Latest Case: Idaho v. Bonner (Constitutional Law)

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Idaho v. Bonner

Docket: 46097

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A district court granted Michael Bonner's motion to suppress evidence following a traffic stop that lead to his arrest for driving without privileges and for DUI. Bonner argued that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime had occurred or was about to occur, and had seized Bonner by taking his identification and ordering him to sit on the curb. The State argued that Bonner had waived his Fourth Amendment rights in his parole agreement, and therefore lacked standing to object to the seizure. Alternatively, the State argued the police officer had made consensual contact with Bonner, and if the instruction for Bonner to sit on the curb constituted a detention, it was a seizure supported by reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling that the police officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to detain Bonner. "Accepting the findings of the district court as true, we nonetheless conclude that the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that the officer articulated a reasonable basis for suspecting that illegal conduct was taking place. Therefore, while we acknowledge that this is a very close question, we conclude that the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress. In light of this ruling, it is unnecessary to address the State’s alternative theory that the stop was consensual."