PI Brief Update, September 2018 Welcome to the latest issue of PI Brief Update, a free newsletter, providing you with industry news and case summaries each month. It is written by our team of PI barristers and currently goes out to around 10,000 people, most of whom are lawyers or claims handlers in the personal injury field. You have received this newsletter at newsletter@newslettercollector.com, because you are signed-up to our newsletters via lawbriefpublishjing.com, www.lawbriefupdate.com or www.pibriefupdate.com. Scroll to the end for contact, unsubscribe info etc. If you'd like to advertise or write articles for us then please email us at mail@lawbriefpublishing.com. Anthony Johnson & Tim Kevan (editors) Summary of Recent Cases - Substantive Law Ecila Henderson (A Protected Party, by her Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor) v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 1841 This is the latest appellate authority concerning the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 in the field of negligence. The Appellant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and, during a serious psychotic episode, she had stabbed her mother to death. She pleaded guilty to manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility and was subsequently detained under a hospital order, the sentencing judge having stated in his remarks that there was no suggestion that the Appellant should be treated as bearing a significant degree of responsibility for what she had done. At the time of the killing, the Appellant had been under the care of the Defendant's mental health team. The Defendant accepted that the incident would not have happened but for its failure to respond to the Appellant's marked deterioration, and that its conduct amounted to a breach of its duty of care towards her. However, the judge at first instance decided that her claim against the Defendant (seeking, inter alia, damages for loss of liberty attendant on her detention under the hospital order, and for the loss of part of her inheritance under the Forfeiture Act 1982) was barred by the doctrine of illegality, following Clunis v Camden and Islington HA [1998] QB 978 and Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] UKHL 33. The Appellant appealed on the ground that the judge had wrongly treated himself as bound by Clunis v Camden and Islington HA and Gray v Thames Trains Ltd, and should have instead declined to follow those decisions as they were inconsistent with the discretionary approach set out in Patel v Mirza. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge's decision, noting that Clunis v Camden and Islington HA and Gray v Thames Trains Ltd were not criticised by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza. The ratio of Gray v Thames Trains Ltd admitted of a narrow principle of public policy which prevented a convicted killer from recovering damages in negligence against a person negligent act or omission allegedly caused claimant's unlawful conduct, namely that there could be no recovery for damage which flowed from loss of liberty or other punishment lawfully imposed, since it was the law which caused the damage and it would be inconsistent for the law to simultaneously require compensation for that damage. And it admitted of a wider principle of public policy, namely that if the tortious conduct of the defendant merely provided the occasion or opportunity for the killing, but (in causation terms) the immediate cause of the damage was the claimant's own criminal act, it was offensive to public notions of the fair distribution of resources that he or she should be compensated (often out of public funds) for such damage. The application of those principles of public policy was not inconsistent with the approach set down in Patel v Mirza. Both the narrower and the wider form of public policy squarely applied in this case, and the Appellant could not be excused by dint of the fact that she was said not to bear a significant degree of responsibility for her actions. It could not be said that she did not know the 'nature and quality' of the act, since her mental state did not justify a verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity'. In the absence of such a verdict, the Court could not go behind the conviction in order to decide that the Appellant in fact bore no responsibility for the serious crime to which she had pleaded guilty. Rhys Alan Williams v (1) McMurrays Haulage Ltd (2) WM Morrison Supermarkets Ltd [2018] EWHC 2079 (QB) The Claimant was a senior employee of the Part 20 Defendant, Morrisons Supermarkets Ltd. The Claimant sustained a severe crushing injury to his forearm and hand when, having opened a gate to the yard of a supermarket, a heavy goods vehicle drove into the yard and reversed into the wall where the Claimant was standing, trapping the Claimant's right arm. The Claimant's claim against the Part 20 Claimant had been settled and the Claimant's claim against the Part 20 Defendant had been discontinued. These proceedings arose when the Part 20 Claimant sought a contribution from the Part 20 Defendant. It was alleged that as the Claimant's employer, the Part 20 Defendant provided insufficient training to the Claimant in relation to opening the yard gates and dealing with moving heavy goods vehicles. The claim for contribution was dismissed. The Part 20 Defendant had not been negligent in providing the Claimant with a key to the yard and allowing him to open the yard gates and admit vehicles. The Claimant was properly trained in the procedure for opening gates and the need to stand in a safe place when near moving vehicles. The Court found that the overwhelming and primary cause of the accident was the negligence of the Part 20 Claimant's employee in manoeuvring the vehicle into an area where he knew the Claimant was standing, without checking or ensuring that the Claimant had moved. Any contributory negligence by the Claimant in standing against the wall was not due to the Part 20 Defendant's training but because of a failure to follow that training. Caine Steven John Ellis (A child by his grandmother and litigation friend Janet Titley) v (1) Paul Kelly (2) Violet Ellis [2018] EWHC 2031 (QB) The Claimant had been allowed by his mother to go to a playground without adult supervision, on the condition that he stayed with his cousins, stayed within a defined area and took care. The playground was situated in a quiet area, known to be popular with children. One of the cousins decided to go to the skateboard park which involved crossing a lane with a zebra crossing between the playground and skatepark. The Claimant later went after his cousin and ran towards the crossing, entering the road at an angle. When approaching the road, he looked at the Defendant's car but continued running. He was hit by the Defendant and suffered a brain injury. The Defendant accepted primary liability but sought a finding of contributory negligence against the Claimant and a contribution from the Claimant's mother. It was held that whilst there is no strict rule as to the age when a child can be found to be contributorily negligent, it has to be judged by the standard of care reasonably expected of a child of the same age, intelligence and experience. The Claimant believed the zebra crossing to be a safe place to cross. Previously, cars had stopped to let him cross. The Defendant's driving had therefore been outside the Claimant's previous experience and it would be difficult for an eight-year-old child to realise that the car would not be able to stop before the crossing due to its speed. As such, the Court considered that it would not be just and equitable to find the Claimant contributorily negligent. In relation to the Claimant's mother, the Court made no finding of liability. The Court found that she had been entitled to regard the playgrounds and the lane as a safe area to allow the Claimant to play, and had taken reasonable precautions by restricting where the Claimant went, telling the children to stay together and giving the Claimant road safety instructions. To hold her responsible would impose far too high a standard on an ordinary parent. The Court was reluctant to impose liability on the basis that it would interfere too greatly with parents' own assessments of when to allow children independence. Half Price for Barristers, Experts, Academics, etc If you are a barrister (in independent practise), a single user expert, an academic, an independent consultant, or other self-employed single user then did you know that you can get an annual subscription to PIBULJ.COM for half of the standard rate? That means for you the cost is just £149+vat per year for full membership of the UK's leading online personal injury journal, giving you access to the latest news and important case opinions from leading personal injury barristers and solicitors, monthly CPD tests, video masterclasses, online book chapters, and a huge archive of content stretching back over 9 years. So what are you waiting for? Click below for more information or to sign-up now. Summary of Recent Cases - Costs Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC & Anor v WPMC Ltd & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 2005 The Court of Appeal's recent decision in Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC & Anor v WPMC Ltd & Anor sends a clear message to parties considering seeking a Non-Party Costs Order ("NPCO") to notify the non-party in advance. Mr Bailey was the sole director of a company, WPMC Ltd, which had been the unsuccessful Defendant in earlier proceedings brought by the Claimants (seeking a final injunction preventing WPMC Ltd from exhibiting a documentary film about the Beatles, which would have breached the Claimants' copyright interests in a number of the Beatles' songs). The Claimants had been notified before the trial that WPMC Ltd had no assets with which it could discharge an adverse costs order, but the action was pursued nonetheless. WPMC Ltd lost and was ordered to pay the costs arising out of the action, and although it was granted permission to appeal by the trial judge, the appeal was not pursued and it subsequently went into voluntary liquidation. The Claimants proved in the insolvency for their costs of pursuing the action, but were able to recover only a proportion of those costs. The outstanding costs were said to be in the region of £600,000. Over a year after judgment in the earlier proceedings had been handed down, the Claimants applied for an NPCO against Mr Bailey personally, which was granted by Arnold J on the basis that he was the "real party" in the sense that he controlled WPMC Ltd, decided to maintain its defence in the hope that he would benefit financially as a result (that is, through acquiring the ability to exhibit the documentary), and had partly funded that defence. WPMC Ltd appealed on four grounds, namely: 1. In order to make a NPCO it was necessary to show that Mr Bailey was acting otherwise than in the interests of WPMC Ltd; in this case, their interests aligned rather than diverged, so it was not possible to make the NPCO. 2. Arnold J erred in finding that Mr Bailey was the only stakeholder who stood to benefit from the successful defence of the action, since WPMC Ltd had a substantial creditor who also stood to benefit. 3. Mr Bailey's funding of the defence was de minimis (standing at less than £10,000) compared with the Claimants' costs, the defence having largely been funded by way of a CFA. Arnold J had failed to apply the principle in Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd (Nos 2 and 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 655, to the effect that a non-party should only be liable under an NPCO to the extent of his funding of the claim or defence. 4. In exercising his discretion, Arnold J erred in according insufficient weight to the fact that Mr Bailey had not been warned that the Claimants might seek an NPCO against him personally. The Court of Appeal rejected the first ground, finding that the authorities did not require any "divergence of interest" between the party and the non-party. Rather, the effect of Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd and others [2004] UKPC 39 was that "generally speaking", if a non-party promotes and funds the defence of proceedings by an insolvent company solely or substantially for his own benefit, then he should be liable for the costs of the proceedings if his defence fails. That will not always be the case however, since where the non-party is a director who can realistically be regarded as acting "rather in the interests of the company (and more especially its shareholders and creditors) than in his own interests", the position may be different. Further, it was wrong as a matter of principle to require that there be a divergence of interest between the party and the non-party. For example, it could not be said (as WPMC Ltd had suggested) that allowing NPCOs where the company's and director's interests aligned amounted to "piercing the corporate veil", since the purpose of the doctrine of separate corporate personality was intended to deal with legal rights and obligations, whereas "the exercise of discretion to make [an NPCO] leaves rights and obligations where they are" and indeed the very fact that it is a matter of discretion "demonstrates that the question is not one of rights and obligations of a non-party". The extent to which there is real benefit to the company in pursuing an action or maintaining a defence will be a relevant consideration, but the fact that there may be such a benefit cannot of itself be fatal to the making of an NPCO. Indeed, in considering the related second ground of appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that (a) there was a benefit to WPMC Ltd in successfully defending the action, and (b) there was another stakeholder which stood to benefit from the successful defence of the action, namely WPMC Ltd's creditor; but in light of what had been said in connection with the first ground, this was but one factor to take into account. The Court of Appeal rejected the third ground: the proportionality principle enunciated in Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd (Nos 2 and 3) was concerned to cap the potential liability of professional litigation funders under an NPCO, whose funding of the claim did not disturb the fact that the claimant was the party primarily interested in and in control of the litigation. That did not apply to cases such as the present, where the non-party was both a funder and the "real party" to the litigation. As to the fourth ground, the Court of Appeal agreed that Arnold J had erred in failing to take into account the fact that Mr Bailey had not been warned that an NPCO might be sought. The case law was to the effect that a party seeking an NPCO should "warn the non-party at the earliest opportunity of the possibility that he may seek to apply for costs against him" (Symphony v Hodgson [1994] QB 179, per Balcombe LJ at pp.192-193), however failure to warn was but one factor to weigh in the mix (Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc [2016] EWCA Civ 23, per Moore-Bick LJ at paragraph [32]), and it ought to be shown that the failure to warn made a difference to the conduct of the proceedings (Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd and others, per Lord Brown at paragraph [31]). Mr Bailey's evidence was that if he had been warned of the prospect of the NPCO, he would have, inter alia: instructed a legal team much earlier, rather than handling the defence himself for a time; looked into obtaining ATE insurance to protect against the risk of an adverse costs order; and/or compromised the claim notwithstanding that he considered WPMC Ltd had a good defence. The judge ought to have accepted that evidence, given that Mr Bailey was in the best position to assess how he would have behaved, there was no suggestion that his evidence was anything other than honest and sincere, and no application was made to cross-examine him on it. The judge had therefore failed to take a number of relevant considerations into account, and it was appropriate to exercise the discretion afresh. In doing so, the Court of Appeal considered that the fact that Mr Bailey had partly funded the defence and stood to benefit from it if successful was "evenly balanced" against the fact that the defence was in both WPMC Ltd's and its creditor's interests. In those circumstances, the remaining factor, namely the failure to warn was "fatal to the application for the NPCO". The Claimants knew before trial that WPMC Ltd would not be able to discharge an adverse costs order, and they knew that WPMC Ltd and Mr Bailey were operating on the same assumption. In those circumstances the failure to warn was "manifestly unfair to Mr Bailey", depriving him as it did of realistic opportunities to abandon or settle the litigation, or to otherwise protect himself from the effects of an NPCO. Summary of Recent Cases - Civil Procedure & Evidence Manzi v King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 1882 The Claimant brought a clinical negligence claim for a doctor's failure to remove part of the placenta from her uterus after childbirth. The trust accepted that a small piece of placenta may not have been removed but maintained that it was not substantial. The Appellant's evidence was that the doctor that treated her on the day of the operation had told her afterwards that the placenta removed was a lot larger than expected. That doctor had made a note of what had been said to the Claimant after the operation. The Defendant did not call the doctor to give evidence. The trial judge concluded that the retained placenta tissue was not substantial and rejected an argument by the Claimant that adverse inferences should be drawn from the fact that the doctor was not called to give evidence by the Defendant. The Court of Appeal considered whether the trial judge had erred in his evaluation of the evidence and in his failure to draw an adverse inference against the Defendant. In relation to the judge's evaluation of the evidence, the Court of Appeal did not interfere with the trial judge's findings since it was inappropriate to interfere with the judge's contextual evaluation of the weight of evidence unless the evaluation was perverse. The judge could not be criticised for describing the doctor's role as tangential. In relation to adverse inferences, the Court was critical of the Claimant's failure to seek an order that Dr Hooper file and serve a witness statement. The Court considered that the Claimant could have asked for a direction which contained a warning that an adverse inference may be drawn if the evidence was not provided. It would be disproportionate to compel the Defendant to file and serve a witness statement from the doctor simply because she had evidence, however tangential. The appeal was dismissed. Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Graham Dring (On behalf of Asbestos Victims Support Group) [2018] EWCA Civ 1795 The Appellant appealed against a master's decision to grant the Respondent's application under CPR 5.4C for access to documents. The Respondent represented an organisation which aided those suffering from asbestos-related diseases. CPR 5.4C states: "(1) The general rule is that a person who is not a party to proceedings may obtain from the court records a copy of - (a) a statement of case, but not any documents filed with or attached to the statement of case, or intended by the party whose statement it is to be served with it; (b) a judgment or order given or made in public (whether made at a hearing or without a hearing), subject to paragraph (1B)." The master had given the Respondent permission to obtain copies of: the witness statements and their exhibits; expert reports; transcripts; disclosed documents relied on by the original parties at trial contained in the trial bundles; written submissions and skeleton arguments; and statements of case, to include requests for further information and answers if contained in the bundles relied on at trial. It was held that "records of the court" were those documents kept by the court office as a record of the proceedings. The only documents in the master's order that the respondent was entitled to were the statements of case. The respondent was not entitled to trial bundles, trial witness statements, expert reports, skeleton arguments, submissions or trial transcripts. As such, the master's order was set aside. As to the exercise of the court's discretion, it was held that the principle that anyone with a legitimate interest should generally be given permission where documents were read by the court as part of a decision-making process, applied in this case even though the case had settled before judgment. This was because there had been an "effective hearing" in which the documents were deployed and therefore the principle of open justice was engaged. PI Practitioner - each issue a particular topic is highlighted, citing some of the useful cases and other materials in that area. Advantage Insurance Company v Lee Stoodley and Anor [2018] EWHC 2135 (QB) Master Davison's judgment in Advantage Insurance Company v Lee Stoodley and Anor provides clarification of the insurance position where a defendant's policy of insurance covers him to drive another person's vehicle with the owner's permission, and in the course of doing so he negligently injures a third party. It will assist practitioners dealing with claims arising out of RTAs in identifying who the insurer with responsibility to meet the claim is likely to be. Mr Stoodley owned a Vauxhall car and was insured by Advantage. His policy of insurance stated that he was insured to drive other vehicles with the permission of the owner, but that cover was limited to third party, fire and theft. He drove a friend's BMW, with permission, and caused an accident which killed one of his passengers and resulted in catastrophic injuries to another, who subsequently brought a claim likely to be worth a seven-figure sum. The question for Master Davison was whether Advantage was the contractual insurer in respect of the accident, given that Mr Stoodley was insured to drive other cars. If it was not, then in the absence of a contractual insurer Trinity (as the insurer of the owner of the BMW) would be liable to satisfy any judgment in the personal injury claimant's favour pursuant to section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (The 1988 Act). The question whether Advantage was the contractual insurer turned on the interpretation of section 145 of the 1988 Act. Advantage had refused to indemnify Mr Stoodley as he was in breach of his policy of insurance by refusing to co-operate with the investigation into the accident. That refusal to indemnify would, however, be ineffective insofar as the personal injury claim was a liability which was "required to be covered by a policy under section 145": section 148(5). Under section 145, the policy had to insure the policyholder in respect of death, bodily injury or damage to property caused by "the use of the vehicle" on a road or other public place. Advantage argued that the cover it provided for the driving of other cars was not a liability required to be covered by a policy under section 145, because "the vehicle" referred to in that section was the specific vehicle referred to in the policy, namely Mr Stoodley's Vauxhall and not his friend's BMW. Master Davison held that "the vehicle" referred to in section 145 of the 1988 Act could not be confined to the primary vehicle referred to in the policy of insurance, but rather must cover any vehicle which the driver was insured to drive under the policy. Thus, when Mr Stoodley used his friend's BMW, that car became the vehicle insured for the purposes of the policy, and "the vehicle" for the purposes of section 145. Advantage's construction would lead to the absurd result that a driver using another car under the "driving other cars" provisions of his policy would be committing a criminal offence under s.143(2), because the insurance under which he was driving would not then comply with Part VI of the 1988 Act. In reaching this conclusion, Master Davison also took into account Directive 2009/103 and the principle set out in Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (Case 106/89) (1992) 1 CMLR 305, to the effect that the Court should interpret national legislation "as far as possible in the light of the wording and the purpose of [relevant] Directive[s]". Industry News PI small claims limit below £5,000 'would see lawyers play system'... Financial Conduct Authority proposes fees for CMCs... Calls to ban smoking in homes due to alarming child death rate... Government proposes 'death by dangerous cycling' law... PI firm's collapse highlights LASPO survival struggle... Even low levels of air pollution may cause dangerous heart changes... Call for Tomlin order review after major QOCS ruling... Whiplash reform delay welcomed by all sides... Appeal against trimmed hourly rates in clinical negligence case fails... Clyde & Co uses Section 57 to defeat exaggerated injury claim... PIBU Law Journal Summaries, August 2018 RSA v Generali [2018]: Claims for contribution between insurers are subject to a 2 year limitation period - James Byard, Weightmans Despite the introduction of legislation several decades earlier to restrict employee exposure to carcinogenic asbestos dust and fibres, claims for mesothelioma continue to present in significant numbers. The HSE Summary Statistics [2017] predict deaths due to mesothelioma will continue at a rate of 2,500 per annum until 2020. This is primarily due to... | Recovery of NHS Costs for Treating Diseases - Jenny Dickson, Morton Fraser LLP The NHS has been able to recover the costs of treating those who have suffered an injury due to the fault of another for some time. Part 3 of the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 allows compensation payments for treatment in hospital or ambulance services. Illnesses are, however, excluded from this... | Fundamental Dishonesty, Conspiracy and Multiple Passenger Claims - Vaughan Jacob, Lamb Chambers Matthew Boon and 18 others v (1) Dale Pritchard (2) Nigel Mordescai (Liverpool CC, HHJ Gregory, 14 February 2018)... | Vicarious liability for deliberate actions of independent contractor upheld on appeal - David Williams & Andrea Ward, DAC Beachcroft The question of whether an employer should be held liable for deliberate criminal assaults upon its employees by an independent contractor has been considered by the Court of Appeal in its recent judgment in Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants... | | The Discount Rate: What Next? - Trevor Ward, Fletchers Solicitors A reminder - when claimants suffer life changing injury and accept a lump sum payment method of compensation, the same is calculated by reference to a rate of return over their lifetime on the theoretical basis of expected earnings from investments of that sum against inflation. The method uses the 'Discount Rate'... | Claim Dismissed in School PE Accident Case: DS v Halton Borough Council - Peter Wake, Weightmans LLP In a decision which will be widely welcomed by schools, Liverpool County Court has found that a physical education activity during which the claimant pupil was injured was reasonably safe and adequately supervised, hence no liability could attach to the local authority... | | Faking it: Holiday Sickness Claims, An Update on the New Rules - Katherine Ettridge, Blake Morgan As many of you may have heard in the news, tour operators have warned that British tourists could be banned from all-inclusive package holidays in some countries, or the price of going on all-inclusive holidays could rise, as there has been a huge spike in reports of holiday sickness, mostly from British tourists... | A High Court appeal decision which considers fundamental dishonesty and credibility evidence against a claimant - Dan Wood, Ropewalk Chambers & Peter Ward, DAC Beachcroft Case analysis of Molodi v Cambridge Vibration Maintenance Service and another [2018] EWHC 1288 (QB), [2018] All ER (D) 136 (May) by Dan Wood, barrister at Ropewalk Chambers and Peter Ward, associate at DAC Beachcroft Claims Ltd... | CPD Information Reading PIBULJ articles can help to meet the CPD requirements for solicitors, barristers and others. For further details see our CPD Information page. | One Month Trial If you haven't subscribed yet there's no need to miss out. You can join for one month for just £1. Access the trial now! |
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| Editorial: Heatwaves and Court Facilities - Aidan Ellis, Temple Garden Chambers At the start of July, an article in the Economist discussed the obvious difficulties arising from wearing wigs and gowns in Court during a heatwave. As the heatwave intensified over July and the start of August, the article appeared prescient, though not perhaps for the reasons the author intended. In many civil cases, of course, the problem... | Reforming the Personal Injury Discount Rate in Scotland - Nicola Edgar, Morton Fraser LLP The Damages (Investment Returns and Periodical Payments) (Scotland) Bill was introduced to the Scottish Parliament in June 2018 and provides a new method of fixing the Discount Rate with the aim of ensuring fairness and certainty... | Summary of Recent Cases, August 2018 Here is a summary of the recent notable court cases over the past month... | PI Practitioner, August 2018 Each issue a particular topic is highlighted, citing some of the useful cases and other materials in that area. This month: Second appeal on Herbert v HH Law Limited [2018] EWHC 558 (TCC)... | Why transparency is more important than ever in the Legal Services Sector, especially in PI cases, and why we're still not getting it right - Amanda Hamilton, NALP In the last five years, within the current legal services sector, changes have been so radical that consumers are undoubtedly confused. It used to be that if you had a legal problem, you would automatically turn to a solicitor. Paying for the services of a solicitor was not given a second thought, especially if there was the possibility of legal funding (legal aid)... | | Clinical Negligence Medicine by Dr Mark Burgin | EXCLUSIVE: Clinical Negligence experts may have deficient knowledge of their area of expertise in new figures from the GMC and HEE. 2018 - Dr Mark Burgin Dr Mark Burgin discusses the implications for courts of the results of freedom of information requests on three groups of doctors sitting a knowledge test... | PIBULJ.TV - masterclasses from the experts Episode 6: 'Masterclass on Litigating Employers' Liability Claims After the Enterprise Act' Andrew Roy, 12 King's Bench Walk A one hour practical guide on litigating employers' liability claims after the Enterprise Act. Includes: the likely effects of s69, circumventing or mitigating the effects of s69, conventional common law principles, enhanced common law duties, direct application of European legislation, Francovich actions, other duties, practical considerations. | Episode 5: 'RTA Personal Injury: a 2015 Update - What Is Happening to PI in 2015?' Andrew Mckie, Clerksroom Andrew Mckie from Clerksroom presents a 35 minute guide to the latest developments in RTA personal injury claims. Covers fundamental dishonesty, inducements in PI cases, CUE for claimants, pre-medical offers, MedCo, and further problems. |
Get Your Message Heard by 10,000 Readers | Do you offer a product or service to lawyers? Now you can place your ad in this newsletter and be seen by around 10,000 UK based PI lawyers and other personal industry professionals. Contact us now: mail@lawbriefpublishing.com or 0844 5 873 283 | Expert Witness Corner We have special advertising rates for expert witnesses. To advertise in this section, please email mail@lawbriefpublishing.com for more details or telephone 08445 UPDATE (08445 873 283). Clinical Psychology Prof Hugh Koch Adults & children, all PI, employment & sport, nationwide www.cv.hughkoch.com & www.hughkochassociates.co.uk. Psychiatry Dr Gaius Davies Emeritus Consultant Psychiatrist, King's College, Bethlem Royal and Maudsley Hospitals. Reports for PTSD and other stress related disorders and general psychiatric problems. Email: gaius.davies@btopenworld.com. Tel: 020 8650 8764. The Authors | Harriet Wakeman, Temple Garden Chambers Harriet is developing a broad civil and public law practice, including personal injury, health and safety, credit hire and employment law. Harriet acts in both an advisory and representative capacity. HarrietWakeman@tgchambers.com |
| Juliet Wells, Temple Garden Chambers Juliet is developing a practice in Chambers’ core areas, with an emphasis on personal injury, health and safety, employment law, public law and extradition. She regularly appears in the County Court in applications, CMCs, small claims and fast track trials, and appeals, and is building a busy paper-based practice. JulietWells@tgchambers.com |
| Tim Kevan, www.timkevan.com Tim Kevan is a co-founder of Law Brief Publishing. He practised as a barrister for ten years at 1 Temple Gardens (now Temple Garden Chambers) specialising in PI, credit hire and civil fraud. During that time he wrote or co-wrote ten law books. He has since written two legal comedy novels for Bloomsbury Publishing based on the BabyBarista blog which has featured on both The Times and Guardian online. |
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