No, Republicans Cannot Throw the Presidential Election into the House so that Trump Wins

NEIL H. BUCHANAN, MICHAEL C. DORF, LAURENCE TRIBE

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan, Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf, and Harvard Law professor emeritus Laurence H. Tribe explain why President Trump’s plan to win the election through a forced decision by the U.S. House of Representatives relies on an incorrect reading of the plain text of the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution. The authors argue, even in a best-case scenario for Trump, in which the electoral votes of Pennsylvania are thrown out, Biden would still win with a majority of the resulting electoral votes and the House would simply not have the legal authority to vote on an election that had already been decided.

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Is Anyone Surprised That Our Norm-Busting President Ignored the Debate Rules?

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on last night’s presidential debate between President Trump and former Vice President Biden. Dorf observes that Trump’s repeated violations of the agreed-upon rules of the debate; his outrageous substantive comments refusing to condemn white supremacy (and instead naming a specific white supremacist group) and declining to say he would accept the outcome of the election; and his callous response to Biden’s mention of Biden’s deceased son Beau should alert any yet unaware Americans to the fact that Trump has no sense of decency.

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Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families

Docket: 2019-0535

Opinion Date: September 30, 2020

Judge: Donovan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted review of the Division for Children, Youth and Families' (DCYF) petition in its original jurisdiction to determine whether the superior court erred in denying DCYF's motions to dismiss respondent's claims on statute of limitation grounds. While under the care of DCYF, separate individuals sexually assaulted respondent on two separate occasions. The first assault occurred in February 2011, when respondent was approximately 12 years old, after DCYF placed her in the care of a foster family. While living with the foster family, a neighbor’s cousin raped respondent. The second assault occurred in June 2015 when respondent was approximately 16 years olf, after DCYF placed her in a children's home. An employee of the children’s home inappropriately touched, threatened, and raped respondent. In November and December 2018, the respondent filed two complaints alleging, in relevant part, claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious liability against DCYF, all relating to the sexual assaults that occurred while she was in DCYF custody. DCYF moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that they were barred by the three-year statute of limitations provided in RSA 541-B:14, IV. The respondent objected and argued, among other things, that she could not have discovered DCYF’s potential legal fault until December 19, 2016, when an independent audit of DCYF was publicly released that detailed DCYF’s various shortcomings regarding child welfare and safety. The Supreme Court determined the discovery rule in RSA 508:4, I (2010) applied to actions brought under RSA chapter 541-B (2007 & Supp. 2019), and, accordingly, affirmed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.