motions for post‐trial discovery and a new trial were denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the gun evidence was admissible and not unduly prejudicial. Harrington failed to present any evidence at trial from which a reasonable jury could infer that the officers’ actions were racially motivated. Without support for race‐based allegations during the case or presented at trial, introducing this argument at closing arguments would have been highly inflammatory and prejudicial. Harrington unsuccessfully sought sanctions post‐trial based on an unverified third‐party website detailing undisclosed complaints against Duszak. A records request with the city disclosed that four complaints not included in discovery were filed after the discovery request. Four were not complaints, but information reports. Harrington failed to show how the absence of these records prejudiced him. |
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| United States v. Friedman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2004 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Brennan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| To keep his car dealership afloat, Friedman secured loans for fake buyers of a phony inventory of luxury cars. The dealership exported cars overseas, but kept many of the title certificates and used the names of friends, customers, and former employees to secure loans, usually without the person’s knowledge; the loan applications included false income information and forged signatures. The scheme resulted in a bank fraud conviction (18 U.S.C. 1344) and a 108‐month prison sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rejecting a claim based on a conflict of interest concerning an attorney who had briefly represented both Friedman and a cooperating co-defendant, Bilis, the court stated that Friedman has not shown that any privileged communications were ever shared, let alone that any breach of privilege affected his trial. The court upheld “aiding and abetting” and “acting through another” jury instructions that tracked Seventh Circuit pattern instructions; rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; rejected challenges to comments that, essentially, called on the jury to use common sense; and rejected challenges to sentencing enhancements. The court upheld the denial of a motion for a new trial that was based on “new evidence” concerning Bilis’s finances and upheld the loss calculation of $4,722,347 and an order of restitution in that amount. |
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| United States v. Ginsberg |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1305 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law, White Collar Crime |
| Spring Hill owned a 240-apartment complex in a Chicago suburb. In 2007, the owner converted the apartments into condominiums and attempted to sell them. Ginsberg recruited several people to buy units in bulk, telling them they would not need to put their own money down and that he would pay them after the closings. The scheme was a fraud that consisted of multiple components and false statements to trick financial institutions into loaning nearly $5,000,000 for these transactions. The seller made payments through Ginsberg that the buyers should have made, which meant that the stated sales prices were shams, the loans were under-collateralized, and the “buyers” had nothing at stake. The seller paid Ginsberg about $1,200,000; Ginsberg used nearly $600,000 to make payments the buyers should have made, paid over $200,000 to the buyers and their relatives, and kept nearly $400,000 for himself. The loans ultimately went into default, causing the financial institutions significant losses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ginsberg’s bank fraud conviction, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude Ginsberg knew that the loan applications, real estate contracts, and settlement statements contained materially false information about the transactions, including the sales prices, the down payments, and Ginsberg's fees. The court rejected a challenge to the admission of testimony by a title company employee. |
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| United States v. Bennett |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 19-3130, 19-3346 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Stephen R. Clark Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment. In this case, the officers discovered the gun in defendant's possession in a routine search incident to his arrest where the officer had a valid arrest warrant and had positively identified defendant before entering the property; the officer could lawfully enter the curtilage to make an arrest with the warrant; and any intrusion on defendant's privacy interest was minimal. The court also affirmed the district court's determination that defendant did not qualify for a 15-year minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), because defendant's prior conviction for going armed with intent, in violation of Iowa Code 708.8, does not constitute an ACCA predicate violent felony. The court explained that going armed with intent does not necessarily involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. |
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| United States v. Figueroa-Serrano |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2635 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a gun seized without a warrant during a traffic stop and his subsequent statements to law enforcement. The court held that, based on the information the officers knew at the moment they seized the gun, they had probable cause to believe defendant possessed the weapon. The court also held that, although the district court erred by failing to suppress defendant's statements, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. The court further held that the district court did not err by deciding that defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights when he agreed to speak with the officers and then to the special agent. |
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| United States v. Frommelt |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2820 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for sexual exploitation of a child, conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and distribution of the drug. The court declined to consider defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. |
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| United States v. McTizic |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2829 Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiring to violate federal health care laws and eleven counts of health care fraud. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in a health care fraud scheme involving AMS, an entity that provided medical testing of blood, urine, and other specimens. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant voluntarily and intentionally participated in the conspiracy with knowledge that his plan to receive kickback payments and defraud Medicare was unjustifiable and wrongful. In this case, the evidence of defendant's significant experience within the health care industry combined with his attempt to conceal the true terms of his agreement with AMS was enough for the jury to conclude he knew the arrangement was unjustifiable and wrongful when he knowingly became a part of the conspiracy. |
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| United States v. Meeks |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3173 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's reduction of defendant's life sentence to 360 months in prison for conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. The district court left defendant's 360 month sentence for distributing five grams or more of cocaine base unchanged. The court held that the district court understood its authority and discretion to resentence defendant under the First Step Act. In this case, the district court concluded that defendant was entitled to retroactive relief under the Act and that the Sentencing Guidelines recommended defendant serve between 360 months and life in prison because of his total offense level and criminal history, rather than the previous mandatory life sentence. The court also held that the district court considered defendant's motion and had a reasoned basis for its discretion. Finally, the court held that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, nor is there a statutory right, in sentence modification proceedings under the Act. Although the Southern District of Iowa's standing administrative order permitted the public defender's office to represent eligible defendants, the court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to act on defendant's repeated requests to reduce his sentence. |
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| United States v. Reed |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2487 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for three counts of drug and gun charges. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant for conspiracy to distribute heroin, powder cocaine, and crack cocaine, as well as for possessing firearms as a convicted felon. The court also held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a new trial based on defendant's claim that the jury was not representative of a cross-section of the community where defendant failed to provide evidence of the racial composition of the jury pool used by the District of Minnesota, or even the composition of the potential jurors called for his trial. Finally, the court upheld defendant's within-Guidelines 240 month sentence, holding that the district court expressly recognized its authority to vary based on a disagreement with the crack cocaine conversion rate but declined to do so. The court stated that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vary downward and that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. |
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| Harrison v. Kernan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-16823 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Richard C. Tallman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Following the lead of at least two sister circuits and noting the deference owed to prison officials in light of the special duties that arise in the prison context, the Ninth Circuit held that intermediate scrutiny applies to equal protection challenges of prison regulations which facially discriminate on the basis of gender. In this case, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials discriminated against him based on his male gender by not allowing him to purchase certain prison vendor products available only to female inmates. The panel held that plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that he has standing to bring his equal protection challenge of the Department's regulation governing inmates' personal property. The panel also held that imprisoned men and women of the same security classification subject to the challenged regulation are similarly situated for the purpose of this case, and that prison regulations such as this one, which facially discriminate on the basis of gender, must receive intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. Because the panel had not yet established intermediate scrutiny as the applicable standard at the time the district court reviewed the regulation at issue, the panel remanded for the district court to determine the issue in the first instance. |
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| Ho Sang Yim v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Dockets: 17-70624, 17-70670, 17-70742 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Sandra Segal Ikuta Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA reasonably interpreted "perjury," as used in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), to mean an offense where "an offender make[s] a material false statement knowingly or willfully while under oath or affirmation [or penalty of perjury] where an oath is authorized or required by law." Given this definition, the panel held that perjury under section 118(a) of the California Penal Code is an "aggravated felony" because it is "an offense relating to . . . perjury." Petitioners, in three separate petitions for review, were convicted of perjury under section 118(a) and then suffered adverse immigration consequences on the ground that each had committed an "aggravated felony," namely, an "an offense relating to . . . perjury" under section 1101(a)(43)(S). The panel applied the categorical approach and held that section 118(a) is a categorical match with the BIA's generic definition of perjury, meaning that they cover the same amount of conduct. The panel rejected petitioners' claims to the contrary and held that section 118(a) is an "offense" relating to . . . perjury" under section 1101(a)(43)(S). The panel disposed of the petitions and any remaining arguments in concurrently filed memorandum dispositions. |
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| Mitchell v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 20-99010 Opinion Date: August 23, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law, International Law |
| The Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) allowing petitioner to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner's motion asserted that a report issued on August 12, 2020, by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which concluded that petitioner's trial and sentence violated his rights under the American Declaration, requires that his death sentence be vacated, that he must be released or given a new trial, and that he cannot be sentenced to death after a new trial. The panel held that reasonable jurists would not find debatable the district court's conclusion that the IACHR's decision is not binding in federal court. In this case, the district court concluded that IACHR rulings do not have binding power within the United States by virtue of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter because the OAS Charter is not self-executing, and Congress has passed no statute to implement it. Furthermore, the district court rejected petitioner's argument that IACHR decisions are binding because they are derived, through the OAS Charter, from the American Declaration on the ground that the American Declaration is not a treaty and creates no binding set of obligations. |
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| United States v. Cate |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-30161 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: A. Wallace Tashima Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, he was charged with violating the conditions of his supervised release. Defendant filed a motion to terminate his supervised release on the ground that a change in the law meant that the state offense underlying his felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm conviction was no longer a felony. The district court denied defendant's motion, found that defendant had violated his supervised release, and imposed a fifteen-month term of imprisonment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and agreed with the district court that the validity of an underlying conviction cannot be challenged in a supervised release revocation proceeding. Rather, the underlying conviction can only be collaterally attacked in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The panel also held that the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable where it adequately considered defendant's arguments and the requisite statutory factors. |
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| United States v. Hussain |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-10168 Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Daniel A. Bress Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and securities fraud. Defendant, who served as Chief Financial Officer of Autonomy Corporation, a U.K. technology company that Hewlett-Packard acquired in 2011, and others fraudulently inflated revenue through a series of elaborate accounting schemes. The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's wire fraud convictions did not involve an impermissible extraterritorial application of United States law to foreign conduct because the "focus" of the wire fraud statute is the use of the wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, and defendant used domestic wires to perpetrate his fraud. The panel also held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for securities fraud because a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant's approval of false and misleading financial information in an HP press release distributed to the investing public reflected a fraudulent scheme "in connection with" U.S. securities. The panel concurrently filed a memorandum disposition holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certain evidentiary rulings or err in ordering money forfeiture. |
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| United States v. Litwin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-10429 Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Daniel A. Bress Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's convictions and sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and eight counts of distribution of a controlled substance, remanding for a new trial. In light of the unique facts of this case, the panel held that the district court erred in dismissing a juror, a former criminal defense lawyer, hours into jury deliberations following a lengthy criminal trial. The panel explained that the district court's determination that the juror harbored "malice toward the judicial process" is not supported and cannot provide the basis for the juror's dismissal. While the district court also cited the juror's alleged refusal to deliberate, based on the record in this case the panel is firmly convinced there was a reasonable possibility that the juror's dismissal stemmed from her views on the strength of the government's prosecution. The panel based its decision on the specific circumstances of this case, which are uncommon. Here, the district court decided to strike the juror after receiving a complaint from other jurors and without clarifying the juror's alleged confusion about a jury instruction that applied to all charges. The district court also removed the juror without giving the original jury any further instructions or allowing it any further opportunity to deliberate. |
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| United States v. Lusby |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10368 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: J. Clifford Wallace Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing an indictment charging defendant with failing to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The panel rejected defendant's contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes jurisdiction over this appeal, and held that jeopardy did not attach in this case because the district court never heard evidence for the purpose of deciding the issue of guilt or innocence that could subject the defendant to the risk that he would be found guilty. The panel held that, in light of the plain language and purpose behind the statute, a conviction under section 2250(a) does not require that a defendant's interstate travel not be legally compelled. Because the district court erred in holding to the contrary, the panel remanded with instructions to apply the elements of section 2250 as written. |
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| United States v. Rodriguez-Gamboa |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-50014 Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Andrew David Hurwitz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an information charging defendant with illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326 where defendant was previously removed because of an "aggravated felony" conviction—possession for sale of methamphetamine in violation of California Health & Safety Code 11378. In this case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing, heard the testimony of expert witnesses, and concluded that geometric isomers of methamphetamine do not chemically exist. The panel held that the district court's factual finding that geometric isomers of methamphetamine do not exist, under clear error review, finds overwhelming support in the record. The panel rejected defendant's contention that the California statute is overbroad because of its facial inclusion of "geometrical" isomers of methamphetamine. In light of Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), and based on the evidentiary record before it, the panel held that there is simply no "realistic probability"—nor even a theoretical one—of defendant facing criminal liability under California law for the possession of geometric isomers of methamphetamine. |
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| Rendon v. U.S. Attorney General |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-10197 Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Martin Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit granted the government's unopposed motion to amend the decision, vacated the previous opinion, and issued this opinion with the government's requested amendment. After determining that it has jurisdiction to consider the petition for review, the court held that the BIA erred by retroactively applying the stop-time rule to petitioner's pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) conviction. The court held that neither IIRIRA section 309(a) nor 309(c)(5) mandates retroactivity, and that the BIA's interpretation of the stop-time rule does not warrant Chevron deference. In this case, by pleading guilty, petitioner gave up constitutionally protected rights with the reasonable expectation that his resulting sentence would not affect his ability to remain present in this country. The court explained that applying the stop-time rule retroactively would add a new and unforeseen consequence to his guilty plea by rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Davila-Mendoza |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Dockets: 17-12038, 17-12039, 17-12742 Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Branch Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendants, three foreign nationals in a foreign vessel in the territorial waters of Jamaica, were arrested by the United States Coast Guard with the consent of the foreign country and prosecuted in the United States for drug-trafficking crimes under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Defendants pleaded guilty and preserved their right to appeal the denial of their motion to suppress. The Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's convictions, holding that the MDLEA is unconstitutional and exceeded Congress's authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause. The court also held that, as applied to defendants, the MDLEA was not a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to effectuate the subsequently enacted 1989 Convention Against Illicit Traffic Treaty and the 1997 Jamaica Bilateral Agreement between the United States and Jamaica. |
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| United States v. Jimenez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-10569 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Hull Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for conspiracy to commit immigration-document fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money laundering. Defendant's convictions arose out of a scheme to obtain fraudulently an employment-based visa for "multinational executives and managers," called an EB-1C visa. Defendant recruited and paid U.S. businesses to enter into a fictitious joint venture with a Chinese business, and then defendant filed an employer I-140 Petition for Immigrant Worker in the U.S. business's name on behalf of a named Chinese-national beneficiary to classify that beneficiary as an EB-1C multinational executive or manager, even though defendant knew that beneficiary would not work for the U.S. business or the joint venture. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the fraud-conspiracy offense because the I-140 petitions and certain related documents contained false statements and were required by immigration laws or regulations, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's two money laundering convictions because the immigration-document fraud was an underlying "specified unlawful activity" for purposes of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). |
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| United States v. Mastin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-14241 Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The gun fell from defendant's waistband as he complied with a police order to get on the ground and crawl out of a room during the execution of fugitive task force arrest warrants. The court held that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering the hotel room to execute the arrest warrants, because they reasonably believed that the hotel room was the dwelling of two gang members. Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent, Summers v. Michigan, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981), foreclosed defendant's argument that requiring him, an innocent bystander who was not sought by police, to crawl out of the hotel room was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. Rather, requiring defendant to lower himself to the ground allowed officers to peer over him and look for any emerging threats from the room. Finally, the court held that the district court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him where the questions he wished to ask would not have been probative of any bias or lack of truthfulness; they would have confused the issues; and the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion by restricting cross-examination on these topics. |
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| People v. Peterson |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S132449 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Kruger Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court overturned the death penalty for Scott Peterson, who, in 2002, was convicted of killing his wife, Laci Peterson, and the couple's unborn son, holding that the trial court made a series of clear and significant errors in jury selection that undermined Peterson's right to an impartial jury at the penalty phase. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to guilt but reversed the judgment as to the sentence of death, holding (1) Defendant received a fair trial as to guilt; (2) the trial court erred by dismissing many prospective jurors because of written questionnaire responses expressing opposition to the death penalty, even though the jurors gave no indication that their views would prevent them from following the law; and (3) under United States Supreme Court precedent, these errors required reversal of the death sentence in this case. |
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| California v. Belche |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C088829(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Louis Mauro Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Stephen Belche admitted violating probation in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence of three years on the original conviction. The trial court approved the admission agreement, formally revoked defendant’s probation, and ordered that probation would not be reinstated. While defendant was awaiting sentencing on the original conviction, he exposed himself to a jail nurse. The probation department filed a new petition to revoke probation based on the indecent exposure. The trial court found the new allegation true, again revoked defendant’s probation, and sentenced him to six years in state prison. On appeal of that sentence, defendant argued: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to find he violated probation based on his indecent exposure after the trial court formally revoked his probation and ordered that it not be reinstated; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him to six years in state prison because he only agreed to a sentence of three years when he admitted the probation violation. After review, the Court of Appeal determined: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to find defendant violated probation based on his indecent exposure because defendant’s probation had been formally revoked and not reinstated, terminating probation; and (2) the Court had to vacate the six-year prison term and remand for the trial court either to impose a three-year term or allow defendant to withdraw his admission made under the agreement. |
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| Lona v. City of Fullerton Police Dept. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G058257(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Goethals Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Ruben Lona admitted he had been a member of a criminal street gang, but claimed he left the gang in 2016. In 2018, invoking the procedure in Penal Code section 186.34, Lona asked the City of Fullerton Police Department (the Department) to remove his name from a shared gang database that listed him as a suspected gang member or associate. The Department denied his request; Lona then filed a petition for removal pursuant to section 186.35. The trial court denied his petition, based in large part on Lona’s sworn statements that he left the gang only three years earlier, still possessed attire that violated the gang injunction applicable to his former gang, and still bore gang tattoos. Lona appealed, asserting the trial court erred by admitting the Department’s 2018 denial letter and by denying him an opportunity to respond to the letter’s contents. He further contended the Department did not prove his “active gang membership” by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. |
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| People v. Byers |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B295235(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Dhanidina Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant petitioned for resentencing under Proposition 36 of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, on his conviction of possession of a firearm with a prior, the trial court found that defendant was ineligible for resentencing due to weight enhancements that had been found true. On remand, the trial court found that defendant was ineligible for resentencing as to count 20 because defendant was armed with a firearm during the commission of that offense. The trial court reasoned that possessing a firearm is a continuing offense and, during the course of defendant's possession, he had the firearms available for use at different points in time. The Court of Appeal reversed and held that there was insufficient evidence that defendant was armed with a firearm during the offense of possessing the firearm. In this case, defendant was miles away from the firearms when they were found and, moreover, there was no evidence connecting him to those firearms other than that they were in a house where he had been seen earlier in the day and where his car was parked and documents bearing his name were found. |
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| People v. Conatser |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A154326(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 26, 2020 Judge: Petrou Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2015, the defendant pled no contest to felony possession of a controlled substance for sale and admitted two prior drug-related convictions. The court sentenced him to two years on the possession offense and imposed two consecutive three-year terms on the prior convictions, in a split sentence with the first two years to be served in county jail and the remaining six years to be served under mandatory supervision. The court of appeal affirmed in 2016. Senate Bill 180, effective January 1, 2018, made amendments to Health and Safety Code section 11370. The defendant's convictions no longer qualified for the imposition of sentence enhancements. The court denied the defendant's motion to strike the enhancements, finding the new law did not apply because his judgment was final before the amendments became effective. The California Supreme Court, following its 2020 "McKenzie" decision, transferred the case back. On reconsideration, in light of McKenzie, the court of appeal concluded the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the amendments because “this criminal prosecution or proceeding” had not been “concluded before the ameliorative legislation took effect.” The split sentence “constitutes 'a judgment provisional or conditional in nature.’ The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to strike the sentencing enhancements. |
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| People v. Contreraz |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H045787(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Eugene M. Premo Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Contreraz was charged with second-degree robbery, participation in a criminal street gang, carrying a concealed firearm, and resisting a peace officer. Contreraz pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and admitted the firearm and gang enhancement allegations in connection with the robbery offense. The trial court sentenced Contreraz to a total term of 10 years; imposed and stayed a 10-year sentence on the gang allegation; ordered the sentence suspended; and placed Contreraz on three years’ formal probation. In 2018, the Santa Cruz County Probation Department filed a petition alleging that Contreraz had violated his probation by failing to report, failing to participate in an educational/vocational/therapeutic program, failing to pay fines and fees, and failing to pay restitution. The trial court held a hearing; found that Contreraz violated his probation; terminated probation; and executed the previously imposed 10-year prison sentence. The court of appeal previously rejected Contreraz’s argument that he is entitled to the retroactive benefit of Senate Bill 620, which amended Penal Code sections 12022.5(c) and 12022.53(h), effective January 1, 2018, and affirmed. The California Supreme Court transferred the matter back for reconsideration in light of People v. McKenzie. The court of appeal then concluded that Contreraz is entitled to the benefit of Sen. Bill 620 and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to strike the firearm enhancement pursuant to sections 12022.5(c) and 12022.53(h). |
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| People v. Nguyen |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B298575(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Victoria Gerrard Chaney Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant, who pleaded guilty to second degree murder in 2006, appealed from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the petition, holding that defendant is not entitled to an order to show cause and an evidentiary hearing because he did not make the requisite prima facie showing that he was convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory. Rather, defendant bases his petition on his contention that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing demonstrating he aided and abetted the charged offenses with murderous intent. The panel stated that a petition under section 1170.95 is not a vehicle for such a collateral attack on a guilty plea. |
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| People v. Valdes |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B300910(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Arthur Gilbert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed a judgment following his conviction for second degree robbery, with a finding that he used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense. After defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 11 years, he moved for correction of presentence custody credits and abstract of judgment, claiming he was entitled to "an additional one (1) presentence credit day for a total of 296 presentence credit days." The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed, agreeing with defendant that his 11 year sentence must be reduced by one day. In this case, defendant's 38-day good time/work time credit entitles him to a total credit of 296 days instead of 295. Accordingly, the court remanded to the trial court with instructions to correct the sentence. The court affirmed in all other respects. |
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| Anderson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0873 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Dexter Anderson was convicted by jury of the felony murder of his girlfriend, Charlotta Marie Lockhart, and for possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, Anderson contended, among other things: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for felony murder; (2) that he received an incomplete transcript of his trial proceedings; (3) that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and (4) that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on the offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Brooks v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0895 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Deontae Tremayne Brooks was convicted of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in connection with the shooting death of Branden “Big B” Tinch and the aggravated assault of Lenard Gay. Brooks was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. He appealed, arguing: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction under OCGA 16-11-133 (b); (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) trial court error in failing to grant his motion for mistrial. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed Brooks’ conviction under OCGA § 16-11-133 (b), affirmed his convictions for malice murder and the aggravated assault of Gay, and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to enter a judgment of conviction and sentence on the guilty verdicts for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under OCGA 16-11- 131, which the trial court originally merged into the conviction under OCGA 16-11-133 (b). |
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| Campbell-Williams v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0642 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Tiquonda Raenell Campbell-Williams appeals her convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the death of her boyfriend, Tyress Malcome. On appeal, Campbell-Williams argued the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on proximate or intervening cause, and that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not requesting these charges. Campbell-Williams also argued the trial court erred by admitting a deceased witness’s statements under OCGA 24-8-807. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, finding the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to give the jury charges, Campbell-Williams did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the witness’s statements. |
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| Clay v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0727 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| James Rashad Clay was convicted by jury. Acting pro se, he appealed his convictions for malice murder and related offenses in connection with crimes committed against Rashonda Patterson and Joseph Emener. On appeal, Clay claimed numerous errors, but finding no reversible one, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. |
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| Harris v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0855 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Robert Harris was convicted of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the fatal shooting of Kenneth Roberts and the assault of five other men. Harris was jointly indicted and tried with co-defendants Marcus Battle and Jacobey Carter. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Battle’s and Carter’s convictions in Battle v. Georgia, 804 SE2d 46 (2017). Here, Harris argued: (1) his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance for failing to object to certain testimony from the investigating detective, (2) his motion-for-new trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise a "Brady" claim and in not asserting a due process violation because Harris’s conviction rests, in part, on false evidence. Harris also argued (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance and committed a merger error at sentencing. Although the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in sentencing Harris for aggravated assault under Count 5, it otherwise affirmed. |
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| Hodges v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0709 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Victor Hodges was convicted by jury of malice murder, robbery, and other offenses in connection with the death of Julie Mae Simpson. On appeal, Hodges contended only that the trial court employed an incorrect legal standard when it denied his motion for new trial on the general grounds. Finding no such error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Kim v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0865 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Ki Song Kim appealed his convictions for murder and other offenses in connection with the stabbing deaths of Young Chan Choi and Sun Hee Choi. In his sole enumeration of error, Kim claimed that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain Kim’s convictions. However, the Court also concluded it had to vacate Kim’s sentences as to Counts 9 and 10 of his indictment in order to correct sentencing errors that harmed Kim. |
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| Perry v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0863 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Kyle Diamond Luke Perry pleaded guilty to the murder of Jeremias Ortiz and other crimes. The trial court accepted Perry’s plea and imposed sentence, including a sentence of imprisonment for life for the murder. Several years later, Perry filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal, which the trial court granted. Perry then filed a timely notice of appeal, and before the Georgia Supreme Court, he claimed his plea was not entered freely and voluntarily. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Reeves v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1005 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Kevin Reeves challenged his convictions for the malice murder of Marquis Stephens and numerous other crimes, all committed in connection with a gunfight at a house party in 2015. His motion for a new trial was denied. On appeal, Reeves argued the trial court violated his Georgia constitutional right to be present by excluding him from several bench conferences and, relatedly, that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to object to Reeves’s exclusion from the bench conferences. Although the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to merge six of the counts of aggravated assault of which Reeves was convicted with six of the counts of attempted armed robbery, it otherwise affirmed Reeves’s convictions. |
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| Roberts v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0988 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Deanna Roberts pled guilty in federal court to a crime relating to the theft of a medical product, liquid silicone, that Roberts injected into the buttocks of Lateasha Hall, resulting in Hall’s death. When she was later indicted for state crimes arising from Hall’s death, including malice murder, Roberts filed a plea of statutory double jeopardy in superior court, contending that under OCGA 16-1-8 (c), her conviction in federal court barred the state prosecution for all crimes except malice murder. The trial court rejected that claim, and Roberts filed a direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court. Because one of the statutory requirements for the section 16-1-8 (c) bar to apply was not satisfied here, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Roberts’s plea in bar. |
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| Studivant v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1024 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Marquis Studivant was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shooting of Dennis Gayton. Studivant appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence that was collected from a vehicle he was driving around the time of his arrest; and (3) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. |
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| State v. Green |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118366 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Carol A. Beier Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated burglary, and arson, holding that no error required reversal. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court judge did not err by refusing to give a voluntary intoxication instruction or a voluntary manslaughter instruction; (2) Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his argument that the district judge erred in admitting a videotaped interrogation of him into evidence because law enforcement agents repeatedly challenged his honesty and truthfulness during that interrogation; and (3) the district judge did not err in refusing to give a cautionary instruction on informant testimony. |
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| State v. Pattillo |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118941 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Marla J. Luckert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of felony murder, aggravated assault, felony discharge of a firearm, and aggravated endangering of a child, holding that no reversible error occurred. Defendant was convicted of felony murder based on the underlying inherently dangerous felonies of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling and aggravated endangering of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for felony murder, holding (1) the underlying felonies supported Defendant's convictions and sentences; and (2) Defendant's claims that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury lacked merit. |
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| Bowen v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-0473-MR Opinion Date: August 20, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of attempted murder and theft by unlawful taking of a firearm, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury and denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict. A jury found Defendant guilty of attempted murder and theft by unlawful taking of a firearm. Consistent with the jury's recommendation, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a total sentence of twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by declining Defendant's request for a renunciation instruction; and (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict on the charge of theft by unlawful taking of a firearm. |
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| Taylor v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Dockets: 2018-SC-0605-MR, 2018-SC-0613-MR Opinion Date: August 20, 2020 Judge: Vanmeter Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Conrai Kaballah's conviction of criminal attempt-murder, first-degree assault, and other crimes and Ricardo Taylor's conviction of criminal attempt-murder, first-degree assault, and other crimes and both defendant's sentences of life imprisonment, holding that any errors were harmless. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) both defendants should have been Mirandized prior to being interrogated shortly after the assault occurred; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a transcript commissioned by the Commonwealth of a phone call Taylor made from jail to be shown during closing arguments; and (3) both errors were harmless as a matter of law due to the overwhelming evidence against the defendants and the inconsequential nature of the evidence produced from the errors. |
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| Thomas v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2018-SC-0437-MR Opinion Date: August 20, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Defendant to life in prison plus fifty years, holding that the violent offender statute is not applicable to youthful offenders for purposes of consideration of probation, even if they are sentenced after they have reached the age of majority. Defendant committed the crimes for which he was convicted when he was seventeen years old. The district court transferred the charges to circuit court for Defendant's prosecution as a youthful offender. Defendant was nineteen years old when he pleaded guilty pursuant to plea agreements to murder, first-degree robbery, and other crimes. Under the assumption that Defendant was ineligible for probation, the trial court imposed a life sentence with a fifty-year sentence to run consecutively. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Kentucky's Juvenile Code and relevant caselaw support the conclusion that the violent offender statute is not applicable to youthful offenders for purposes of consideration of probation, even if they are sentenced after they reach the age of eighteen years and five months; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to consider probation or other forms of conditional discharge as possible alternatives. |
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| Brown, Bottini & Wilson v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 30m/18 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Robert N. McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals answered four questions of law concerning the application of the Justice Reinvestment Act (JRA), Chapter 515, Laws of Maryland 2016, specifically, a provision codified in Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law (CR) 5-609.1. The JRA eliminated mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment without the possibility of parole required by existing law for defendants who were convicted of certain drug offenses and who were repeat offenders. CR 5-609.1 provides that a defendant who had received a mandatory minimum sentence prior to the elimination of such sentences can ask the court to reduce that sentence. A number of inmates currently serving mandatory minimum sentences invoked CR 5-609.1 and filed motions to modify or reduce their sentences. The Court of Special Appeals certified questions of law concerning CR 5-609.1 that pertained to pending appeals in that court. The Court of Appeals answered the certified questions as to the application of CR 5-609.1 when the mandatory minimum sentence relates to a conviction based on a court-approved plea agreement under which the parties agreed that the mandatory minimum sentence would be imposed and when the defendant waived the right to seek modification of that sentence as part of the plea agreement. |
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| Johnson v. Department of Health |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 71/19 Opinion Date: August 24, 2020 Judge: Biran Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of circuit court judge upholding the order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) ordering Gregory Johnson's involuntary medication, holding that there was no error in the order authorizing Johnson's involuntary medication. Johnson was charged with attempted first-degree murder and related offenses. The circuit court found Johnson incompetent to stand trial and dangerous and committed him for treatment to a state-run forensic psychiatric hospital. After Johnson repeatedly refused to take prescribed antipsychotic medication the Maryland Department of Health began the process to administer the medication to Johnson involuntarily. An ALJ ordered Johnson's involuntary medication to restore him to competency, and the circuit court upheld the order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Maryland law authorizes involuntary medication to restore an individual's competence to stand trial and does not violate separation of powers by entrusting an ALJ with the power to order such medication subject to judicial review; and (2) because the Department and the ALJ met due process requirements, there was no error in the order authorizing Johnson's involuntary medication. |
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| Commonwealth v. Lopez |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12007 Opinion Date: August 20, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that there was no error that resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's statements that he made to police were properly admitted into evidence; (2) the trial judge did not err in finding that text messages sent after the murder were admissible; (3) the trial judge did not err in admitting a redacted version of the videotaped custodial interrogation of Defendant; (4) the trial judge did not err in declining to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter; (5) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial; and (6) there was no reason to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. |
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| Commonwealth v. Mason |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-09070 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and animal cruelty, and declined to grant extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that no prejudicial error occurred. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) no error occurred during jury selection with respect to the voir dire of prospective jurors; (2) the judge did not abuse her discretion in finding that the neutral reason provided by the prosecutor for exercising a peremptory challenge was genuine and adequate; (3) the judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting prior bad act evidence, testimony that Defendant had access to firearms, and testimony regarding the results of a criminalist's Internet search; (4) evidence of charred paper fragments found in the basement of the dwelling where Defendant lived was not relevant, but the error was not prejudicial; and (5) there was no error in the prosecutor's statements during closing argument. |
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| Commonwealth v. Sanchez |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12778 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Construction Law, Criminal Law |
| In this case involving procedures and remedies for impermissible peremptory challenges the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the language of the Federal standard for the first step of a challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and retired the language of "pattern" and "likelihood" governing the first-step inquiry under Commonwealth v. Soares, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). While incarcerated, Defendant argued on appeal and in pursuing postconviction relief that the trial judge did not appropriately inquire as to whether the prosecutor unconstitutionally struck African-American men from the jury. The Appeals Court determined that the trial judge did not err in deciding not to continue past the first step of the Batson-Soares inquiry. In granting Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, the First Circuit concluded that the trial judge unreasonably applied Federal law. Defendant then filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a reduced sentence. The motion judge reduced the verdict under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(2) and resentenced Defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order and remanded for retrial, holding (1) the judge improperly reduced the verdict, and the principles of double jeopardy did not preclude retrying Defendant; and (2) adopting the Federal formulation of the Batson-Soares test will better identify improper peremptory challenges. |
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| Howard v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-CA-01586-SCT Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Ishee Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Eddie Howard was sentenced to death for the rape and murder of eighty-four-year-old Georgia Kemp. Howard was tied to the crime by Dr. Michael West, who identified Howard as the source of bite marks on Kemp’s body. At trial, Dr. West testified that he was a member of the American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO) and that he had followed its guidelines in rendering his opinion. But since Howard’s trial, the ABFO revised those guidelines to prohibit such testimony, and this reflected a new scientific understanding that an individual perpetrator could not be reliably identified through bite-mark comparison. This, along with new DNA testing and the paucity of other evidence linking Howard to the murder, compelled the Mississippi Supreme Court to conclude that Howardwasis entitled to a new trial. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief and vacated Howard’s conviction and sentence. |
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| Willis v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-01509-SCT Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Randolph Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Willis appealed his conviction for aggravated assault following a fight outside Kedarious' grandmother's home in which one person was shot and paralyzed. Counsel for his codefendant and nephew Kedarious Willis (Kedarious) filed a Lindsey brief with the appellate court, averring there were no meritorious arguments for appeal. After reviewing the errors Willis alleged, the Mississippi Supreme Court found no merit to his arguments. Therefore, the Court affirmed conviction. |
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| State v. Khongwiset |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 215 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Mike McGrath Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault with a weapon, a felony, holding that the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into Defendant's request to substitute counsel. On appeal, Defendant argued that when she requested that her counsel be replaced, the trial court's inquiry into her complaints was inadequate. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into the nature and causes of the apparent conflicts and alleged breakdown in communication between Defendant and her counsel; and (2) because Defendant failed to present material facts demonstrating that there was an irreconcilable conflict or breakdown in communication such that she was unable to mount an adequate defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request to substitute counsel. |
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| State v. Dixon |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 853 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Stacy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of burglary and one count of theft by receiving stolen property, holding that Defendant's assignments of error were without merit. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered in a warrantless search of a backpack Defendant discarded in a ditch; (2) the district court did not err in admitting the State's evidence pertaining to the value of the stolen property; and (3) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of theft by receiving stolen property. |
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| State v. Wilson |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 875 Opinion Date: August 21, 2020 Judge: Papik Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the district court that Defendant committed an aggravated offense and was thus subject to lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), holding that the district court did not err. Defendant pleaded no contest to first degree sexual assault and another related charge. After accepting the pleas, the district court found that Defendant committed an aggravated offense under SORA and was thus subject to a lifetime registration obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by determining that Defendant committed an aggravated offense and was therefore required to register under SORA for life. |
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| City of West Fargo v. Olson, et al. |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 188 Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The City of West Fargo (the “City”) petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a supervisory writ to direct the district court to vacate a pretrial order requiring the City to produce at trial the individual (or the “Witness”) who initially inspected and reviewed the installation of the Intoxilyzer 8000 testing device used to administer a chemical breath test to Brady Johnson. The City charged Johnson with driving under the influence following a chemical breath test adminstered by law enforcement using an Intoxilyzer 8000 testing device. Johnson objected to the introduction of the analytical report at trial, arguing cross-examination of the Witness is required under the Confrontation Clause and Rule 707 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. According to the City and Johnson, the Witness initially inspected and reviewed the installation of the Intoxilyzer 8000 testing device which was used to administer Johnson’s breath test. She signed two documents entitled, “Intoxilyzer 8000 Initial Inspection” and “Intoxilyzer 8000 Installation and Repair Checkout.” The City responded to Johnson’s objection, arguing the documents signed by the Witness were not testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause or Rule 707 as to require the City to produce the Witness for trial. The district court ordered the City to produce the Witness at trial. The Supreme Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court order, concluding the Witness did not make any testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause or Rule 707 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence requiring the City to produce her at trial. |
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| North Dakota v. M.J.W. |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 183 Opinion Date: August 27, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In June 2000, M.J.W. pled guilty to two misdemeanor offenses. In January 2001, he again pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense. In July 2003, he pled guilty to three misdemeanor offenses. In each of these three criminal cases, the district court sentenced M.J.W. to a suspended jail sentence, a fine, and unsupervised probation. M.J.W. was convicted of additional criminal offenses in October 2003 and August 2004. In October 2019, M.J.W. petitioned the district court under N.D.C.C. ch. 12-60.1 to seal records in each of the five cases. The State opposed M.J.W.’s petitions in the first three cases, arguing that M.J.W.’s subsequent convictions within three years of release from probation barred him from filing the petitions. The State did not oppose M.J.W.’s petitions in the October 2003 and August 2004 cases. The district court held a consolidated hearing on M.J.W.’s petitions in December 2019. At the close of the hearing, the State argued M.J.W. did not qualify for relief under N.D.C.C. 12-60.1-02(1)(a) because he had been convicted of new crimes within three years of his release from probation in each of those cases. The district court found the terms of N.D.C.C. 12-60.1-02(1)(a) to be ambiguous, and applying the rule of lenity, granted M.J.W.’s petitions and sealed the records in all five cases. Upon the State's appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court misapplied the law. Judgment sealing the records was reversed. |
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| Cook v. State |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: W2018-00237-SC-R11-PC Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Clark Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court remanded this matter to the trial court for a new post-conviction hearing before different judge, holding that the post-conviction judge should have recused himself even though Petitioner failed to file a motion for recusal because his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. After a second trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition as assigned to Judge Lee V. Coffee, the same judge who presided over Petitioner's second trial. The post-conviction judge denied relief. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the post-conviction judge should have recused himself. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioner's challenge to the judge's impartiality was waived because Petitioner failed to file a motion seeking the post-conviction judge's recusal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the post-conviction judge should have disqualified himself under Rule of Judicial Conduct 2.11, and therefore, Petitioner was entitled to a new hearing before a different judge on his petition for post-conviction relief. |
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| Archuleta v. State |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 62 Opinion Date: August 20, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment against Defendant's post-conviction claims, holding that Defendant's Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), claim was not cognizable under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Later, Defendant filed a third state petition for post-conviction relief, including an Atkins claim and twelve additional claims unrelated to Atkins. The post-conviction court concluded that all of Defendant's claims were barred under the PCRA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the PCRA did not provide a remedy for Defendant's Atkins claim; and (2) each of Defendant's remaining claims was procedurally barred. |
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| Lewis v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 110 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Kate M. Fox Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of aggravated assault and battery and mandatory life sentence, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In charging Defendant, the State sought a habitual criminal sentencing enhancement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-10-201. After a trial, the jury convicted Defendant and found that he qualified for the habitual criminal enhancement under section 6-101-201(b)(ii). The court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that his trial counsel did not communicate with him in a manner that enabled him fully to understand he was facing a life sentence, and this deficiency fell below the standard of professional conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish prejudice. |
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| Uden v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 109 Opinion Date: August 25, 2020 Judge: Boomgaarden Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal from an order of the district court dismissing Petitioner's petition seeking exoneration under the Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-12-401 through 407, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction because the court's order dismissing Petitioner's petition was not a final appealable order. The district court dismissed Petitioner's petition as deficient under the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the order dismissing Petitioner's Factual Innocence Act petition following initial review is not a final appealable order; and (2) therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner's appeal. |
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