“Might as Well Carry a Purse with That Mask, Joe”: COVID-19, Toxic Masculinity, and the Sad State of National Politics

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, LINDA C. MCCLAIN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Boston University law professor Linda C. McClain comment on COVID-19, toxic masculinity, and the state of national politics today. Grossman and McClain contrast President Trump’s reckless bravado that endangers the lives of Americans with the empathy of Democratic presidential nominee former Vice President Joe Biden’s in asking people to be patriotic by doing their part by wearing masks to protect other Americans.

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Should Department of Justice Lawyers Defy William Barr?

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—comments on an open letter addressed to the 100,000 professionals working in the U.S. Department of Justice and published by Lawyers Defending Democracy. In the letter, more than 600 members of the bar from across the United States call on their DOJ colleagues to refrain from “participating in political misuse of the DOJ in the elction period ahead.” Sarat argues that the letter rightly recognizes that Attorney General Barr’s blatant partisanship endangers the integrity of the DOJ itself and its role in preserving the rule of law.

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Thiele v. Thiele

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17256

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Carney

Areas of Law: Family Law

Angela and Kim Thiele married in February 2009 and separated in January 2016. Angela filed for divorce in February 2016. Kim received a Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine degree in 1980. After working as an employee in another doctor’s practice, he established his own professional corporation in 2001; he worked as an independent contractor at other practices for the next ten years. During this time his business had few fixed assets because the doctors that employed him covered most of the overhead of running the medical practice. Kim’s business received 30% of the revenue he brought in from seeing patients, which Kim deposited into the corporation’s bank account. Business expenses were paid out of the corporate bank account, as was Kim’s salary. In 2011 Kim decided to open his own practice rather than continue to work as an independent contractor. He obtained a business license and hired an office manager to help him with the transition. At about the same time Angela contributed $15,000 of her own funds to the marital estate. She helped Kim decorate the office, and she participated in discussions with Kim about taking over another doctor’s practice or starting his own practice. Angela also worked as a receptionist and administrative assistant, answering the phone, greeting patients, and performing other administrative tasks as needed. The primary dispute in the couple's divorce centered on the classification of Kim's practice as separate or marital property. The superior court determined that the practice had neither transmuted nor actively appreciated during marriage and therefore was not marital property. The court also declined to award Angela attorney’s fees or reimbursement for the cost of an expert witness. Angela appealed the court’s determination that the medical practice was not marital property and its refusal to award attorney’s fees or costs. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on both issues.

In re Dominic F.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B302482(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 6, 2020

Judge: Stratton

Areas of Law: Family Law, Native American Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, holding that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) does not apply here. Mother contends that the juvenile court and DCFS failed to satisfy the formal notice requirements under the ICWA and related California law. In this case, the initial inquiry conducted by the juvenile court created a "reason to believe" the children possibly are Indian children; DCFS's repeated efforts to gather information concerning the children's maternal ancestry constitutes substantial evidence that DCFS met its duty of further inquiry; but the juvenile court and DCFS's further investigation did not yield results that pushed their reason to believe the children are Indian children, to reason to know the children are Indian children. The court explained that a suggestion of Indian ancestry is not sufficient under ICWA or related California law to trigger the notice requirement. Because DCFS was not required to provide formal notice to the pertinent tribes, the court did not reach Mother's argument that the ICWA notices may have lacked necessary information.

In re S.S.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E074852(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Slough

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (department) filed a petition seeking to remove an 18-month old girl based on mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues and noncustodial father’s failure to provide for her. However, after the child was detained, father came forward and said he had been trying to reunify with her since mother took the child when she was about four months old. He also said he had established his paternity through a genetic test and had been paying child support to mother throughout their separation. Father said he couldn’t yet take custody of the child because his housing, transportation, and employment weren’t stable, but he indicated he had obtained work and was attempting to find suitable housing. He also indicated he would return to Chicago, his home city, and live with relatives who were willing to help him raise her once he obtained custody. The department amended the petition to remove the allegations against father before the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, nonetheless maintained the child should be removed from both parents, and asked the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that placing the child with her parents would pose a substantial danger to her health, safety or well-being. Rights to the child were ultimately terminated, but the father appealed, averring his situation had changed: he obtained full-time employment with benefits and a permanent place to live. The court denied his motion, concluding he had shown his circumstances were changing, but had not changed. Before the Court of Appeal, father argued the entire procedure violated his due process rights and there wasn’t adequate support for the trial court’s finding that giving him custody would be detrimental to the child. The Court held a juvenile court could not terminate parental rights based on problems arising from the parent’s poverty, "a problem made worse, from a due process standpoint, when the department didn’t formally allege those problems as a basis for removal." Absent those impermissible grounds for removal the Court found there wasn’t clear and convincing evidence that returning the child to father would be detrimental to her. Termination of father’s rights was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Smith v. Smith

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46832

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

In 2005, Ballard Smith (Husband) and Charlie Smith (Wife) stipulated to a final divorce order that required the parties to sell real property located in Salt Lake City, Utah and allocate the net proceeds to both parties on an equal basis. In subsequent orders, Husband was tasked with marketing and selling the Salt Lake Property. Without Wife’s knowledge, Husband moved the Salt Lake Property in and out of various business entities and unilaterally sold a six-acre portion of the Salt Lake Property. After the majority of the Salt Lake Property remained unsold for nearly a decade, Wife petitioned the magistrate court to modify its prior order, requesting that the magistrate court: (1) direct that the Salt Lake Property be appraised and that Husband pay her one-half the appraised value; or (2) in the alternative, appoint a receiver to sell the Salt Lake Property and divide the net proceeds equally. Husband opposed the petition by arguing the magistrate court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property when it entered its original final divorce order. The magistrate court granted Wife’s petition to modify and appointed a receiver to handle all matters relating to the Salt Lake Property. Additionally, the magistrate court ordered Husband to pay Wife one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of the six-acre portion of the Salt Lake Property and awarded Wife attorney fees. Husband appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court and awarded Wife attorney fees for her intermediate appeal. Husband then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Adoption by Jessica M.

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 118

Opinion Date: October 6, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the probate court terminating the parental rights of Parents in anticipation of adoption pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 9-204, holding that the court did not err or exceed the bounds of its discretion. The child's maternal aunt and uncle - the child's legal guardians - petitioned to terminate Parents' parental rights and for adoption of the child. After a hearing, the court entered judgment terminating both Parents' parental rights, finding that both parents abandoned the child and that termination of Parents' parental rights was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court's findings that Parents were unfit to parent the child were supported by competent evidence.

In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor Identified in the Petition: C.C.B. and S.R.B. v. G.A.K. and G.R.K.

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2018-CA-01745-SCT

Opinion Date: October 8, 2020

Judge: James W. Kitchens

Areas of Law: Family Law

The chancery court tried this adoption case twice. After the first trial, the chancellor granted the adoption petition of the maternal grandparents, C.C.B. and S.R.B.; after the second trial, the chancellor granted the competing adoption petition of G.E.K. and G.R.K., the foster parents. The grandparents appealed, arguing for the first time that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Mississippi Termination of Parental Rights Law (MTPRL) to terminate parental rights and adjudicate the adoption of S.A.B. Also, for the first time on appeal, they argued the chancery court lacked jurisdiction because it failed to order a home study as required by statute. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court held the chancery court had jurisdiction under the MTPRL to accept the voluntary releases of parental rights filed by S.A.B.’s natural parents and to order S.A.B.’s adoption. Further, the Court held that, because the failure to order a home study did not implicate the chancery court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the Court affirmed.

In re Claim of Roberts for Attorney Fees

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 307 Neb. 346

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Stacy

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a series of orders fixing fees for court-appointed counsel in a juvenile proceeding, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. After Mother's children were adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) the State moved to terminate Mother's parental rights. The juvenile court denied the State's motion following a trial. The court of appeals affirmed. Thereafter, Mother filed three fee applications seeking payment for services rendered by court-appointed counsel. The court found Mother's requested fees were fair and reasonable and allowed the fee applications. The Supreme Court affirmed after clarifying the statutory framework for appealing such orders, holding that there was no abuse of discretion.

Yori v. Helms

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 307 Neb. 375

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: William B. Cassel

Areas of Law: Family Law

After Appellant appealed an order of the district court finding him in contempt of court and modifying terms of a parenting plan, the Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal from an order of commitment and a purge order containing a reduction in Appellant's parenting time, holding that, as to the first appeal, there was no abuse of discretion, and that, as to the second appeal, there was no final order. The district court found Appellant in contempt of court for violating parenting provisions of a dissolution decree, imposed a suspended jail sentence, and modified terms of the parenting plan in this case. Appellant appealed this order. While the appeal was pending, the court entered an order of commitment and a purge order reducing Appellant's parenting time but setting the matter for a future review hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed as to the first appeal and dismissed the second appeal for lack of a final order, holding (1) the modifications at issue in the first appeal were part of the equitable relief the court had the authority to provide; and (2) the second appeal was not taken from a final order.

Bruns v. Green

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4787

Opinion Date: October 8, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court held that a trial court need not find a change in circumstances in order to designate a parent the residential parent and legal custodian of a minor child after terminating a shared parenting plan and decree. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the decision of the juvenile division of the court of common pleas that terminated a shared parenting plan between Father and Mother and designated Mother as the sole residential and legal custodian of the parties' minor child, holding that, under the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 3109.04, a trial court is not required to find a change in circumstances but needs only to consider only the best interest of the child when deciding whether the terminate a shared parenting plan and which parent to designate as the residential and custodial parent of a minor child.