Can A City Refuse Land-Use Permits Because it Doesn’t Like the Federal Policies the Property Will be Used to Implement?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar explains why a local government cannot constitutionally create policy discriminating against entities that do business with the feds. Specifically, Amar discusses a situation in which the city of Farland, California, is trying to prevent a privately operated state prison facility located in that city from contracting with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

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Keohane v. Florida Department of Corrections Secretary

Docket: 18-14096

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Judge: Newsom

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Plaintiff, an inmate who was diagnosed with gender dysphoria, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment rights, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff's challenges to the prior freeze-frame policy and the FDC's initial denial of hormone therapy are moot in light of the FDC's subsequent repeal and replacement of the policy and its provision of hormone treatment. The court rejected the merits of plaintiff's claim that the FDC violated the Eighth Amendment by refusing to accommodate her social-transitioning requests (to grow out her hair, use makeup, and wear female undergarments). In light of the disagreement among the testifying professionals about the medical necessity of social transitioning to plaintiff's treatment and the "wide-ranging deference" that the court pays to prison administrators' determinations about institutional safety and security, the court could not say that the FDC consciously disregarded a risk of serious harm by conduct that was "more than mere negligence" and thereby violated the Eighth Amendment. Rather, the court concluded that the FDC chose a meaningful course of treatment to address plaintiff's gender-dysphoria symptoms, which was sufficient to clear the low deliberate-indifference bar. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order, dismissed as moot in part, and reversed in part.