| United States v. Gomera-Rodriguez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1605 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence entered upon Defendant's guilty plea to one count of possessing child pornography, holding that the district court's decision not to impose a below-guidelines sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his possession of approximately 13,000 child pornography images. The district court sentenced Defendant to ninety-seven months' imprisonment and twenty years' supervised release, a sentence that was at the low end of the Guidelines Sentencing Range. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that the sentence was not procedurally unreasonable and that Defendant failed to overcome the presumption that the sentence was substantively reasonable. |
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| United States v. Larson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Dockets: 18-1924, 18-1985 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: David Hackett Souter Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession of child pornography, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to suppress and for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). After agents executing a search warrant of Defendant's residence discovered digital files containing images and videos of child pornography on Defendant's computers Defendant filed a motion to suppress and, in the alternative, for a Franks hearing. The district court denied both motions. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of child pornography. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no evidence that the affidavit contained egregious misrepresentations sufficient to necessitate a Franks hearing to attack the warrant application, let alone to render the warrant invalid due to a misrepresentation; and (2) the warrant was adequately supported and the evidence obtained was admissible. |
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| United States v. Almonte |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3769 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on five counts related to sex trafficiking. The court held that the fact that there has been no suggestion that defendant's false testimony warrants a sentencing guidelines adjustment does not impede the court's consideration of that false testimony in determining an appropriate sentence in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court also held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable and the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction on one count. |
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| Braswell v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-6200 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: Stephanie Dawn Thacker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of appellant's 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition seeking relief from his sentence via the savings clause. In United States v. Wheeler, the court set forth a four part test to determine whether an individual can seek relief from an erroneous sentence in a section 2241 habeas corpus petition via the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). The district court concluded that appellant could not meet the second prong of the Wheeler test because he filed his first section 2255 motion after the applicable change in settled substantive law, even though that section 2255 motion was resolved before that change in law was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review. The court held that, in the unique circumstance where the change in settled substantive law occurred before a petitioner filed his or her first section 2255 motion, but such change was deemed retroactive after the resolution of petitioner's first section 2255 motion, petitioner satisfies the second prong of the Wheeler test. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. |
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| Moore v. Stirling |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Richardson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus relief based on two ineffective assistance of counsel claims previously rejected by the state post-conviction court. The court held that petitioner defaulted on his claims because he failed to raise them to the state court and thus they are unexhausted. Because the new evidence does not fundamentally alter the heart of the two ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented to the state court, the court held that the district court properly deferred to the state court rejection of these claims. Likewise, the court rejected petitioner's third ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that he defaulted on this claim by not presenting it to the state court and he failed to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel were ineffective. |
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| United States v. Jones |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4448 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Niemeyer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence and his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court held that the officers had probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed in defendant's house, and thus the warrant appropriately authorized the search of the house for evidence of that crime. The court found unpersuasive defendant's argument that the warrant should have been limited in geographic scope because the smoldering marijuana cigarette in the trash can was the likely source of the marijuana odor. Rather, the court held that the presence of one marijuana cigarette in the kitchen did not negate the fair probability that other evidence of the crime of marijuana possession would be found in the house. |
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| United States v. Jordan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 17-4751 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Pamela Harris Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and four other drug-trafficking and firearms-related offenses. The court held that there was no error in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered from the traffic stop, because the detective had ample reasonable suspicion of drug distribution, justifying the full length of the stop under the Fourth Amendment; there was no Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation by admitting evidence relating to a recorded phone call between defendant and an informant who did not testify at trial; and the district court did not err by holding that section 403 of the First Step Act does not apply retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal when it was enacted. |
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| United States v. Moore |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4606 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: James Harvie Wilkinson, III Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was stopped at a routine traffic checkpoint where officers discovered a substantial amount of illegal drugs. After defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute twenty-eight or more grams of crack cocaine, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained by officers, holding that the routine traffic checkpoint fully complied with Fourth Amendment requirements. In this case, the primary purpose of the checkpoint was valid; the roadblock adequately advanced a significant public interest; and the checkpoint was minimally intrusive. |
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| United States v. Torres-Reyes |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4450 Opinion Date: March 2, 2020 Judge: Richardson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's 37 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States. The court held that the district court's record failed to assure the court that the sentencing court considered at least two of the grounds for defendant's requested variance from the Guidelines range. In this case, defendant argued that a variance was warranted considering his 1995 convictions over-represented his criminal history and created unwarranted sentence disparities. The court wrote that these non-frivolous arguments for a variance required the district court to make a record indicating that the arguments were addressed. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Alvarado-Palacio |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 17-51030 Opinion Date: March 2, 2020 Judge: James Earl Graves, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress his statements and confession. Defendant was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not clearly err by determining that defendant knowingly waived his Miranda rights. In this case, defendant initially affirmed that he understood his right to an attorney prior to or during interrogation, there was a video of him signing the Spanish translated waiver, he had a second affirmation stating that he understood his rights, and he had an agreement to speak with the agents. |
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| United States v. Arambula |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-40330 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his 120 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing cocaine base. Defendant argued that his 1994 conviction for robbery, in violation of Texas Penal Code 29.02, does not qualify as a crime of violence in light of the commentary in USSG 4B1.1. The Fifth Circuit denied the government's motion for summary affirmance and granted the government's motion for an extension of time to file its brief. The court held that the government has not addressed whether the holdings in the cases upon which it relies are equally applicable to cases involving section 4B1.2(a), notwithstanding the commentary to that guideline. Therefore, the government has not satisfied the standard for summary affirmance. |
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| United States v. Berry |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-20050 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Edith H. Jones Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law, Real Estate & Property Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's final order of garnishment under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of wire fraud, mail fraud, and falsifying a tax return, all in connection with the ongoing theft of funds from her employers. Defendant was then ordered to pay restitution of more than $2 million. In order to enforce the judgment, five investment retirement accounts (IRAs), held under defendant and her husband's names, were garnished. After defendant agreed to release the funds, the government reapplied to garnish two accounts in the husband's name and the district court granted the writ. The court first rejected defendant's claim under federal law that any non-defendant spouse's IRA an be part of a defendant spouse's property or rights to property under 18 U.S.C. 3613. The court has previously held that notwithstanding its anti-alienation provision, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(1), Employee Retirement Income Security Act retirement accounts are subject to MVRA restitution awards. Furthermore, under United States v. Loftis, 607 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2010), the court held that defendant's one-half interest in her husband's solely managed IRA is part of all property and rights to property of the spouse fined under section 3613. Under Texas law, the court held that the husband's IRAs are solely managed community property, and that a wife has only a one-half interest in her husband's solely managed community property. Finally, the court held that the Consumer Credit Protection Act was inapplicable in this case. Therefore, the court held that half the funds—around $1 million—may be garnished now. |
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| United States v. Moton |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-40884 Opinion Date: March 2, 2020 Judge: Higginbotham Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for two counts of possession with intent to distribute a synthetic cannabinoid. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that defendant acted with the requisite mens rea; sentencing errors in the presentencing report did not affect defendant's sentence and were harmless; and the district court did not err by applying a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. |
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| United States v. Sanders |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 17-20492 Opinion Date: March 2, 2020 Judge: Jerry E. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for conspiracy and fraud for participating in a plot to defraud the federal workers’ compensation fund. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendants Rose and Sanders of conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud, as well as health care fraud and aiding and abetting. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to convict Rose of conspiracy to launder money, and of money laundering and aiding and abetting. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err by denying a motion for a mistrial, and there was no error in the district court's handling of a recalcitrant witness. Finally, the court upheld the criminal forfeiture order. |
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| United States v. Scully |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 16-51429 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: James L. Dennis Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and three substantive counts of wire fraud, relating to the operation of his company, Gourmet Express. The court held that the IRS agents' search of defendant's home office did not violate the Fourth Amendment and therefore the district court did not err by admitting the seized evidence. In this case, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The court rejected defendant's argument that the government violated due process by filing the second superseding indictment and held that the district court did not err in refusing to strike it. The court weighed the four Barker factors and held that plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. |
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| Ashford v. Raby |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1677 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Thapar Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Ashford was driving while intoxicated, speeding at over 100 miles per hour and changing lanes without a turn signal. An officer followed him, using his lights to indicate that Ashford should pull over. Ashford did not comply. Backup cruisers arrived and forced him to stop. Ashford complied with instructions to show his hands but ignored instructions to turn his engine off. Officer Raby and his police dog, Ruger, arrived. Raby reached through the window, unlocked Ashford's door, and pulled it open. The officers told Ashford to step out of the vehicle. He did not comply. Ashford’s SUV was in drive and his foot on the brake was the only thing stopping it from lurching forward into a police cruiser. Ashford claims he was afraid to retract a hand into the passenger compartment to turn the key. Ashford tried to explain this to the officers. Officers warned him that Raby would use the dog. Raby commanded Ruger to attack. Raby stepped in, grabbing Ashford’s arm and lowering it for Ruger to bite. Raby and Ruger pulled Ashford out of the car. At a hospital, Ashford was treated for puncture wounds and superficial injuries to his forearm. Ashford sued Raby under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Raby based on qualified immunity. Existing law did not clearly establish that the officer’s perspective was unreasonable, |
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| Davis v. Gallagher |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1241 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Davis, an African American inmate, claims that officer Gallagher called him “Bubba” and “boy.” Davis stated he might file a grievance over Gallagher’s perceived racism. Later that day, Davis encountered Gallagher. According to Davis, Gallagher “searched” Davis and planted heroin in Davis’s pocket and wrote an incident report which falsely alleged that Davis possessed heroin. Davis was placed in administrative segregation and was tested for drug use. The test came back negative. Gallagher’s version is that he saw Davis put something in his pocket, “shook [Davis] down,” and discovered a rock-like substance, which proved to be heroin. Davis claims that Inspector Miller told him that he would be released from segregation only if he revealed who had supplied him with drugs and threatened to make Davis “suffer.” A jury found Davis not guilty of felony heroin possession by a prisoner. Davis filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for being placed in solitary confinement; First Amendment retaliation for threatening to file a grievance; malicious prosecution (Fourth Amendment); and substantive and procedural due process violations. The district court ultimately rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to Gallagher on Davis’s malicious prosecution claim. When there is evidence to support each version of the parties’ dueling allegations, summary judgment is not appropriate—even when the evidence includes self-serving statements from the parties. |
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| In re: Franklin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-6093 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Franklin was convicted of arson (18 U.S.C. 844(i)), using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c), possessing an unregistered firearm or destructive device; and possessing firearms while unlawfully using a controlled substance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Franklin filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Franklin later sought authorization to file a second section 2255 motion, in which he would argue that his section 924(c) conviction should be vacated because his arson conviction no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition. Davis established a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Lower courts may determine the retroactivity of new rules when “[m]ultiple cases . . . necessarily dictate" retroactivity. The Supreme Court’s 2016 “Welch” decision explained that decisions announce a substantive rule and are retroactive when they “alter the range of conduct . . . that the law punishes.” In Davis, the Court narrowed section 924(c)(3), concluding that its second clause was unconstitutional. Arson under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) does not qualify as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed against a building, including one owned by the arsonist, Franklin’s section 924 conviction must have been based on section 924(c)(3)(B), which Davis invalidated. |
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| United States v. Alexander |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1522 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2007, Alexander pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base; the offense carried a statutory penalty range of 10 years to life imprisonment. The PSR attributed to Alexander 258.58 grams of cocaine base and Alexander was designated a career offender. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a 360-month sentence. In 2019, Alexander filed a pro se motion for a reduced sentence, citing section 404 of the First Step Act, which made retroactive certain sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Under the Fair Sentencing Act, an offense involving 50 grams of cocaine base carries a statutory maximum of 40 years of imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and his guidelines range became 262-327 months. Alexander asserted that “[a] sentence of 262 months would be reasonable.” The district court reduced his sentence to 262 months. Alexander appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to conduct a de novo resentencing hearing that would permit him to argue in support of a sentence outside the reduced guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The First Step Act’s limited, discretionary authorization to impose a reduced sentence is inconsistent with a plenary resentencing. Alexander did not raise his arguments that he should have received a one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and concerning his post-offense rehabilitation and serious medical condition in his motion for a sentence reduction. |
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| United States v. Paulus |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5532 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: McKEAGUE Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Paulus, a cardiologist at KDMC, was first in the nation in billing Medicare for angiograms. Audits indicated that in multiple cases Paulus reported a higher degree of blockage in his patients’ arteries than their angiograms reflected, inserted a stent, and billed insurers. Before Paulus was indicted, the government informed him that its consultants had reviewed 496 of Paulus’s procedures and concluded that 146 were unnecessary and that KDMC’s consultants had reviewed a random selection of Paulus’ procedures and found 75 angiographic films with minimal blockage. A jury convicted Paulus of healthcare fraud and making false statements relating to healthcare. Before sentencing, the government disclosed to Paulus for the first time the “Shields Letter,” indicating that KDMC's independent experts had reviewed 1,049 of Paulus’s cases and flagged 75 procedures as unnecessary. KDMC offered to refund Medicare for those procedures. Paulus knew that KDMC had identified 75 of his procedures as problematic but did not know that KDMC had reviewed 974 other procedures that it apparently found non-problematic. The government had planned to use the Letter at trial but KDMC objected. After an ex parte hearing, the district court held that the information was inadmissible and ordered that the parties not disclose any more information about the KDMC Review. The district court denied Paulus’s motion for a new trial, sentenced Paulus to five years’ imprisonment, and ordered him to pay $1,156,102.23 in restitution. The Sixth Circuit vacated. KDMC's attorney-client privilege claims did not justify and ex parte hearings and the evidence withheld from Paulus violated his Fifth Amendment rights under “Brady.” The Letter had “potential exculpatory value” and Paulus lacked a readily available means to get the missing details. Paulus was prejudiced and “it doesn’t matter how blameless” the prosecution was. |
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| Ross v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 17-2902, Nos. 17-2880 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2011, the petitioners pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for brandishing a firearm during a “crime of violence”—theft from a federally licensed firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(u). In 2016, both moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate their section 924(c) convictions, citing the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding that a violation of section 922(u) no longer counts as a crime of violence. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Express collateral-attack waivers in both plea agreements are valid and bar their challenges to their convictions and sentences. The petitioners did not satisfy any recognized bases for avoiding a valid collateral-attack waiver. The court rejected their arguments that they were asserting a non-waivable “jurisdictional” challenge to the constitutionality of the statute of conviction; that allowing their convictions to stand would result in a “miscarriage of justice”; and that their section 924(c) convictions rest on a “constitutionally impermissible factor.” |
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| Thomas v. Wardell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 17-2582 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: Brennan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Thomas was convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of his uncle and is serving a 40-year sentence at Indiana’s Westville Correctional Facility. He has a history of mental illness which began before his incarceration; his symptoms include suicidal ideations, paranoia, and hallucinations. Thomas has also been diagnosed with epilepsy, antisocial personality disorder, and anxiety, for which he has received various medications while incarcerated. Thomas sued state correctional officials, alleging deficient health care, inadequate conditions of confinement, and that officers treated him with excessive force. The district court found Thomas’s pro se complaint deficient and gave him opportunities to remedy its problems but ultimately dismissed his case for failure to prosecute. The court also denied three requests by Thomas for appointed counsel. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal. The district court abused its discretion by denying Thomas’s requests to appoint counsel. Thomas made reasonable attempts to obtain counsel and the court did not assess whether Thomas appeared competent to litigate the case given its difficulty. This outcome prejudiced Thomas. The court remanded for the appointment of an attorney. The district court also provided insufficient grounds on which to dismiss Thomas’s case for failure to prosecute. |
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| United States v. Muresanu |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3690 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Muresanu began participating in an ATM skimming scheme when he was 17 years old and had recently arrived from his native Romania. Muresanu was charged with possession of counterfeit access devices and three counts of attempted aggravated identity theft. There is no such federal crime; the statutory definition of aggravated identity theft does not cover attempts. Muresanu’s attorney did not object to the defect in a pretrial motion but “strategically waited" and moved for acquittal on the identity-theft counts after the government rested its case. The judge ruled that Muresanu had waived the objection, then deleted the attempt language from the jury instructions and instructed the jury on the elements of the completed crime. The modified instruction conformed to the statutory offense but varied from the indictment. Convicted, Muresanu was sentenced to 34 months on count one and a consecutive mandatory 24-month sentence on the identity-theft counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judge correctly applied the Sentencing Guidelines to count one. Defects in the indictment are not jurisdictional and must be raised by pretrial motion but the modification of the jury instructions led the jury to convict Muresanu of crimes not charged by the grand jury, violating his Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on charges brought by indictment. That error is per se reversible. |
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| Dixon v. City of St. Louis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 19-2251, 19-2254 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Plaintiffs, a group of pretrial arrestees who were detained in St. Louis jails, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, challenging the constitutionality of the procedures by which defendants, state and city officials, set money bail. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of plaintiffs' motion for class certification and entry of a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of any monetary condition of release resulting in detention. In this case, the district court resorted to the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief without adequately considering the new rules and their implementation. The district court abused its discretion by interjecting the power of the federal government into the Missouri Supreme Court's attempt to police its own lower courts, without contemplating what this would mean for federal-state relations. On remand, the district court should consider the effect of the rule changes on the question of whether a preliminary injunction served the public interest in comity between the state and federal judiciaries, as well as the necessity of an injunction. |
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| United States v. Burrage |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2090 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: William Duane Benton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's revocation of supervised release for a Grade A violation for possession of heroin and three Grade C violations for disobeying the probation office. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant committed the Grade A violation of possession of heroin by a preponderance of the evidence; the district court did not plainly err in denying defendant's due process rights by admitting evidence unrelated to a violation in the petition for revocation of supervised release; and, even if defendant's due process rights were violated, he failed to show how further disclosure would have helped him. |
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| United States v. Clayborn |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1291 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1 based on his controlled substance convictions in Illinois and in Iowa. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that defendant's Iowa and Illinois controlled substance convictions qualified as predicates for career offender sentencing. The court declined to find that the Illinois and Iowa statutes are categorically not career-offender predicates because they include the word "deliver," which may not involve a commercial activity; the Illinois and Iowa convictions are not overbroad; and defendant's remaining claims to the contrary were rejected. |
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| United States v. Heard |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3411 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: William Duane Benton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing a firearm, possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possessing a stolen firearm. The court held that there was no error in admitting eyewitness identification evidence, because the show-up identification was not impermissibly suggestive and the identification was reliable; the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to instruct the jury on eyewitness identification where the government's case did not rest solely on questionable eyewitness identification; there was no Sixth Amendment violation of defendant's right to counsel where the district court allowed defendant to give his own closing argument, defendant was still represented by counsel and received advice, there was no duty to conduct a Faretta hearing, and defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel; and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. |
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| United States v. Jones |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2134 Opinion Date: March 2, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. The court held that the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines did not result in impermissible double-counting. In this case, by considering the December 2017 drug quantity under USSG 2D1.1, while also considering defendant's December 2017 supervised release status under USSG 4A1.1(d), the district court did not penalize defendant twice for the same conduct. Rather, the court explained that the district court evaluated the seriousness of the offense and defendant's criminal history. |
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| United States v. Warren |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 18-2981, 18-3019 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Roger Leland Wollman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendants Pugh and Warren's convictions for drug related crimes and affirmed Pugh's sentence. The court held that the informant's testimony, together with the government's other evidence, was sufficient to support Pugh's convictions; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pugh's proposed jury instruction; there was no error in admitting under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), a certified copy of Pugh's 2010 information and guilty plea on the Illinois attempted robbery in order to show knowledge and intent; Pugh's Rehaif challenge failed, because sufficient evidence existed such that a reasonable jury could find that Pugh knew of his prohibited status, and because Pugh cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the instructional error; and defendant's prior conviction in Illinois for attempted robbery qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(a). In regard to Warren's challenges, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of two prior convictions to prove knowledge and intent, and Warren's Rehaif challenge failed for the same reasons as Pugh's Rehaif claim. |
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| United States v. Jones |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-35457 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: William A. Fletcher Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his criminal sentence, which had been enhanced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The panel held that defendant's prior conviction of second degree burglary of a dwelling under Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-4-203(2)(a) was a violent felony, because it covered only conduct within the generic offense of burglary as defined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018). Therefore, defendant was properly sentenced under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). |
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| United States v. Wagner |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-3068 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Scott Milne Matheson, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2015, the FBI deployed a Network Investigative Technique (“NIT”) to identify the Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses of computers accessing “Playpen,” a child pornography website. One of those IP addresses belonged to Defendant-Appellant Wesley Wagner. Agents executed a warrant for his Kansas residence, where they interviewed him and found evidence of child pornography on a laptop computer. He would be indicted for receipt and possession of child pornography. Wagner moved to suppress the NIT's identification of his IP address, the pornography evidence in his home, and statements he made to agents. he district court denied his motions. Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted him of both counts. On appeal, Wagner argued the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress and motion to dismiss the indictment. He also contended an erroneous evidentiary ruling required a new trial and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Wagner's convictions. |
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| Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc. |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-15081 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Hull Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government Contracts, Personal Injury |
| Plaintiffs, current and former alien detainees, filed a class action under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and Georgia law, alleging that CoreCivic, a private contractor which owns and operates the Stewart Detention Center, coerces alien detainees to perform labor at the detention center by, inter alia, the use or threatened use of serious harm, criminal prosecution, solitary confinement, and the withholding of basic necessities. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of CoreCivic's motion to dismiss the complaint and held that the TVPA applies to private for-profit contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities. Specifically, the court held that, under the plain language of the statute, the TVPA covers the conduct of private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities; the TVPA does not bar private contractors from operating the sort of voluntary work programs generally authorized under federal law for aliens held in immigration detention facilities; but private contractors that operate such work programs are not categorically excluded from the TVPA and may be liable if they knowingly obtain or procure the labor or services of a program participant through the illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA. |
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| Woods v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 20-10843 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit denied appellant's motion for a stay of execution. The court held that appellant was not entitled to a stay of execution for at least two reasons: first, equity weighs heavily against granting the motion because of its untimeliness and the State and the victims' interest in enforcement of criminal sentences; and second, appellant failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his procedural due process, equal protection clause, and Eighth Amendment claims. The court also held that when, as here, a district court dismisses a plaintiff's federal claims, the court has encouraged dismissal of the remaining state-law claims too. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion and the court denied appellant's motion for a stay of execution. The court granted appellant's motion for excess words. |
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| Woods v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 20-10873 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit denied petitioner's emergency motion for appointment of substitute counsel and for a limited stay. Petitioner was scheduled to be executed on March 5, 2020, for his capital murder convictions for intentionally killing three on-duty police officers. The court held that petitioner was not entitled to substitution of counsel, because he failed to establish that appointing new counsel is in the interest of justice. The court also held that petitioner was not entitled to a stay, because he failed to justify his extreme delay in filing this motion for a stay. |
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| Chaparro v. Shinn |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CV-19-0205-CQ Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Beene Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court answered a certified question by holding that a sentence imposing "life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years" means the convicted defendant is eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years' imprisonment despite Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1604.09's prohibition of parole for persons convicted of offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1994 and that a court lacks jurisdiction to correct and illegally lenient sentence absent timely correction or appeal. Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder committed in 1995. The trial court sentenced Defendant to "life without possibility of parole for 25 years." After serving twenty-four years of his sentence, Defendant sued the Arizona Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting his entitlement to parole eligibility. The State sought a determination as to whether Defendant's sentence entitled him to parole eligibility. The district court issued a certification order. The Supreme Court held (1) regardless of section 41-1604.09, Defendant was eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years pursuant to his sentence because the sentencing hearing and order manifested the trial court's intent for Defendant to be parole eligible; and (2) Defendant's illegally lenient sentence was final under Arizona law. |
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| State v. Green |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CR-18-0537-PR Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: Montgomery Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated his sentences and remanded for resentencing, holding that convictions for possession of drugs for sale, whether completed or inchoate, are not disqualifying convictions for purposes of determining eligibility for mandatory probation and drug treatment under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-901.01 and that the statute applies equally to qualifying inchoate and completed drug offenses. In 2017, Defendant was convicted of two counts of possession of a narcotic drug and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argued that he should be sentenced to probation under section 13.901.01 because his 2006 conviction for solicitation to sell a narcotic drug did not qualify as a personal possession or use offense under section 13.901.01. Therefore, Defendant argued, his 2017 drug convictions did not count as a third personal possession or use conviction. The trial court ruled that Defendant's 2006 conviction was a strike, and therefore, Defendant was not eligible for mandatory probation. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentences, holding that Defendant's conviction for solicitation to sell a narcotics drug was not a strike. |
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| Halliburton v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 101 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment, holding that the circuit court did not err in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motions for directed verdict; (2) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his custodial statement; (3) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial based on a prejudicial outburst from the witness stand; and (4) did not err in excluding the testimony of a witness that Defendant alleged would have pointed to someone else as the killer. |
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| Kitchell v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 102 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court resentencing Defendant to life imprisonment after his original life-without-parole sentence was vacated due to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), holding that the circuit court erred by allowing the jury to be informed of Defendant's prior sentence. Defendant pleaded guilty to capital murder and attempted capital murder and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. After Miller was decided, the Supreme Court granted habeas relief and remanded to the circuit court for a sentencing hearing where Defendant could present Miller evidence for consideration. The circuit court held a resentencing trial, and the jury sentenced Defendant to life. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred by permitting the jury to be informed that Defendant was previously sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new sentencing trial, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in not excluding this evidence pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 403 and that the error was not harmless. |
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| Riley v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 99 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence and granted Defendant's counsel's motion to withdraw, holding that no error occurred in the proceedings and that there were no nonfrivolous issues that supported an appeal in this case. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant's counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a no-merit brief stating that there were no meritorious grounds to support an appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and granted counsel's motion to withdraw, holding (1) Defendant's appellate counsel demonstrated that any appeal would be frivolous and that this appeal had no merit; and (2) no prejudicial error occurred in the proceedings below. |
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| People v. Jimenez |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S249397 Opinion Date: March 2, 2020 Judge: Cuellar Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that a felony for misuse of personal identifying information under Cal. Penal Code 530.5, subdivision (a) can be reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47, holding that a conviction for misuse of identifying information is not subject to reclassification as misdemeanor shoplifting. Defendant was convicted of two felony counts of misusing personal identifying information in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a). Defendant later moved to reclassify his felony convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. The trial court granted Defendant's motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that misuse of personal identifying information is not a "theft" offense under Cal. Penal Code 459.5, subdivision (b). |
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| California v. Quintanilla |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076549(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Joan Irion Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury convicted Rene Quintanilla, Jr., of one count of first degree murder, one count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and one count of child abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or death.1 For murder, the jury further found that Quintanilla intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The trial court sentenced Quintanilla to prison for an indeterminate term of 50 years to life, consecutive to a determinate term of six years. On appeal, Quintanilla contended the trial court made several prejudicial errors in the admission of evidence during trial. In addition to his evidentiary challenges, Quintanilla argued for reversal based on the prosecutor's alleged misconduct in adducing testimony regarding the witnesses' opinions regarding Quintanilla's relationship with the victim that the trial court excluded from evidence during an in limine hearing. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting the victim's out-of- court statements pursuant to Evidence Code section 1390. Accordingly, although this case involved a horrific and tragic killing, the Court concluded the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings required reversal and remand for further proceedings. |
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| People v. Delrio |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A154848(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Fujisaki Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Surveillance video from a neighbor’s house showed two individuals walking from a truck to a burglarized house and then walking away, carrying sacks. Deputy Willett contacted Delrio and told him that a vehicle registered to him had been involved in a burglary. Delrio completed paperwork to report the vehicle stolen. Willett viewed the video and concluded that one of the individuals resembled Delrio, who was on parole. Sergeant Acosta went to Delrio’s house to conduct a parole search; officers located Delrio's cell phone. Acosta believed Delrio’s parole obligations required him to surrender his password; he stated, “you’re on parole. I need the passcode,” Delrio complied. A detective downloaded the contents of the phone before returning it. Minutes after the officers left his house, Delrio called and asked Acosta to return to the house, where Delrio showed Acosta a photograph from his cell phone in which Delrio was holding $100 bills and said the money was the proceeds from selling the stolen jewelry. Delrio told Acosta about his involvement in the burglary. Delrio unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The court of appeal affirmed. Any expectation of privacy he may have had did not outweigh the government’s interest in conducting the search because the officers had specific reasons to suspect he was involved in a residential burglary. |
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| Colorado v. Ashford |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 16 Opinion Date: March 2, 2020 Judge: Brian D. Boatright Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| While searching Tony Ashford for weapons in the course of an investigatory stop, a police officer felt a pill bottle in Ashford’s pocket and asked him, “I know this is a pill bottle, what is it?” Ashford took the bottle out of his pocket, and the officer could see that it contained baggies of methamphetamine. Ashford was arrested, and after a more thorough search, he was charged with several drug-related offenses, as well as six habitual offender counts. Ashford moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop. The district court granted Ashford’s motion, finding that the officer’s question about the pill bottle exceeded the scope of the stop. The State appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the officer’s question did not measurably extend the stop of Ashford, thus holding that the question about the pill bottle did not exceed the scope of the investigatory stop. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the district court’s suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Colorado v. Vanness |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 18 Opinion Date: March 2, 2020 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether defendant Vernon Vanness had a right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing in light of: (1) he was charged with a level 4 drug felony not eligible for a preliminary hearing; (2) he was separately charged with a special offender count; and (3) he would stand convicted of a level 1 drug felony eligible for a preliminary hearing if the State proved both counts beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. The Court following Colorado v. Tafoya, 434 P.3d 1193 (2019) and held that he did have such right. |
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| State v. Jackson |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20193 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Andrew J. McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming Defendant's conviction of one count of murder, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, and four counts of assault in the first degree, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State's late disclosed expert witness to testify without first granting Defendant a reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert, and the error was harmful. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State's expert witness on cell site location information (CSLI) to testify as to what that information revealed about the location of Defendant during the time of the crimes because the State disclosed the expert only one week before evidence started. Defendant argued in the alternative that the court abused its discretion by denying his related motion for a continuance to obtain his own CSLI expert. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's decision to permit the State's late disclosed expert witness to testify was an abuse of discretion in the absence of affording Defendant a reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert; and (2) the error was harmful, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial. |
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| Anderson v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-1059 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Lawson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court approved the First District Court of Appeal's decision affirming Defendant's felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, an automobile, and rejecting Defendant's argument that his jury should have been instructed on reckless driving as a lesser-included offense, holding that Defendant was not entitled to his requested jury instruction on the permissive lesser-included offense of reckless driving where the charging instrument failed expressly to allege the element of driving. The First District affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence on the ground that reckless driving is not a permissive lesser-included offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, an automobile unless the charging instrument alleged that the defendant was driving at the time of the offense. On appeal, Defendant argued that the information alleged use of an automobile to commit the offense and that it was undisputed that he was driving at the time of the offense, entitling him to a jury instruction on the charge of reckless driving as a permissive lesser-included offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an element of an offense cannot be established in a charging document by inference, and the charging instrument in this case failed expressly to allege the element of driving. |
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| Smith v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-42 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the post conviction court denying Appellant's motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the postconviction court properly denied all claims argued in this appeal. In his postconviction motion Defendant raised several ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as well as a claim alleging retroactive application of Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). The postconviction court entered an amended order denying relief on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the alleged failures on the part of defense counsel did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) Defendant's claim that he was entitled to a new trial under Riley was procedurally barred because Defendant failed to raise this claim on direct appeal. |
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| Bamberg v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S19A1052, S19A1054 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After a 2009 jury trial, Damon Bamberg and his mother, Sonya Bamberg, were convicted of murder and other offenses arising out of the shooting death of Damon’s ex-wife, Allison Nicole “Nikki” Bamberg. They appealed, claiming error in the reconstruction of a missing transcript of the first day of trial and in the denial of their motions to reopen the evidence to submit a transcript of a “true crime” television show. In addition, Damon claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and the admission of a statement made by Sonya was made in error. Sonya claimed the trial court impermissibly commented on the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. |
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| Calhoun v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1411 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Thanquarius Calhoun was convicted of felony murder and various misdemeanors in connection with the death of Marion Shore. On appeal, Calhoun argued his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. After its review of the transcribed record of proceedings, the Georgia Supreme Court found no such ineffective assistance and affirmed Calhoun’s convictions. |
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| Debelbot v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S19A1474, S19A1475 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Albert and Ashley Debelbot were tried by jury and convicted of the murder of their infant daughter, McKenzy. Following the denial of their motions for new trial, the Debelbots appealed, asserting, among other claims of error that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain their convictions and that they were denied the effective assistance of counsel. In Debelbot v. Georgia, 826 SE2d 129 (2019) (“Debelbot I”), the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the convictions, although it noted that the sufficiency of the evidence was a “close question.” The Court also, however, vacated in part the denial of the motions for new trial and remanded for further consideration of the claims that the Debelbots were denied the effective assistance of counsel. The trial court again rejected the claims of ineffective assistance and denied the motions for new trial. The Debelbots appealed for a second time, and this time, the Supreme Court reversed, “[t]he Debelbots have shown a reasonable probability that, but for the failure of their lawyers to object during closing argument to the gross misstatement of the law by the prosecuting attorney, the outcome of their trial would have been different.” |
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| Dept. of Public Safety v. Ragsdale |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19G0422 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury |
| Matthew Ragsdale filed this personal injury action against the Georgia Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) after he was injured during an October 31, 2014 motor vehicle accident that occurred when Ross Singleton, the driver of another vehicle, fled from law enforcement. Ragsdale sent an ante litem notice to the Department of Administrative Services (“DOAS”) on December 3, 2014. The notice provided on that date failed to include all the information required by OCGA 50-21-26 (a) (5). Ragsdale filed suit, but dismissed this initial filing based on the deficiency of his first ante litem notice. Thereafter, in March 2017, Ragsdale sent a second ante litem notice to DOAS. Ragsdale then renewed the action, and [DPS] filed its motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that the March 2017 ante litem notice was untimely. In response, Ragsdale argued that because he was the victim of Singleton’s crime, the time for filing the ante litem notice had been tolled “from the date of the commission of the alleged crime or the act giving rise to such action in tort until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated” pursuant to OCGA 9-3-99. The trial court agreed and denied the motion to dismiss in a single-sentence order, citing Ragsdale's arguments in response to the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of DPS’s motion to dismiss, following cases in which that court had previously “determined that limitation period tolling statutes apply to the period for filing ante litem notice as well as for filing suit.” The Georgia Supreme Court found the Georgia Tort Claims Act's ante litem notice period was not subject to tolling under OCGA 9-3-99. |
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| Edwards v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1577 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Cornelius Edwards challenged his 2018 convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with an attempted armed robbery of Delvin Phillips and Marvin Goodman that resulted in the shooting death of Appellant’s accomplice, Billy Favors. Appellant contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court failed to fulfill its role as the so-called “thirteenth juror;” (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a recording of a recording of a telephone call; and (3) the trial court committed reversible error in admitting other acts evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Georgia v. Hamilton |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1363 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| An appeal of Marlina Hamilton’s indictment for the murder of her ex-husband Christopher Donaldson, went before the Georgia Supreme Court three times. After Hamilton was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with Donaldson’s death in 2010, the trial court granted a motion for new trial on the general grounds. The State then brought its first appeal, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order. After the State elected to retry Hamilton, she moved for immunity from criminal prosecution based on self-defense under OCGA 16-3-24.2. In connection with that motion, Hamilton also requested that the trial court admit into evidence, for the purposes of deciding whether she was immune from prosecution, the transcripts of her jury trial and of her motion for new trial hearing. The trial court granted that request, over the State’s objection, by written order. The State appealed that order under OCGA 5-7-1 (a) (5) (A), but the Supreme Court dismissed that appeal. The trial court entered an order granting Hamilton’s motion for immunity from criminal prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2. The State then appealed Hamilton’s grant of immunity, arguing the trial court erred by considering Hamilton’s immunity motion before retrial; by admitting and relying on the transcripts from Hamilton’s first trial and her motion for new trial to decide Hamilton’s immunity motion; by granting Hamilton’s immunity motion; and by failing to recuse from the case. The Supreme Court held the trial court properly considered Hamilton’s immunity motion before retrial. Furthermore, the Court held that although the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the transcripts of Hamilton’s jury trial and her motion for new trial hearing under OCGA 24-8-804 (b) (1) without making any determination regarding whether the witnesses who provided the testimony in those transcripts were available for the 2019 immunity hearing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering and admitting that evidence under OCGA 24-8-807. And because there was evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Hamilton was justified in using deadly force to defend herself under OCGA 16-3-21, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order granting Hamilton immunity under OCGA 16-3-24.2. Finally, the Court held the trial court properly rejected the State’s motion to recuse. |
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| Hogan v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1448 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Fernando Hogan appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes stemming from the shooting death of Kilon Williams and the aggravated assault of Williams’s friend, Nicholas Gibson. On appeal, Hogan contended only that the trial court erred by granting the State’s challenge to Hogan’s peremptory strikes of three prospective jurors and reseating those jurors. Upon review of the record, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded Hogan’s conviction and sentence for the aggravated assault of Gibson should have been merged, and so it vacated that conviction and sentence. Finding no other reversible error, the Court otherwise affirmed the judgment of the trial court. |
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| Hyden v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1496 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Clark Hyden was convicted by jury of malice murder, felony murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, and various other offenses in connection with the beating death of Tommy Crabb, Sr. On appeal, Hyden contended: the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his kidnapping conviction under the standard set forth in Garza v. Georgia, 670 SE2d 73 (2008); that the trial court erred by allowing the State to waive its initial closing argument; that Hyden was denied his right to a speedy appeal; and that Hyden’s trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Johnson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1404 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Frederick Johnson, Jr. was charged with murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felony first-offender probationer, both in connection with the 2016 fatal shooting of Tyrell Jordan. Johnson contended he shot Jordan in self-defense, and that the shooting was a justified use of force in defense of self under OCGA 16-3-21 (a). But because Johnson was a felony first-offender probationer generally forbidden to possess a firearm, the State argued he was categorically barred by OCGA 16-3-21 (b) (2) from claiming that the shooting was a justified use of force in defense of self. The State filed a motion in limine to bar Johnson from asserting his theory of justification at trial, and pursuant to OCGA 16-3- 24.2, Johnson moved for pretrial immunity from prosecution for murder based on the same theory. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion in limine and denied the motion for immunity, concluding as a matter of law that Johnson could not claim the shooting was a justified use of force in defense of self. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, finding that “[b]y its own terms, OCGA § 16-3-21 provides a justification defense, but only for crimes that involve 'threatening or using force.’ It offers no defense at all for crimes that merely consist of possessing or carrying a firearm.” Here, if Johnson’s possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting was justified under the rule of law produced by the combination of OCGA sections 16-3-21 and 16-11-138, then it could not be said that Johnson was “committing . . . a felony” when he shot Jordan, and the preclusive bar of OCGA 16-3-21 (b) (2) would not apply. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied the motion for immunity and granted the motion in limine upon the rationale that it employed. |
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| Kilpatrick v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1580 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Charles Kilpatrick, Jr. appeals his convictions related to the shooting death of Joseph Wilder. In 1998, appellant and Wilder were driving westbound on I-20 in their respective vehicles. Appellant’s friend, Marcuss Herndon, was a passenger in appellant’s vehicle. Witnesses testified that appellant’s and Wilder’s vehicles were bumping into each other on the highway. The two vehicles ultimately ended up stopped in the emergency lane with Wilder’s vehicle, which was a maroon SUV, parked behind appellant’s vehicle, which was a dark-colored truck. Witnesses stated they saw appellant, who was positioned behind the back of his truck and in front of Wilder’s forward-facing SUV, point a gun at and fire it several times into Wilder’s vehicle, all while calmly walking backwards towards his truck. Herndon, who remained in the passenger seat of appellant’s vehicle, testified that he heard gunshots, but that he did not actually see the shooting. Immediately after his arrest, appellant told police he shot Wilder in self-defense. On appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, contending the State failed to meet its burden of disproving his defense of justification. He also argued the trial court made multiple errors, including excluding his expert witness, and excluding evidence that Wilder was a member of a motorcycle gang. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant’s conviction. |
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| McElrath v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1361 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2017, a jury found Damian McElrath guilty but mentally ill of the felony murder and aggravated assault of his adoptive mother, Diane, whom McElrath killed by stabbing over 50 times in a single episode. Based on the same episode, McElrath was also found not guilty of the malice murder of Diane by reason of insanity. McElrath appealed, contending among other things that the jury’s verdicts were repugnant and that his conviction for felony murder had to be reversed or vacated. McElrath also appealed the trial court’s separate order that, upon his discharge from evaluation at a state mental health facility, he should be placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Under the specific facts of this case, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that McElrath’s verdicts were indeed repugnant. Accordingly, the Court vacated both verdicts and remanded McElrath’s case for a new trial. The Supreme Court also vacated the trial court’s order placing McElrath in the Department of Corrections’s custody pursuant to the verdicts which now vacated. |
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| Sawyer v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1341 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2016, a jury found Devin Sawyer guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Michael Weeks, Jr. Sawyer appeals, contending that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance because counsel: (1) did not object to a witness’ purported comments on Sawyer’s credibility; (2) did not object to testimony that allegedly placed Sawyer’s character into evidence; and (3) did not object to hearsay testimony involving statements made by Weeks’ mother. Because the Georgia Supreme Court determined that Sawyer’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance to Sawyer, it affirmed his conviction. |
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| Smith v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1098 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Omari Smith was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of T’Shanerka Smith (no relation). On appeal, Smith contended the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a separate trial; that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the court’s jury charge on conflicts in testimony; and that the trial court erred in denying Smith’s motion for a continuance of the hearing on his motion for new trial. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and therefore affirmed Smith’s convictions. |
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| Tolbert v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1579 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2005, Appellant Contresstis Tolbert and his co-defendant Jeremy Butts were found guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2001 shooting death of Robert Funderburk. Appellant contended the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements to the police and by admitting “similar transaction” evidence. Finding those claims meritless, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Westbrook v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1120 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Rickey Westbrook appealed his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony stemming from the 2015 shooting death of Harry Wells. Westbrook contended, among other things, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered from his cell phone, by denying his motion to suppress a witness’s identification of him during a photographic lineup, and by ruling that the recording of his call from jail to a friend was admissible. Concluding that Westbrook’s contentions were without merit, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Wilkins v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1403 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Nathaniel Wilkins was convicted of two counts of malice murder in connection with the shooting deaths of Forrest Ison and Alice Stevens. He appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence an alleged adoptive admission and by denying three motions for a mistrial; and (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting when the trial court gave an inapplicable jury instruction about accomplice corroboration and defined aggravated assault three times. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| State v. Becker |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118235 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: McAnany Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder but vacated the portion of his sentence ordering lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of prosecutorial error and errors related to jury instructions but that the district court erred in ordering lifetime postrelease supervision following Defendant's indeterminate life sentence. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the prosecutor did not err in his comments during closing argument; (2) the district court did not commit reversible error in failing to instruct on lesser included crimes and on voluntary intoxication; (3) Defendant's newly raised constitutional claims were without merit; but (4) the district court erred in imposing a term of postrelease supervision rather than parole. |
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| State v. Gray |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 117747 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, rape, and aggravated burglary, holding that the district court did not err in admitting prior sex crime evidence and did not commit clear error when it did not instruct the jury on intentional second-degree murder as a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court should have sentenced him for intentional second-degree murder even though he was convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the identical offense doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's identical offense argument was unpreserved for appellate review; (2) the district court did not err when it admitted evidence of prior crimes under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455; and (3) Defendant failed to establish that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the district court offered an instruction on intentional second-degree murder. |
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| Johnson v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 9/19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Getty Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's convictions of volume possession of a controlled dangerous substance under Md. Code Crim. Law (CR) 5-612, holding that CR 5-612 is unambiguous and that Defendant's sentence was not illegal because the maximum term of imprisonment under the statute is twenty years. In connection with his conviction, Defendant was sentenced to a total sentence of fourteen years' imprisonment, the first five years without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argued that his sentence was illegal because the express language of CR 5-612 failed to state a maximum potential term of imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's sentence was legal because it fell within the permissible range of years for which an individual may be sentenced - five to twenty years' of imprisonment. |
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| Commonwealth v. Claudio |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12786 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this case involving a consequence of the evidence tampering by Sonja Farak, a chemist at the State Laboratory Institute at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a defendant who qualified for an enhanced sentence due to a subsequently vacated predicate offense that had been tainted by Farak's misconduct may challenge the guilty plea without being exposed to a harsher sentence than that which he received in exchange for his plea. Defendant was indicted on two counts alleging aggravated statutory rape and as a habitual criminal, with two drug offenses on his prior record as the predicate convictions. Defendant pleaded guilty to lesser charges without the habitual offender enhancements. Defendant was later identified as a "Farak defendant," and one of his prior drug convictions was vacated. Before seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, Defendant requested a ruling that if he succeeded in withdrawing his plea he would not be subject to a harsher punishment as the result of a reprosecution of the rape charges. The superior court judge asked whether protections from harsher punishment established for "Dookhan defendants" apply to "Farak defendants" challenging Farak-related predicate offenses that resulted in enhanced sentences on subsequent convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the question in the positive. |
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| Commonwealth v. Lopez |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12525 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and set aside Defendant's conviction as a joint venturer of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to establish Defendant's knowing participation in the murder with the required intent beyond a reasonable doubt. At the close of all evidence, Defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty. The motion was denied. After Defendant was convicted, he appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant's presence when the victim was stabbed, and therefore, the conviction cannot stand; and (2) retrial of Defendant was barred by the principles of double jeopardy. |
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| Dickerson v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-CA-00710-SCT Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Chamberlin Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury convicted David Dickerson of capital murder, arson and armed robbery and sentenced him to death for capital murder. He was sentenced to twenty years for arson and forty years for armed robbery, to run consecutively. Dickerson appealed his convictions and sentences, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Dickerson then sought post-conviction collateral relief proceedings, claiming however that he was incompetent to proceed with the post-conviction proceedings; so the Court remanded the case and ordered the trial court to determine whether Dickerson was competent to proceed in post-conviction proceedings. The trial court found Dickerson competent. Dickerson then appealed that finding. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court’s determination that Dickerson was competent to proceed in post-conviction collateral relief proceedings was not manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. |
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| Pitts v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-KA-00275-SCT Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Chamberlin Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Cody Pitts was convicted by jury on one count of touching a child for lustful purposes, for which the circuit court sentenced him to a ten year sentence at the Mississippi Department of Corrections without the possibility of parole or early release. Pitts appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(25)—the tender-years exception to the rule against hearsay; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by giving jury instruction S-6: an instruction concerning the uncorroborated testimony of a sex-crime victim. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and affirmed. |
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| Stewart v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-00764-SCT Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Leslie D. King Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Albert Stewart was convicted of felony fleeing and of possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Stewart to serve five years for the felony-fleeing count and a consecutive three-year term for the possession count. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court found no merit in the issues Stewart raised on appeal, it affirmed his convictions and sentences. |
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| State v. Higgins |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 52 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Gustafson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and subsequent judgment and sentence issued by the district court convicting Defendant of misdemeanor criminal trespass and felony criminal mischief resulting from Defendant unlawfully entering a pipeline facility and damaging the pipeline's property, holding that the district court did not err in its rulings. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's request to assert the common law defense of necessity or in refusing Defendant's necessity defense instructions because the common law defense of necessity was not available to Defendant under the circumstances of this case; (2) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict as to the criminal mischief charge; and (3) did not err in ordering restitution in the amount of $3,755.47. |
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| State v. Lund |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 53 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Laurie McKinnon Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), fourth offense, a felony under Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-401, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal, Defendant argued that his Montana conviction for felony DUI was erroneous because it was based on previous DUI convictions from Alaska in 2003, 2007, 2009 under an Alaska statute that was dissimilar to Montana's DUI statute. Therefore, Defendant argued that the three prior Alaska DUI convictions did not qualify as predicate offenses for felony enhancement under Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-731(1). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the district court properly determined that Defendant's prior convictions under Alaska's DUI statute required a "similar" standard of impairment to Montana's DUI statute, and therefore, Defendant's three prior Alaska DUI convictions qualified as predicate offenses for enhancement purposes under Montana's felony DUI statute. |
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| State v. A.D. |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 154 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Papik Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed these consolidated appeals in which Appellants argued that the county court erred by concluding it lacked jurisdiction to decide motions to transfer their felony criminal cases to juvenile court, holding that the county court lacked jurisdiction, and therefore, the Supreme Court also lacked jurisdiction. The State filed complaints in county court charging Appellants with felonies. Appellants filed motions asking the county court to transfer their respective cases to juvenile court. In both cases, the county court issued orders stating that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to transfer to juvenile court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the county court correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction over Appellants' motions to transfer to juvenile court; and (2) because the county court lacked jurisdiction over the motions to transfer, this Court lacked jurisdiction over these appeals. |
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| State v. Fredrickson |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 165 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Funke Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal from a district court order finding Defendant indigent and entitled to court-appointed appellate counsel at the expense of Washington County, holding that the court's order was neither a judgment nor a final, appealable order. On appeal, the State argued that the district court abused its discretion in finding Defendant indigent and entitled to court-appointed appellate counsel because Defendant failed adequately to provide his financial situation, acquired undisclosed additional funds during the pendency of the underlying action, and had sufficient assets to pay for his legal counsel. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the district court's order was not a judgment or a final, appealable order. |
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| State v. McCulley |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 139 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding that Defendant's assignment of error related to excessive sentences of incarceration was moot and that the district court did not err in calculating time served and the order of costs and restitution as part of the sentences. Defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanors related to the unauthorized use of a third-party's financial accounts and the misuse of the party's credit cards. The plea agreement included restitution to the businesses defrauded by the transactions, as well as restitution to the third-party. After the pleas were entered but before sentencing Defendant absconded to Oregon for almost eight years. Defendant was eventually arrested in Oregon, extradited to Nebraska, and sentenced. On appeal, Defendant claimed her sentences were excessive and that the court erred in its calculation of credit for time served and in failing to consider her inability to pay the restitution and costs ordered as part of her sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant completed serving the sentences, her assignment of error alleging excessive sentences was moot; and (2) Defendant's remaining assignments of error were without unavailing. |
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| State v. Alonzo |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 288PA18 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's convictions but modified the court of appeals' decision because the trial court did not err by not instructing the jury on the definition of "sexual act" under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-27.1(4). A jury found Defendant guilty of taking indecent liberties with a child, guilty of felony child abuse by sexual act, and not guilty of first-degree statutory sexual offense. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error in defining "sexual act" and did not accurately define the phrase in the context of felony child abuse under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-318.4(a2). The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury according to the definition of "sexual act" contained in section 14-27.1(4) but that the trial court's error did not amount to plain error. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the trial court did not err by not instructing the jury on the meaning of "sexual act" according to the definition found in section 14-27.1(4). |
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| State v. Carey |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 293A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing in part the trial court's judgments and holding that the trial court had erred by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction charge for insufficiency of the evidence, holding that a "flash bang" grenade is a weapon of mass death and destruction as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-288.8(a). Defendant was convicted of, among other things, possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction, which stemmed from his possession of "flash bang" grenades. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the flash bang grenades found in Defendant's car were not devices or weapons or grenades capable of causing mass death and destruction when constructing section 14-288.8(c)(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State presented substantial evidence tending to show that Defendant possessed an "explosive or incendiary" grenade in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-288.8(a). |
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| State v. Hoyle |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 239A18 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Paul M. Newby Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals vacating a judgment entered by the superior court convicting Defendant of indecent exposure and remanding for a new trial, holding that there was no error in Defendant's conviction. The court of appeals ordered a new trial in this case, concluding that the trial court should have instructed the jury that to find that Defendant's exposure was in the "presence" of someone under the age of sixteen as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-190.9 the State must show that the victim could have seen the exposure had she looked and that the failure to give the instruction was reversible error. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the requirement that the exposure be "in the presence of" the victim does not require a jury to find that the victim could have seen the exposed private parts had she looked; and (2) the evidence established that the proximity of the exposure to the victim was sufficiently close that a jury could find it was in the child's presence. |
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| State v. Mercer |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 257PA18 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury on justification as a defense for the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, holding that the failure to give such an instruction was prejudicial, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, concluding that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's requested jury instruction on justification as a defense to possession of a firearm by a felon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err by recognizing the availability of a common law justification defense for a possession of a firearm by a felon charge and by prescribing the factors set forth in United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000), as the framework within which to determine whether the trial court erred by failing to present the defense to the jury; and (2) there was sufficient evidence of each Deleveaux factor to require a justification instruction be given to the jury, and the failure to give that instruction was prejudicial. |
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| State v. Nobles |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 34PA14-2 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Native American Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions and rejecting Defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that he was an Indian for purposes of the federal Indian Major Crimes Act (IMCA) such that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of North Carolina's courts. Defendant was charged in Jackson County with first-degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that he was an Indian, and therefore, he could only be tried in federal court pursuant to the IMCA. After a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, determining that Defendant was not an Indian within the meaning of the IMCA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss; and (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's request for a special jury verdict. |
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| State v. Reed |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 365A16-2 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the superior court's judgment following Defendant's plea of guilty to trafficking in cocaine, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to an unlawful traffic stop. In his appeal, Defendant argued that his initial investigatory detention was not properly tailored to address a speeding violation and contended that the officer seized him without consent or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Therefore, Defendant argued, the officer unlawfully seized items from the vehicle during the ensuing search of the car and that those objects were the fruit of the poisonous tree. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle after the traffic stop had been completed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was obtained as a result of the officer's unlawful detainment of Defendant without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after the lawful duration of the traffic stop had concluded. |
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| State v. Simpkins |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 188A19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court failed to satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1242 before allowing Defendant to proceed pro se, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel and that the trial court was therefore required to ensure that his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Defendant was charged with offenses related to his failure to maintain a valid driver's license. Defendant was first tried in the district court, where he was convicted. Defendant appealed to the superior court, where he was tried without counsel and convicted by a jury. On appeal, a majority of the court of appeals determined that Defendant did not engage in such serious misconduct as to warrant forfeiture of the right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court violated his right to counsel under the federal and state Constitutions. |
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| Schulke v. NDDOT |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 53 Opinion Date: March 2, 2020 Judge: Jensen Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT) appealed a district court’s judgment reversing an administrative hearing officer’s decision to revoke Carter Schulke’s driving privileges for a period of three years. On May 11, 2019, following a high-speed pursuit, Schulke was stopped by law enforcement, arrested for fleeing, driving under suspension, reckless endangerment, and possession of drug paraphernalia, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car. While Schulke was seated in the backseat of the patrol car the arresting officer smelled alcohol emanating from Schulke. Because of safety concerns and Schulke’s behavior, the arresting officer did not conduct field sobriety tests or request an alcohol related screening test at the location of the stop. At the correctional center, the arresting officer requested Schulke perform field sobriety tests. Schulke refused to perform the field sobriety tests. Schulke was then read the implied consent warning for the screening test and asked to submit to a screening test pursuant to N.D.C.C. 39-20-14(1). Schulke refused to submit to the screening test. Schulke was then read the implied consent advisory for an Intoxilyzer breath test pursuant to N.D.C.C. 39-20-01. Schulke refused to take the breath test, became extremely uncooperative, and was eventually placed in confinement. Schulke was informed that in addition to the other charges, he was being arrested for “DUI Refusal.” The NDDOT argued the district court erred in reversing the administrative hearing officer’s determination that Schulke refused an alcohol related screening test in violation of N.D.C.C. 39-20-14(1). The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the administrative hearing officer's determination was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. It therefore reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated the administrative hearing officer's decision. |
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| State ex rel. Franks v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-711 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Appellant's motion for relief from a judgment dismissing his mandamus action against the Ohio Adult Parole Authority and the Bureau of Sentence Computation (collectively, the APA), holding that the court of appeals properly denied Appellant's motion for relief from judgment. In his complaint for a writ of mandamus Appellant, an inmate, alleged that he should have been eligible for parole in 2019 but that the APA had his first hearing scheduled for 2024. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint after adopting the recommendation of the magistrate. Appellant then filed a motion for relief from judgment. The court of appeals denied the motion, ruling that Appellant was barred from asserting that the court of appeals committed any error in adopting the magistrate's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's propositions of law were either waived or without merit. |
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| State ex rel. Ware v. Walsh |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-769 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the prosecuting attorney failed properly to respond to a public-records request, holding that Appellant did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A). Appellant, an inmate, filed with his complaint an affidavit listing six civil actions he had filed within the previous five years. The court of appeals concluded that Appellant did not comply with section 2969.25(A)(4) because the affidavit did not provide any information describing the outcome of the actions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the complaint because Appellant did not strictly comply with section 2969.25. |
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| State v. Nettles |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-768 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: DeWine Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for multiple counts of drug trafficking, holding that the warrant issued by a Sandusky County judge that allowed Drug Enforcement Agency agents sitting in Toledo (Lucas County) to listen to cell-phone calls of an alleged drug trafficker who was based in Sandusky County was valid because the government properly obtained the interception warrant in the Sandusky County Common Pleas Court. On appeal, Defendant argued that the warrant was invalid because the calls were intercepted in Toledo when the agents listened to them, and therefore, the warrant was issued by a judge in the wrong county. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) interception occurs both at the place where agents are listening and at the place where the phone is used and (2) Defendant's calls were intercepted - captured and redirected - by law enforcement in Sandusky County where Defendant used his cell phone to facilitate drug trafficking, and therefore, the interception warrant was properly obtained in Sandusky County. |
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| Oregon v. Fulmer |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S066654 Opinion Date: March 5, 2020 Judge: Thomas A. Balmer Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| At issue in this case is evidence discovered in a purse during an inventory of an impounded vehicle. A Hillsboro police officer observed defendant Tamara Fulmer driving a vehicle with expired registration tags. The officer initiated a stop, and defendant pulled over. The officer approached defendant and informed her of the reason for the stop. Defendant admitted not only that her registration tags were expired, but also that her driver’s license had expired and that she did not have insurance. The officer returned to the patrol vehicle, confirmed the information that defendant had given, and began writing a citation. The officer determined that defendant’s vehicle would need to be towed and impounded, as defendant could not legally drive it without a license or insurance, and it was blocking a bicycle lane. The officer called a second officer to assist. The first officer informed defendant that he would need to do an inventory of defendant's vehicle and told her to step out of the vehicle so the second officer could begin that process. Defendant exited the vehicle with her cell phone and a pack of cigarettes in her hand, but her purse remained on the passenger’s seat. Defendant neither asked to nor was told that she could remove additional items from the car. She stood near the patrol vehicle while the inventory took place. The second officer began the inventory by looking in defendant’s purse. In a wallet inside defendant’s purse, the officer found used syringes and a small amount of methamphetamine. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of methamphetamine. She moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, arguing that the officers had unlawfully searched her purse. She acknowledged that, the Oregon Supreme Court previously recognized an inventory exception to the warrant requirement, but she asserted that the exception did not apply because the officers had not told her that she could remove her purse from her car. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, determining that “the inventory search was valid and it was lawfully followed through [the] policy that’s been implemented by the City of Hillsboro.” The trial court also determined that the officers were not required to ask defendant if she wanted to take her purse with her before conducting the inventory. The Supreme Court concluded after review of the trial court record that the application of the inventory exception in this case violated defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9. The trial court therefore erred in denying her pretrial motion to suppress, and the resulting judgment of conviction had to be reversed. |
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| Abdulrazzak v. South Dakota Board of Pardons & Paroles |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 10 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judges: Salter, Glen A. Severson Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing as untimely Appellant's appeal of an order of the Board of Pardons and Paroles revoking Appellant's parole, holding that the circuit court did not err. Thirty-four days after the Board entered an amended order revoking Appellant's parole the clerk of court received and filed Appellant's pro se notice of appeal. The Board filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, claiming it was untimely. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err when it dismissed as untimely Appellant's appeal of the Board's decision revoking Appellant's parole; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's request for a standby attorney at the hearing on the motion to dismiss his appeal. |
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| State v. Ceplecha |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 11 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: Kern Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendants' convictions of first-degree manslaughter and sentences of life imprisonment, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in either case. Daniel Ceplecha and his son, Rangler Ceplecha, each pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement. Prior to sentencing, Defendants filed motions to withdraw their pleas, asserting that they acted in self-defense. The circuit court denied the motions. Thereafter, the circuit court sentenced each defendant to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Rangler's motion for new counsel because he failed to establish a fair and just reason in support of his request; (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendants' motions to withdraw their guilty pleas; and (3) did not abuse its discretion or violate the Eighth Amendment by imposing life sentences. |
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| In re Gregory FitzGerald |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 14 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Carroll Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner Gregory FitzGerald appealed two superior court decisions entering judgment for the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). On appeal, petitioner argued he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of errors trial counsel made during his 1994 criminal trial. He also alleged the State knowingly presented false evidence at his trial. Finding no such errors, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. |
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| T.C. v. L.D. |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 19 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Eaton Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Plaintiff T.C. sought an order of protection against stalking or sexual assault (SSA order) against defendant L.D. Plaintiff was seventeen at the time she sought the order; defendant was thirteen. The court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint without reaching the merits, holding that the statute pertaining to SSA orders did not permit claims against a minor defendant. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, finding nothing in the SSA statute that expressly limited who may be the subject of an SSA complaint. |
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| Vermont v. Rolls |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 18 Opinion Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Paul L. Reiber Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Brandon Rolls was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a minor, was acquitted by a jury of that charge, but convicted of the lesser-included offense of sexual assault. Defense counsel objected to the State’s requested jury instruction of the lesser-included offense. The trial court overruled the objection, explaining that it had to provide a lesser-included-offense instruction upon either party’s request if the evidence supported the instruction, as it did in this case. Defense counsel did not object to the language the court proposed for the lesser-included-offense instruction. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in its jury instructions, mandating reversal of his conviction and sentence. Finding no error in the trial court’s instruction, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Butcher v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Virginia Docket: 181608 Opinion Date: February 27, 2020 Judge: Kelsey Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for misdemeanor failure to stop at the scene of an accident in violation of Va. Code 46.2-894, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Defendant had failed to satisfy either of two post-accident reporting requirements in the statute. Upon affirming Defendant's conviction, the court of appeals further held that "to meet the statutory command, [Defendant] only needed to report forthwith the required information to one person described in the statutory list." The Supreme Court vacated this portion of the court of appeals' opinion, holding that the court of appeals did not have to agree with Defendant's concession of law that the statute's reporting requirements are disjunctive and that it was logically unnecessary for the court of appeals to address this undisputed legal issue. |
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| State v. Schultz |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2017AP001977-CR Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rejecting Defendant's assertion that his second criminal prosecution violated the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy, holding that the State's second prosecution of Defendant for sexual assault did not violate the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment or Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution. A jury acquitted Defendant of the charge of repeated sexual assault of a child for engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim, M.T., in "late summer to early fall of 2012." Thereafter, paternity tests revealed that Defendant was the father of M.T.'s child. The State subsequently charged Defendant with sexual assault of a child under sixteen years of age occurring "on or about October 19, 2012," the date it was determined the child was conceived. Defendant was convicted. Defendant moved for postconviction relief, asserting that his second prosecution violated the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two cases against Defendant did not involve the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. |
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| Garza v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 32 Opinion Date: March 4, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of misdemeanor interference with a peace officer, holding that Defendant's actions were sufficient to constitute interference with a peace officer and that the circuit court did not err in refusing to give Defendant's proposed jury instruction. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of misdemeanor interference with a peace officer; and (2) the circuit court did not err in rejecting Defendant's proposed jury instruction concerning the type of verbal conduct that may constitute interference with a peace officer. |
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| LaJeunesse v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 29 Opinion Date: March 3, 2020 Judge: Gray Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of two counts of sexual intrusion on a victim under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-314(a)(i), holding that the district court did not err when it admitted testimony under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) and 801(d)(1)(B) and did not violate Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause when it allowed the State to amend the felony information after the State had presented its witnesses. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of other acts under Rule 404(b) or in allowing the victim's prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B); and (2) the amendment to the felony information without a continuance did not deny Defendant his right to effectively cross-examine the witnesses or prejudice his defense. |
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