Latest Case: Harbin v. Texas (Constitutional Law)

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SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb describes some ways in which we resist positive change; specifically, she describes her initial hesitation to becoming an ethical vegan and the rationalizations we use to justify resisting positive change. Professor Colb argues that animals are different from inanimate objects, and we must recognize that when anyone suffers, anyone regardless of species, we have an evil that rightly commands our attention and action.

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Harbin v. Texas

Docket: PD-0059-20

Opinion Date: March 17, 2021

Judge: Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The court of appeals reversed a trial court's second punishment hearing granted pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant James Harbin, II was eighteen years old when he shot and killed his father in 1991. The issue at the time of his first trial was whether appellant killed under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause. In the guilt phase of appellant's first trial, the jury charge defined "sudden passion" and "adequate cause," and instructed the jury if it had a reasonable doubt about murder, it would "next consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter," which was in accordance with the statute then in effect. Twenty-three years later, appellant sought a new punishment hearing for the State's failure to disclose favorable information about the father's psychiatric history and for defense counsel's ineffective investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence. In the pendency of the new punishment hearing, the law changed. At the second hearing, appellant request a jury instruction on sudden passion under the 1994 law. The trial court denied the request. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a third punishment hearing. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in applying the 1994 statute to the offense committed in 1991. The Court concluded the court of appeals erred and reversed its judgment.