Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea brought him record popularity — around 85 percent of his citizens felt favorably about him. So he has little political incentive to change course. Moreover, he continued to tighten control of the media, even replacing the state news agency with a Kremlin mouthpiece. Even if people wished otherwise, the Russian public can hear only his message.

What about sanctions? The United States, the European Union and several others already had them in place, but the latest wave implemented this week targets the banking, technology and aerospace sectors in both Russia and Belarus, for their support and facilitation of the attack on Ukraine. “These sanctions are completely unprecedented in their strength,” said Julia Friedlander, a former Treasury Department and National Security Council official. On face, conditions could look ripe for the public to turn against its leader. But the Russian public is famously stoic in the face of hardship and traditionally responds well to a strong leader and nationalistic appeals. And it’s unclear any of those conditions will push Putin off course. With the media in his pocket, he can blame everything on the U.S. and Europe.

The imposition of sanctions on Belarus in addition to Russia may paint a picture of what Russia expects of Ukraine. Belarus, unlike most in the region, is so culturally, linguistically and socially similar to Russia — essentially a mirror of Putin’s own country — that any progress toward a more open, less authoritarian society there could make Russians hungrier for the same. Their own sovereignty is often questioned on the global stage. This was also a factor in Putin’s effort to destabilize and sow division in Ukraine, the region’s largest non-Russian Slavic country, which most Russians view as seamlessly connected to them.

A key motivation in Ukraine is a Russian concern about them drifting westward politically. While this has also been a concern with Belarus in the past, it was a more acute and immediate problem in Ukraine, which at the time of Putin’s invasion was talking to the European Union about a possible association agreement. Belarus is nowhere near that, but if President Lukashenko was overthrown, new elections held and a new democratic constitution written — and if this endured for very long — the likelihood of an approach to the European Union would grow. At that point, a desire for NATO membership could even be conceivable, and this would probably be endorsed by Belarus’ contiguous NATO members: Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. If this eventually came about, it would add a sixth NATO country to the five already bordering Russia (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Norway and Poland).

But so far, Putin has not intruded into a NATO country with Ukraine-like tactics. One imagines the Baltic member states — Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia — tempt him. In Estonia, for example, the economically depressed city of Narva on the Russian border is 80 percent ethnic Russian, and 36 percent already hold Russian passports. It would not be hard for Putin to add fuel to already resentful citizens’ grievances there — they have to learn Estonian to qualify for citizenship or state jobs — and claim a need to “help” them on humanitarian grounds.

Which takes us to NATO policy, the third major factor that will determine the next year’s course. NATO would face a crisis if, say, even one Russian soldier (the “little green men,” as the Ukrainians called the Crimean invaders) crossed the Estonian border. Estonia would surely invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which calls for all members to come to the defense of any member attacked. And that would be a difficult decision for the 28-member alliance, some of whom have deep economic ties to Russia.

NATO is already turning up the heat in Eastern Europe, according to Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who said yesterday that the Alliance will be deploying over 100 warplanes to the region on high alert. Additional troops and aircraft have been positioned to join prepositioned armaments in the east over the past several days.

But tragically, these moves may be too conventional to thwart Putin’s “hybrid warfare” strategy, which subtly combines special forces, cyber tactics, propaganda, media control, mainline troops and manipulative public statements. So even if we see a quieter Putin in the coming weeks and months, we’ll do well to remember the size of his arsenal and the scope of his ambitions. As has been the case in the past, the expansion of Russia’s “sphere of influence” seems to have only just begun.