| United States v. Alexander |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1896 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment and affirmed the sentence imposed, holding that the district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss and that the sentence was reasonable. Appellant was charged with conspiring to manufacture, distribute, and import cocaine into the United States. Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government could not prove the element of the offense that Appellant knew or intended that the cocaine would be sent to the United States. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Appellant entered into a conditional plea agreement and then appealed. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's motion to dismiss, holding that Appellant's challenge to the validity of the indictment failed; and (2) affirmed Defendant's below-guideline sentence, holding that the sentence was reasonable. |
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| United States v. Lopez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1418 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the imposition of a role-in-the-offense enhancement in connection with Defendant's conviction for racketeering conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), holding that there was no error in Defendant's sentence. Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to conduct enterprise affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. A PSI report applied a three-level role-in-the-offense enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(b). The probationer arrived at the enhancement by analyzing Defendant's role in each of the predicate racketeering acts separately and concluded that the enhancement applied only to a murder plot. The government argued that the role enhancement should apply across the board based on Defendant's managerial role in the overall conspiracy. The district court effectively adopted the government's interpretation of the relevant guideline and sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the role-in-the-offense enhancement is dependent upon the defendant's role in the criminal enterprise as a whole instead of his role in the discrete acts of racketeering activity that underpin the RICO conviction; and (2) the district court's factual finding that Defendant played a managerial or supervisory role in the RICO conspiracy was not plainly erroneous. |
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| United States v. Rosario-Perez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Dockets: 14-1692, 14-2098, 14-1870, 14-1919 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In these cases against four defendants - Manuel De Jesus Rosario-Perez (Rosario), Jorge Gomez-Gonzalez (Gomez), Bryant Setiawan-Ramos (Setiawan), and Santiago Hernandez-Rosa (Hernandez) - the First Circuit affirmed the various drug and weapons charges as to Rosario, Gomez, and Hernandez but vacated Setiawan's convictions and remanded his case for a new trial, holding that Setiawan's convictions must be set aside on a cumulative error theory. Each defendant was indicted for conspiracy to distribute drugs within 1,000 feet of a school and possession with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The indictment also charged everyone but Rosario with carrying and using firearms in relation to drug trafficking. Each defendant was convicted of one or more counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) most of Defendants' claims were without merit; but (2) the district court's decision to admit evidence that Setiawan killed "Teton," a drug seller, while excluding evidence that a witness named "Cascote" killed Teton was improper, and the cumulative effect of the decision warranted a new trial. |
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| United States v. Holloway |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-1035 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Nardini Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Holloway sought reduction of his 168-month prison sentence and 10-year term of supervised release under Section 404 of the 2018 First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194. The district court applied the framework of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), including U.S.S.G. 1B1.10. Because Holloway was sentenced as a career offender, the district court concluded that his Guidelines range after application of the First Step Act was equivalent to his original Guidelines range, so that Holloway was ineligible for a reduction of his term of imprisonment. The district court did not address supervised release. While his appeal was pending, Holloway completed his prison term and was released from custody. The Second Circuit vacated, holding that Holloway’s appeal was not mooted by his release. Holloway remains eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release and was eligible for relief under the plain language of the Act: The court had previously sentenced him for an offense covered by the Act, and Holloway was not otherwise barred from relief under the Act’s limitations; 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B), rather than section 3582(c)(2), provides the correct framework for consideration of a motion for a reduction of a term of imprisonment under the First Step Act; so U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 does not prevent a district court from considering a First Step Act motion made by a defendant whose new Sentencing Guidelines range is equivalent to his original range. |
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| Dooley v. Wetzel |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1684 Opinion Date: April 27, 2020 Judge: Rendell Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2002, Dooley was tried for five counts of attempted murder, five counts of aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of a crime, and reckless endangerment. A jury found him guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). Dooley filed grievances requesting the “D Stability Code” designation, which would have entitled him to greater mental health resources. A Department of Corrections (DOC) official told Dooley that after the GBMI verdict, the judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation and the report "did not support the GBMI designation and it was deleted from the final order.” The district court dismissed Dooley’s section 1983 complaint without leave to amend and declared that the dismissal constituted a “strike” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.1915(g). The Third Circuit vacated. On these facts, Dooley’s contention that he retained the GBMI designation, at least to some extent, is not baseless. If, as the DOC contends, a jury found Dooley GBMI and a sentencing judge concluded that Dooley was not severely mentally disabled, that would not have eliminated his GBMI status. Under current DOC policy, it would have placed him in Category II of GBMI inmates, which would have required that he be placed on the D Roster and receive regular psychiatric evaluations. Even if the sentencing judge found him not severely mentally disabled, his GBMI verdict did not disappear or lose all significance. |
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| United States v. Sims |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1172 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Hardiman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Sims, as a member of the “Black P-Stones,” an interstate gang that trafficked drugs and women, prostituted women online, provided them security while they worked, then collected their money and supplied the women with drugs. Sims and his fellow gang members used force and coercion to trap women in a vicious cycle of drug addiction and prostitution. Sims pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, 18 U.S.C. 1594(c). The PSR assigned Sims a base offense level of 34 for the conspiracy offense. Sims requested a base offense level of 14, which the Ninth Circuit had applied to the same crime in 2016. The district court applied a base level of 34, opining that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “defies the written words of the Guidelines. It defies logic.” The court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the resulting advisory Guidelines range of 151–188 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. When a conspiracy offense (like Sims’s conviction under section 1594(c)) is not covered by a specific Guidelines section, then Guidelines section 2X1.1 applies and requires courts to apply the base offense level for the substantive offense underlying the conspiracy. The substantive offenses underlying Sims’s conspiracy conviction were 18 U.S.C. 1591(a) and (b)(1), so Guidelines 2G1.1(a)(1) mandated a base offense level of 34. |
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| United States v. Beck |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 17-4179 Opinion Date: April 27, 2020 Judge: Albert Diaz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and to committing a felony offense involving a minor (specifically, producing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251) while being required to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2260A. Although the court agreed with defendant that his appeal fell outside the scope of his waiver, the court rejected defendant's contention that section 2260A cannot support a conviction. The court concluded that section 2260A more closely resembles an offense rather than an enhancement. On its face, section 2260A includes three elements: a defendant (1) must be required to register as a sex offender and (2) must commit one of its sixteen enumerated offenses, which (3) must involve a minor. Whereas, an enhancement may only include two elements. |
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| United States v. Benson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Dockets: 18-4539, 18-4540, 18-4577 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: G. Steven Agee Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants Benson, Brown, and Wallace were convicted of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in a crime of violence resulting in murder. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not err in permitting the challenged testimony under either Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) or 804(b)(3), and that even if the district court erred, it was ultimately harmless; rejected Benson's challenges to the Government's remarks, because the Government's closing argument did not prejudice his substantial rights and the jury instruction accurately reflected the law; and held that the Government presented sufficient evidence that Wallace had advance knowledge that a codefendant would carry a gun, and the predicate offense of Hobbs Act robbery constituted a valid crime of violence for the purposes of a 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) conviction. Accordingly, the court affirmed all three convictions. |
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| United States v. Patterson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4402 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: G. Steven Agee Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not violate defendant's due process rights when it failed to specify the evidence underlying its finding that he had violated his release conditions, given that the basis of the district court’s conclusion was evident from the record; held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant had indeed failed to comply with those conditions; and thus affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's supervised release. However, the court held that the district court procedurally erred by failing to acknowledge its consideration of defendant's nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a lower sentence. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence, remanding for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Badgett |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10146 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Higginbotham Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the terms of supervised release and the revocation sentences imposed by the district court. In United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), the Supreme Court struck down 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), a separate provision of the federal supervised-release statute that imposed a five-year minimum sentence on convicted sex offenders who committed certain specified sex offenses while on supervised release. The court held that there is currently no caselaw from either the Supreme Court or this circuit extending Haymond to 18 U.S.C. 3583(g) revocations, and thus the district court could not have committed any "clear or obvious" error in applying the statute. The court also held that defendant's 48-month revocation sentence is not substantively unreasonable. In this case, defendant failed to identify any objective error in the district court’s within-Guidelines revocation sentence. |
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| United States v. Diggles |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-40521 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Costa Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit heard this case en banc to resolve inconsistency in its caselaw on one common issue: How does the requirement that a court pronounce its sentence in the presence of the defendant apply to supervision conditions? The court stated that what matters is whether a condition is required or discretionary under the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). If a condition is required, making an objection futile, the court need not pronounce it. If a condition is discretionary, the court must pronounce it to allow for an objection. In this case, because the district court adopted the conditions the PSR proposed, it pronounced the three conditions it was required to: the financial disclosure requirement and the gambling and credit restrictions. The court clarified the law governing supervised release conditions in three respects: 1. A sentencing court must pronounce conditions that are discretionary under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d); 2. When a defendant fails to raise a pronouncement objection in the district court, review is for plain error if the defendant had notice of the conditions and an opportunity to object; 3. A sentencing court pronounces supervision conditions when it orally adopts a document recommending those conditions. |
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| United States v. Douglas |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-30488 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 371 to commit a deprivation of civil rights, an offense defined by 18 U.S.C. 242. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's application of a four-level dangerous-weapon enhancement, a three-level bodily injury enhancement, and a six-level public official or color-of-law enhancement. The court held that the district court did not procedurally err in sentencing defendant, and that the district court did not err in denying defendant's request for a downward variance. In this case, defendant failed to demonstrate that his within-guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable, and the district court expressly acknowledged its consideration of defendant's arguments before imposing a 60-month sentence. |
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| United States v. Nava |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 17-51077 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Higginbotham Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's two concurrent 480-month sentences for drug-trafficking offenses. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the methamphetamine seized in Gulfport was relevant conduct to his cocaine trafficking convictions; because defendant's 480-month sentence falls within the statutory maximum term, the district court's factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence did not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment; and, even if the district court committed plain error in imposing an offense-level adjustment for abusing a position of trust, defendant could not prove that any error affected his substantial rights. |
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| United States v. Rodriguez-Pena |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-40978 Opinion Date: April 27, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for illegal reentry where the Government conceded a Guidelines calculation error. The court held that the error affected defendant's substantial rights and failure to correct the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Rodriguez-Saldana |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50949 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Higginbotham Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to felony illegal reentry. In this case, defendant was in the United States to receive necessary eye surgery. Defendant contends that the prospect that he would receive surgery while in prison was a "dominant factor" in the sentence imposed, which would be improper under the Supreme Court's decision in Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 332 (2011). In reviewing for clear and obvious error, the court did not find enough indication that the district court extended defendant's sentence to allow him time to have eye surgery. The court held that the district court's statements as to the possible availability of eye surgery are not clear error, nor is the district court's recommendation that defendant be sent to a specific medical facility. |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-10476 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Carl E. Stewart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion seeking vacatur of his sentence in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which rendered a residual clause similar to the one found in 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied the motion, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent (at the time) that foreclosed vagueness challenges to section 924(c)(3)(B), and concluded that section 924(c)(3)(B) was not unconstitutionally vague. The Fifth Circuit granted granted a certificate of appealability. The court held that the Supreme Court abrogated the precedent that the district court relied on in denying the section 2255 motion, agreeing with defendant that United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), rendered section 924(c)(3)'s residual clause unconstitutional. However, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion on alternative grounds, holding that defendant's predicate convictions for bank robbery and attempted murder qualify as crimes of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, Davis does not impact his convictions. |
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| United States v. Benton |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3287 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The DEA had been surveilling Benton and Merida. Merida went inside Benton’s home carrying four kilograms of powder cocaine. Moments later, Merida exited and drove away. DEA agents stopped and searched Merida’s car and executed a search warrant on Benton’s home. In Merida’s car, agents found $94,190. In Benton’s home, they found the four kilograms of powder cocaine and three kilograms of crack cocaine in a safe, with a handgun lying nearby. Benton pled guilty to conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and conspiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), & 846. The government dropped a charge of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. The PSR calculated Benton’s offense level as 33 based on the underlying drug quantity calculation, which added the four kilograms of powder cocaine and the three kilograms of crack cocaine, deemed to be “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). Benton had 30 prior convictions, including prior offenses for cocaine possession and trafficking, resulting in a Guidelines range of 235-293 months. The Sixth Circuit upheld his 260-month sentence. The court upheld the “relevant conduct” determination and rejected arguments the district court should have granted a downward departure because Benton’s criminal history category overrepresented the seriousness of his past crimes and that Benton should not have received a considerably higher sentence than his co-defendant, Merida, who received 84 months of incarceration. |
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| United States v. Brown |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-5356 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Murphy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2007, a jury convicted Brown as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the sentence for felons who possess firearms from a 10-year maximum to a 15-year minimum if the defendant has three prior convictions that qualify as “violent felonies,” 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2), (e). Sixth Circuit precedent (Nance: then treated Brown’s three Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions as violent felonies, so that court upheld his 180-month sentence under the Act. Years later the parties agreed that changes to precedent showed that Brown’s burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felonies. The district court granted Brown relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He was resentenced and released from prison. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision granting Brown relief under section 2255 and remanded for the court to reinstate his original sentence. The court concluded that, following the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Stitt” holding, the Sixth Circuit’s 2007 Nance’s holding that a Tennessee aggravated-burglary conviction categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act “is once again the law of this circuit.” |
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| United States v. Ward |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-5747, 19-5751 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Danny Julian Boggs Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Witnesses told Memphis police that Ward had pulled up in a car, had fired shots at individuals gathered outside, then got out of the car and continued shooting. People returned fire. The witnesses directed the officers to another house, where they found Ward with a gunshot wound to his leg. Officers subsequently found an empty (stolen) pistol and shell casings on the lawn of the house next to the house where they found Ward. Two weeks later, Ward, on crutches, was arrested for trying to rob a pharmacy. Ward has a 2007 state conviction for aggravated robbery and a 2011 federal conviction for brandishing a firearm during a robbery. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm based on the shooting, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); for attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; and for brandishing a firearm during that robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), Ward pleaded guilty to robberyl the government dropped the section 924(c) count. At trial on the felon-in-possession count, Ward stipulated that he had a prior felony. Convicted, Ward was sentenced to 115 months of imprisonment The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Ward’s argument that his conviction was improper under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” holding because neither the indictment nor the jury instructions charged that he “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” There was clear evidence that Ward knew he was a felon and that the government could prove it. |
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| Chambers v. Sood |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 17-3503 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The doctor examined Chambers during the intake process at the Stateville Correctional Center. Chambers was housed there for a few weeks when he was processed into state custody. Chambers requested medication to treat a flare-up of a painful chronic condition, herpes. The doctor did not provide the medication. Chambers filed a grievance with the Stateville grievance office but was transferred to a different prison before the grievance was investigated. A grievance officer returned the grievance to Chambers unreviewed and invited him to take the matter to the Administrative Review Board (ARB), which normally serves in an appellate capacity reviewing decisions of grievance officers. ARB’s regulations also specify that grievances pertaining to problems at an earlier-assigned prison must be filed directly with ARB. Chambers skipped this step and instead sued the prison doctor under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners must pursue their complaints about prison conditions through all levels of the relevant administrative-review system before bringing a lawsuit in federal court. |
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| City of Chicago v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-3290, 18-2885 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law |
| The Attorney General imposed conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG), 34 U.S.C.10151, which the primary source of federal criminal justice enforcement funding for state and local governments. The district court granted a preliminary injunction as to conditions that required that state or local officials honor requests to provide federal agents advance notice of the scheduled release of aliens in custody and that state or local correctional facilities give federal agents access to aliens in their custody. The Seventh Circuit upheld a nationwide injunction. The district court granted a permanent injunction and invalidated a condition requiring that state or local governments certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373, which prohibits them from restricting their officials from communicating information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any individual to the INS, was unconstitutional but stayed the injunction to the extent that it applied beyond Chicago. The Seventh Circuit again held that the Attorney General cannot pursue the executive branch's policy objectives through the power of the purse or the arm of local law enforcement, rejecting the Attorney General’s assertion that Congress itself provided that authority in the language of the statutes. Chicago has determined that effective law enforcement requires the cooperation of its undocumented residents; such cooperation cannot be accomplished if those residents fear immigration consequences should they communicate with the police; and, local law enforcement must remain independent from federal immigration enforcement. The Byrne JAG grant was enacted to support the needs of local law enforcement to help fight crime, but “is being used as a hammer to further a completely different policy of the executive branch.” States do not forfeit all autonomy over their own police power merely by accepting federal grants. There is no reason to stay the application of the injunction. |
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| Siler v. City of Kenosha |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1855 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Kenosha Officer Torres, on patrol, received a call requesting assistance apprehending Siler. The dispatcher stated that Siler was wanted on a warrant for strangulation and suffocation, had taken a vehicle without consent, and was known to have violent tendencies. Siler did not actually have a warrant for strangulation and suffocation; he was wanted for violating probation. When Torres spotted Siler, he activated his lights and siren. Siler did not stop, resulting in a three-minute chase. Siler crashed his car and fled on foot. Torres followed him to an auto body shop. Bystanders indicated that Siler was in the back room. Siler again attempted to flee. Torres blocked the exit. Within seconds Torres and Siler were on opposite sides of an SUV and began to move in “cat and mouse” fashion. Torres pointed his service revolver at Siler, ordering him to the ground. Siler responded, “fuck you” and “shoot me.” Siler bent over and, when he stood up, Torres saw a black cylindrical object pressed against Siler’s forearm. Torres yelled “drop it.” Siler responded, “fuck you,” “no,” and “shoot me.” Torres still could not see Siler’s hands. Eventually, Torres fired his gun seven times successively. Siler died from gunshot wounds. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by Siler’s estate, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Torres, citing qualified immunity. Torres’s action conformed to constitutional standards. |
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| United States v. O'Leary |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-1931 Opinion Date: April 27, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Bauer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| O’Leary and his codefendants operated a crack cocaine distribution business from 2010-2014. O’Leary sold crack cocaine rocks to customers, collected money, and looked out for police. Each distributor received one-to-eight packets daily, each containing 30 rocks, depending on demand and favor in the operation. As a preferred distributor, O’Leary received more packets than others. At O’Leary’s bench trial, the prosecution's evidence included O’Leary’s stipulations, the grand jury testimony, six intercepted phone call recordings of O’Leary making incriminating statements, a map of the distribution area, and 23 grams of seized cocaine. The parties stipulated that O’Leary had knowingly sold .4 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover officer on two specific dates. O’Leary was also present when co-conspirators sold crack cocaine packets. O’Leary was found guilty and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the relevant quantity of 280 grams of cocaine. The law does not limit O’Leary’s guilt to the quantities he sold alone, but rather, to the entire operation; the conspiracy sold about 60 grams of crack cocaine daily, so the 280 grams of crack cocaine quantity was satisfied within five days |
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| United States v. Rees |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2230 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2017-2018, FBI Child Exploitation Task Force Office Lynn was investigating the sharing of child pornography through online, peer‐to‐peer networks. His investigation led him to believe child pornography would be found in the college apartment, house, and pickup truck of 40‐year‐old Rees. Seeking warrants, Officer Lynn gave a magistrate a 17‐page probable‐cause affidavit, describing his training and experience, methods for tracking child pornography on peer‐to‐peer networks, and the specific investigation that steered him toward Rees’s residences and vehicle. When officers executed the resulting warrants they found thousands of still images and almost 200 videos of child pornography on Rees’s computer. Charged with receiving and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), (5)(B), Rees unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The district court accepted Rees’s conditional guilty plea and sentenced Rees to 97 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The warrant‐issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability evidence of child‐pornography crimes would be uncovered in the searches; even if the warrants were invalid, the officers executed them in objective good faith. |
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| United States v. Shaw |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078, 19-2117 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The 2018 First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194, addresses the disparities between sentences for crack and powder cocaine and allows courts to grant sentence reductions if the defendant was previously convicted of a “covered offense.” Section 404(b) of that Act makes the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively applicable to defendants whose offenses were committed before August 3, 2010. If a defendant was convicted of a crack-cocaine offense that was later modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, he is eligible to have a court consider whether to reduce his term of imprisonment. In this consolidated appeal, the district courts denied each defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction, concluding that each defendant was ineligible under the First Step Act because the drug quantity described in each defendant’s PSR or plea agreement indicated that the Fair Sentencing Act did not alter the penalty range. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding each defendant eligible to have a court consider whether to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act. The statute of conviction alone determines eligibility for First Step Act relief. The defendants’ offenses are “covered offenses” under the Act’s plain language because the Fair Sentencing Act modified the penalties for crack offenses as a whole, not for individual violations. |
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| Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1018 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2011, Illinois prisoner Williams was diagnosed with a left-eye cataract. He became completely blind in that eye and experienced dizziness, acute pain, photophobia, and the feeling that some foreign substance was in his eye. His doctors recommended cataract extraction surgery; without this common operation, they would be unable to detect other vision-threatening conditions. Wexford, which provides prison health services, refused to authorize the surgery, based on its “one good eye” policy. In February 2016, an optometrist diagnosed a right-eye cataract and a possible macular hole and vitreomacular traction. Weeks later, a specialist recommended cataract extraction. Doctors found no vision in Williams’s left eye and cataracts in both eyes. Still, he did not qualify for surgery. In February 2016, Williams filed a grievance form, checking a box indicating an emergency. Pontiac’s warden responded by checking a box: “an emergency is not substantiated. Offender should submit this grievance in the normal manner.” Williams asserts that the Administrative Review Board (ARB). denied his grievance. Williams filed a second grievance in August; the warden denied emergency status. The ARB returned the grievance to Williams without addressing the merits. It checked boxes indicating that Williams had not satisfied the requirements of the standard procedure; he was required to provide responses from his counselor and others. Williams filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, stating that Williams “did not file a standard grievance" after the denials of emergency status, thereby failing to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Williams did enough to satisfy the PLRA. |
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| Goffin v. Ashcraft |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-1430 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Based on a report by the burglary victim, Goffin’s uncle, Officer Ashcraft tried to arrest Goffin for burglary and stealing handguns, bullets, and prescription pain medication. Before the arrest, several witnesses told Ashcraft that Goffin was armed, possibly intoxicated, and dangerous. When Goffin broke free from arrest, fled toward a group of bystanders, and moved as though he was reaching into his waistband, Ashcraft shot him once in the back. Goffin claims (and Ashcraft disputes) that he was patted down by another officer (Hines) just before he fled. The pat-down removed nothing from Goffin; the officer failed to discover that Goffin was carrying a loaded magazine and extra bullets. Officer Hines claims that Goffin fled before he completed the pat-down. Stolen guns were discovered within reach of where Goffin had been sitting in acar, but Goffin did not have a weapon on him. In Goffin’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Officer Ashcraft is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of the shooting that a pat-down that removes nothing from a suspect eliminates an officer’s probable cause that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm. |
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| Jimerson v. Payne |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 18-3174, 18-2873 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to Tina Jimerson and John Brown, Jr., two Arkansas prisoners serving life sentences for murder and aggravated robbery. The court held that Jimerson's Youngblood and actual innocence claims are timely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D), but her Brady claim is not; Brown's claims were timely under section 2244(d)(1)(D); and Brown and Jimerson have made an adequate showing excusing procedural default as to their Youngblood claims. The court also held that, under these particular circumstances where the prosecutor and law enforcement acted in concert to not only conceal the contents of the recording but also effectively concealed the fact that a recorded conversation took place, an adverse inference may be drawn and it is appropriate to weigh the value in favor of Brown and Jimerson. Therefore, under the O'Neal standard, the court is required to treat the constitutional violation as if it had substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdicts. The court reversed in part as to certain claims and affirmed in part as to certain claims, ultimately affirming the grant of habeas relief. |
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| United States v. Felicia Massey |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3408 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after she pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and cooperated with the government. The court held that there was no plain error at sentencing, and that defendant was ineligible for relief under the First Step Act. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erroneously limited the factors that it considered in determining how much to reduce her sentence, holding that it is settled that the court was permitted to consider only assistance-related considerations. Furthermore, defendant has not established that the district court refused to consider any assistance-related consideration or that explicit consideration of her preferred factors is reasonably likely to have affected the sentence. Finally, the court held that defendant is not entitled to resentencing under the First Step Act, because her conviction was not entered on or after the date of enactment of the Act. |
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| United States v. Garcia-Garcia |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3071 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss after he pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin. The court held that the record supported the district court's conclusion that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his suitcase. Examining the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in finding that a reasonable officer would have believed defendant understood that the officer was requesting to search his suitcase. Although the officer's Spanish may have been imperfect, -- he referred to defendant's suitcase as a "bolsa" -- the context of the interaction and defendant's response mean it was not clearly erroneous to find that a reasonable officer would believe defendant understood the officer's request. Furthermore, the relative ease with which the officer and defendant communicated using the translation application further supports the district court's finding that it was reasonable for the officer to believe defendant consented based in part on a request using the term "bolsa"—a translation produced by the application. Finally, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the video indicates that the officer clarified any confusion that may have existed as to the meaning of his request. In this context, a reasonable officer would expect a person to understand the question "¿permite?", or "May I?", as requesting consent to search the suitcase. |
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| United States v. Vanoy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3165 Opinion Date: April 27, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err in determining that defendant was an armed career criminal based on his two Virginia drug convictions for offenses under Virginia Code Sec. 18.2-248. The court held that the statute is divisible, and the convictions are not broader than federal law and are serious offenses. Finally, the court held that defendant's claim that the Virginia statute has a broader mens rea requirement than federal law fails because the categorical approach does not require them to match. |
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| Mitchell v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-17031 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Sandra S. Ikuta Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from the district court's denial of his 2009 motion for authorization to interview jurors at his 2003 criminal trial in order to investigate potential juror misconduct. Petitioner argued that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), changed the law governing requests to interview jurors for evidence of racial bias, and that this change constituted an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The panel first held that petitioner's motion is not a disguised second or successive section 2255 habeas motion, and the district court had jurisdiction to decide his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The panel held that a mere development in jurisprudence, as opposed to an unexpected change, does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6). In this case, the panel wrote that, although Peña-Rodriguez established a new exception to Rule 60(b), this change in law left untouched the law governing investigating and interviewing jurors. Furthermore, because Peña-Rodriguez does not override local court rules or compel access to jurors, it is not "clearly irreconcilable" with precedent, Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (2003) (en banc), and therefore did not make any change in the law regarding lawyer access to jurors, let alone one so significant that it would constitute "extraordinary circumstances" for purposes of Rule 60(b). |
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| United States v. Ray |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Dockets: 18-50115, 18-50120 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant Bacon's conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm and assault causing serious bodily injury, and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a clinical expert psychologist, which would have allowed Bacon to present an insanity defense, because the testimony was relevant to defendant's defense. Furthermore, the error was not harmless and the panel could not tell from the record whether the testimony was reliable. |
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| James v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-11855 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who has been convicted and sentenced to death for murder. The court held that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in rejecting petitioner's claim that he was provided constitutionally ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of his second trial by counsel's failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence. The court held that petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that his counsel's performance affected the outcome of his sentencing proceeding. |
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| United States v. Abney |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 19-3090 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Cornelia Thayer Livingston Pillard Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The DC Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to unlawful possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, or crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). The court held that the district court committed reversible error when it denied defendant's request to allocute before he was sentenced. In this case, defendant's attempt to speak up preserved his claim and, even if it did not, the district court's failure to invite defendant to allocute before it sentenced him is plain error calling for resentencing. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| Ex parte Marvin Gray. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Alabama Docket: 1180999 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Stewart Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Marvin Gray sought mandamus relief to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss a complaint filed against him by Ruthie Thomas. In 2017, Thomas was involved in an automobile accident with Gray in a Montgomery parking lot. In 2019, she filed suit. Eighty-nine days after she filed her original complaint, Thomas moved to amend her complaint, asserting she made multiple "scrivener's errors" resulting in the incorrect identification of one of the defendant in the original complaint. In the amendment, Thomas named Gray as defendant in place of another person involved in the accident. Gray filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him, asserting that he was not added as a defendant until after the statute of limitations had expired. Gray argued that the amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint because, he argued, it did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., regarding fictitiously named defendants. In particular, Gray asserted that Thomas was aware of Gray's name 12 days following the accident and well before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Because the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the amended complaint related back to the filing of the original complaint under Rule 15, Ala. R. Civ. P., it denied Gray's petition. |
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| Davis v. Straughn |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 169 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-101, holding that Appellant stated no ground in the petition on which the writ could issue. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment. More than thirty years later, Appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the judgment was void and the circuit court was without jurisdiction because the felony information charging him with the offense was not signed by the prosecuting attorney but, rather, was signed by a deputy prosecuting attorney on behalf of the prosecutor. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not state a basis for the writ. |
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| Johnson v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 168 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, holding that the performance of Appellant's trial counsel was not deficient. Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5 alleging, among other claims, that trial counsel was ineffective concerning the mitigating circumstances presented to the jury and the failure to call any witnesses but his sister at the sentencing phase. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it denied Appellant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase. |
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| Lukach v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 175 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's second petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis and second petition for writ of certiorari, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to either coram nobis relief or issuance of a writ of certiorari. In two separate trials, Petitioner was convicted of the rapes of two girls and the rape of a five-year-old child and burglary. Petitioner subsequently filed multiple petitions for psostconviction relief, including the instant petitions for coram nobis relief and seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied coram nobis relief, holding (1) the claims raised in Petitioner's second coram nobis petition that reasserted claims raised in Petitioner's first coram nobis petition were an abuse of the writ; and (2) the remaining claims were either outside the scope on which the writ may issue or did not establish that Petitioner was entitled to coram nobis relief. The Court also denied Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari, holding that the arguments in the petition could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. The Court further denied Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel as unwarranted and motion to withdraw as moot. |
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| McCray v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 172 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of theft of property, and one count of possession of a firearm by certain persons, holding that substantial evidence supported one of the aggravated robbery counts and that the circuit court did not err when it denied Appellant's motions to dismiss for speedy trial violations. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the circuit court erred when it denied his directed verdict motion with respect to one of the aggravated robbery counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the aggravated robbery conviction; and (2) Appellant's motions to dismiss for speedy trial violations were properly denied. |
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| Reynolds v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 174 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Josephine L. Hart Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's claims for postconviction relief raised under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, holding that none of counsel's alleged errors created a reasonable probability of a different outcome had they not occurred. In denying postconviction relief, the trial court held that the alleged deficient actions of trial counsel were based on reasonable strategic and legal grounds and that counsel's alleged errors would not have changed the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that to the extent trial counsel's performance arguably satisfied the first prong of Strickland, the failure did not satisfy the second prong - that Appellant's counsel's error was sufficiently prejudicial as to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome. |
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| Smith v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 171 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's motion asking the Court to proceed with a belated appeal of a judgment reflecting his conviction on drug-related charges, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Petitioner waived his right to appeal and that trial counsel had performed within an objectively reasonable standard. As grounds for the motion, Petitioner asserted that he asked counsel to appeal. The matter was remanded for a hearing. The trial court ultimately concluded that Petitioner waived his right to appeal and that counsel acted within an objective standard of reasonableness in not pursuing an appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's conclusions were supported by the transcript and were not clearly erroneous. |
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| People v. Guerrero |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S253405 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Goodwin Liu Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal with instructions to remand to the trial court to reduce Defendant's forgery conviction to a misdemeanor, holding that the mere fact that a defendant possessed separate stolen identification and forged instruments together at the same time did not provide a sufficient connection between the two offenses to bar him from a sentence reduction pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 473(b). Among the offenses that Proposition 47 amended was forgery not exceeding $950 dollars. Proposition 47 included an exception providing that the sentencing reduction for forgery was not applicable to a defendant convicted both of forgery and identity theft. In People v. Gonzalez, 6 Cal.5th 44 (2018), the Supreme Court held that the exception applies only when there is a meaningful connection between a defendant's forgery conviction and his identity theft conviction. In this case, the Supreme Court held (1) a meaningful connection between forgery and identity theft for purposes of the exception requires a facilitative relationship between the two offenses; and (2) where Defendant merely possessed two separate items of contraband at the same time, a "meaningful relationship" was not established, and Defendant was entitled to a sentence reduction. |
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| People v. Lopez |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S250829 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Ming Chin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that section Cal. Penal Code 459.5(b) prohibits charging shoplifting and theft of the same property, even in the alternative, and that, as a general rule, section 459.5(b) prohibits a prosecutor from charging theft when there is probable cause that a defendant has committed shoplifting of the same property. Defendant stole items worth $496.37. Defendant was charged with shoplifting and theft but was convicted solely of theft. Defendant appealed, arguing that he had been charged in violation of section 459.5(b), which provides that no person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property. The court of appeal concluded that Defendant had been improperly charged but that Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to object to the charges because section 459.5(b) permitted the prosecutor to amend the information to charge shoplifting and theft in the alternative. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeal (1) correctly concluded that Defendant was charged in violation of section 459.5(b)'s prohibition on charging a person with shoplifting and theft of the same property; but (2) erred in concluding that section 459.5(b) would have permitted the prosecutor to charge Defendant with shoplifting and theft in the alternative. |
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| Ayala v. Super. Ct. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D077460(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Guerrero Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Emergency Rule 4 established a statewide Emergency Bail Schedule, adopted by the Judicial Council of California in response to the ongoing emergency situation caused by the SARS-Co-Vid-2 pandemic. The Emergency Bail Schedule set bail for all misdemeanor offenses, felony offenses, and violations of postconviction supervision at zero dollars (zero bail), except as specified in the rule. Among other things, the San Diego County Superior Court implemented an order establishing a procedure for handling persons arrested prior to implementation of the Emergency Bail Schedule. These persons were to be released on zero bail, unless the prosecuting agency notified the custodial officer that the agency would be requesting an increase in bail, a " 'no bail' " hold, or the imposition of conditions of release. The order specified that the Emergency Bail Schedule should be implemented in the same manner as the regularly adopted San Diego County bail schedule and asserted that each court "retains the traditional authority in an individual case to depart from the bail schedule or impose conditions of bail to assure the appearance of the defendant or protect public safety." Petitioners challenged the superior court's implementation order as inconsistent with Emergency Rule 4. They contended that bail for offenses and violations covered by the rule should have been set at zero dollars, and the superior court had no authority to increase bail or impose conditions in an individual case. They also contended the implementation order, including the remote hearings contemplated therein, violated various constitutional protections. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the implementation order was not inconsistent with Emergency Rule 4. Furthermore, the Court concluded petitioners did not show the implementation order or its procedures violated any guarantees of the federal or state constitutions. The Court therefore denied the petitions. |
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| California v. Ashbey |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C083291(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Cole Blease Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Angel Ashbey briefly lived with two others in a secluded house in a forested area. Ashbey struck one of her roommates in the head with a pipe until he lost consciousness, poured gasoline over him, and threw several lit matches in his direction; none caught fire. After her roommate managed to escape, she set several fires in the house and four more on the forested land around the house. A jury convicted Ashbey of attempted voluntary manslaughter, arson of a structure, and four arsons of forest land. The jury also found true several enhancements relating to these offenses. The trial court sentenced Ashbey to a total of 19 years in prison. On appeal, Ashbey raised seven issues on appeal. Principal among them, as discussed in the published portion of the Court of Appeal's opinion were: (1) she should have been convicted of only one arson of forest land, not four, because she set the several fires on only one parcel of land; (2) even if her four arson convictions were proper, she should have received concurrent, not consecutive, sentences for the four arsons of forest land; (3) the court wrongly instructed the jury about attempted voluntary manslaughter and the right to self-defense; (4) the court wrongly modified one of the jury’s verdict forms; and (5) the abstract of judgment mistakenly referred to each of the four arsons of forest land as an arson of a structure. The Court agreed the abstract of judgment should have been modified for the reasons Ashbey alleged. In all other respects, the Court affirmed judgment. |
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| California v. Torres |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E073187(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Carol D. Codrington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In May 2019, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) recommended that defendant-appellant Tony Torres, be granted a “compassionate release” and his sentenced recalled under Penal Code1 section 1170(e) on the grounds he had less than six months to live and no longer posed a danger to society. Based on the Board’s recommendation, defendant filed a motion for compassionate release, which the trial court denied in July 2019. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court abused its discretion because the trial court found he had satisfied the requirements of section 1170(e), yet denied his motion because he “did not deserve compassionate release” due to his past and lack of remorse for his offense. Because it was undisputed defendant satisfied section 1170(e)’s requirements and the trial court denied his motion for improper reasons, the Court of Appeal reversed. |
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| In re Hampton |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C087151(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Andrea Lynn Hoch Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jonathan Hampton was convicted by jury of second degree murder for shooting and killing Jonathan Giurbino. After an initial round of state and federal habeas corpus litigation resulted in denial of his petitions, Hampton initiated a second round of state habeas corpus litigation in 2014. Hampton asserted for the first time: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his federal constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, with CALCRIM No. 570 on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter; (2) his trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance in failing to request such an instruction; and (3) his appellate counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance in failing to assert this instructional error claim in his direct appeal. According to Hampton, he was unaware of his entitlement to a heat of passion instruction until July 2014, when another inmate handed him a copy of the First Appellate District’s decision in California v. Thomas, 218 Cal.App.4th 630 (2013), holding on facts similar to the facts of this case that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for a heat of passion instruction amounted to federal constitutional error and required reversal. The trial court granted the petition, concluding the original trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 570, and further concluding the "Thomas" decision amounted to a change in the law entitling Hampton to raise the instructional error claim in his habeas corpus petition despite having failed to do so on appeal. The State appealed; the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the trial court erred in determining there was an intervening change of law. The matter was remanded to the trial court for a determination regarding his remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). On remand, the trial court denied the habeas corpus petition as untimely. In this habeas petition (filed 2018), Hampton reasserted his IAC claims. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its order denying the petition and to issue an order to show cause as to why Hampton was not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAAC). Having done so, and having reviewed the return to the order to show cause, as well as Hampton’s traverse thereto, the Court of Appeal granted the petition, vacated the judgment of conviction, and remanded the matter to the Sacramento County Superior Court for further proceedings. |
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| People v. Bucio |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B299688(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 27, 2020 Judge: Tangeman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of robbery and first degree murder during the course of a robbery. After the enactment of Senate Bill 1437 in 2018, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. SB 1437 amended the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder. The Court of Appeal joined the Fourth Appellate District in holding that SB 1437 is constitutional. The court held that SB 1437 does not amend Propositions 7 and 115; the District Attorney's contention that section 1170.95 conflicts with the Victim Bill of Rights Act of 2008 lacks merit; and section 1170.95 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, because it does not infringe upon the governor's commutation power and does not infringe upon the judiciary's power to resolve specific controversies. Therefore, the trial court erred by finding SB 1437 unconstitutional. The court reversed the judgment. |
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| People v. Davis |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F077426(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Charles S. Poochigian Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of first degree burglary, unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, and receiving a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant also pleaded no contest to misdemeanor domestic battery. The Court of Appeal held that remand pursuant to Senate Bill 1393 would be futile, and thus did not address the Attorney General's alternative argument that defendant's claim is non-cognizable in the absence of a certificate of probable cause. In this case, the record clearly indicates that the trial court would not have stricken the prior serious felony enhancement even if it had the discretion afforded by SB 1393. The court also held that defendant forfeited his challenge to fees imposed under sections 1202.4, 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373. |
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| People v. Offley |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296139(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Frances Rothschild Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants Offley and Keller challenged the trial court's denial of their petitions under Penal Code section 1170.951 for resentencing on their murder convictions. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by denying defendants' petitions at the first stage of prima facie review. The court reversed the denial of Offley's petition because an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) does not establish as a matter of law that a defendant acted with malice aforethought. The court also reversed the denial of Keller's petition because the trial court misinterpreted the record. In this case, Keller's enhancement was under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) and showed only that a principal to the crime, not Keller himself, fired a weapon and caused the victim's death. |
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| Coke v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 28 Opinion Date: April 27, 2020 Judge: William W. Hood, III Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Pamela Coke was charged with sexual assault on a child. The prosecution filed this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order suppressing: (1) evidence obtained from Coke’s cell phone; and (2) certain statements she made to the police before her formal arrest. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence from Coke’s cell phone, but reversed the portion suppressing her statements. The Court determined the warrant at issue in this case contained no particularity as to the alleged victim or to the time period during which the assault allegedly occurred. "Rather, it permitted the officers to search all texts, videos, pictures, contact lists, phone records, and any data that showed ownership or possession. We conclude that such broad authorization violates the particularity demanded by the Fourth Amendment." Because the warrant authorized a general search of Coke's phone, it was also unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Abihai |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-17-0000546 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for escape in the second degree but remanded the matter to the circuit court for calculation of Defendant's presentence detention credit consistent with this opinion, holding that the circuit court erred when it denied Defendant's credit for time serve on the sentence imposed for the escape conviction. Defendant was serving a term of life imprisonment when he left the Laumaka Work Furlough Center in Honolulu and did not return. A jury later convicted Defendant of escape in the second degree, and the circuit court imposed a five-year prison term to run concurrent to his life sentence. The circuit court denied Defendant credit for time served. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal, holding that the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court's decision denying Defendant credit for time served on his escape conviction. |
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| State v. Martin |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-14-0001090 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court primarily affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of various counts, including attempted murder of a police officer, and sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus ten years, holding that the issues Defendant raised on certiorari lacked merit. In his application for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court Defendant raised five questions, including the issue of whether the ICA committed grave errors of law and fact when it held that the trial court properly admitted evidence of Defendant's suicide attempt the day after the shooting. The Supreme Court addressed Defendant's question regarding his suicide attempt, holding (1) evidence of a suicide or attempted suicide is not automatically admissible as relevant to a defendant's consciousness of guilt, and (2) the circuit court correctly ruled that the evidence was admissible as probative of Defendant's identity as to the person who had committed the offenses charged. Further, the Court noted plain error affecting Defendant's substantial rights with respect to the lack of a merger instruction on Defendant's firearms convictions and remanded the relevant counts to the circuit court for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Melendez |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-18-0000522 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Richard W. Pollack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the order of the circuit court dismissing the charge against Defendant for possession of a dangerous drug in the third degree, holding that the ICA erred in holding that, in order to prevail on a motion to dismiss a possessory drug violation as de minimis, a defendant must prove that the possessed drugs could not have any pharmacological or physiological effect. The charge against Defendant stemmed from the discovery that he was in possession of .005 grams of a substance containing cocaine. The circuit court found that the violation was de minimis and dismissed the charge. The ICA vacated the circuit court's order, determining that the circuit court erred in finding that the cocaine possessed by Defendant could not have had any pharmacological or physiological effect upon consumption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the record supported the determination that Defendant's violation was de minimis because the possessed drug was neither usable nor saleable; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge. |
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| Idaho v. Garcia |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46253 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jesus Manuel Garcia was found guilty by jury of second-degree murder, aggravated battery, use of a deadly weapon during the commission of the former crimes, and possession of a controlled substance. The district court sentenced Garcia to an indeterminate life sentence with twenty-five years fixed for second degree murder, which included a sentencing enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon. The district court also sentenced Garcia to twenty years, with six years fixed, for aggravated battery; this also included a sentencing enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon. The district court further sentenced Garcia to three years fixed for the possession of a controlled substance conviction. All three sentences were ordered to run concurrently. In addition, the district court ordered restitution to the victims in the amount of $162,285.27. Garcia timely appealed, arguing: (1) the district court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present “in-life” photos of the victim and to elicit testimony about the victim’s personality and character during trial; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct when she referred to this challenged evidence in her closing statement; (3) Garcia was deprived of due process because of the cumulative errors; (4) the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence that did not give proper weight and consideration to mitigating factors; and (5) the district court abused its discretion in ordering Garcia to pay restitution without adequately considering his current and future ability to pay restitution. Finding only that the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution without proper consideration of Garcia's ability to repay the amount in the future, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed conviction, vacated the restitution order, and remanded for reconsideration of Garcia's foreseeable ability to pay restitution. |
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| Idaho v. Hess |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47437 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Richard Hess appealed an order of restitution entered against him following his guilty plea to trafficking heroin. Hess relied on the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Nelson, 390 P.3d 418 (2017), to argue that there was insufficient evidence to support all but $1,500 of the award. The Court of Appeals reversed the restitution order, and the Supreme Court granted the State’s timely petition for review. The Court determined that $500 of the district court’s award of investigation costs was unsupported by the evidence. However, the district court correctly awarded the remaining amounts of restitution because: (1) Hess failed to preserve his foundational objections; and (2) substantial evidence supported the remainder of the award. |
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| State v. Booth-Harris |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-0002 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder after declining Defendant's invitation to change constitutional precedent to further limit the admissibility of eyewitness identifications following police photo arrays, holding that the double-blind procedures used in this case were not unduly suggestive and that Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) because the police used unduly suggestive photographic identification procedures the district court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress the resulting identification; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request jury instructions on eyewitness identifications that reflect modern scientific research. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction while preserving for possible postconviction relief action Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals' decision, holding (1) the eyewitness identification was not unduly suggestive; and (2) contrary to the decision of the court of appeals, the record was adequate to decide the ineffective assistance of counsel claim challenging the jury instruction on eyewitness identification, and this claim is rejected on the merits. |
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| State v. Doolin |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 17-1715 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the decision of the court of appeals declining relief on Defendant's claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to object to the crime victim's first-time, in-court identification of Defendant, holding that Defendant's trial counsel did not provide constitutionally deficient representation for failing to object to the victim's trial testimony. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, concluding that the record was inadequate to decide Defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims but preserved those claims for post conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) the record was adequate to decide Defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, but the claim is rejected because precedent permits first-time, in-court identifications; and (2) the court of appeals decision stands on the remaining issues. |
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| State v. Collins |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 117743 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court dismissing the second-degree murder and aggravated battery charges against Defendant on the grounds that Defendant had reasonable grounds to believe he was in danger of great bodily harm, holding that Defendant was not entitled to immunity from prosecution under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-5231. A court of appeals panel reversed the decision of the district court concluding that Defendant was entitled to statutory self-defense immunity, holding that the facts as found by the district court did not support a grant of immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on the facts as found by the district court, there was probable cause to believe Defendant's use of force was not statutorily justified. |
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| State v. Espinoza |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118737 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Stegall Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence, holding that because Defendant did not object to the district court's failure to make factual findings at sentencing and he did not file a motion under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 165, Defendant's as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence was not amenable to appellate review. Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree felony murder, an off-grid person felony mandating a hard twenty-five sentence. Before sentencing, Defendant argued that his hard twenty-five sentence was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case under section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. The district court found the sentence constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant failed to meet his obligation to ensure the district court made the factual findings necessary for appellate review, Defendant failed to preserve his as-applied constitutional challenge for appellate review. |
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| State v. Thomas |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 116111 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court granting Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss his charge of first-degree murder based on self-defense immunity, holding that the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. The State charged Defendant with first-degree premeditated murder. Defendant moved to dismiss based on self-defense immunity. After a hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the State did not meet its burden to show probable cause that self-defense immunity did not apply. The district court made no distinct factual findings. The court of appeals panel reversed and remanded for a rehearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, the court of appeals' ruling was appropriate. |
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| Breazeale v. Kentucky |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-000113-MR Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Lambert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Charlie, the one-year-old son of Breazeale's girlfriend Samantha, was not Breazeale’s son. When he and Charlie had strep, Breazeale babysat Charlie. Breazeale was the only person in the home with Charlie that day. The next morning, when she removed Charlie’s clothing, Samantha saw bruises all over his body. Breazeale said that he tripped and landed on Charlie. Breazeale would not allow Samantha to take Charlie to the hospital. Charlie began spitting up blood, so Samantha and her mother took him to the emergency room. Charlie had life-threatening injuries and was flown to Kosair Children's Hospital in Louisville. After surgery, Charlie was hospitalized for 12 days. He was placed on a ventilator but survived. The Medical Director in Chief of the Division of Child Maltreatment at the University of Louisville testified that Charlie’s injuries were consistent with an intrusion injury: a stomp, kick, or punch to his stomach. Breazeale was convicted of first-degree assault and first-degree criminal abuse. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his 30-year sentence, rejecting Breazeale’s argument that his two convictions violated his rights against double jeopardy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to instruct the jury on justifiable force or by allowing evidence of Breazeale’s prior bad acts and photographic evidence Breazeale’s right to a unanimous verdict was not violated; all 12 jurors had to find that Breazeale intentionally committed some violent act against Charlie; it was not required to identify the specific act. |
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| Commonwealth v. Honorable Mary Shaw |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-000218-MR Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Vanmeter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals denying the Commonwealth's petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's issuance of an order granting Defendant's request for an in camera review of the alleged victim's therapy records, holding that the trial court had no authority to order the Commonwealth to provide it with the names of the victim's therapy providers. Defendant was indicted on four counts of incest, one count of sodomy in the first degree, and one count of rape in the first degree. Defendant filed a motion requesting that the trial court conduct an in camera review of any therapy or mental health records of the victim. The trial court granted the motion as to the records from the relevant time period. The Commonwealth petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a reasonable belief existed that exculpatory information may be found in the records; but (2) the trial court lacked authority to order the Commonwealth to retrieve the names of the healthcare providers directly from the victim. |
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| Eversole v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2018-SC-000656-MR Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Wright Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for first-degree fleeing or evading, first-degree wanton endangerment, reckless driving, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender, holding that the trial court erred by depriving Defendant of the right to be represented during a critical stage of the trial. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that he was denied representation at a critical stage of his trial through the trial court's ex parte discussion with a juror who had been offered a bribe. The trial court's interview with the juror was conducted outside of Defendant's presence. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded this matter to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court's failure to take action to include counsel during the bench conference and the failure to admonish the juror to disregard her encounter and not to discuss the attempted bribe with fellow jurors violated Defendant's right to a fair trial as guaranteed by his rights to representation and right to be present at all critical stages of trial. |
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| Mulazim v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Dockets: 2018-SC-000466-MR, 2018-SC-000471-MR Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Hughes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing Defendants for several counts of first-degree robbery, tampering with physical evidence and of being first-degree persistent felony offenders, holding that any error in the trial proceedings was harmless. Defendants in this case were Dawan Q. Mulazim and Quincinio Deonte Canada. After a jury found them guilty, the trial court sentenced Mulazim to sixty years in prison and Canada to fifty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting a pre-trial identification of Canada; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the first-degree robbery charges; (3) the Commonwealth's closing argument did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof; (4) the trial court did not err in refusing to strike jurors for cause; (5) the information presented in the penalty phase complied with Mullikan v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2011); and (6) the trial court's decision to shackle Defendants during sentencing was an abuse of discretion, but the error was harmless. |
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| Zapata v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2018-SC-000666-MR Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Wright Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant entered a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), to the murder of his wife. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging deficiencies in representation. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court again denied Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel's alleged conflict of interest, or Appellant's incorrect belief that he could withdraw his guilty plea at any point prior to sentencing; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his plea. |
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| Bratt v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 39/19 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Hotten Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court granting Petitioner's motion to correct an illegal sentence after Petitioner's earlier filed petition for credit had been granted and his commitment record was adjusted to reflect credit for time served, holding that the trial court did not impose an inherently illegal sentence because the failure to award credit is not an illegality that lies within the sentence itself. In his motion to correct an illegal sentence Petitioner argued that the amendment to his commitment record applying the appropriate credits for time served was of no legal force in the absence of a hearing. Thus, Petitioner argued, his original sentence was still in effect, and that sentence constituted an illegal sentence. The trial judge found that the original sentence was indeed illegal and that the later amendment was insufficient to correct the illegal sentence because the required hearing was not held. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in granting the motion to correct an illegal sentence because it was not the appropriate mechanism for challenging the failure to award credit against a sentence. |
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| Faulkner v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 42/19 Opinion Date: April 27, 2020 Judge: Biran Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment denying the petitions for writs of actual innocence filed by David Faulkner and Jonathan Smith under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc, 8-301, holding that new trials were warranted for both Smith and Faulkner. More than a dozen years after Adeline Wilford was murdered and the case had gone cold, the Maryland State Police reopened the investigation and charged Faulkner and Smith with burglary, murder and related offenses. Both Smith and Faulkner were convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Several years later, Smith and Faulkner filed petitions for writs of actual evidence, contending that, if newly discovered evidence had been provided to their juries, there was a substantial or significant possibility that the juries would have reached different results. The lower courts denied relief. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered new trials for both petitioners, holding that, in light of the newly discovered evidence discussed in this opinion, Smith and Faulkner were entitled to new trials. |
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| Shannon v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 46/19 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Robert N. McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for, among other charges, unlawful possession of a regulated firearm by a person who had previously been convicted of a predicate offense, holding the indictment provided Defendant with sufficient notice of the crime charged in that count and adequately described the specific conduct on which that charge was based. While the relevant count of the indictment accurately stated information about a prior conviction that prohibited Defendant from possessing a firearm, it inaccurately referred to that conviction as a crime of violence. The error went unnoticed in the circuit court. On appeal, Defendant argued that the additional language in the firearms count meant that he was not charged with a crime and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that count. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the firearm count charged a cognizable crime and showed the jurisdiction of the trial court; and (2) to the extent the drafting error in the indictment could be a basis for objection, Defendant waived any objection by failing to raise it below. |
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| Burnham v. Commonwealth (No. 1) |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12792 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition for extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused her discretion in denying relief. Petitioner primarily sought relief from a superior court judgment revoking his probation and imposing a suspended sentence. In his petition, Petitioner argued that the superior court's reliance on his mental health issues and treatment in refusing to re-probate him violated the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's claims were appropriately raised in a direct appeal from the revocation of his probation. |
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| Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court (No. 2) |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12926 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In this case regarding the mitigation of the spread of COVID-19 in the Commonwealth's prison decision the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed its prior decision, issued on April 3, 2020, as to the extent of the Court's constitutional authority to stay final sentences absent an ongoing challenge to the underlying conviction or a violation of constitutional rights, holding that the global stays of sentences sought by Petitioners would co-opt executive functions in ways that are not permitted by article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Petitioners asked the Supreme Judicial Court to reconsider its determination that neither the Court's inherent judicial authority nor its superintendence authority permitted a judge to stay a final sentence that is being served, absent a pending appeal or a motion for a new trial, without violating separation of powers principles under article 30. Petitioners further challenged the court's order with respect to reporting requirements. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed its prior decision but concluded that some of the requested relief as to additional reporting requirements should be allowed, and accordingly issued a revised Appendix B. |
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| In re Burnham |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-OE-142 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint seeking relief in the nature of mandamus, holding that mandamus relief did not lie with respect to Plaintiff's challenges to discretionary decisions of the superior court. Plaintiff's requests for relief related to postconviction motions and other requests Plaintiff made in a criminal proceeding in the superior court to withdraw his guilty plea. Plaintiff requested several clarifications and that the Court provide a "speedy remedy" for other alleged instances of inaction or misconduct by the superior court in failing to provide relief. The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, holding that Plaintiff failed to make a showing that alternative avenues of relief were inadequate. |
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| Michigan v. Warren |
| Court: Michigan Supreme Court Docket: 158065 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Stephen J. Markman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Kelly Warren pleaded guilty to two separate charges of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense (OWI-3rd) in exchange for the dismissal of other criminal charges against him and of the sentence enhancement to which he was subject as a fourth-offense habitual offender. At the plea hearing, the trial court, noted on the record that each charge carried with it a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, but the court did not inform defendant that it had the discretionary authority to sentence him to consecutive sentences under MCL 768.7b(2)(a) because he had committed the second OWI-3rd charge while the first OWI-3rd charge was pending. The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 2 to 5 years, which subjected defendant to a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea on the basis of the court’s failure to advise him of the possibility of consecutive sentencing. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted with directions to compare Michigan v. Johnson, 413 Mich 487 (1982) with Michigan v. Blanton, 317 Mich App 107 (2016), On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences, the majority concluding that Michigan caselaw, including Johnson and Blanton, was not dispositive of the issue and that neither the Michigan Court Rules nor due process required the court to inform defendant that it had the discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Defendant again petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding MCR 6.302(B)(2) required a trial court to advise a defendant of its discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority and potential consequences. As a result, the trial court here erred when it denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea because the court failed to apprise him of both this authority and its potential consequences. |
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| Dolo v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0063 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Chutich Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's request for postconviction relief and remanding the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Minn. R. Evid. 106 by overruling Defendant's objection and allowing the jury to hear only an excerpt of a recorded police interview. Defendant was charged with second-degree sexual conduct. At trial, the State offered as evidence an eight-minute excerpt of an hour-long, videotaped, voluntary interview of Defendant by a police detective. Defendant objected and argued that the entire recording should be admitted into evidence and played for the jury under Rule 106. The trial court overruled the objection and played only the requested excerpt for the jury. The jury found Defendant guilty. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, challenging the trial court's decision to play only the excerpt of the police interview for the jury. The district court denied postconviction relief. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the entire interview should have been played for the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it properly overruled Defendant's objection under Rule 106. |
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| State v. Thompson |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0717 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: McKeig Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the state district court that revised Appellant's sentence from two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of release to two consecutive terms of life with the possibility of release after thirty years, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion when it strictly followed the terms of the federal district court's remand order. Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to two life without parole sentences consecutively. After Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), was decided Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Ultimately, the federal district court vacated the "without possibility of release" provision of Appellant's sentences and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the state district court, without a resentencing hearing, revised Appellant's sentence to two consecutive terms of life with the possibility of release after thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that the language of the federal district court order reflected a limited remand; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the issue of whether Appellant's sentences should be served consecutively was beyond the scope of the remand order. |
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| Brown v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-DR-01256-SCT Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Griffis Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Joseph "Peanut" Brown sat on death row since his conviction for capital murder in Adams County, Mississippi in 1994. The jury found that Brown shot and killed a convenience-store clerk during a robbery. Brown filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised numerous issues. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined most of the claims raised at this point were subject to the time bar, the successive-writ bar, and/or were barred by res judicata. The Court determined the remaining issue was without merit. The successive petition was therefore denied. |
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| Saddler v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-01298-SCT Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Josiah D. Coleman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Johnny Lee Saddler confessed to the inappropriate touching of a thirteen-year-old girl. He contended his constitutional and procedural rights were violated during trial court proceedings, arguing that because he invoked his right to counsel and his right to silence, the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress his confession. Saddler further argued his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate. Finally, Saddler argued that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present improper lay opinion evidence. After review of the trial court record, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined Saddler waived his rights, and his confession was properly admitted. The Court found Saddler's counsel was not constitutionally ineffective, and the lay opinion did not prejudice Saddler's defense. |
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| Hamilton v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97881 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Laura Denvir Stith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court overruling Appellant's Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief from the sentences imposed on her for class C felony stealing under Mo. Rev. Stat. 570.030, holding that Appellant's crimes were class A misdemeanors under State v. Bazell, 497 S.W.3d 263 (Mo. banc 2016), and Appellant should have been sentenced accordingly. Appellant's judgment of conviction was not yet final when the Supreme Court decided Bazell, which held that stealing in violation of section 570.030 is a class A misdemeanor that cannot be enhanced to a class C felony. After Bazell was decided, Appellant's two five-year sentences were imposed. Appellant argued that she was entitled to have Bazell applied to her sentencing and that the sentences imposed exceeded the sentences authorized by law. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Appellant was entitled to have Bazell applied to her sentencing; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in entering judgments of conviction against Appellant and sentencing her as if her crimes were class C felonies. |
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| Lemasters v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97878 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Patricia Breckenridge Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the motion court overruling Appellant's pro se Rule 29.15 postconviction motion seeking to vacate his felony statutory sodomy conviction under Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.062, holding that there was no final judgment in the underlying criminal case, and therefore, Appellant's postconviction relief motion was premature. In his motion for postconviction relief, Appellant argued that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court overruled the motion on the merits. Appellant appealed, arguing that his postconviction relief motion was premature because the trial court failed to carry out the Supreme Court's mandate issued in his direct appeal, and therefore, his judgment of conviction was not yet final. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the trial court failure strictly to comply with the Court's mandate; and (2) therefore, the judgment of condition in Appellant's criminal case was not yet a final judgment that triggers the running of the time period in which he can file a Rule 29.15 motion, and the Rule 29.15 motion was premature. |
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| State ex rel. Barton v. Stange |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC98343 Opinion Date: April 27, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner's claims of actual innocence did not entitle him to relief and that Petitioner neither demonstrated the "substantial threshold showing of insanity" nor that he was incompetent under Mo. Rev. Stat. 552.060. Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court issued its order setting Petitioner's execution date, Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) Petitioner failed to prove the substantial threshold showing of insanity required by Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); (2) Petitioner failed to prove that he is incompetent under section 552.060; and (3) Petitioner failed to offer sufficient evidence to show actual innocence, either as a gateway or as a freestanding claim. |
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| State v. Russell |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97916 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Laura Denvir Stith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Appellant for class C felony stealing under Mo. Rev. Stat. 570.030 because State v. Bazell, 497 S.W.3d 263 (Mo. banc 2016), held that stealing in violation of section 570.030 is a class A misdemeanor that cannot be enhanced to a felony. Appellant pleaded guilty to stealing in violation of section 570.030. Before Appellant's sentencing occurred Bazell was decided. Bazell held that stealing under section 570.030.1 was a class A misdemeanor that could not be enhanced to a class C felony. The circuit court subsequently sentenced Appellant to seven years for a class C felony, despite Appellant's objection that Bazell required he be sentenced for a class A misdemeanor. In his direct appeal, Appellant argued that he received an excessive sentence. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Appellant did not waive his claim that he received an excessive sentence; and (2) the circuit court erred in sentencing Appellant for a class C felony. |
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| State v. Clausen |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 100 Opinion Date: April 28, 2020 Judge: Gustafson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's drug-related convictions, holding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence regarding Defendant's prior DUI convictions, and the error was not harmless. Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, methamphetamine, a felony; criminal possession of dangerous drugs, marijuana, a misdemeanor; and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in allowing testimony concerning her prior DUI convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that because the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence was inadmissible under Mont. R. Evid. 403. |
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| Newson v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 22 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Silver Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree but affirmed his remaining convictions, holding that the district court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, child abuse, neglect or endangerment, and ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. During trial, defense counsel argued that Defendant shot the victim in a sudden heat of passion and that the killing was not premeditated. The district court, however, refused to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, concluding that the evidence did not establish that offense. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction as to the murder charge and remanded for a new trial on that charge, holding (1) the circumstantial evidence suggested the killing occurred in a sudden heat of passion upon provocation, and therefore, the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on Defendant's defense theory of voluntary manslaughter, and the error was not harmless; and (2) Defendant's remaining allegations of error were without merit. |
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| State v. District Court |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 23 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Ron D. Parraguirre Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied the State's petition challenging the district court's order denying the State's proposed jury instruction regarding the level of mens rea the State must prove to convict David Radonski of arson, holding that the State must prove that Radonski engaged in violation conduct coupled with a specific intent to harm. The State charged Radonski with multiple counts of arson in connection with the 2018 Perry Fire that burned over 51,000 acres. The State argued that Radonski could be liable for arson if he merely intended to commit the proscribed act of starting a fire, regardless of whether he intended to cause resulting harm. Radonski objected to the State's proposed jury instruction, arguing that the State must prove that he specifically intended to cause harm emanating from misconduct. The district court determined that arson is a specific-intent crime and denied the State's proposed jury instruction. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Nevada's arson statutes plainly require that the State prove that Radonski "willfully and maliciously" caused a fire, which means that the State must prove a specific intent to harm in addition to a volitional act. |
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| New Hampshire v. Castine |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2018-0341 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: James P. Bassett Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Jami Castine was convicted on two charges of first degree assault against a minor victim, as well as one charge of an enhanced felony version of second degree assault against the victim’s brother. The trial court sentenced defendant to a stand-committed prison sentence of 10-to-20 years on one of the first degree assault convictions, a consecutive 10-to-20 year sentence on the enhanced second degree assault conviction, and a consecutive 10-to-20 year sentence on the second first degree assault conviction that was suspended in its entirety for a period ending 10 years from the defendant’s release. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as to one of her two first degree assault convictions. She argued that one of the first degree assault convictions should have been reversed because the evidence at trial was insufficient to exclude the reasonable conclusion that the injuries and serious bodily harm alleged in the two first degree assault indictments were the result of a single act. Defendant did not challenge her other convictions. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed that one of her first degree assault convictions should have been reversed, and remanded. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Koehler |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 768 CAP Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Wecht Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2015, appellant John Koehler filed his second petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). In 1996, a jury found Koehler guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and related offenses arising from the killing of his girlfriend and her nine-year-old son, and sentenced Koehler to death. In 2001, Koehler filed a timely PCRA petition. Therein, Koehler included a claim for relief from his death sentence due to ineffectiveness of counsel during the penalty phase. The PCRA court denied relief following a hearing, and Koehler appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Then in 2015, Koehler filed a second PCRA petition, this time asserting that his due process rights had been violated during his 2012 appeal. Koehler premised this assertion upon the involvement of a former Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice in a well-publicized email scandal that included the exchange of religiously, racially, and sexually offensive emails. Viewing the subject of the infamous emails as suggesting a disregard for victims of domestic violence, Koehler alleged that the justice's participation in his previous appeal raised a risk of actual judicial bias, as well as the appearance of bias. Recognizing that his second PCRA petition was facially untimely, Koehler asserted that he met the timeliness exceptions for governmental interference and newly discovered facts. Koehler sought, inter alia, the reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc in order to appeal anew to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the denial of his first PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed the petition, holding that it was without authority to grant relief. The Supreme Court concluded that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law, as it did possess the authority to grant the form of relief that Koehler sought in the event that he established the merits of his claim. Accordingly, the PCRA court's order was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Benson |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: W2017-01119-SC-R11-CD Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Page Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder and remanding the case for a new trial, holding that the proof at trial did not fairly raise the issue of whether or not Defendant killed the victim in self-defense, and therefore, the trial court properly exercised its gate-keeping role in refusing to charge the jury on self-defense. In reversing Defendant's conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that self-defense should have been charged and that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it is the role of the trial court to make a threshold determination of whether self-defense has been fairly raised by the evidence and thus should be submitted to the jury; (2) the trial court correctly concluded that the evidence in this case did not fairly raise as an issue that Defendant reasonably feared imminent death or serious bodily injury to justify his use of deadly force; and (3) therefore, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury regarding self-defense. |
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| In re Commitment of Gregory Jones |
| Court: Supreme Court of Texas Docket: 19-0260 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment and commitment order and reinstated the judgment of the trial court ordering Gregory Jones civilly committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Tex. Health and Safety Code chapter 841, holding that the trial court erred when it declined to submit an instruction explaining that a verdict for Jones required only ten votes out of a jury of twelve, but the error was harmless. A civil-commitment trial conducted under chapter 841 provides that a verdict may be rendered by the agreement of ten members of a twelve-person jury. By statute, however, a civil-commitment verdict finding that the defendant is a sexually violent predator must be unanimous. On appeal, Jones argued that the trial court erred when it declined to submit his instruction that a final verdict for the defendant required only ten out of twelve votes. The court of appeals agreed, held that the error was harmful, and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's failure to submit the requested 10-2 instruction did not probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment, and therefore, the trial court's legal error was harmless. |
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| Lopez v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Dockets: PD-1382-18, PD-1265-18, PD-0013-19, PD-0014-19, PD-0015-19 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Keel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Family Law |
| The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review in these cases to clarify whether the State had to prove the commission of bigamy in order to enhance punishment of sexual assault. Penal Code section 22.011(f) enhanced sexual assault to a first-degree felony if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry, or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married. The appellants in these cases (consolidated for review) were convicted or sexual assault and enhanced under Section 22.011(f). Each was married to someone other than his victim at the time of the sexual assault, but none committed bigamy with his victim. On appeal they challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the enhancements because the State did not prove bigamy. After review, the Court held that the State did not have to prove commission of bigamy to trigger the enhancement under Section 22.011(f). |
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| State v. Gallegos |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 19 Opinion Date: April 29, 2020 Judge: Pearce Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of attempted murder, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying Defendant's Utah R. App. P. 23B motion, nor was Defendant prejudiced by his trial counsel's decision not to call an expert who would have testified about the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications. On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call the eyewitness testimony expert, who his prior counsel had previously identified and disclosed. Defendant also filed a Rule 23B motion asking the court to remand so that he could supplement the record with facts concerning the uncalled expert. The court of appeals denied the Rule 23B motion and affirmed Defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err by concluding that Defendant failed to present a sufficient basis for remand under Rule 23B; and (2) did not apply an incorrect version of the Washington v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), standard to its conclusion. |
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| Washington v. Davis |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 96663-0 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Barbara Madsen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2014, Keith Davis was arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle. A month later, he was arrested again for possession of a different stolen vehicle; crack cocaine was discovered on Davis' person in a search incident to that arrest. In March 2014, the State charged Davis with two counts of possessing a stolen vehicle and one count of possession of a controlled substance. On February 6, 2015, Davis waived his right to counsel. During his colloquy with the trial judge, Davis asked how he could request standby counsel. The judge informed Davis he could move for standby counsel but the motions were unlikely to be granted. The court then found Davis knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and he proceeded pro se. During pretrial and case setting hearings, Davis continually asked for standby counsel and repeated his frustrations about preparing to defend himself while incarcerated. Trial was held in 2017, and after unsuccessful attempts at continuing proceedings, Davis again asked for standby counsel. The court attempted to clarify if Davis meant he was withdrawing as his own counsel and requesting new counsel. Davis stated that he would not go to trial and that the court could “go to trial without [him]”; he said he was “not coming to trial” and “you guys can hold trial without me. Right? You do that? . . . Because I’m not coming.” Frustrated that his requests were denied, the trial court warned Davis outbursts and disruptions would lead to his removal. In response, Davis stated, "You can remove me now... I don't even want to be here. So remove me. I don't care. ...you can hold your trial without me." Davis did return to court and represent himself without significant incident until the State commenced its case in chief. After a break in proceedings, Davis returned to court to find the water on his table had been removed; the court noted Davis was taking frequent breaks. Davis then began a “tirade of expletives, pounding on the table with his fists, and yelling at an extremely loud volume, . . . at one point scream[ing]" at the trial judge. The judge made rulings on record (but outside of the jury's presence), and Davis was removed. He appealed his ultimate conviction, arguing his right to be present was violated when the trial court found he voluntarily absented himself from his trial. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed Davis' conviction. |
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| Washington v. Van Wolvelaere |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97283-4 Opinion Date: April 30, 2020 Judge: Sheryl Gordon McCloud Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Julia Tucker stole a snowmobile and was convicted of theft of a motor vehicle. On appeal, she argued a snowmobile was not a motor vehicle under the relevant statute, RCW 9A.56.065. The Washington Supreme Court found snowmobiles were unambiguously included as motor vehicles under the statute. Therefore, Tucker’s conviction was affirmed. |
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| State v. Kennedy |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-0906 Opinion Date: April 24, 2020 Judge: Armstead Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the sentencing order of the circuit court finding that Petitioner's offense of simple battery as a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the second degree was sexually motivated, holding that the circuit court neither abused its discretion nor erred when it found that Petitioner's offense was sexually motivated. The jury found Petitioner not guilty of sexual assault in the second degree, not guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree, and guilty of battery. At sentencing, the circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner's battery was sexually motivated and directed Petitioner to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit judge did not abuse her discretion finding that Petitioner's actions were sexually motivated. |
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